Standard Industries, Inc.

WELSH PLASTICS, LTD. Welsh Aircraft, Inc., d/b/a Welsh Plastics, Ltd., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Standard Industries, Inc. and International Union, Allied Industrial Workers of America, AFL-CIO, and Its Local Union No. 454. Case 7-CA-11549 July 11, 1975 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS JENKINS, KENNEDY, AND PENELLO On March 31, 1975, Administrative Law Judge Ar- nold Ordman issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief ' and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.' ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re- lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that Respondent, Welsh Aircraft, Inc., d/b/a Welsh Plastics, Ltd., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Standard Industries, Inc., Vassar, Michigan, its offi- cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. i Respondent's request for oral argument is hereby denied since the re- cord, the exceptions, and the brief adequately present the issues and posi- tions of the parties. 2 Respondent's motion for the receipt of additional testimony or admis- sion of the transcript in the Michigan Employment Security Commission hearing held after the hearing in the present case is hereby denied. Respon- dent contends that such testimony would show that its refusal to execute the contract was not the sole reason for the strike , and that the implementation of the wage portion of the new agreement is not an admission that there was agreement to the entire proposed contract because the increase was granted during negotiations to keep peace and allow it to continue its operations We would find the strike herein to be an unfair labor practice strike whether the sole reason for it was Respondent 's refusal to sign the contract or wheth- er such refusal was a reason for the strike . And we would find a complete agreement had been reached between Respondent and the Union even with- out reliance upon evidence of implementation. Additionally, after the close of the hearing, Respondent filed a motion to strike pleadings, order new hearing, censure General Counsel, and disquali- fication of Administrative Law Judge . We hereby deny the motion as com- pletely lacking in merit . We agree with the Administrative Law Judge that there was no violation of the attorney-client privilege in allowing Bernard Fieger to testify, and that there was no impropriety committed by either the Administrative Law Judge or the General Counsel in this connection DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE I 93 ARNOLD ORDMAN, Administrative Law Judge: Pursuant to an unfair labor practice charge filed on October 31, 1974, by the Charging Party, herein called the Union, Gen- eral Counsel for the National Labor Relations Board on December 12, 1974, issued a complaint against Respon- dent. In essence, the complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Re- lations Act, as amended, by refusing to execute a written contract embodying a collective-bargaining agreement which Respondent and the Union had previously made. The complaint further alleges that a strike engaged in by Respondent's employees, beginning October 16, 1974, was in protest against that refusal and, hence, is an unfair labor practice strike. Respondent's answer to the complaint, dat- ed December 19, 1974, challenges the assertion of jurisdic- tion over Respondent's enterprise and puts the General Counsel to proof on the major substantive allegations of the complaint. Hearing was conducted before me on the controverted issues on February 12, 1975. Following the close of the hearing, General Counsel and the Union submitted written briefs. Upon the entire record, my observation of the wit- nesses, and due consideration of the briefs, I make the fol- lowing: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS Prefatory Statement: The Due Process Issue Before dealing with the jurisdictional and substantive is- sues here presented, it is appropriate at the outset to rule upon Respondent's claim that it was deprived of due pro- cess in the instant hearing by violation of the attorney- client privilege. The relevant facts can be succinctly stated. Bernard Fieger, an attorney, not of counsel for the Respondent in this proceeding, was the principal negotiator for manage- ment in numerous bargaining sessions with the Union. As noted, General Counsel urges that a collective bargaining agreement was consummated at these bargaining sessions which Respondent later refused to execute. Accordingly, General Counsel issued a subpena for Bernard Fieger and presented him as its first witness in the prosecution of its case at the instant hearing. Before Fieger took the stand, Respondent's counsel announced on the record that it was instructing the witness "not to answer any questions or make available any documents under attorney-client privi- i Shortly after the hearing opened, under circumstances more fully de- scribed hereunder, counsel for Respondent withdrew from the hearing. I Respondent did not submit a brief but instead mailed a document ad- dressed to the Regional Director for Region 7 of the National Labor Relations Board, the office where the complaint herein originated . The doc- ument is entitled "Motion to Strike Pleadings , Order New Hearing, Censure General Counsel and Disqualification of Administrative Law Judge." Put- ting aside questions as to the propriety and sufficiency of this action, Respondent's motion and a supporting memorandum filed therewith will be considered as a brief for purposes of this proceeding 219 NLRB No. 19 94 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD leges." Fieger then took the stand. Following a few prelimi- nary questions, General Counsel asked Fieger to identify a letter the latter had written on February 26, 1974, to Rob- ert Kellerman, Regional Representative of the Union, stat- ing that the writer had been retained by Respondent to represent it in bargaining negotiations with the Union. Counsel for Respondent immediately renewed his objec- tion to violation of the attorney-client privilege, indicated that he was prepared to lodge a complaint against the wit- ness with the Bar Grievance Committee and stated that the undersigned was acting improperly in permitting violation of the attorney-client privilege . The undersigned stated his ruling that the particular matter under inquiry , namely, identification of the letter written by the witness to the Union, was not improper, and that no ruling as to other matters was being made . Nevertheless, counsel for Respon- dent withdrew from the hearing , repeating his objection as to violation of the lawyer-client privilege . Testimony by Attorney Fieger was completed and the hearing was pro- cessed to completion with no further participation by Re- spondent or its counsel of record. The legal issue posed herein is simple and straightfor- ward. Absent a waiver, an attorney's testimony as to confi- dential communications between himself and his client is privileged against disclosure , and a proper objection lodged against such disclosure must be sustained. On the other hand, the essence of the privilege is that the commu- nications in question are confidential. Where a third per- son or persons are present, who are not agents of the client or of the attorney, the essential element of confidentiality disappears . 8 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2311 (McNaughton rev. 1961). In the instant case no questions were directed to Fieger and no testimony was given by him relating to pri- vate communications or instructions between him and his client nor were any documents sought or produced which were of such a nature. The sole content of the examination of Fieger was the identification and introduction of the letter written by Fieger to the Union stating his role as negotiator for Respondent and the recital of what tran- spired and what was said and done at bargaining sessions attended by Fieger and other representatives of Respon- dent together with Kellerman and employee representa- tives of the Union. The element of confidentiality essential to invocation of the attorney-client privilege is wholly ab- sent. In essence, the question here posed is, as General Counsel phrases it (Brief, p. 5), "whether a bargaining ne- gotiator who is also an attorney can testify to events equal- ly within the knowledge of union representatives." Here, no evidence was sought or elicited to which the attorney- client privilege attached and Respondent's contention in this regard is wholly without merit . See Wigmore, supra. See also N.L.R.B. v . Harvey, 349 F.2d 900, 903-906 (C.A. 4, 1965), and cases and authorities there cited. We now turn to the substantive issues in the case. 1. JURISDICTION The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that Respondent is a Michigan corporation with its only office and place of businesses in Vassar, Michigan, where it is engaged in the business of providing custom decorating services on parts for the automotive industry. The issue as to whether Respondent does sufficient business affecting interstate commerce to justify the Board's assertion of ju- risdiction in this proceeding is, however, sharply contested. The complaint, as initially issued, alleged that during the year ending December 31, 1974, Respondent sold and dis- tributed products valued in excess of $60,000 of which products valued in excess of $50,000 were shipped from its place of business in Michigan directly to customers to points outside that state. Pursuant to information received as a result of a pre-hearing subpena served upon Respon- dent by General Counsel, General Counsel served notice that it intended, at the opening of the hearing, to amend the foregoing allegation by further alleging indirect out- flow, i.e., the shipment of goods to facilities in Michigan which, in turn, were engaged in interstate commerce. That motion was made at the opening of the hearing and grant- ed. In this connection all parties agreed to the introduction into evidence of an affidavit executed by Frank Ferko, Respondent's vice-president and general manager.3 The af- fidavit revealed, inter alia, that Respondent made sales val- ued in excess of $156,000 to Chevrolet Motors, a division of General Motors, which clearly is in interstate commerce and over which the Board has consistently asserted juris- diction. In addition, the affidavit reveals that Respondent made direct sales in excess of $30,000 to Kusan, Inc., an out-of-state employer. On this showing alone, I find that the Board's assertion of jurisdiction is warranted. Square Binding and Ruling Co., Inc., 146 NLRB 206, 208-209 (1964), and cases there cited. The Board has uniformly ruled that where direct outflow does not total in excess of $50,000, jurisdiction may be asserted by combining direct and indirect outflow. R. E. Smith, et al., 129 NLRB 1342, 1343-1344 (1961), and cases there cited. Accordingly, I find that Respondent is an employer en- gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. I find further, as amply demonstrated in the record, that the Union is an organization which admits employees to membership and deals with employers con- cerning grievances and terms and conditions of employ- ment, thus qualifying as a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE A. The Evidence In 1965 Robert Kellerman, Regional Representative for the Union, conducted a successful organizing campaign among the employees at the Vassar plant involved herein, which was then known as Welsh Industries. A Board certi- fication resulted and a series of collective bargaining agree- ments were entered into, the most recent of which expired on April 30, 1974. The appropriate unit of employees is alleged, and I find it, to be as follows: 3 This stipulation was entered into before Respondent's counsel withdrew from the hearing. WELSH PLASTICS, LTD. 95 All employees employed at the Company's plant in Vassar, Michigan; but excluding all professional em- ployees, technical employees, sales employees, ac- counting employees, industrial relations employees, confidential employees, office clerical employees, and all guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. On March 13, 1974, about 1-1/2 months before expira- tion of the most recent collective bargaining agreement, the Local Union president, Estella Johnson, was informed by management that the name of the enterprise was being changed from Welsh Industries to Welsh Aircraft, Inc., d/b/a Welsh Plastics, Inc., and that all employees were being fired but would be called back in a few days to work under the new name. A notice posted in the plant the fol- lowing day read as follows: NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Effective 7:00 a.m. March 14, 1974, operations will cease. Welsh Industries will no longer exist. All em- ployees connected with Welsh Industries are terminat- ed. This facility will re-open Monday, 3/18/74 at 7:00 a.m. as Welsh Plastics, Ltd., a new Michigan Corpora- tion. All employees will be automatically rehired, se- niority rights shall carry forward and the present con- tract between Management and Union shall be honored until it's [sic] expiration date. I would like to take this opportunity to wish the hearti- est success to this new enterprise. It will require co- operation [sic] between Management & Union and a 100% effort by all to insure success and long life. John L. Canu Gen. Mgr. All employees were given two days off and operations re- sumed on March 18, 1974. All employees returned on that day to the same job and the same shift. There was no change in seniority, in job content, in product line, in serv- ices provided, or in customers serviced. There was also no change in the manner of processing grievances, and man- agement continued to recognize the Union as the collective bargaining representative of the employees not only with respect to the processing of grievances but also with respect to negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement. Indeed, so far as operations, employee relations, and em- ployer-union relationships were concerned, there was no change whatever except the change in the name of the en- terprise. In the meantime, as noted, bargaining negotiations be- tween management and the Union were being instituted. Following an exchange of correspondence in February, 1974 between Kellerman and Fieger in which the latter made known that he was authorized to serve as bargaining representative for management,' a series of bargaining ses- sions took place between representatives of the Union and representatives of management. These meetings were de- voted to negotiating a new agreement to succeed the agree- 4 Indeed, Fieger testified that he had been employed by Respondent's parent company, Standard Industries , Inc., to represent it in connection with the negotiations with employees in several subsidiary enterprises in- cluding Welsh Industries. ment expiring on April 30, 1974. The bargaining sessions were held on April 11, 23 and 24 and on May 1, 1974. Fieger, accompanied by other representatives of manage- ment including John Canu, manager of the Vassar plant, attended all but the first of these sessions and was the prin- cipal spokesman for management. Kellerman, accompa- nied by the employees comprising the Local Union com- mittee, was the principal spokesman for the Union. All testimony as to the negotiations, that given by Fieg- er, by Kellerman, and by Johnson and Taylor, as Local Union committee members, was in accord that on the final meeting in this series, the meeting on May 1, 1974, full agreement was reached on all the terms of a new collective bargaining agreement and that Fieger and Kellerman, as the respective principal spokesmen, shook hands on the "deal." An arrangement was also made that Fieger would draft the written contract embodying the agreement made. Two days later, by agreement with management, the em- ployees were released from work for a Union meeting at which the membership ratified the agreement made at the May 1 meeting. A few days after May 1, 1974, John Canu was killed in an airplane crash. He was succeeded as general manager by Frank Ferko who had not attended any of the prior bargaining sessions. Fieger did not prepare the written contract as had been arranged. Repeated requests for that contract by Keller- man over the next few months, made to Fieger, to Ferko and to Fuller, another management official, were unsuc- cessful . Finally in late August of 1974, Kellerman, with the acquiescence of management, prepared a draft of the con- tract which had been agreed upon utilizing his own notes from the negotiating meetings and the predecessor con- tract, much of which was unchanged. On October 8, another meeting was held with manage- ment at which Kellerman submitted the new contract to management for signature. Ferko, the new manager, re- fused to sign it and expressed his dissatisfaction with sever- al of its provisions. Ferko made no claim that the contract submitted for signature did not reflect the agreement reached at the prior bargaining sessions. His objection was merely that he would not have agreed to the provisions he found unacceptable, had he been present at the prior bar- gaining sessions. On October 16, 1974, Respondent's employees went on strike, a strike which was still current at the time of the hearing herein. The sole reason for the strike was the pro- test against Respondent's refusal to execute the contract embodying the collective bargaining agreement previously made. Mediation efforts to resolve the dispute were insti- tuted and representatives of Respondent and the Union met on October 28, and November -14, 1974. At the No- vember 14 meeting, Attorney Stockier, who had never ap- peared at any prior meeting, submitted a new contract pro- posal by Respondent which varied substantially from the terms previously agreed upon. Stockier also stated, the first time any such statement was made, that the prior negotia- tors for Respondent had no authority to negotiate any such agreement and any arrangements they made were subject to approval by the home office of the Company. Ferko, who was also present at the November 14 meeting, indi- 96 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD cated that this was the first time he had learned of this asserted lack of authority. The proposed new contract was rejected by the Union which adhered to its position that an agreement had already been made. B. Analysis and Concluding Findings Section 8(d) of the Act expressly prescribes the obliga- tion of an employer or a union engaged in collective bar- gaining to execute a written contract , upon request, incor- porating any agreement reached . The evidence in this case is undisputed that a complete collective bargaining agree- ment was reached on May 1, 1974, and was ratified by vote of the Union membership two days later. Indeed, the re- cord shows that shortly thereafter , Respondent implement- ed the wage portion of that agreement by granting the raise therein provided retroactive to May 1, 1974, as had also been provided. At no time during the extensive bargaining negotiations was it even suggested that Fieger and the management rep- resentatives who accompanied him at the bargaining ses- sions lacked authority to enter into an agreement or that approval by some higher management authority was re- quired as a precondition to such an agreement . That asser- tion was made for the first time at the November 14 meet- ing more than 6 months after the agreement under consideration was consummated , and this belated assertion even came as a surprise to Frank Ferko, Respondent's new plant manager for the preceding several months. I am satisfied and find that Fieger and his conegotiators, including the then plant manager, John Canu, had com- plete authority to negotiate a collective-bargaining agree- ment with the Union and that the belated claim of lack of such authority was a pretext contrived to evade Respondent's statutory obligation to execute a contract in- corporating the agreement reached.5 To be sure, Bernard Fieger did not carry out his commit- ment made at the May I meeting to draft the contract implementing the collective bargaining agreement there consummated 6 After futile efforts to obtain such a con- tract from Fieger, the task was undertaken by Kellerman with the acquiescence of management . No evidence was adduced nor was any suggestion made that the written contract which Kellerman drew-and which has been in- troduced into evidence-did not reflect accurately the col- lective-bargaining agreement which was finally consum- 5 This finding obviates the necessity of ruling on the contention , advanced by the Union in its brief to me, that, even assuming arguendo the absence of actual authority, Respondent would be estopped, under familiar principles of "apparent authority" embodied in the law of agency , from challenging the binding effect of the actions taken by Fieger and his conegotiators in consummating the agreement of May 1. I believe the record in the instant case would warrant such a finding , if required. Significant, in any event, is the provision of Sec 2(13) of the Act that in "determining whether any person is acting as an `agent' of another person so as to make such other person responsible for his acts, the question of whether the specific acts performed were actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling." 6 The record contains a suggestion that his failure to do so may have been attributable to the fact that he was not paid for his services But that is merely speculative, was not fully explored at the hearing, and a determina- tion in that regard is not required here. mated at the May I meeting. Indeed, the evidence is to tl contrary. I find that that contract, submitted to Respo dent for signature, did embody the collective-bargainir agreement previously reached. Remaining for consideration is the suggestion or clai that the change occurring on May 14, 1974, when Welt Industries became Welsh Plastics, Ltd., absolved Respoi dent of any prior obligation or commitment to the Unioi I find this claim, too, to be without merit. As already ind cated, all that occurred at that time was a change of narr and a 2-day break in employment. All business operatior remained the same and no change in employment relatior ships was made. Respondent even acknowledged in I March 14 notice to the employees that all employees wet automatically rehired, that seniority rights would be cat ried forward and that the existing contract would be hor ored. Furthermore, Respondent resists only the executio of the contract. It continues to acknowledge the status c the Union as bargaining representative of its employee and, in the papers it most recently filed (supra, fn. 2), at serts that it is "ready, willing and able to collective bargain ing in good faith [sic]" with the Union. Even more significant, however, is the fact that the bar gaining sessions, which culminated in the bargaining agree merit of May 1, did not begin until April 1974 after th, change of name had taken place. Yet no mention wa made either by Fieger, principal spokesman for manage merit, or by his conegotiator, Canu, manager of both Welsl Industries and Welsh Plastics, Ltd., and author of thi March 14 notice, that the earlier change of name of thi enterprise had any significance either with respect to tht obligation of management to bargain with the Union of the authority of the management representatives at the bar, gaining meetings to enter into a binding collective-bargain ing agreement. In this posture of the record, no serious problem of suc• cessorship is raised. In essence, we are dealing here with a continuing enterprise which has merely undergone a change of name. Settled authority confirms that on the facts presented here, Respondent is not exonerated from full compliance with its statutory bargaining obligation. See N.L. R.B. v. William J. Burns International Detective Agency, Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972); Columbia Marine Service, Inc., 191 NLRB 197 (1971); Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Sac- ramento, 187 NLRB 1017 (1971). Accordingly, I conclude and find that Respondent, by failing and refusing to execute a written contract incorpo- rating the collective-bargaining agreement previously reached with the Union, violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. It follows further that the employees by engaging in a strike on October 16, 1974, in protest against that fail- ure and refusal, were engaging in an unfair labor practice strike which, the record shows, was still in progress at the time of the hearing. I so find. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Welsh Aircraft, Inc., d/b/a Welsh Plastics, Ltd., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Standard Industries, Inc., is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(2), (6), and (7) the Act. WELSH PLASTICS, LTD. 97 2. International Union, Allied Industrial Workers of America, AFL-CIO, and its Local Union No. 454, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. All employees of the employer named above em- ployed at its plant in Vassar, Michigan, but excluding all professional employees, technical employees, sales employ- ees, accounting employees, industrial relations employees, confidential employees, office clerical employees, and all guards and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for bargaining within the meaning of Sec- tion 9(b) of the Act. 4. The above-named labor organization is the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the above- described appropriate unit within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 5. By failing and refusing to execute a written contract with the above-named labor organization incorporating a collective-bargaining agreement reached with that labor organization, the above-named employer has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the mean- ing of Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 6. By engaging in a strike in protest against the unfair labor practice described in paragraph 5, the employees of the above-named employer have engaged in and are engag- ing in an unfair labor practice strike. REMEDY Having found that Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, the statute requires that Respon- dent be required to cease and desist from engaging in such unlawful conduct. Appropriate affirmative relief will also be prescribed by requiring Respondent to execute the writ- ten contract incorporating the collective bargaining agree- ment previously reached. East Texas Steel Castings Co., 191 NLRB 113 (1971). In addition, having found that Respondent's employees have engaged in and are engaging in an unfair labor practice strike, I shall direct that, upon their request, Respondent reinstate them to their former jobs. The customary notice-posting and reporting require- ments will also be included in the remedial order. Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, upon the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I recommend the following: ORDER? Respondent, Welsh Aircraft, Inc., d/b/a Welsh Plastics, Ltd., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Standard Industries, Inc., its officers, agents, successors and assigns , shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Failing and refusing to execute and give effect to the written contract between it and Allied Industrial Workers of America, AFL-CIO, and its Local 454, effective May 1, 1974, through April 30, 1976, and incorporating the collec- tive-bargaining agreement previously reached. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, as amended. 2. Take the following affirmative action: (a) Execute, deliver, and give effect, including retroac- tive effect, to the above contract embodying its collective- bargaining agreement and effective from May 1, 1974, through April 30, 1976. (b) Upon request, reinstate its employees, who went on strike on October 16, 1974, to their former jobs. (c) Post at its Vassar, Michigan, facility copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 8 Copies of the no- tice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re- gion 7, after being duly signed by its representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt there- of, and be maintained for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the said Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. 7 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 8 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to execute, and give effect to, a contract embodying a collective-bargaining agreement previously reached by us with an exclusive bargaining representative of our employees. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed under Section 7 of the Na- tional Labor Relations Act, as amended. WE WILL execute, deliver and give effect to the con- tract embodying our May 1, 1974, collective-bargain- ing agreement with Allied Industrial Workers, AFL- CIO, and its Local Union No. 454, effective May 1, 1974, through April 30, 1976. WE WILL, upon request, reinstate our employees, who went on strike on October 16, 1974, in protest against our refusal to execute that contract, to their former jobs. WELSH AIRCRAFT, INC., d/b/a WELSH PLASTICS, LTD., A WHOLLY-OWNED SUBSIDIARY OF STANDARD INDUSTRIES, INC.