Northern Indiana Tool, Inc.

NORTHERN INDIANA TOOL, INC. Northern Indiana Tool, Inc. and Allen R. Keehn. Case 25-CA-8511 December 2, 1977 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS PENELLO AND MURPHY On July 25, 1977, Administrative Law Judge Paul Bisgyer issued the attached Decision in this proceed- ing. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and Respondent filed a brief in support of the Administrative Law Judge's Decision. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings,' findings,2 and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the complaint be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. I we agree with the Administrative Law Judge, for the reasons stated by him, that a remedial order is not warranted in the special circumstances here to remedy the isolated 8(aX) ) violations committed by Respondent's former vice president. James Cleveland. Cleveland is no longer associated with Respondent and the plant which he supervised is no longer in existence. The violations which he committed while he was still associated with Respon- dent were committed at his home in a single conversation with his nephew. Couts. In these circumstances, there is little likelihood that Cleveland's remarks to Couts would have any continuing coercive impact upon the unit employees. Moreover, since none of the present owners of Respondent was involved in, or even aware of, Cleveland's coercive remarks, it would be unfair to saddle them with a remedial order. Accordingly, in light of all of the foregoing, we can perceive no useful purpose in issuing a remedial order in this case. 2 Contrary to his colleagues. Chairman Fanning would issue a remedial order to remedy the unlawful interrogation and threat made by Cleveland. Cleveland's unlawful remarks, directed to Couts in the presence of Newman, Cleveland's stepson and also a Walkerton employee, were of a serious nature and were such as would likely be passed along to other employees. Further, contrary to his colleagues' suggestion, Chairman Fanning does not find it proper for the Board to excuse a respondent from liability because the official engaging in misconduct is no longer associated with that respondent or because other officials are unaware of the misconduct. Where. as here, a high-ranking official has engaged in clearly unlawful activity. Chairman Fanning does not believe that it effectuates the purposes of the Act to withhold the Board's usual remedy and leave an undisputed 8(aX I) violation unremedied. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE PAUL BISGYER, Administrative Law Judge: This proceed- ing, with all the parties represented, was heard on February 22 and 23, 1977, in Plymouth, Indiana, on the complaint of the General Counsel issued on January 31, 1977,1 as amended at the hearing, and the answer of Northern Indiana Tool, Inc., herein called the Respondent or Company. In issue are the questions whether the Respon- dent, in violation of Section 8(aX3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, discriminatorily discharged employee Allen R. Keehn because of his protected union and concerted activities and whether the Respondent, by this and other conduct interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in violation of Section 8(aX I) of the Act. 2 At the close of the hearing, the parties waived their right to argue their case orally but subsequently filed briefs in support of their respective positions. Upon the entire record and from my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and with due consideration being given to the arguments advanced by the parties, I make the following: FuTNDnOs AND CONCLUSIONS I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT The Respondent, an Indiana corporation with its principal office and place of business at Koontz Lake, Indiana, operates a machine shop at this location where it performs tool-and-die work and related machine shop services, including the production of tools, dies, fixtures, and special machines. From about May until its discontin- uance on October 10, 1976, the Respondent also operated another facility in Walkerton, Indiana, where it performed metal stamping and fabrication work. The Respondent, in the regular course of its operations, annually manufactures, sells, and distributes products valued in excess of $50,000 which are shipped directly to points outside Indiana. The ' The complaint is based on a charge filed by Allen R. Keehn on December 13, 1976, a copy of which was duly served on the Respondent by registered mail on December 14, 1976. 2 Sec. 8(aX I) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7." Insofar as pertinent, Sec. 7 provides that 'le Imployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .... " Sec. 8(aX)(3), with certain qualifications not material herein, prohibits an employer "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization .... " 233 NLRB No. 139 917 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Respondent also annually purchases goods and materials for its operations valued in excess of $50,000 which are shipped into the State from sources located outside the State. It is conceded, and I find, that the Respondent at all material times has been an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Evidence The main issue presents another familiar case of an employee's discharge alleged to be due to his involvement in union or other protected concerted activity whereas the employer insists that the discharge was solely for legitimate cause-here, insubordination and poor attitude toward his superior and the Company. The essential facts and circumstances leading up to and surrounding the discharge of Allen R. Keehn, the Charging Party, are virtually undisputed and are set forth below. 1. Employee Keehn's initial employment at the Walkerton plant; his union advocacy; and the nondiscriminatory closure of this plant By way of background, in 1972, the Respondent was formed with Thomas Kriskovsky as president and James Cleveland as vice president. Since that date, the Respon- dent has conducted its operations only in its Koontz Lake plant except for the period from about May to October 1976,3 when it also operated a smaller plant in Walkerton about 4 or 5 miles from the Koontz Lake facility. Cleveland managed the Walkerton facility, determining the wage scales and other working conditions of the approxi- mately six production employees there employed. Kriskov- sky, in turn, continued to run the Koontz Lake plant where some 10 employees were employed. Because the relation- ship between Kriskovsky and Cleveland was not of the very best, Cleveland during the first week in October sold his stock interest in the Respondent to the former and completely severed his association with the Company. On October 10, Kriskovsky shut down the Walkerton facility, moving much of its machinery and equipment to the Koontz Lake plant. Since their dissociation, there has been no communication between Cleveland and Kriskovsky; nor has Cleveland had occasion to visit the plant. About November 13, Lloyd Knowlton and Carl Salyer each became one-third owners of the Company along with Kriskovsky, with each individual supervising a separate department.4 Kriskovsky continued as the Respondent's president while Knowlton and Salyer assumed the office of vice president and executive vice president, respectively. At or about the time the Walkerton plant went into operation, Keehn, a boyhood friend of Kriskovsky, sought a job from Kriskovsky. On the latter's recommendation, Cleveland on May 3 hired Keehn as a press operator at the Walkerton plant at $3.50 an hour. On May 24, Keehn 3 All dates refer to 1976 unless otherwise indicated. 4 Knowlton, who was a newcomer to the Company, was put in charge of the Fabrication Department. Salyer, who worked for the Company approximately 4 years, was put in charge of the machinery and lathe operations, while Kriskovsky ran the Die Shop. received a 25-cent raise and another 25 cents on July 1 bringing up his hourly rate to $4. While employed at this plant, Keehn was unhappy with working conditions and "from time to time" discussed the situation, both at and away from the plant, with another employee, Mark Couts, who was Cleveland's nephew and a close friend of Keehn sympathetic to the latter's views. Also present at several of these conversations at the plant were other employees including Danny Newman, Cleveland's stepson and a member of Cleveland's household. In these discussions, Keehn pointed out the need for union representation to secure job security, better wages and other improvements in working conditions and named certain unions which might serve the employees' purposes. The record contains evidence of two incidents which prompted Keehn to express his union views to the employees. One occurred on July 2 when the employees were required to unload by hand long, heavy steel tubes from a truck under conditions which were dangerous and could have caused injuries but fortunately did not.5 After the truck was unloaded and Kriskovsky was not present, the employees gathered on the receiving dock where Keehn criticized the assignment and asserted that, had they been organized, they would not have been directed to unload the truck by hand. Keehn also evaluated the relative merits of different unions and the benefits they could derive from such representation. Concerning the second event, which occurred in Septem- ber, Cleveland, who was away from the plant in the morning, summoned the employees to his office on his return. In an angry tone, Cleveland stated that he had been informed that, in his absence, the employees idled their time away and warned them that, if such idleness were repeated or if he saw them standing around in a group or not doing their jobs, they would be kicked out of the plant. Shortly after this reprimand, while Cleveland was again not in the plant, the employees met in the office. In the course of the discussions, Keehn expressed his concern over the fact that the employees lacked job security since Cleveland was unpredictable and could fire them for making a mistake, regardless of their years of service or experience. Keehn also repeated that union representation would obtain for employees job security they did not then enjoy. Apparently, Keehn's union advocacy at the Walkerton plant did not go beyond this "informal and casual" talking stage. According to Couts' uncontradicted and credible testi- mony, in late September before the Walkerton plant was closed down, he visited his uncle, Cleveland, at his home in Koontz Lake. There, in the presence of Danny Newman, Cleveland's stepson and a Walkerton employee, Cleveland inquired of Couts whether he had heard anyone talking about a union in the shop or whether he was aware of such discussions, warning that, if he learned who that individual was, he would not last long in his job. Cleveland also indicated that the reason he did not want a union in the shop was that it would put him out of business and that the Company could not survive if it were organized. Couts 5 On this occasion, Cleveland was absent from the Walkerton plant. Kriskovsky, who substituted for Cleveland on this day, assisted in the unloading operation. 918 NORTHERN INDIANA TOOL, INC. further credibly testified that he had probably two similar conversations with Cleveland in or about September or early October at Cleveland's home in which Cleveland expressed the view that his business could not survive union organization. Although Couts and Newman were aware of Keehn's outspoken union sympathies, they evidently did not reveal this information to Cleveland. Except for the foregoing conversations with Couts, 6 there is no evidence that Cleveland interrogated other employees or threatened them with discharge or plant closure. Kriskovsky denied any knowledge that Cleveland had interrogated any employee or made any threats or antiunion statements to him, although Kriskovsky was generally aware that Cleveland did not favor having a union in the plant. Nor is there any evidence that Cleveland at any time reported Keehn's union sympathies to Kriskovsky or his new partners. Indeed, about a week before the Walkerton plant was closed down, Cleveland advised Keehn that Kriskovsky wanted to see him about a job at the Koontz Lake plant. 2. Keehn's subsequent employment at the Koontz Lake plant; events leading to his termination Following the shutdown of the Walkerton plant on October 10, Keehn again sought employment from his friend, Company President Kriskovsky, who stated that he might have a welder's job for him in the Koontz Lake plant in a week or so at a reduced wage rate of $3.25 an hour since Keehn lacked experience in such work. On October 18, Keehn started working there7 under Kriskovsky's supervision as an apprentice welder helping Terry Kilburn, a welder. About a week later, Keehn came under the supervision of Lloyd Knowlton,8 who had joined the Company in the meantime and, as indicated above, ultimately became a part owner. On November 7, at Keehn's request, Knowlton raised his wage rate to $3.50 an hour. On November 22, an incident occurred which resulted in Keehn's discharge undeniably for good reason and his prompt reinstatement. About 7 o'clock that morning, when Keehn reported for work, his supervisor, Knowlton, told him that a delivery truck was due to arrive about 8 a.m. to receive a shipment of pedestals which Keehn was to prepare for loading. Since Keehn's fellow worker, who would normally help in such job, was out sick that morning, the assignment was his sole responsibility. About 10 or 15 minutes later, Knowlton returned and reminded Keehn of the urgency of the shipment and directed him to hurry it up. This provoked Keehn's obscene and abusive response. Knowlton retorted that he was not obliged to tolerate such language and summarily discharged Keehn on the spot. Keehn, however, was permitted to remain in the plant to speak to Kriskovsky concerning the incident. Upon Kriskovsky's arrival a few minutes later, Keehn 6 The General Counsel adduced additional testimony by Couts, of little, if any, probative value, that, while Couts was visiting his uncle Cleveland at his home in early December. some 2 months after both of them had severed their relationship with the Respondent, Cleveland told Couts that, if he had kept the Walkerton plant as his own operation, he would not have retained Keehn in his employ because he disliked people who talked union. I Neither Cleveland's stepson Newman nor his nephew Couts continued their employment at the Koontz Lake plant. related what had happened and the language he had used to Knowlton and asked for, and received Kriskovsky's advice to apologize to Knowlton and try to settle the matter between them. Keehn did so, explaining to Knowlton that he was in a bad mood and disliked being pressured on the job and requesting that the incident be forgotten. Knowlton relented and allowed Keehn to return to work but not without admonishing him that he would not tolerate the language used by Keehn or insubordina- tion.9 Subsequently, Keehn discussed this incident with other employees. Because Knowlton's authority was thus challenged by Keehn,10 management decided to meet with the employees to impress upon them that each owner had absolute power of discipline over the employees under his supervision, with which no other owner would interfere. Accordingly, such a meeting was held on November 23 in which the indicated message was conveyed to the employees. At one point at the meeting, Keehn, directing his remarks to Knowlton, declared that he was going to give what he considered to be 8 hours' work for 8 hours' pay. Knowlton answered that perhaps Keehn's ideas regarding 8 hours' work might not correspond with his and that, as long as Keehn worked for him, it would be advisable that Keehn's ideas conform with his. After Keehn began working at the Koontz Lake plant, he continued informally to discuss with a number of employ- ees at different times the need for a union to improve working conditions and to obtain better wages and job security. However, all he could elicit from his fellow employees was a lack of interest in being organized lest the plant shut down or for some other reason. Following the November 22 episode, Keehn for the first time attempted to interest a union to organize the Respondent's employees. According to Keehn, he was prompted to do so because he feared that his job was in jeopardy as a result of his quarrel with Knowlton on November 22. Therefore, on that day he immediately contacted John Van Strien, a former United Auto Workers committeeman, to discuss unionizing the plant. In answer to Van Strien's inquiry whether the employees favored a union, Keehn stated that they were "pretty negative about it." Van Strien thereupon suggested that Keehn would do well to forget the whole matter unless the employees changed their mind. On December 1, Keehn became involved in another incident with his superior, Knowlton, which, the General Counsel contends, furnished a pretextual reason for Keehn's discharge on the following day. On December I, Knowlton was doing some rewiring work in his depart- ment. At or about 3:25 p.m., 5 minutes before Keehn's shift s Knowlton testified that he was a member of an ironworkers' union on a withdrawal card because of his management status. 9 The foregoing narration reflects Keehn's and Knowlton's testimony. Whatever variances there are in their accounts, they are of no consequence and do not affect my ultimate determination. 10 There is testimony in the record that Keehn did not have much respect for Knowlton. 919 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ended and at a time when Keehn was preparing to wash up before leaving, as employees were permitted to do," Knowlton, who was standing on a table, called to Keehn to help him pull a wire through a hole in a wall partition. Keehn complied and assisted in this effort. However, by 3:30 p.m., the close of Keehn's shift, the wire had not yet been pulled through because certain difficulties were encountered. Keehn then asked Knowlton whether he was going to work overtime on this job,'2 which Keehn was not averse to doing. Knowlton replied, "No, why?" Keehn answered that he was not staying beyond 3:30 if he was not going to be paid for overtime. Knowlton thereupon remarked that therefore Keehn did not want to help him finish that job.' 3 Consequently, Terry Kilburn, Keehn's fellow employee, was asked to help and he agreed, spending at most 5 minutes to pull the wire through the hole. Kilburn performed this job on his regular time for which he was not paid overtime.14 In the meantime, Keehn left the plant. Upon the completion of the wire-pulling job, Knowlton related to Kriskovsky his latest problem with Keehn. He informed Kriskovsky that Keehn was insubordinate again and had actually "cut down" the Company. Stating that he had not yet decided what he intended to do about Keehn, Knowlton told Kriskovsky that he would reach a decision by the next morning.'5 On December 2, sometime in the morning after Keehn came to work, Knowlton informed Keehn that Friday, December 3, would be his last day.1 6 In reply to Keehn's inquiry as to the reason, Knowlton stated for "insubordina- tion and bad attitude." Keehn retorted for "not working past 3:30, without being paid for it?" adding that he would not work overtime unless he was paid. When Keehn remarked that he intended to go to the Labor Board, Knowlton replied that he was not concerned as he had already been in communication with the Labor Board which supported the discharge for cause. Keehn then warned Knowlton of his intention to complain to OSHA about certain plant safety violations which Knowlton indicated did not disturb him. Keehn also made the comment that, in view of his termination, Knowlton should not expect him "to break ... [his] ass" the next 2 days.17 Following his notification to Keehn of his termination, Knowlton advised Kriskovsky of the action he had taken. Since Knowlton appeared to be upset, Kriskovsky suggest- ed that Knowlton take his car to get himself a cup of coffee, which he did. In the meantime, Kriskovsky invited to his office Salyer, the other owner, and Keehn. Keehn was asked about the December I incident and whether it ni Keehn's regular shift hours were from 7 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. Employees were permitted to use the last 5 minutes of their shift to wash up. 12 According to Keehn's undisputed and credible testimony, alongside the timeclock a company notice was posted, stating "No overtime without foreman's permission." He further testified that this rule was the reason why he made the inquiry. He also testified that employees customarily worked a lot of overtime and that he was never asked to work overtime without being paid for it. 13 The foregoing narration, in essence, embodies Keehn's testimony. Although Knowlton's version differs in certain details, such variances do not affect my ultimate determination and therefore a resolution of such conflict in testimony is unnecessary. 14 According to Kilburn's credible testimony, he reported late for work that morning and therefore his shift ended at 4 p.m. would have hurt him to stay over 5 or 10 minutes to finish the wire-pulling job. Keehn answered that he was willing to remain and work as much overtime as the Company wanted but, after finishing 8 hours work, he was not disposed to continue beyond his regular schedule unless he was paid overtime. Salyer then remarked that he expected employees "to give and take" since they might report late and yet be paid for the full shift. Keehn responded that the Company only paid for the time punched in on the clock and, besides, he was never late. Kriskovsky agreed with Salyer that employees should not be reluctant to give their company 5 minutes of their time. Concluding this inter- view, Kriskovsky stated that it would be to everybody's interest if Keehn immediately left the plant and that Keehn would be paid for Thursday, December 2, but not for Friday. Keehn, thereupon, asked for the paychecks due him and Kriskovsky instructed his secretary, June Beem, to prepare them. When Beem and Keehn were alone and Keehn was given his checks, Beem, undeniably a nonsuper- visory office employee, asked him whether, "[b]etween the two of us, were you talking union?" Keehn answered in the affirmative and the conversation ended as Kriskovsky appeared. Although testifying that she made that inquiry, Beem admitted that she had no actual knowledge that Keehn was discharged for union activity or that she was informed by any company owner that Keehn was terminat- ed for that reason. Keehn left the plant a few minutes after 9 in the morning. The same day, Keehn visited employee Kilburn at his home and, visibly disturbed, complained that he was fired because he refused to work overtime on December 1 (apparently without being paid). Knowlton and Kriskovsky denied knowledge of Keehn's union advocacy and no direct evidence to the contrary was presented. Moreover, the record is barren of any evi- dence-nor is it contended-that either of them or Salyer ever unlawfully interrogated employees concerning their union sympathies or threatened them for supporting a union or even expressed opposition to a union to any employee. B. Concluding Findings I. With respect to Keehn's discharge The question whether an employee was terminated because of his union membership or activities is not susceptible of easy determination as it involves an inquiry into the employer's state of mind. For this reason, all the facts and circumstances surrounding the separation must be carefully evaluated with due recognition being given to it There is conflicting testimony whether Keehn told Kilburn, with whom he performed welding work, to slow down on the job, which Kilburn purportedly reported to Knowlton on December 1. This conflict need not be resolved as I am not convinced that the alleged conduct entered into Knowlton's discharge decision. Moreover, the alleged slowdown charge appears to be nothing more than a complaint Keehn made to Kilbum that the wages paid them were inadequate for the work they performed. 16 It appears that Knowlton himself made the discharge decision. Contrary to the General Counsel's suggestion in his brief, there is insufficient evidence that the discharge decision was made at an early morning conference of the three owners of the Company. 1" The foregoing account reflects Keehn's testimony. Knowlton's version does not differ from Keehn's in significant respects. The variances in certain details do not require a different conclusion from that reached below. 920 NORTHERN INDIANA TOOL, INC. the settled principle that an employer may terminate an employee for any reason good, bad, or indifferent so long as he is not motivated by the employee's union or concerted activities. Of course, an employee's union involvement does not insulate him from discharge for nondiscriminatory considerations. From my careful review of the record, I find that the General Counsel has failed to sustain his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Keehn's discharge was on account of his union activities rather than for cause, that is, his demonstrated insubordination and poor atti- tude, as the Respondent vigorously urges. As noted above, it was what Knowlton, Keehn's superior and a co-owner of the plant, regarded as Keehn's uncooperative and insubor- dinate conduct in refusing to work 5 extra minutes without overtime pay that precipitated Keehn's discharge on December 2. Whether or not Knowlton was unfair and unreasonable in asking Keehn to give the Company 5 minutes free time and whether or not Keehn acted justifiably in refusing to extend himself in that respect, this does not necessarily establish that Knowlton's termination of Keehn was motivated by pretextual or union-related considerations. Unquestionably, an employer's unfairness or unreasonableness is not the equivalent of discrimination under the Act. In fact, the December 2 incident was the second one in 9 days following the November 22 episode where Keehn provoked Knowlton to terminate him because of his insubordination and abusive and obscene language directed at Knowlton. If Knowlton were really discriminatory minded, as the General Counsel maintains, he surely would not have relented and immediately reinstated Keehn on that occasion. Moreover, the record is devoid of any evidence of knowledge of Keehn's union sympathies-much less of union animosity or antiunion conduct-on the part of Knowlton or the other two co- owners of the Respondent upon which an inference of illegal motivation might be validly predicated. Contrary to the General Counsel's contention, it would be rank speculation to impute to Knowlton Cleveland's interroga- tion of his nephew Couts at Cleveland's home or Cleve- land's antiunion remarks made to Couts where, as here, Cleveland had dissociated himself from the Respondent 2 months before Keehn's discharge s and about 1 month before Knowlton joined the Company. Indeed, militating against a finding of discrimination is the fact that Cleveland, in contemplation of his severance from the Company and the shutdown of the Walkerton plant which he managed, advised Keehn to see President Kriskovsky concerning employment at the Koontz Lake plant where Keehn was subsequently hired by his friend Kriskovsky. Nor, even assuming that Knowlton or his co-owners were aware of Keehn's union sympathies because of the small size of the Koontz Lake plant, as the General Counsel argues, I find, under the facts and circumstances related l' Cleveland's remark to his nephew Couts at the former's home 2 months after Cleveland's dissociation from the Respondent that, had he retained the Walkerton plant as his own operation, he would not have kept Keehn in his employ because of Keehn's union discussions is certainly a very weak reed which the General Counsel grasps as evidence of the Respondent's knowledge of Keehn's union advocacy and the discriminatory nature of his discharge. 19 Sec. 8(c) provides: above, such assumption to be an insufficient basis for a determination that Keehn was a victim of unlawful discrimination for union activity. Furthermore, whatever suspicion the evidence might arouse concerning the Respondent's inclination to penalize employees for their union sympathies-and I have none-it is clear that suspicion is an inadequate substitute for probative evi- dence. In sum, I conclude that the record falls far short of establishing that Keehn's discharge was in retaliation for his union advocacy or sympathies. Accordingly, the relevant allegations of the complaint will be dismissed. 2. With respect to interference, restraint, and coercion of employees There can be no question that Cleveland's inquiry of his nephew, Couts, then a Walkerton employee, during the latter's visit at Cleveland's home in September 1976 whether he had heard anyone talking about a union in the shop and Cleveland's simultaneous warning that, if he learned the identity of such employee, he would not last long, are well-recognized forms of restraint and coercion of employees in the exercise of their statutory right to self- organization which Section 8(a)(1) of the Act prohibits. However, I find to be privileged expressions of opinion '9 and not violative of the Act Cleveland's further remarks to Couts on this and about two other occasions that he did not want a union in his plant because it would put him out of business and that the Company could not survive if organized. I am unable to find in such statements a threat to close down the plant in reprisal for its unionization. Returning to the coercive conduct noted above, I find that, although the Respondent is undeniably responsible for Cleveland's acts while he was part of management and the operator of the Walkerton plant, effectuation of the policies of the Act does not require, under the special facts and circumstances of this case, that an order be issued directing the Respondent to refrain from the unlawful conduct herein. I reach this conclusion in view of the isolated nature of the interrogation of, and warning uttered to a nephew of a former co-owner, the closure of the Walkerton plant and the absence of any antiunion conduct on the part of the surviving co-owner and the two new co- owners. Accordingly, the complaint herein will be dis- missed in its entirety. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW I. The Respondent is an employer engaged in com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit. 921 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2. The Respondent has not discriminated against Allen R. Keehn in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 3. Effectuation of the policies of the Act does not require a remedy with respect to the isolated instance of interference, restraint, and coercion violative of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the 20 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings. conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. Act, as amended, I hereby issue the following recommend- ed: ORDER 20 It is ordered that the complaint issued herein against the Respondent, Northern Indiana Tool, Inc., be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 922