Cal-Fin

CAL-FIN, 871 Cal-Fin and James Hoffman Carpenters Union, Local 1062, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (AFL-CIO) and James Hoffman. Cases 31-CA-4298 and 31- CB-1493 May 9, 1975 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS FANNING, KENNEDY, AND PENELLO On December 31, 1974, Administrative Law Judge Louis S. Penfield issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent Union filed excep- tions and a supporting brief, General Counsel filed cross-exceptions and a supporting brief, and Respond- ent Cal-Fin filed a brief in opposition to Respondent Union's exceptions. - Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order as modified herein. The General Counsel has excepted, inter alia, to the failure of the Administrative Law Judge to provide in his recommended Order that Respondent Union cease and desist from acting as the collective-bargaining rep- resentative of the Cal-Fin employees until it has been certified as such by the Board, and his failure to affir- matively order Respondent Union to notify Cal-Fin that it will not claim to represent those employees until it is so certified as their representative, nor will it seek or accept any status or benefits conferred by any agree- ments with Cal-Fin until and unless it is so certified. We find merit in these specific exceptions and we will amend the recommended Order as requested by the General Counsel, as we find that the recommended additions to the Order will more effectively remedy the unfair labor practices found by the Administrative Law Judge and adopted herein. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re- lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modified below, and The Administrative Law Judge stated in his Decision that the charges in the above-named cases were filed on July 1, 1974. The charges were in fact filed on March 1, 1974. hereby orders that Respondent Employer, Cal-Fin, Goleta, California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, and Respondent Union, Carpenters Union, Lo- cal 1062, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Join- ers of America (AFL-CIO), Santa Barbara, California, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order as herein modified: 1. Insert the following as paragraph II, 1, (d) and reletter the subsequent paragraph accordingly: "(d) Acting as the exclusive bargaining representa- tive of Respondent Employer's employees for collec- tive-bargaining purposes unless and until the National Labor Relations Board shall certify Respondent Union as such representative." 2. Insert the following as paragraph II, 2, (a) and (b) and reletter the subsequent paragraphs accordingly: "(a) Notify Respondent Employer that it will not claim status as the exclusive collective-bargaining rep- resentative of Respondent Employer's employees un- less and until the National Labor Relations Board shall certify Respondent Union as such representative. "(b) Notify Respondent Employer that it does not seek and will not accept any benefit or status conferred by existing agreements with Respondent Employer un- less and until it is so certified by the Board." 3. Substitute the attached notice for the notice of the Administrative Law Judge marked "Appendix B." APPENDIX B NOTICE To MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT interfere with the rights of Cal-Fin employees under Section 7 of the Act by seeking to have Cal-Fin apply the terms of any existing collective-bargaining agreement, by threatening Cal-Fin employees with discharge unless they join our Union, by attempting to enforce the union- security provisions of any existing collective-bar- gaining agreement, or by engaging in any like or related conduct, unless and until this Union has been certified by the National Labor Relations Board as the representative of the Cal-Fin em- ployees. WE WILL NOT act or claim to act as the exclusive bargaining representative of any of Cal-Fin's em- ployees unless and until this Union has been certi- fied as the collective-bargaining representative of 217 NLRB No. 154 872 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD such employees by the National Labor Relations Board. CARPENTERS UNION, LOCAL 1062, UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA (AFL-CIO) DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE Louis S. PENFIELD, Administrative Law Judge: These cases were heard before me in Santa Barbara, California, on Octo- ber 7, 1974. An order consolidating cases, and a consolidated complaint and notice of hearing issued on July 24, 1974. The consolidated complaint is based on a charge filed in each case on July 1, 1974. The consolidated complaint alleges violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (2) by, Cal-Fin, herein called Respond- ent Employer, and a violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) by Car- penters Union, Local 1062, United Brotherhood of Carpen- ters and Joiners of _ America (AFL-CIO), herein called Respondent Union. After the hearing opened, the General Counsel's complaint was amended to add an alleged Section 8(b)(2) violation by Respondent Union. ' All parties were given full opportunity to participate in the hearing, and after the'close thereof, the General Counsel and Respondent Union each filed a brief in support of its respec- tive position. Respondent Employer filed no brief. Upon the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after due consideration of the briefs filed by the parties, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I JURISDICTION Respondent Employer is a California corporation with its principal place of business in Goleta, California, where it is engaged in the manufacture and sale of prehung doors. Dur- ing the past year Respondent Employer sold products valued in excess of $50,000 directly to customers located outside the State of California. I find Respondent Employer to be en- gaged in_a business affecting commerce within the meaning of the Act, and assertion of jurisdiction to be appropriate. II THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES The complaint alleges that Respondent Employer violated Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act, by entering into a collec- tive-bargaining agreement at a time when Respondent Union did not represent a majority of the employees in the bargain- ing unit. The complaint further alleges that Respondent Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by the execution of the same collective-bargaining agreement, and ,also that there- after it threatened employees with discharge if they did not become members of Respondent Union. By an amendment to the complaint, made at the hearing, the General Counsel alleges that Respondent Union violated Section 8(b)(2) by a later attempt to enforce the union-security clause of the afore- mentioned contract. Respondent Employer filed no brief, and made no defini- tive statement of position during the course of the hearing. Respondent Union contends that there are circumstances which signify that it had a presumed continuing majority at the time the collective-bargaining agreement was executed, and that thus its execution and all subsequent attempts to enforce it were lawful. A. The Bargaining History Respondent Employer commenced its manufacturing op- erations in 1968. It first functioned as a partnership. In 1973, it was reorganized to become a corporation. Respondent con- ducted its business at several different plant sites, but at all times it was primarily in the business of manufacturing pre- hung doors. On a far lesser scale, Respondent produced some other finished building materials, and for a time sold some building hardware. Respondent was never engaged in the general production of cabinets, although on one or two small projects it did manufacture a few cabinets on a specialty basis. When Respondent commenced its business, two partners, Chris Wyatt and AgonMilbrick, did the production work on prehung doors. Subsequently, additional production workers were added. Thus, by June 1972, Respondent had a total of five production workers, and in February 1974, the pro- duction work force had increased to approximately 12., The first collective-bargaining agreement was executed on July 21, 1968. At this time, Respondent Employer became party signatory to a master labor agreement which had been negotiated by Respondent Union, and other local unions, with the Southern California Association of Cabinet Manu- facturers, herein called the Association. The master agree- ment purported to cover employees working for employers engaged in the manufacture of various types of cabinets in the Southern California area. Respondent Employer was not a member of the Association when it signed the 1968 agree- ment, nor did it ever become a member of the Association at any time thereafter. There is unrefuted testimony in the rec- ord to the effect that at the time Respondent Employer became party signatory to the 1968 contract, Union Agent Joe Apparicio represented to Respondent Employer that the contract terms were applicable only to the two partners, Agon Milbrick and Chris Wyatt, who at that time did all the production work in which Respondent Employer was en- gaged. It is not established that the parties discussed or reached any understanding regarding the application of the terms of the agreement to any subsequently hired production employees. The 1968 contract remained in effect-until 1.971. During this period Respondent did make contributions to certain union trust funds on behalf of Agon Milbrick. It is not clear to what extent any of the other of the provisions of the 1968 contract were applied to Milbrick. It is conceded, how- ever, that production workers subsequently hired during the term of the 1968 contract were not subjected to any of its provisions. In 1971, Respondent Employer, as a nonmember, executed a successor agreement that had been negotiated with the Association. The 1971 agreement had the same coverage and was to remain in effect until June 30, 1974. Although at the time Respondent Employer was engaged almost exclusively in the manufacture of prehung doors, it is not explained why once again it purported to bind itself to a master agreement applicable to cabinet manufacture. When Respondent Em- CAL-FIN ployer signed the 1971 agreement, it had three production employees.- The parties stipulated that at no time while the 1971 agree- ment continued in effect, did Respondent Employer apply its terms or abide by "the wage and hour provisions , the fringe benefit provisions, or the union shop provisions ," regarding production workers, nor is it shown that any of its em- ployees were asked to, or did, join Respondent Union. An apparent exception existed in the continuing contributions made to the trust funds on behalf of Agon Milbrick who at all times was either a partner or had a substantial interest in Respondent's business. At some point in early 1973, officials of Respondent Union became concerned over the fact that the terms of the 1971 agreement were not being observed or applied to Respondent Employer's production workers. Thereupon, Respondent Union initiated efforts to change the situation . Discussions ensued between representatives of Respondent Employer and Respondent Union concerning the matter . Respondent Em- ployer resisted all efforts to bring its production employees within the scope of the 1971 agreement , claiming that the agreement related to the cabinet manufacturing industry which demanded more skilled, and thus higher paid , workers than were needed in the manufacture of prehung doors. Re- spondent Employer asserted that it could not operate its door manufacturing business and meet these contract require- ments. As a consequence the discussions did not bring about a definitive resolution of the dispute. On June 4, 1973, counsel for Respondent Union undertook to join issue in the dispute by sending a letter to Respondent Employer notifying it that Respondent Union deemed Re- spondent Employer in violation of the 1971 agreement and would go to arbitration if necessary to compel Respondent Employer to comply with its terms . An exchange of corre- spondence ensued between counsel for both parties culminat- ing in an understanding that there would be a series of meet- ings between the parties to consider the problem of contract applicability. B. The Meetings Leading to the Execution of the Current Contract The primary thrust of these meetings, which were held in the fall of 1973, centered on Respondent Employer's asser- tion that the 1971 agreement was unsuitable to its operations since it did not manufacture cabinets, and on its claim that its employees were less skilled than those needed in the cabi- net industry and thus should be paid at a lower scale than the existing master cabinet agreement permitted. There were ex- tensive discussions concerning the work the employees were doing, and the type of machines that they operated. Respon- dent Union thereafter suggested that considering the nature of Respondent Employer's operation its employees might more appropriately be covered by the terms of a master door agree- ment, which apparently fell ,within the scope of Respondent Union's jurisdiction, rather than by the terms of the master cabinet agreement. At the next meeting, Respondent Union produced a copy of such a door, agreement. Discussions thereof ensued, and Respondent Union in effect agreed to "renegotiate a contract because-it recognized the Employer's special need." 873 There is a dispute as to whether or not in the course of these discussions Respondent Employer expressly conceded that it was bound by the 1971 cabinet agreement. Respondent Union claims that Respondent Employer made an affirmative representation to this effect. Respondent Employer contends that it went no further than to concede the binding effect of the 1971 agreement to be an arguable matter which might be resolved against it should the issue be litigated. Respondent Employer asserts, however, that it undertook to defer joining issue in its legal responsibility under the 1971 contract,until it could be determined if it were not possible for the parties to reach an altogether new and palatable agreement. While Respondent Employer's version seems the more plausible, it is relatively unimportant which version we accept since after several meetings the parties did reach an accord on a new and acceptable agreement covering Respondent Employer's pro- duction workers alone. This new agreement, herein called the door agreement, is a full and detailed collective-bargaining contract . It was ex- ecuted by Respondent Employer and Respondent Union, re- spectively, in January and February 1974, with its terms to be effective from October 1, 1973. It makes no reference whatsoever to the 1971 Association agreement or to the As- sociation. Its terms run from October 1, 1973, to March 30, 1975, nearly a year longer than the 1971 agreement. It de- scribes the bargaining unit as follows: All employees employed by Cal-Fin at its plant presently located at 400 David Love Place, Goleta, California, engaged in the production of pre-hung doors and related materials, including employees operating power saws, joiners, power staple guns, and related equipment; ex- cluding, shipping and receiving employees, drivers, cleri- cal employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the National Labor Relations Act. The wage and benefit provisions are generally lower than corresponding provisions found in the 1971 cabinet agree- ment. Among its other provisions the new door agreement contains a union-security clause requiring union membership after 30 days of employment. At the time of the execution of the door agreement, there were approximately 12 employees in the bargaining unit. No one of them was a member of Respondent Union, nor had any one of them executed a card authorizing Respondent Union to act as his bargaining representative. As heretofore noted, at no time while the 1968 and 1971 contract purported to be in effect has it been shown that any of Respondent Em- ployer's production workers were union members, or had designated Respondent Union as their 'representative. On February 27, 1974, Union Agent Apparicio, together with the owners of Respondent Employer met with the majority of Respondent's _production workers. The em- ployees were advised at this time of the execution of the door agreement. They were also told by Apparicio that they were "to either join the Union or that [they] would be replaced by union workers. .. ." Then Apparicio undertook to explain the provisions of the door agreement, and to point out that it improved the wages and benefits of the employees. The employees present indicated that they were not interested in joining Respondent Union. It does not appear that at any time after this any of Respondent's production workers joined 874 DECISIONS OF-NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Respondent Union, nor does it appear that any contract provision, with the exception of the wage scale, was observed or applied by Respondent Employer. On March 8, 1974, counsel for Respondent Union sent a letter to_ Respondent Employer stating that Respondent Union intended to file grievances regarding Respondent Em- ployer's failure to abide by various provisions of the door contract. Among the provisions noted as having been violated was the union-security clause. This attempt by Respondent Union to enforce the security clause constitutes the entire basis for the General Counsel's amending the complaint by adding the Section 8(b)(2) allegation. It is not shown that following this letter Respondent Employer took any steps whatsoever to enforce the union-security clause. C. Discussion of the Issues and Conclusions The general principles of law applicable to collective-bar- -gaining agreements signed when a union does not represent a majority in the bargaining unit are not in dispute. It is well established that when an employer enters into a collective- bargaining contract with a nonmajority union it is regarded as having given unlawful assistance to such union, and thereby to have engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act. It is equally well established that when a union accepts recognition in such - a situation it en- gages in conduct violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.' In the instant case, it is not disputed that when the so-called door agreement was negotiated and executed by Respondent Union and Respondent Employer, not a single employee in the bargaining unit as defined by the contract was a member of Respondent Union, or had authorized Re- spondent Union to represent him. Respondent Union con- tends, however, that the employees of Respondent Employer were part of a multiemployer bargaining unit, that Respond- ent Union at all times represented a majority in such unit, and that the so-called door agreement was no more than a modifi- cation of the existing multiemployer contract . Respondent Union further contends that even if it be assumed that the employees of Respondent Employer properly constitute a single employer unit, the action taken was still a modification of an existing contract, and Respondent Union's status as collective-bargaining representative for a number of years gives rise to a presumption of continuing majority which has not been effectively rebutted. It is Respondent Union's claim that by virtue of Respond- ent Employer's having executed the 1968 and 1971 master contracts covering the Southern California cabinet industry, its employees necessarily became a part of that multiem- ployer bargaining unit. Multiemployer bargaining units come into being where groups of employers bargain with the union either jointly or through agents each as authorized to bargain on its behalf. In the instant case, presumably, members of the Association had authorized the Association to bargain for them. Had Respondent Employer been a member of the As- sociation, its employees might be regarded as part of a mul- tiemployer unit. There is nothing here, however, to show that Respondent Employer was at any time a member of the As- I International Ladies' Garment Workers Union , AFL-CIO (Bernhard- Altmann Texas Corp.) v NL R.R. 366 U S 731 (1961). sociation, or that at any time it authorized the Association to negotiate or bargain for it. Respondent Employer did no more than become party signatory to collective -bargaining agreements previously negotiated by Respondent' Union and the Association. By signing such agreements Respondent may have become bound by their terms, but this did not make it become part of the multiemployer bargaining unit itself. The Board, confronted with a similar situation in Movable Partitions, Inc., 175 NLRB 915 (1969), ruled as follows: When the Employer went into the drywall business in 1959, it signed, as an individual employer, the then- current collective-bargaining agreement, the terms of which were negotiated between District Council No. 9 and the Master Painters Association. When the agree- ment expired, and a new Association one was negotiated, the Employer, upon notice from Painters District Coun- cil No. 9, signed a new agreement containing the renego- tiated provisions . It signed such agreements in 1962 and 1965, although it had no explicit understanding with the Painters District Council that it would accept this proce- dure. At no time, did the Employer join the Master Painters Association. At no time, did it participate in negotiations or authorize the Master Painters to negoti- ate on its behalf. Under these circumstances, we find that this Employer has no history of bargaining in a multiem- ployer unit. While it has adopted contracts negotiated by the Master Painters Association, this alone is not suffi- cient basis for including it in a multiemployer unit. We therefore find that the bargaining history, establishes that the Employer's employees petitioned for constitute a separate appropriate unit. Under the circumstances, and contrary to the contention of Respondent Union, I find that the employees of Respondent Employer did not become a part of the multiemployer unit at any time, and accordingly that Respondent Union may not rely upon any presumed majority in such unit for any purpose in this proceeding. Respondent also argues that even if we assume the appro- priate unit to be limited to employees of Respondent Em- ployer, the execution of the current agreement is still lawful because the bargaining history as evidenced by the 1968 and 1971 contracts gives rise to a presumption of continuing majority representative status even in a unit limited to em- ployees of Respondent Employer. It is well settled that a union which has enjoyed exclusive representative status un- der a collective-bargaining agreement is presumed to- have continuing majority status during the existence of the agree- ment and after its expiration. When -a valid agreement is no longer in existence, however, the presumption of continuing majority is rebuttable if it can be shown that the union, in fact, no longer has majority status, or there exist circum- stances which would justify the employer in having a good- faith doubt as to the union's continuing majority status. Nor- mally, we are confronted with issues of this nature in refusal to bargain cases. In such cases, the employer is required to show that any asserted doubt as to the continuing majority is based on objective considerations, and that it is not being advanced for the purpose of gaining time in which to under- mine the union . In the instant case, Respondent Union ad- vances the doctrine to support its right to continuing recogni- CAL-FIN tion even where it is shown that both Respondent Employer and Respondent Union were fully aware that not a single employee of Respondent Employer was a member of, or had designated, Respondent Union to represent him. Respondent Union argues that Section 10(b) of the Act precludes an attack on the validity of the 1968 and 1971 contracts, and thus Respondent Union's continuing majority in the single employer unit must be presumed to continue. Respondent Union contends that it only sought to enforce this 1971 agree- ment and that the subsequent negotiations which resulted in the door agreement, amounted to no more than a modifica- tion of such valid agreement . The General Counsel is not attacking the validity of the 1971 agreement , and we do not reach the issue of whether or not a true modification of a valid collective-bargaining agreement would always be insulated from an attack on a union's continuing majority status. It is true that Respondent Union did press Respondent Employer to apply the terms of the 1971 agreement, and that when unsuccessful in achieving this, it demanded compliance by threatening a lawsuit to compel arbitration . Thereafter, Re- spondent Employer may or may not have agreed that it was bound by the 1971 agreement , but the central thrust of its efforts was directed at getting an entirely new agreement which it could live with, and this aim appears to have been fully understood by Respondent Union . The meetings which ensued were clearly held for the purpose of exploring all possibilities which might resolve the dispute. During the course of these meetings, Respondent Union openly recog- nized that the cabinet agreement to which Respondent Em- ployer was purportedly bound, did not fit the type of opera- tion in which Respondent Employer was engaged. As a result, Respondent Union obtained , and brought to one of the meetings, a copy of the standard door agreement, and there- after agreed to "renegotiate a contract, because it recognized the Employer's special need." The term "renegotiate" is broader than the term "modify," and may well connote the negotiation of an entirely new agreement . Its meaning in a given situation is properly tested by what actually happened. In the instant case, regardless of any earlier claims or under- standings, the agreement which resulted from these negotia- tions seems obviously intended to supersede altogether the 1971 master cabinet agreement . Thus the new door agree- ment bears only superficial resemblance to the master cabinet agreement. The parties thereto are Respondent Employer and Respondent Union alone, and the Association is not even mentioned. The bargaining unit is specifically defined as lim- ited to Respondent's employees. The wage scale differs, and the door agreement is to remain in effect for ne arly a year longer than the master agreement. At its conclusion' , the door agreement reads, "The parties agree that this agreement is a complete agreement and it reflects all the understandings of the parties." Under the circumstances, it seems clear that the door agreement neither constituted, nor was intended to con- stitute, a modification of the 1971 cabinet agreement, and I so find. On the contrary, I further find the door agreement to be an entirely new agreement between the parties tailored to meet Respondent Employer's special needs as a prehung door manufacturer. As we have seen, it is undisputed that both prior to the execution of the door agreement and thereafter , Respondent Union did not represent any employee of Respondent Em- 875 ployer in the unit defined by the contract. This fact was well known to both parties when the door agreement was ex- ecuted. Under the circumstances, the case falls squarely within the established principles noted above. Thus by ex- ecuting the door agreement, Respondent Employer engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act, and Respondent Union engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, and I so find. I further find that Apparicio's undenied statement to the effect that the employees must join Respondent Union or face replacement by union members made, as it was, at the same time that the employees were first told that the unlawful door agreement covered them constitutes restraint and coercion with regard to their Section 7 rights, and is a further violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. As we have seen, the General Counsel amended his com- plaint to add an allegation that Respondent Union had vi- olated Section 8(b)(2) of the Act by filing a grievance on March 8, 1974, relating to Respondent Employer's failure to enforce the union-security clause of the door agreement. Re- spondent Union rests its defense in this case upon the validity of the initial execution of the door agreement, and, in effect, concedes that should the agreement be found unlawful, Re- spondent Union's attempt to enforce the union-security clause therein would be violative of the Act. Having hereto- fore found the execution of the agreement to be unlawful, I further find that by the letter of March 8, 1974, Respondent Union, in attempting to enforce the union-security clause in the contract, engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(b)(2) of the Act. III THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent Employer has engaged in unfair labor practices violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act, and that Respondent Union has engaged in unfair labor practices violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the Act, I shall recommend that each-cease and desist from its respective unfair labor practices , and take certain affirma- tive actions designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and the entire record in this case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent Employer is an employer within the mean- ing of Section 2(2) of the Act. 2. Respondent Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. Respondent Employer, by entering into a collective- bargaining agreement with Respondent Union at a time when such union did not represent a majority of Respondent Em- ployer's employees in any appropriate unit, engaged in con- duct violative of Section 8(a)(1) and(2) of the Act. 4. Respondent Union, by entering into an agreement with Respondent Employer at a time when Respondent Union did not represent a majority of Respondent Employer's em- ployees in any appropriate unit and by thereafter threatening employees with discharge if they did not become members of Respondent Union, engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. 876 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 5. Respondent Union, by undertaking to enforce the union- security provisions of an unlawful collective-bargaining con- tract, engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(2) of the Act. 6. The aforesaid violations are unfair labor practices affect- ing commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER2 I. Respondent Employer, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Giving assistance to Respondent Union by continuing to recognize it as the exclusive representative of its employees for collective-bargaining purposes unless and until the Na- tional Labor Relations Board shall certify Respondent Union as such representative. (b) Maintaining or giving of any force or effect to the collective-bargaining agreement executed by Respondent Employer and Respondent Union in January and February 1974, or to any modification, extension, renewal or supple- ment thereto, provided however, that nothing herein shall require Respondent Employer to vary or abandon any wage, hour, seniority, or other substantive feature of its relations with its employees which has been established in performance of this agreement, or to prejudice the assertion by employees of any rights they may have thereunder. (c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain- ing, or coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaran- teed by Section 7 of the Act. 2: Take the -following affirmative action which I find will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Withdraw and withhold all recognition from Respond- ent Union as the collective-bargaining representative of any of its employees, unless and until the Board shall certify Respondent Union as such representative. (b) Post in conspicuous places at Respondent Employer's place of business in Goleta, California, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted, copies of the notice attached hereto and marked "Appendix A."' Co- 2 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes - 3 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." pies of said notice to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 31, shall, after being duly signed by an authorized representative of Respondent Employer, be posted by it im- mediately upon receipt thereof and maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter in such conspicuous places. Rea- sonable steps shall be taken by Respondent Employer to in- sure that the notice is not covered, altered, or defaced by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 31, in writing, within 20 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this Decision what steps Respondent Employer has taken to com- ply therewith. - II. Respondent Union, its officers, agents, and representa- tives, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Restraining and coercing employees of Respondent Employer by seeking to have Respondent Employer apply the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement executed by it and Respondent Employer in January and February 1974, or the terms of any modification, extension, renewal or supple- ment thereto, unless and until Respondent Union has been certified as the exclusive representative of the employees of Respondent Employer. (b) Restraining or coercing employees of Respondent Em- ployer by threatening them with discharge if they do not become members of Respondent Union. (c) Causing or attempting to cause Respondent Employer to discriminate against any employee by enforcing the union- security provisions of the contract executed in January and February 1974. (d) In any like or related manner, restraining or coercing employees of Respondent Employer in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Post in conspicuous places, including places where no- tices to members are customarily posted, and its usual mem- bership meeting places, copies of the notice furnished herein and marked "Appendix B."4 Copies of said notice to be fur- nished by the Regional Director for Region 31, shall, after being duly signed by an authorized representative of Re- spondent Union, be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof and maintained by it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respond- ent Union to insure that said posted notice is- not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Forthwith, mail copies of said notice marked "Appen- dix B" to said Regional Director after copies have been signed, as provided above, for posting by Respondent Em- ployer, if it so agrees, at the places where Respondent Em- ployer is required to post copies of the notice "Appendix A." (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 31, in writing, within 20 days from the date of receipt of the copy of this Decision what steps Respondent Union has taken to comply herewith. 4 See fn 3, supra. APPENDIX A NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS, BOARD An Agency of the United States Government We hereby notify our employees that: CAL-FIN 877 WE WILL no longer -recognize Carpenters Union, Lo- cal 1062, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (AFL-CIO), as the exclusive representative of our employees, or maintain or give any force or effect to an existing collective-bargaining agreement with such labor organization, unless and until such time as that labor organization has been certified by the National Labor Relations Board as the bargaining representative of our employees. CAL-FIN