Int'l Brotherhood of Pottery and Allied Workers

INTL. BROTHERHOOD OF POTTERY AND ALLIED WORKERS International Brotherhood of Pottery and Allied Workers, AFL-CIO (Homer Laughlin China, Inc.) and Gerald Haught and United States Potters As- sociation, Homer Laughlin China, Inc.; Canonsburg Pottery Company; Hall China Company; and Tay- lor, Smithe & Taylor Company, Parties to the Con- tract, Case 6-CB-2803 March 21, 1975 Decision and Order BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND PENELLO On November 12, 1974, Administrative Law Judge Benjamin K. Blackburn issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed ex- ceptions and a supporting brief; the General Counsel filed cross-exceptions and a supporting brief; and the Parties to the Contract filed a brief in answer to the General Counsel's cross-exceptions and supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions, cross-excep- tions, and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions' of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.' ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re- lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the Respondent, International Brotherhood of Pottery and Allied Workers, AFL-CIO, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. ' The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge It is the Board's established policy not to over- rule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings 2 We note that in the first sentence of sec. II, C, of the Administrative Law Judge's Decision, he inadvertently stated that the threat occurred on Sep- tember 14 whereas the correct date is September 12 3 We agree with the Administrative Law Judge that the unfair labor practices herein found could not be deemed so serious and extensive in their effect on the employees in the bargaining unit as a whole as to warrant the addition of the extraordinary remedial provisions General Counsel has re- quested In denying General Counsel's request, accordingly, we need not and do not pass on the validity of the procedural considerations which, in the Administrative Law Judge's view, also militated against granting Gen- eral Counsel's request DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE 25 BENJAMIN K. BLACKBURN, Administrative Law Judge: The charge was filed on September 18, 1973.' The complaint was issued on July 25, 1974. The hearing was held on Septem- ber 12, 1974, in New Cumberland, West Virginia. The principal issue litigated was whether, under all the circumstances of the case, the Board should, as a remedy for a violation by Respondent of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Na- tional Labor Relations Act, as amended, give employees in a multiemployer bargaining' unit an opportunity to invoke the Board's decertification procedure notwithstanding contract- bar rules. For the reasons set forth below, I find such a remedy inappropriate in this case. Various motions relating to that aspect of the case which I took under advisement at the hearing are disposed of in the section entitled "The Remedy" below. Upon the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after due consideration of briefs, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I JURISDICTION The Potters Association, located in East Liverpool, Ohio, is composed of Homer Laughlin China, Inc., located in New- ell, West Virginia; Canonsburg Pottery Company, located in Canonsburg, Pennsylvania; Hall China Company, located in East Liverpool, Ohio; and Taylor, Smith & Taylor Com- pany, located in Chester, West Virginia. The Potters Associa- tion negotiates and executes labor agreements with Respond- ent on behalf of its member companies. The companies manufacture dinnerware. During the 12 months just prior to issuance of the complaint herein, they sold and shipped products valued in excess of $50,000 directly to customers located in States other than the States in which their respec- tive plants are located. II THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE A. Credibility The other issue litigated was whether certain words spoken by Richard Bratt, Respondent's seventh vice president, who is charged with the responsibility of servicing its contract with the Potters Association at the Homer Laughlin plant, to Gerald Haught, a Homer Laughlin employee, on September 12, 1973, violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. In my view, Bratt's version of -what he said is sufficient to establish a violation.2 However, Haught's version differs from Bratt's I Dates are 1973 unless otherwise indicated 2 According to Bratt, he said, "What is going on here? I hear you are passing petitions. You of all people passing a petition. I just can't understand this. [Haught yelled to other employees to come listen because Bratt was threatening him.] I am ashamed of you, Gerald You of all people getting, mixed up in this thing [i e , the circulation of a decertification petition in the Homer Laughlin plant] I am really ashamed of you and disgusted. Do you Continued 217 NLRB No. 19 26 DECISIONS- OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD in that Haught testified Bratt cursed and threatened Haught and his family before Haight called to other employees, said he "would" rather than "ought to" kick Haught in the ass, and said Haught would be found floating face down in the river (Newell, West Virginia, is on the Ohio River) if Haught did not stop circulating a decertification petition. Since the threats implicit in Haught's version are much stronger than those in Bratt's, it is necessary that the credibility conflict between them be resolved so that Bratt's words can be given their proper weight in resolving the major issue of remedy. Efforts by each side to corroborate its version through the testimony of an earwitness to the conversation are of little help. Robert Lilly, Haught's brother-in-law, who was called as a witness by the General Counsel , walked away during Bratt's opening comments and returned near the end of the incident. He left before the threat to Haught's family. He did hear the "floating in the river" remark. Thomas Redman, called as a witness by Respondent , came in response to Haught's summons. Consequently, he was not in earshot when, according to Haught, Bratt threatened his family. Red- man turned to make a comment to the man standing next to him just when, according to Haught, Bratt called him a yel- low-bellied bastard and made the "floating in the river" re- mark and thus did not hear anything that was said after Haught mentioned a gun. Respondent relies on a hearing which was held before a West Virginia justice of the peace around October 13 to but- tress its argument that Bratt should be credited over Haught. Haught accused Bratt of assault . Bratt wound up pleading guilty to assaulting Haught and was placed under a $500 peace bond for 30 days after Haught dropped a charge that Bratt had threatened his family. According to Bratt, Haught told the justice of the peace that Bratt had not threatened his family. According to Haught, he made no such affirmative statement but merely agreed to drop that aspect of his charge at the justice of the peace's suggestion . The results of that hearing are consistent with either version of what was said there. It, too, is of little help in resolving the conflict as to what Bratt said to Haught on September 12. I have credited Haught over Bratt for, principally, two reasons. First, when Bratt was asked why he spoke to Haught as he did, he said, "Because I was upset. And I did lose my temper, I'll be the first to admit that. I had lost my temper which I shouldn't do, and I 'm sorry if I did lose my temper but I was upset over trying to help this kiln as much as I had." The beginning of Bratt's version of what he said is, I think, much too subdued for a man who was upset when he sought out Haught. Haught's version of how Bratt started off and Haught's reaction of calling other employees over to hear what Bratt was saying (a point on which both men agree) strike me as the more likely conduct of a man who had lost his temper. Second, Alfred Hissom, another employee called as a wit- ness by Respondent, testified that he was not present during realize what you are doing to these people? You would probably be taking some benefits off these people, international insurance and this sort of thing that they would lose if they got out of the international I ought to take you out in the parking lot and kick your ass. [Haught said he would only go with a gun as an equalizer.] Gerald Haught, you yellow bastard, you don't have guts enough to do anything. Anybody that would do that, you are yellow, and you are nothing " the exchange between Bratt and Haught but that, when he returned to the area a few minutes later, "Robert Lilly and I think Jack Charnack was talking to me, telling me that Dick Bratt was there and he threatened his family, and I guess the whole family is supposed to end up in the river." While this testimony might be insufficient as hearsay to establish that Bratt did say such things (there is no necessity for getting into the intricacies of the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule), it is, I think, a sufficient basis for resolving a credibility conflict. Having resolved the conflict against Bratt for these two reasons, of course, I find further support in Lilly's tes- timony that he did hear Bratt talk about Haught "floating in the river." B. Facts Gerald Haught went to work for Homer Laughlin China, Inc., in February 1972. On May 8, 1972, he and some six or seven other men walked off the job. Haught and two others were terminated. The men who had walked out went to Re- spondent's office. This was the first occasion on which Haught and Richard Bratt ever laid eyes on each other. Grievances were filed. Bratt telephoned the plant superin- tendent and persuaded him to take the men back. Bratt subse- quently processed the grievances, insofar as they related to a day's pay lost by Haught and some of the other men as a result of the incident, through the various steps leading up to arbitration provided in Respondent's contract with the Pot- ters Association. On May 31 Bratt invoked arbitration. On June 30, after discussions with Homer Laughlin officials which convinced him that the grievances were not meritori- ous, he withdrew his demand for arbitration and dropped the grievances. Bratt's failure to carry Haught's claim for a day's pay through the arbitration process was the beginning of Haught's disenchantment with Respondent and Bratt. Kilns 6,7, and 8 are housed in the same building at Homer Laughlin's plant. Haught was transferred to kiln 8 when it began operations in November 1972. Soon thereafter he became shop committeeman for some 20 to 25 employees who worked in his immediate vicinity. There is a written agreement at the plant level between Respondent and Homer Laughlin covering each of the kilns. The work done at kiln 8 differs somewhat from the work done at kilns 6 and 7. When kiln 8 was opened, the agreement for kilns 6 and 7 was made applicable to it. The employees at kiln 8 felt that they needed an agreement which took into consideration the dif- ferent conditions under which they worked. Homer Laugh- lin's failure to give them such an agreement and Respondent's failure to get one for them soon became a bone of contention among kiln 8 employees, especially Haught. On February 26, 1973, Haught wrote out a formal griev- ance over the lack of a written agreement for kiln 8 and filed it with his foreman. He did not file it with Respondent or with Bratt. In March Haught and some 20 other employees walked out over this issue. They went to Respondent's office and saw Bratt. Bratt telephoned the plant and spoke to J. B. Cartwright, the personnel manager. He persuaded Cart- wright not to discharge Haught for leading this and other walkouts. Instead, he managed to arrange for a meeting with Homer Laughlin officials to settle the underlying dispute. This meeting was held on March 22. Haught attended with INTL. BROTHERHOOD OF POTTERY AND ALLIED WORKERS Bratt. The result of the meeting was a memorandum of agree- ment signed by Bratt for Respondent and by Cartwright and another official for Homer Laughlin which reads, "A sepa- rate agreement for #8 (a) will agree to split crew (b) will include piece rates from #6-7. No reprimand if production resumes today. Committee will make every effort to restore production today. Company will make sagger3 purchase situation always available to Mr. Bratt at all times." On April 13 Haught filed an 8(b)(1)(A) charge (Case 6-C]3-2654) against Respondent, the gravamen of which was that Respondent had refused "to process the grievances of Gerald Haught and other employees." The grievances Haught had in mind were those over a separate written agree- ment for kiln 8, especially the written grievance he had given to his foreman on February 26. During his contacts with the Regional Office in connection with Case 6-CB-2654, Haught learned about the Board's decertification procedures and was advised that the last day on which he could file a petition for a decertification election under the Board's contract-bar rules was September 15. (The 3-year contract then in effect be- tween Respondent and the Potters Association was scheduled to expire on November 15. Apparently, the Regional Office overlooked the fact that Homer Laughlin's 1,600 unit em- ployees were only part of a multiemployer unit, for Haught was told that he would need approximately 500 signatures of employees on decertification petitions to satisfy the Board's 30-percent showing-of-interest rule.) When Bratt was served with a copy of the charge in Case 6-CB-2654, he protested to the Regional Director, in a letter dated April 17, that he had received no grievances from Haught. On April 19 Bratt received a copy of the grievance which Haught had given to his foreman on February 26, presumably from Haught. Case 6-CB---2654 came to nothing. The Regional Director ap- proved Haught's request to withdraw his charge on May 30. The March 22 memorandum which Bratt managed to ob- tain from Homer Laughlin. did not satisfy Haught because a full written agreement for kiln 8 did not follow. It did not end unrest among employees at kiln 8, for several more walkouts or sitdowns occurred between April and September. Haught was off sick from June 28 to August 7. On September 4 he participated in another walkout along with seven other em- ployees. On September 5 he, along with the other seven, received a written warning that the next time he walked off the job he would be discharged. This was the last straw for Haught. He decided to implement the tentative decision he had made several months before to try to bring another union, such as the Teamsters, into the plant by first decertify- ing Respondent. On the evening of September 10, at home, he tore eight sheets of paper out of a spiral notebook. He lettered on the top front of each one "Petition to hold an election to withdrawfrom IBOP. The election will be held and conducted by the National Labor Relations Board." He car- ried them into the plant with him the next morning, Septem- ber 11, and began soliciting signatures. He enlisted five of his coworkers to help him solicit signatures at the plant gates at the end of the day. They stopped when they were told by the plant superintendent that they could not solicit on company 3 A shortage of naggers, the conveyors on which plates are earned into the kiln to be fired, was a key part of the complaints at kiln 8. Since the employees are paid piece rates, the shortage reduced the amount of money they were able to earn 27 property. In all, 119 employees signed Haught's petition on September 11. (Fifty-two signed on September 12, 20 on Sep- tember 13, and 14 on September 14. The petition, which is in evidence, bears one signature which is dated January 8, 1973. There is no evidence to support Respondent 's contention that Haught forged many of the signatures . The fact that signa- tures were obtained on September 13 and 14 belies the Gen- eral Counsel's contention that Bratt's threatening Haught on September 12 effectively restrained him and other employees from engaging in their decertification effort.) An employee telephoned Bratt on the afternoon of Septem- ber 11 and tipped him off that Haught was circulating a petition to decertify Respondent. Bratt had an appointment at the plant at 2:30 the next afternoon. He went early in order to seek out and speak to Haught. He arrived around 2 p.m. He was angry because he felt, in view of the number of times he had saved Haught's job for him and in view of his efforts, especially on March 22, to resolve the complaints at kiln 8 to Haught's and the other men's satisfaction, that Haught was an ingrate. Bratt went to where Haught was working . He asked Haught if he was the one who was circulating a decertifica- tion petition . Haught said that he was. Bratt began cursing Haught. He asked Haught if he realized what he was doing, jeopardizing the benefits of all the workers in the plant. He told Haught he had better drop it or he would have Haught and his family taken care of. Haught called to employees working nearby to come over and listen to Bratt because Bratt was threatening him. Several did so. Haught asked Bratt to repeat what he had just said. Bratt invited Haught to step outside to the parking lot where he would kick him in the ass. Haught said he was not a fool, that if he did go outside it would only be with a gun as an equalizer. Bratt called Haught a yellow-bellied bastard. He said that, if Haught did not stop circulating the decertification petitions, "they" would find Haught floating face down in the river. On that note, Bratt walked away. Haught walked off the job again in November . Pursuant to the warning he had received on September 5, he was dis- charged . He filed an unfair labor practice charge (Case 6-CA-7263) against Homer Laughlin on the theory that he had been discharged for circulating the decertification peti- tions. This case also came to nothing. It was dismissed by the Regional Director on the ground of insufficient evidence. C. Analysis and Conclusions Respondent does not challenge the fact that Bratt threat- ened Haught on September 14. In fact, its answer reads, in pertinent part, "It is admitted that on or about the time specified, Richard Bratt did speak to one Gerald Haught in a threatening manner." It argues, rather, that the Board should dismiss this case on the merits because it involves an isolated incident which requires neither a finding that the Act has been violated nor a remedy of any kind. The fact that only one employee was threatened and only a handful of em- ployees were witnesses to that threat out of 1,600 employees represented by Respondent at the Homer Laughlin plant sup- ports that argument. So does the fact that Bratt gave way to extreme provocation when he said what he did. Taken at face value, the words Bratt spoke were a threat to kill Haught for 28 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD exercising his right under the Act to attempt to decertify a union he no longer wanted to represent him. Given the per- sonality which Bratt revealed on the witness stand, no reason- able person-could come to the conclusion that the threat was seriously intended. In the heat of anger, Bratt resorted to the sort of empty bombast typical of tough guy confrontations. Nevertheless, a threat to kill, even if only an empty threat, is not something to be taken lightly. Nor is the provocation to which Haught subjected Bratt legally significant . Bratt's an- ger at Haught for undermining Respondent after all the effort Bratt had made to protect and help him is understandable, but even if Bratt were correct in considering him an ingrate, an employee's right to invoke the Act in the manner Haught sought to invoke it is not conditioned on his personality or his maintaining amicable personal relations with the union officials who represent him. For these reasons, Bratt's threat- ening remarks to Haught were not an isolated incident in the sense in which the Board has used that concept to dismiss cases on their merits. Cf. Thermalloy Corporation, 213. NLRB No. 26 (1974). I find Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) when, on September 12, 1973, Richard Bratt threatened Ger- ald Haught because he circulated a decertification petition among employees of Homer Laughlin China, Inc. Upon the foregoing -findings of fact, and upon the entire record in this case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. United States Potters Association; Homer Laughlin China, Inc.; Canonsburg Pottery Company; Hall China Com- pany; and Taylor, Smith & Taylor Company are employers engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. International Brotherhood of Pottery and Allied Work- ers; AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By threatening Gerald Haught on September 12, 1973, for circulating a decertification petition among employees of Homer Laughlin China, Inc., Respondent has violated Sec- tion 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practice is an unfair labor practice affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY Remedy is what this case is really all about. Respondent offered to settle during, the prehearing stage on the basis of the Board's usual remedy in 8(b)(1)(A) threat cases, i.e., a cease-and-desist order and posting of an appropriately worded notice to members. The General Counsel rejected Respondent's offer on the ground that the remedy must pro- vide "for the employees to resume their decertification efforts in an uncoerced atmosphere and if within 60 days of the closing of the case on compliance the employees secure the requisite showing of interest, a representation petition would be processed by the region, thereby not allowing the present contract to bar the filing of such petition."" This impasse 4 The quoted words are the pertinent part of the General Counsel's motion to amend the complaint by adding a paragraph which I took under advise- presents two separate and distinct issues. As already indicated, Respondent's contract with the United States Potters Association covers a mui ltiemployer unit made up of four companies : The total number of em- ployees in the bargaining unit is approximately 2,800 (some 1,600 at Homer Laughlin, 300 at Canonsburg, 500 at Hall, and 400 at Taylor, Smith & Taylor). The'bargaining relation- ship between Respondent and the Potters Association began prior to 1890. It has been a stable one for many years. The contract which was in effect when Richard Bratt threatened Gerald Haught on September 12, 1973, expired on November 15, 1973, and was succeeded by one which began on' Novem- ber 15, 1973, and expires on November 15,1976. Respondent and the Potters Association bargained for, and agreed to the current contract during the long hiatus between' the filing of the charge in this case on September 18, 1973, and issuance of the complaint on July 25, 1974, without any hint from the General Counsel that he would seek a remedy which threat- ened their bargaining relationship . Respondent first learned what the General Counsel wanted when, just before the com- plaint issued, a member of the Regional Office staff contacted Respondent's counsel, Joseph Finley, and asked him if Re- spondent would agree to the remedy at issue here. (Finley was first contacted when the charge was filed. At that time he indicated his willingness to settle on the conventional basis. Why the long hiatus in the handling of the case ensued ns not explained in the record.) Finley refused. In format, the complaint is similar to the sort of complaint usually issued by the General Counsel in 8(a)(2) cases. It names the "Parties to the Contract" in the caption. It con- tains a subparagraph which alleges the bargaining relation- ship between Respondent and the Parties to the Contract and the existence of the 1970-73 and 1973-76 contracts. It con- tains no averment that the Parties to the Contract have vi- olated the Act in any way. It contains no statement as to the remedy which the General Counsel considers appropriate for the violation-alleged to have been committed by Respondent. It was served on the Parties to the Contract. At`no time prior to the hearing did the General Counsel attempt to notify the Parties to the Contract that it was seeking a remedy which would affect their contractual rights. Counsel for the Parties to the Contract first learned what was in the wind from Finley. Finley happened to see Thomas Quigley under circumstances having nothing to' do with this case in August 1974. He mentioned the telephone call he had received from the Regional Office in July and his response to the General Counsel's proposal. Finley spoke to Marcus Aaron on the telephone on September 6, 1974, less than a week before the hearing. He told Aaron about the same; con- versation at that time. At the outset of the hearing, counsel for the Parties to the Contract moved "for ... a dismissal of the action insofar as it pertains to" the Parties to the Contract. I took that motion and a related motion by Respondent "to sever [the Parties to the Contract] as parties to this proceeding" under advise- ment. Technically, "dismissing" or "severing" as to the Par- ment at the hearing Pursuant to Sec. 102 17 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, Series 8, as amended, I hereby grant the General Counsel's motion although, as developed more fully below, I think it comes too late to have any bearing on the question of whether the Parties to the Contract were denied due process by the General Counsel's pleading INTL.' BROTHERHOOD OF POTTERY AND ALLIED WORKERS ties to the Contract would be improper for they have not been accused of any violation of the Act and cases concerning then have not been consolidated with this case concerning a violation by Respondent. For that reason, I hereby deny both motions. Nevertheless, the motions and counsels' arguments in support thereof raise the question of whether the Parties to the Contract have been accorded due process by the Gen- eral Counsel's pleading. As the General Counsel aptly noted , Board pleading is notice pleading. The essential requirement of good notice pleading is that parties be given fair warning of what they are alleged to have done or of the jeopardy they are placed in by the actions and positions of opposing parties. An 8(a)(2) com- plaint in the format of the complaint in this case meets that requirement because withdrawal of recognition from or dises- tablishment of an assisted union is the standard remedy im- posed by the Board on an employer who violates Section 8(a)(2). Merely serving on the allegedly assisted union a copy of a complaint which names the union as party to a contract with the accused employer without spelling out the fact that a remedy directed against the employer will also affect the union's rights is sufficient to alert the union that the litigation places its rights in jeopardy. The same logic does not apply, however, where the remedy sought is an unusual one. Receipt of an 8(b)(1)(A) complaint which names employers as parties to a contract with a union accused of threatening one em- ployee might make an experienced practitioner before the Board suspicious that the litigation somehow places his client's contractual rights in jeopardy . Such a document, however, falls far short of giving the client or practitioners unskilled in the intricacies of Board law that which good notice pleading demands-fair warning of what they have at stake in the litigation. The fact that, here, counsel for the Parties to the Contract happened to learn from counsel for Respondent just what the General Counsel had in mind in time for counsel to show up at the hearing in order to protect their respective clients' interest does not make up for the General Counsel's failure to give their clients the warning they are entitled to. When, as here, a remedy which will affect the rights of a party to a contract is different from the remedy which the Board usually imposes for the sort of violation alleged in the complaint, fairness requires that the General Counsel include in the complaint an explicit statement of the remedy he seeks. While the Board's liberal rules encourage amendments to complaints, an amendment at the hearing which makes such an explicit statement part of the complaint does not give parties to the contract the timely notice that fairness requires. The second remedy issue goes to the appropriateness of the remedy sought by the General Counsel . The relationship be- tween Respondent and the Potters Association is a long and stable one. They renewed their contract for 3 more years in November 1973 in good faith and with no intention of inter- fering with the rights of employees under the Act. The remedy sought by the General Counsel would place their relationship in jeopardy because one union official lost his temper for a few moments and uttered some empty threats to one employee in the presence of a handful of employees out of a bargaining unit of 2,800 employees. I agree with the observation of counsel for Respondent that such a remedy for such a violation "is almost like the guillotine for running a 29 red light." The purpose of the Act is to promote stability, not instability, in bargaining relationships . Because the Parties to the Contract have been denied due process and because waiver of the Board's contract-bar rules is not appropriate in view of the minor nature of the violation found , I will not recommend the remedy sought by the General Counsel. Rather, I will recommend the cease-and-desist order and notice customary in cases of this sort. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, conclu- sions of law, and the entire record in this proceeding, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the fol- lowing recommended: ORDERS International Brotherhood of Pottery and Allied Workers, AFL-CIO, its officers, agents , and representatives, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Threatening employees for circulating decertification petitions. (b) In any like or related manner attempting to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Sec- tion 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec- tuate the policies of the Act: (a) Post at its offices and meeting halls copies of the at- tached notice marked "Appendix."6 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 6, after being duly signed by Respondent 's authorized represen- tative, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to members are customarily posted . Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not al- tered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Mail signed copies of the attached notice marked "Ap- pendix" to the Regional Director for Region 6 for posting at facilities of United States Potters Association; Homer Laugh- lin China, Inc.; Canonsburg Pottery Company; Hall China Company; and Taylor, Smith & Taylor Company, provided they choose to post said notice. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 6, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. 5 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 .46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes 6 In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." 30 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD APPENDIX NOTICE To MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board having found , after a trial, that we violated Federal law by threatening an employee of Homer Laughlin China, Inc., for circulating a petition to decertify us as the bargaining representative of employees at plants operated by members of the United States Potters Association, we hereby notify you that: The National Labor Relations Act gives all employees these rights: To engage in self-organization To form, join, or help unions - To bargain collectively through a representative of their own choosing To act together for collective bargaining or other aid or protection To refrain from any or all of these things. WE WILL NOT threaten you for circulating decertifica- tion petitions. WE WILL NOT, in-any like or related manner, attempt to restrain or coerce you in the exercise of the above rights. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF POTTERY AND ALLIED WORKERS, AFL-CIO