Ultra-Sonic De-Burring, Inc.

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Ultra-Sonic De-Burring, Inc. of Texas and Communi- cations Workers of America Local 9455, AFL- CIO. Case 20-CA-1 1915 December 9, 1977 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND PENELLO On September 2, 1977, Administrative Law Judge William J. Pannier III issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The General Counsel filed a brief in support of the Administrative Law Judge's Decision. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find- ings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge, to modify his remedy, 2 and to adopt his recommended Order, as modified herein. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge as modified below and hereby orders that the Respon- dent, Ultra-Sonic De-Burring, Inc. of Texas, Red- wood City, California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order, as so modified: 1. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(a): "(a) To the extent that it has not already done so, offer Indiana Lee Zoller and Shirley Holt immediate and full reinstatement to their former positions or, if their former positions no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed and make them whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered as a result of the discrimina- tion practiced against them in the manner set forth above in the section of this Decision entitled 'The Remedy.' " 2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the Administrative Law Judge. I Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 233 NLRB No. 165 Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings. Nor do we find merit in Respondent's contention that, because the Administrative Law Judge generally discredited the Employer's witnesses and credited the General Counsel's witnesses, his credibility resolutions are erroneous or attended by bias or prejudice. N.LR.B. v. Pittsburgh Steamship Co., 337 U.S. 656 (1949). We have further considered Respondent's contention that the Adminis- trative Law Judge has evidenced a bias against Respondent's position. We have carefully considered the record and the attached Decision and reject these charges. We agree with the Administrative Law Judge's finding that a bargaining order is appropriate to remedy Respondent's unfair labor practices which have precluded the holding of a free and fair election. It is clear Respondent embarked upon its course of unlawful conduct on August 6, 1976, and the Union attained majority status on August 10, 1976. Accordingly, we shall impose Respondent's bargaining obligation as of the later date. Bandag, Inc., 228 NLRB 1045 (1977). For the reasons given in his separate opinion in Beasley Energy, Inc., 228 NLRB 93 (1977), Chairman Fanning would date the bargaining order prospectively. 2 We shall delete from the second paragraph of "The Remedy" the following language: "dismissing, if necessary, anyone who may have been assigned or hired to perform the work which Zoller had been performing prior to her termination on August 9, 1976, and which Holt had been performing prior to her termination on August 13, 1976." We shall modify the recommended Order and notice accordingly. For the computation of interest see, generally, Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962). APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a hearing at which both sides had the opportunity to present their evidence, the National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the law and we have been ordered to post this notice. WE WILL NOT create the impression that we are engaging in surveillance of your activities on behalf of Communications Workers of America Local 9455, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization. WE WILL NOT interrogate you regarding your union activities nor regarding the union activities of other employees. WE WILL NOT threaten to cease business operations if you select Communications Workers of America Local 9455, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, as your collective-bargaining representative. WE WILL NOT tell you that other employees are being discharged because they have supported or are supporting Communications Workers of America Local 9455, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization. WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discrimi- nate against you for engaging in activities on behalf of Communications Workers of America Local 9455, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization. 1060 ULTRA-SONIC DE-BURRING WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with any of your rights which are guaranteed by the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. WE WILL offer Indiana Lee Zoller and Shirley Holt immediate and full reinstatement to their former positions or, if their former positions no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed, and make them whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered as a result of our discrimination. WE WILL, upon request, recognize and bargain with Communications Workers of America Local 9455, AFL-CIO, as the collective-bargaining representative of the employees in a unit of: All production and maintenance employees of Ultra-Sonic De-Burring, Inc. of Texas, including truckdrivers, employed at its Red- wood City, California, facility; excluding office clerical employees, professional em- ployees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act, respecting rates of pay, wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of employment and, if an understanding is reached, embody such under- standing in a signed agreement. ULTRA-SONIC DE- BURRING, INC. OF TEXAS DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE WILLIAM J. PANNIER III, Administrative Law Judge: This matter was heard by me in San Francisco, California, on April 5, 1977. On November 16, 1976,1 the Regional Director for Region 20 of the National Labor Relations Board issued a complaint and notice of hearing, based on an unfair labor practice charge filed on September 13, amended on November 15, alleging violations of Section 8(aX1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C., § 151, et seq., herein called the Act. All parties have been afforded full opportunity to appear, to introduce evidence, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to file briefs. Based on the entire record, on the briefs filed on behalf of the parties, and on my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, I make the following: I Unless otherwise stated, all dates occurred in 1976. 2 Though the answer admits the allegation in the complaint that Clarkson was president and general manager of Respondent, Clarkson FINDINGS OF FACT I. JURISDICTION At all times material, Ultra-Sonic De-Burring, Inc. of Texas, herein called Respondent, has been a Texas corporation with an office and place of business in Redwood City, California, where it engages in the business of cutting and de-burring plates and parts for other business entities. During the past calendar year, Respon- dent, in the course and conduct of its business operations within the State of California, performed services valued in excess of $50,000 for business firms located within the State of California, each of which firms purchased and received goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly from outside the State of California and/or sold goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly to customers located outside the State of California. Therefore, I find that at all times material, Respondent has been an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act engaged in commerce and in operations affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. IL. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED At all times material, Communications Workers of America Local 9455, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, has been a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. ISSUES 1. Whether Respondent, through Robert Clarkson,2 violated Section 8(aXI) of the Act by announcing an increase in pay rates to encourage employees to abandon their support of the Union, created the impression that employees' union activities were under surveillance, inter- rogated employees regarding their union activities and the union activities of other employees, and threatened cessation of business operations if the employees selected the Union as their collective-bargaining representative. 2. Whether Respondent discharged Indiana Lee Zoller on August 9 and Shirley Holt on August 13, refusing thereafter to reinstate them, because of these employees' membership in or activities on behalf of the Union or because these employees had engaged in other concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, thereby violating Section 8(aX3) and (I) of the Act. 3. Whether the unfair labor practices in which Respon- dent may have engaged are so serious and substantial in character and effect as to warrant entry of a remedial order requiring Respondent to recognize and bargain with the Union. testified that he was vice president and general manager. This disparity. however, is not significant. for Respondent admits that Clarkson has been a supervisor and agent of Respondent at all times material herein. 1061 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD IV. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Events of August 6 In August, Respondent employed de-burring employees Indiana Lee Zoller, Shirley Holt, Carol Trejo, and Georgette "Gigi" Bristol at its Redwood City facility. Also employed there were machine operator Robert Jenkins, truckdriver Thomas Cushing, saw employee Jon Town- send, and Vincent M. Trapp, who did cutoff work. In addition, David DiGiovanni was working there, as he had been doing during summer vacations and during Christmas and Easter breaks for a number of years. At the time of the hearing, DiGiovanni was employed by Respondent, per- forming "mostly saw operations." 3 On the evening of August 5, the Union conducted a meeting, attended by several of Respondent's employees, 4 at the Marble Lodge, a bar located near Respondent's plant. Zoller had been the employee who had contacted the Union and had arranged for this meeting, although Holt had assisted her in notifying the other employees of the time and place of the meeting. While Zoller had been absent from work during the week of August 2 through 6, due to laryngitis and bronchitis, she had been persuaded to attend the meeting by Holt notwithstanding her illnesses. On Friday, August 6, Zoller's doctor released her to return to work the following Monday. On that same Friday, several events occurred at Respondent's plant. Respondent concedes that during the morning, Clarkson had told Trejo and Holt, the only de-burrers working that day, that Respondent had decided to raise the top pay rates for the classifications of its employees. 5 Clarkson testified that he had first considered doing so in June and that he had made the final decision to do so during the first week after Respondent had reopened following its July 5 through 19 annual 2-week vacation shutdown. According to Clarkson, the increased rate was made effective for the next full payroll period, which began on July 29. In arguing that these increases were unlawful, the General Counsel points primarily to the proximity of their announcement to the Union's meeting and to the "small plant doctrine" as the basis for inferring employer knowledge that the meeting had been conducted. Yet, the fact that a plant is small does not compel a finding of employer knowledge of employees' union activities. See ABC Body Works, Inc., 201 NLRB 833 (1973); Bulk Haulers, Inc., 200 NLRB 389, 393 (1972). Nor does proximity of employer action to union activity compel a finding that there is a nexus between the two. See discussion, Bloom/Art Textiles, Inc., 225 NLRB 766, 767- 768 (1976). Clarkson's announcements of the increased rates came the morning immediately after the Union's meeting. Consequently, a quite short timespan fell between these 3 Also employed were Lindy Rolich, an admitted supervisor within the meaning of Sec. 2(1 1) of the Act, as well as Clarkson's wife and son. 4 Holt, Trejo, Trapp, Townsend, Cushing, Jenkins, and Zoller. The Union's president. Ellis Crandall, and John Martinez, union shop steward at the telephone company, represented the Union at the meeting. s While other top classification rates were raised, only the de-burrers were being paid top rate with the result that only they benefited immediately from this increase. The General Counsel argues, in his brief, that Trejo had received two raises that morning. However, the only testimony regarding a two events, thereby raising some doubt that Clarkson could have learned of the meeting so quickly (see Placke Toyota, Inc., 215 NLRB 395, 399 (1974)); a conclusion only strengthened by the employees' testimony that they had attempted to conceal their union activities from Respon- dent. Furthermore, in cross-examining Clarkson, the General Counsel secured an admission that on August 6, Trapp had divulged to Clarkson that a union meeting had occurred the preceding evening. In doing so, the General Counsel appeared satisfied with Clarkson's placement of this disclosure as occurring at approximately 1 p.m. Consequently, it is somewhat difficult to find that the wage increases were accorded as a result of information not transmitted to Clarkson until approximately 3 hours after the increases were announced. When he testified, Clarkson conveyed the impression of a none-too-subtle individual who would react quickly and directly to adverse information. Indeed, his conduct that afternoon following Trapp's disclosure of the meeting, as described infra, confirms that impression. He promptly broached both Holt and Trejo concerning the meeting in a manner which the former characterized as "upset" and the latter described as both "forceful" and "upset." By contrast, both de-burrers described his demeanor during the morning as being friendly. Having observed Clarkson during the hearing, and in view of his conduct once he learned of the Union's campaign, I find it highly unlikely that he would have been able to restrain himself during the morning and calmly resort to the "fist inside the velvet glove" type of unfair labor practice had he known of the meeting. Finally, while Clarkson chose not to announce the increased rates until they were conferred on August 6, he testified that it had always been his practice to delay announcements of increases until the date of employee receipt. The General Counsel did not dispute his assertion that this had been his practice and, accordingly, Clarkson acted in conformity with past practice in delaying an- nouncement of the increases until August 6. Therefore, I find that a preponderance of the evidence fails to establish that Respondent's announcement of wage rate increases on August 6 was intended to dissuade the employees from supporting the Union. I shall recommend that this allegation of the complaint be dismissed. As noted above, at approximately I p.m. on the afternoon of August 6, Trapp disclosed to Clarkson that there had been a union meeting on the preceding evening. Clarkson also admitted that during this conversation Trapp had said that he believed that one of the Union's officials was a friend of Zoller. Later that afternoon, Clarkson approached Holt, within Trejo's range of hearing, and (testified Holt) said that he had heard that there had been a union meeting the preceding evening and, when she inquired as to the source second raise is that of Trejo, that Clarkson told her "about my other raise." She did not explain what she meant by this. Nor did the General Counsel see fit to develop any further testimony concerning the possibility that she had received two raises from Respondent on August 6 nor concerning the explanation afforded her for receiving a second raise that day, assuming that is what she meant by this comment. In these circumstances, the General Counsel has failed to develop a sufficient record to warrant the conclusion that Trejo received two raises on August 6 or to show that a second raise, if afforded her, resulted from unlawful considerations. 1062 ULTRA-SONIC DE-BURRING of his knowledge, retorted: "Nevermind. I heard you and Lee instigated it." While Clarkson denied having said that Holt and Zoller were "ringleaders," he agreed with her recitation of his remarks which Holt had described as preceding the accusation. Further, Trejo testified that she had overheard Clarkson telling Holt that he had learned of the meeting and accusing her of instigating it. Nor did Clarkson deny having then asked what had taken place at the meeting, having inquired as to the identities of the employees who had attended it, and having told Holt that he would fight her "to the bitter end" and that she had better become satisfied with Respondent's conditions of employment (during the conversation, Holt had listed a number of matters which had given rise to employee dissatisfaction), because if she was not happy, she should quit. Clarkson was not a convincing witness. Moreover, the comment about Zoller and Holt being "ringleaders" is consistent with both the uncontroverted portions of this same conversation and with Clarkson's other antiunion activity in this matter. I credit Holt's account that Clarkson had accused her and Zoller of instigating the Union's campaign. Having finished with Holt, it is undisputed that Clarkson next spoke with Trejo, telling her that he knew about the Union's meeting, that he would fight "you on this all the way," and that he felt that she should come to him if she had any complaints. It is likewise uncontroverted that later that afternoon, when Holt went to Clarkson's office to pick up her paycheck, Clarkson had asked her if she had decided what she was going to do and she had replied that she "would be back unless he told me otherwise." A dispute did arise, however, regarding Clarkson's comments during a meeting in his office at approximately 4:30 p.m. that day. In attendance were Rolich, Jenkins, Townsend, Clarkson, and Clarkson's wife. Jenkins was the only witness called by the General Counsel to describe what had been said during the meeting, although he had not remained for its entirety. He testified that Clarkson had said that he had heard about the Union, knew all about it and did not mind that the employees had gone to the meeting, but "would fight it," "would be against it," and "if he had to, he would close the place down." Both Clarkson and his wife denied that Clarkson had threatened closure. However, Clarkson agreed that he had said that he was aware that there were union activities in progress, and that "I was opposed to it and would fight it." He also conceded that the subject of closure had arisen, but testified that Townsend had raised it by asking whether the plant would close if the Union became the bargaining representative. Clarkson testified that he had replied that "it would not be my intention to close, but the unions do, on occasion, cause companies to go broke." To corroborate Clarkson's account of the closure remark, Respondent chose not to call Townsend, who assertedly had initiated discussion of the subject. Instead, it called Trapp, whose sympathies had been made evident by his report to Clarkson of the Union's meeting. He denied that Clarkson had threatened, at any time during the meeting, to close the plant if the Union was successful in its campaign. However, while his testimony corroborated that of Clarkson in this respect, it controverted it in another regard, for Trapp denied that Clarkson had indicated what his "attitude" would be if the employees persisted in attempting to have a union represent them. Clarkson, of course, had testified that he had said that he "was opposed to it and would fight it." Only when pressed further regarding this matter on cross-examination did Trapp ultimately concede that Clarkson had said that he "would fight the union to keep them out if I can." His obvious reluctance to attribute an antiunion comment to Clarkson, coupled with his voluntary disclosure of his fellow employees' union activities, lead me to believe that Trapp's concern with promoting Respondent's interests renders his testimony untrustworthy. The closure statement is the only portion of this conversation which is in dispute. In all other respects, Clarkson's recitation of his comments conforms with that of Jenkins. As noted above, Clarkson appeared to be a direct individual. As subsequent events disclose, he was not reluctant to resort to interference with employment relationships in his efforts to thwart the employees' desire for representation. In these circumstances, I do not credit his denial that he told the assembled group that afternoon that he would close the plant if he viewed it to be necessary in his campaign to "fight" the Union. Nor do I credit the support for his denial provided by his wife and by Trapp. Therefore, I find that in his conversations of August 6, Clarkson did create the impression that employees' union activities were under surveillance, did interrogate employ- ees regarding their own union activities and those of other employees, and did threaten cessation of business opera- tions to prevent the Union from becoming the employees' collective-bargaining representative. By such comments, Respondent violated Section 8(aX I) of the Act. B. The Discharge of Indiana Lee Zoller Zoller was terminated, assertedly for absenteeism, shortly after she reported for work on Monday, August 9. Clarkson testified that on Tuesday, August 3, Swiss Tech, a customer whose order Zoller had been filling, had tele- phoned to inquire if the order would be shipped as scheduled on August 9. According to Clarkson, when he replied that Respondent would be unable to make shipment on schedule, Swiss Tech had canceled the order. At this point, Clarkson testified, "I made up my mind if she wasn't there on Wednesday, she was all through." Of course, Zoller did not report for work on Wednesday, August 4. To buttress this defense, Respondent raised a number of factors which were either conceded by the General Counsel's witnesses or were not disputed: During her entire period of employment with Respondent, Zoller had always had drinking and absence problems; Clarkson had spoken to her about her absences; other employees had been discharged and denied wage increases on the basis of excessive absence; when a shortage of work occurred early in 1975, Respondent had selected Zoller for layoff on the basis of her excessive absences and, while it did rehire her in mid-1975, it did so only after Holt had assured Clarkson that Zoller had "overcome the problem" and had "straight- ened out"; notwithstanding Holt's assurance, Zoller's absence and drinking problems had continued through the remainder of 1975 and throughout 1976 until her dis- 1063 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD charge; in 1976, Zoller had missed 140 hours of work, 12.15 percent of her scheduled worktime, until the date of her termination, including the day that employees were to return from the 2-week annual vacation; on occasion, Zoller had complained to other employees of having hangovers and being shaky; and, Respondent was encoun- tering customer complaints regarding delays in shipments of merchandise. Notwithstanding these matters, a number of other factors tend to support the conclusion that Respondent has raised the above-enumerated factors simply to vilify Zoller and in an effort to conceal the fact that it discharged her because of its suspicion, based upon Trapp's report of Zoller's friendship with one of the union officials at the August 5 meeting, that Zoller had instigated the organizing campaign. For example, as set forth above, Clarkson made a series of statements on August 6 which disclosed his hostility toward the Union. As found above, several of these statements were unlawful, thereby demonstrating that Respondent was not loath to resort to unlawful conduct in its effort to prevent unionization of its employees. Indeed, both Clarkson's threat of closure during the late afternoon meeting of August 6 and his earlier suggestion to Holt that she should quit if she was not happy are evidence of his willingness to go beyond mere words and resort to the employment relationship, if need be, as a vehicle for preventing representation of Respondent's employees. While on August 6 Clarkson had also accused Holt of being a "ringleader" in the organizing campaign, his accusation appears to have been intended as a means of eliciting a disavowel by her, rather than being an accusation based upon facts brought to his attention which had given rise to a belief that she had been, in fact, a "ringleader." Thus, his comment was designed as a technique for obtaining information. See, e.g., South Shore Hospital, 229 NLRB 363 (1977). It was intended to place Holt "in the position of declaring [herself] as to union preference just as if [she] had been interrogated as to such preference ... .. The Conolon Corporation, 175 NLRB 27 (1969), modified 431 F.2d 324 (C.A. 9, 1970), cert. denied 401 U.S. 908 (1971).6 Consequently, so far as the record discloses, prior to August 9, the single employee who had been brought to Clarkson's attention as being a possible link to the Union was Zoller. This, of course, resulted from Trapp's disclosure that one of the Union's officials at the August 5 meeting was a friend of Zoller. 7 On the very next 6 The threats found lacking by the court of appeals in Conolon are provided in the instant case both by Clarkson's other comments to Holt during the same conversation and by his comments to other employees during the course of that same afternoon. Moreover, the subsequent termination of Zoller made plain what would happen to those who became "ringleaders." I Respondent points out in its brief that both Trejo and Jenkins had voiced strident criticism of Respondent's employment conditions on August 6. From this, Respondent argues, in essence, that if Respondent were bent upon retaliating against union supporters, these two employees would be choices at least as logical as Zoller and, accordingly, the absence of any discriminatory conduct directed against them demonstrates that Respon- dent was not unlawfully motivated in terminating Zoller. Yet, "a discrimina- tory motive, otherwise established, is not disproved by an employer's proof that it did not weed out all union adherents." Nachnman Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 337 F.2d 421, 424 (C.A. 7, 1964). "A violation of the Act does not need to be wholesale to be a violation." N.L.R.B. v. Puerto Rico Telephone working day, Zoller was discharged. This proximity between the disclosure of Zoller's protected concerted activity and her termination "strongly suggests a causative relationship between the two and is, as we have said, sufficient to establish a prima facie case .... " Union Camp Corporation, Building Products Div., 194 NLRB 933 (1972), enfd. 463 F.2d 1136 (C.A. 5, 1972). Moreover, as discussed infra, when Holt then picked up the mantle of leadership left by the departed Zoller, she too was then discharged and Clarkson frankly told at least one employee that her termination had resulted, at least in part, from her union activity. In these circumstances, the unique status of Zoller on August 9, the timing of her discharge in relation to Trapp's disclosure, and the subsequent termination of Holt when she commenced distributing authorization cards all serve to support the General Counsel's contention that Zoller's discharge was the product of unlawful motivation. Respondent's defense serves only to confirm that conclusion, for it is simply illogical. If, as Clarkson asserted, the Swiss Tech order had been canceled on August 3 - and thereby lost due to Zoller's absence - one wonders what he could have hoped to achieve by waiting I more day to see if Zoller would report for work. If the order was already lost, surely her appearance on August 4 would not restore the situation and Clarkson did not see fit to explain what he had hoped her return would accomplish. Furthermore, confronted with Swiss Tech's inquiry, Clark- son made no effort to contact Zoller to ascertain when she would be returning. Yet, he admitted that he had contacted her in the past to inquire about her absences. Surely if the Swiss Tech account was as significant as he attempted to portray it, Clarkson would have made an effort to find out if Zoller would be available to work on it during the remaining 3 days of the week, rather than meekly relinquish further business relationships with this customer. After all, delivery of the order was not due until August 9. Assuming that Swiss Tech did cancel its order on August 3, the evidence raises doubt that Respondent is being candid in attributing that cancellation to Zoller. Since at least June, Respondent had been receiving written and telephonic complaints from Varian, a major customer, about delays in deliveries, both to it and to its suppliers. As Clarkson conceded that Zoller had not been working on either Varian's orders or those of its suppliers, it would appear that these delivery delays were a problem attribut- able to Respondent's operation, rather than simply one which was attributable to Zoller. Yet, this is precisely what Company, 357 F.2d 919, 920 (C.A. 1, 1966). Moreover, the situation of Trejo and Jenkins was quite different from that of Zoller. While they had criticized employment conditions, so far as the record discloses, there was no indication that, in contrast to Zoller, Respondent would have felt that they had converted their dissatisfaction into action to obtain representation. Consequently, though critics, they posed no apparent threat to Respondent. Moreover, there is no evidence that their employment records left them vulnerable as was the case with Zoller. By selecting Zoller for termination, Respondent, in reality, achieved three objectives. It disposed of the employee who then appeared to be the leading proponent of unionization. It would be in good position to defend itself against any charge of discrimination by using Zoller's employment record as a shield. It could serve notice on other union supporters of the potential consequences of continuing their support; i.e., "Support the Union and lose your job." Hambre Hombre Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Panchiros, 228 NLRB 136, 137 (1977). 1064 ULTRA-SONIC DE-BURRING Clarkson attempted to do - to attribute blame for the delays in Varian deliveries to Zoller: . . . In as small an operation as we are, we do not have adequate scheduling time. Any burden that is created by one person being gone is directly felt on everything, and even though she was not working directly on those jobs at that time - after vacation - on some of the earlier complaints she was, but even though she was not working on them directly after that, yes, it would have a direct effect because somehow, some way, somebody would have to try to take up the slack. The fallacy in this testimony arises when the Varian complaints are compared to Zoller's attendance record from April to Varian's first written complaint on June 17, which is presumably the period during which the delays in deliveries were disturbing Varian. During this period, Zoller missed but 4 hours of work during each of two pay periods. In these circumstances, it is difficult to explain how the delayed deliveries of which Varian complained could be attributed to Zoller's attendance. Respondent made no effort to do so. Similarly, from June 17 until July 2, the last day of work prior to Respondent's annual shutdown, Zoller missed not a single hour of work. Accordingly, she could hardly be blamed for delivery delays that led Varian to transmit a second written complaint to Respondent on July 8. While she was absent for a significant period after the shutdown, it is obvious that no one had been assigned to perform her work on the Swiss Tech order, since that was the order that Respondent purportedly was unable to complete. Yet, the clear implication of Clarkson's above-quoted testimony is to attribute fault with the delayed Varian deliveries to her absences. In sum, this testimony serves to demonstrate a tendency on Clarkson's part to attribute problems to Zoller for which she was not responsible. Consequently, it casts considerable doubt upon Clarkson's testimony that Zoller was at fault for the loss of the Swiss Tech account. Of course, it is true that Zoller was a day late in returning from the 2-week shutdown and, by this point, Clarkson had received Varian's July 8 letter of complaint. Presumably, therefore, he would have been most concerned about the absence of any employee that might occasion further delivery delays. Yet, when she did report on July 21, Clarkson merely told her that "I thought it was inexcusable to take off for two weeks and then still not make it back to work on the day after vacation." While not exactly soft- spoken words, Clarkson's admonition contains no warning that further absences would be met with disciplinary action, though one would expect an employer faced with the complaints of a major customer about delayed deliveries to issue exactly such a warning to an irregularly present employee. Clarkson did claim that he had warned Zoller periodically that her absences might force him to terminate her. However, in so testifying, he carefully confined these warnings to her early years of employment. He made no contention, and there is no evidence that, he issued similar warnings to her during the period following her reemployment in mid-1975. Several additional points are pertinent to Zoller's August 2 to 6 absence. First, there is simply no objective evidence that a decision to terminate her had been made prior to Trapp's disclosure on August 6. The entire defense rests upon Clarkson's testimony and, as found above, he was virulently opposed to unionization of Respondent's em- ployees. Moreover, he was not a persuasive witness when he testified regarding the reasons for Zoller's and Holt's discharges. Secondly, the loss of the Swiss Tech order would presumably have been supportable by documenta- tion, even if no more than business records showing the order itself and the existence of merchandise in inventory that had been prepared for shipment but had not been shipped because of the cancellation. Yet, no documenta- tion was presented to support Clarkson's testimony regarding this business transaction. Nor was any Swiss Tech official subpenaed to corroborate Clarkson. By contrast, to support Clarkson's testimony regarding an ancillary incident in March, Respondent summoned a witness who had to travel approximately 100 miles to the hearing. This willingness to provide corroboration for the latter point but not for the purported loss of the Swiss Tech account, which assertedly precipitated the decision to terminate Zoller, raises some doubt as to the veracity of Clarkson's testimony concerning the cancellation. Third, Zoller had been absent for an entire week in August. Thus, notwithstanding the clear implication of Respondent's evidence regarding her drinking problem, the duration of her absence alone indicates that it was not attributable to a simple hangover. Moreover, Clarkson acknowledged that a message had been received by Respondent early in the week concerning the fact that Zoller would be absent. In addition, earlier that same year Zoller had been absent for a prolonged period due to laryngitis and bronchitis, the two ailments with which she had been afflicted in early August. At that time, both Clarkson and his wife had spoken with Zoller and Mrs. Clarkson acknowledged that Zoller had advised them of the nature of her illnesses. This conversation occurred in circumstances that had initially led Clarkson to question the validity of Zoller's absence excuse. s Yet, he apparently was satisfied with her explanation, for he admitted that he had made no effort either to confirm the nature of Zoller's illness or to require her to provide a doctor's excuse for her absence. Zoller had been employed by Respondent since 1969. Save for the 6-month interruption in her employment in 1975, Respondent had tolerated whatever drinking and absence problems she may have suffered. Even assuming that she had, in fact, been selected for layoff in 1975 due to these problems, the fact is that she had then worked continuously for Respondent for the year prior to her August 9 termination and had been employed initially for over 5 years until the shortage of work presented an external circumstance that had led to her layoff. Conse- quently, whatever her problems, Respondent had tolerated them for quite an extended period. "[Aln employer who I The Clarksons had encountered Zoller at the Marble Lodge. 1065 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD freely tolerates such conduct may not suddenly find it offensive only when committed by an employee who exercises his rights to engage in concerted activity." Apico Inns of California, Inc., d/b/a Holiday Inn ofAmerica of San Bernardino, 212 NLRB 280 (1974), enfd. as modified 512 F.2d 1171 (C.A. 9, 1975). See also Shasta Fiberglass, Inc., 202 NLRB 341 (1973). Moreover, the situation in the instant case appears to involve much more than simple toleration, for there is no dispute that the quality of Zoller's work remained satisfactory, that she was never criticized, and that employees whose attendance records were significantly better than that of Zoller were terminated, and in one case denied a wage increase, during the same period that she was retained. Therefore, I do not credit Clarkson's testimony concern- ing his reasons for terminating Zoller, but rather find that she was discharged because Respondent was attempting to prevent representation of its employees and because she had been linked with the Union and was viewed as being most likely responsible for its organizing campaign. C. The Discharge of Shirley Holt Clarkson agreed that on the morning of Wednesday, August 11, he had asked what Cushing thought about the Union. In light of the preceding unlawful comments of August 6 and the unlawful discharge of Zoller on August 9, I find that the surrounding circumstances of this interroga- tion establish the coercive context requisite for a finding that the question violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Following her discharge, Zoller gave blank authorization cards to Holt, who then distributed them to Trejo, Jenkins, Townsend, and Trapp. All save Trapp returned signed cards to her. On Friday, August 13, Holt was terminated, with Clarkson telling her that she had started a hate campaign against de-burrer Bristol which had made it impossible for the latter to get the necessary cooperation to perform her job. Clarkson did not controvert Holt's testimony that, in response, she had disputed his assertion that she had been making trouble for Bristol. Respondent contends that following Zoller's discharge, Holt had led a campaign of giving Bristol the "cold- shoulder treatment" because Holt had suspected Bristol of having informed Clarkson of the Union's meeting. Holt had acknowledged that she had believed this to be the case and that she had voiced her suspicions to other employees. Moreover, it is clear that Clarkson did become concerned about Bristol's situation, for he mentioned the matter to both Holt and Cushing, assuring them that Bristol had not divulged such information to him. Yet, Respondent's defense collapses beyond this point. The only specific incident advanced by Respondent of Holt's silent treatment was one which occurred on August 11. Initially, it should be noted that I have some doubt regarding the candor of Respondent's three witnesses - Clarkson, Bristol, and DiGiovanni - in relating what took place that day without embellishment. Clarkson testified that he had called Bristol for information about a 9 While Respondent presented evidence that Holt had been considered a troublemaker by some of her fellow employees, Clarkson denied being aware of that reputation. Consequently, her reputation could not have been a factor in his discharge decision and it can only be concluded that customer's order on which Holt had been working. He claimed that, after a short period of silence, Bristol had reported that Holt would not answer her. He testified that he then had instructed Bristol specifically to tell Holt that he wanted an answer as the customer was on the telephone, but, following another short silence, Bristol had again reported that Holt would not answer her. The testimony of DiGiovanni, allegedly present in the room with Bristol and Holt, did not correspond to that of Clarkson's with respect to a second effort to elicit this information from Holt. Instead, he testified simply that Bristol had asked Holt three successive times "when a certain batch of parts were going to be done from the backroom." At no point did DiGiovanni describe Bristol as having mentioned that it was Clarkson who wanted this information, though, of course, Clarkson had purportedly instructed Bristol to make this clear to Holt. Bristol's testimony corroborated neither Clarkson nor DiGiovanni. In contrast to the latter, she testified that she had merely called thrice to Holt from across the room. She did not assert that she had divulged to Holt her reason for calling. In contrast to Clarkson, she testified that after having received no response from Holt, she had merely reported to Clarkson that Holt would not answer. She made no mention of Clarkson instructing her to advise Holt of the reason why she wanted Holt to answer nor did she claim that she had made a second series of efforts to call to Holt pursuant to Clarkson's direction. Holt did acknowledge having heard Bristol calling, but contended that her machine was so noisy - a contention not denied by Respondent's witnesses and apparently verified by Respondent's counsel prior to the hearing - that she had not realized what Bristol had wanted. The fact is that both Holt and Bristol conceded that they had not gotten along from virtually the inception of the period when they had both become employed by Respondent. 9 This seemingly was apparent to Clarkson, for while he did speak with Holt about the incident on Thursday, August 12, he admittedly confined his remarks to the assurance that Bristol had not been the "stool pidgeon" and to an appeal for Holt to cooperate with Bristol. His own recitation of what he had told Holt discloses that he neither reprimanded her, as would be likely had she, in fact, prevented him from providing information sought by a customer, nor did he warn her of any adverse consequences should she persist in ignoring Bristol, as would have been likely had such conduct been interfering with performance of Bristol's job. Moreover, this conversation appears to have ended the matter so far as Clarkson was concerned - at least until Respondent was faced with the need to provide a valid defense to Holt's termination. To support Respondent's defense that Holt had been terminated for continuing to refuse to cooperate with Bristol, the latter testified: Thursday, the following day, it was the same procedure again: Not talking to me, not giving me any of the information I needed, so I just didn't even bother with Respondent elicited this evidence in an effort to cast Holt in the least favorable light, as had been the case with much of the evidence presented about Zoller, in the hope that Respondent's position would thereby be enhanced. 1066 ULTRA-SONIC DE-BURRING it, and told Mr. Clarkson that I could not get any information and did not bother with it. She claimed that it was this treatment that had led her to tender her resignation on the following day, and Clarkson testified that it was the submission of Bristol's resignation that had led him to decide to terminate Holt. Yet, in contrast to the very precise description of the August 11 incident which she advanced, Bristol made no effort to describe with precision any instances thereafter on which she had unsuccessfully sought to obtain information from Holt. Nor did she specify what information she would need to perform her job that Holt would possess. Both women were de-burrers and, thus, presumably performed parallel, rather than sequential, functions. At no point was it made clear how information in Holt's possession would be needed by Bristol. Indeed, the information which she had sought from Holt on August I I had been sought at Clarkson's request and had been needed by him, not by Bristol. In addition to the longstanding "cool" relationship between Holt and Bristol, the former had ceased speaking to Bristol before the Union's meeting that precipitated the chain of events at issue in the instant case. Thus, Bristol testified that Holt had been ignoring her "off and on pretty regularly ... for maybe two weeks before that." Yet, there is no evidence that Bristol had been unable to perform her job prior to August 12. Nor did Bristol explain why she had chosen to force the issue on August 13. In short, Respondent's evidence in connection with Holt's discharge is so vague, and concerns a matter of such longstanding duration, that it simply will not serve to support a finding of lawful motivation. Conversely, all of the affirmative factors which support- ed my finding that Zoller had been terminated for unlawful considerations equally support such a finding with regard to Respondent's motivation for discharging Holt. In addition, Jenkins testified that late on the afternoon of Friday, August 13, Clarkson had told him that Holt had been terminated because "he thought she was the instigator of the union; started the trouble. Plus, she would not talk to Gigi." Though Clarkson denied having told Jenkins that he had terminated Holt because of her union activities, he admitted having spoken with Jenkins that afternoon and admitted having told him that Holt had been fired. He did not explain what had motivated him to discuss the matter with Jenkins nor did he explain why he would see fit to tell an employee that another employee had been fired, but refrain from explaining his motivation for doing so as well. In these circumstances, and in view of my basic feeling that Clarkson was not a credible witness, as supported by the objective evidence and by Respondent's failure to present evidence sufficient to support Clarkson's testimony in other areas, I credit Jenkins' account of this conversation.'0 s0 Though Holt, like Zoller, attempted to conceal her activities from Respondent, she had given an authorization card to Trapp. He, of course, had seen fit to inform Clarkson of the Union's meeting and of Zoller's friendship with one of the Union's officials. It is, therefore, a fair inference that he would similarly have informed Clarkson of Holt's activity as well. ii Respondent urges that the card of Jon Townsend should not be counted as he did not personally authenticate it. Yet. Holt testified that she Therefore, I find that Respondent terminated Holt because she had succeeded Zoller in spearheading the Union's organizing campaign and that Respondent thereby violated Section 8(aX3) and (I) of the Act. D. The Remedial Bargaining Order With respect to the bargaining order sought by the General Counsel as a remedy for Respondent's unfair labor practices, Respondent argues both that no evidence has been presented to show that the unit is appropriate and that the evidence fails to disclose that the Union represent- ed a majority of the employees in that unit. The General Counsel contends that a production and maintenance unit is the one which is appropriate in the instant case. "It is well established that a unit of all production and mainte- nance employees is presumptively appropriate in the absence of cogent reasons to the contrary." Rembrandt Lamp Corporation, 128 NLRB 905, 906 (1960). Moreover, in the case of Respondent, such a unit encompasses all of its employees at the Redwood City facility. Thus, for this reason as well, the unit advanced by the General Counsel is presumptively appropriate. Greene Construction Company, and Tecon Corporation, ajoint venture, 133 NLRB 152, 153 (1961). As Respondent has adduced no "cogent reasons" showing that, in the circumstances of its operation, a production and maintenance unit embracing all employees at its Redwood City facility is inappropriate, I find that the unit is appropriate. Including discriminatee Zoller, Respondent employed 11 nonsupervisors at the Redwood City facility between August 5 and 10 (Holt, Trejo, Bristol, Jenkins, Cushing, Townsend, Trapp, DiGiovanni, Sandra Clarkson, and the Clarksons' son). As Mrs. Clarkson works in the office, she would appear to be an office clerical employee, excluded from the unit. Even, however, were she included in the unit as, for example, a plant clerical employee, the Union possessed authorization cards signed by six of the employ- ees and, accordingly, represented a majority of the employees in the unit." The cards clearly designate the Union as the collective- bargaining representative of the card signers. There is no evidence that any misrepresentations were made to them when their signatures were solicited. However, the record does disclose that although most of the cards were signed on August 9 and 10, they were backdated to August 5, pursuant to instructions originating with an official of the Union. Respondent contends that this should invalidate these cards. However, while certainly not a practice to be condoned, the backdating of the cards does not affect the fact that by signing them, the employees sought to obtain representation by the Union. To deprive them of represen- tation merely because the cards are misdated would be to sacrifice substance for form and, more importantly, to advance Respondent's goal, sought through unfair labor had given Townsend a blank card which he had returned to her 10 or 15 minutes later. IT Ihe Board will also accept as authentic any authorization cards which were returned by the signatory to the person soliciting them even though the solicitor did not witness the actual act of signing." McEwen Manufacturing Company and Washington Industries, Inc., 172 NLRB 990, 992 (1968). Therefore, I count Townsend's card notwithstanding the fact that he did not personally authenticate it. 1067 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD practices, of depriving them of representation. In the circumstances of the instant case, it is clear that all of the cards had been signed by August 10 and, accordingly, a much better solution than leaving the employees unrepre- sented is to make the bargaining obligation effective as of that date. Among the unfair labor practices committed by Respon- dent were a threat of closure and the discharges of the two successive leading proponents of unionization. A threat of closure is sufficient to render impossible the conducting of a free and fair election. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, Inc., Birmingham Division, 210 NLRB 593 (1974). The effect of action directed to the principal union adherents, particularly their discharges, "is pervasive in its effect as it simultaneously restrains (or eliminates) the organizational activity of those already committed to the Union, while warning others that dire consequences may attach to them if they come to the Union's support." Motel 6, Inc., 207 NLRB 473 (1973), enfd. by unpublished decision dated November 14, 1974, 94 LRRM 2368 (C.A. 9). Therefore, the magnitude of Respondent's unfair labor practices warrants issuance of a remedial bargaining order. Respondent, however, argues that most of these unfair labor practices predated the signing of most of the cards, on August 9 and 10, thereby demonstrating that "such action could not have dissipated the union's majority." Of course, Holt's termination occurred after all of the cards were signed and that, alone, would warrant issuance of a bargaining order. See Hambre Hombre Enterprises, Inc., supra. Furthermore, the Board has not been reluctant to issue bargaining orders based upon unfair labor practices occurring prior to attainment of majority. See Bookland Inc., 221 NLRB 35 (1975). The fact that majority support is retained despite unlawful discharges does not serve to shield employers from issuance of remedial bargaining orders. See John C. Carey Milling Company, 218 NLRB 916 (1975); The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., supra. In essence, Respondent is basing its argument upon subjective considerations, while the test for determining whether a bargaining order should issue is an objective one. See Broadmoor Lumber Company, 227 NLRB 1123, fn. 16 (1977), and cases cited therein. Therefore, I find that the timing of Respondent's unfair labor practices does not nullify the need for issuance of a bargaining order to remedy them. V. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent, set forth in section IV, above, occurring in connection with Respondent's opera- tions, described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes 12 It is settled that a statement such as that made by Clarkson to Jenkins following Holt's discharge on August 13 is a violation of Section 8(aX)() of the Act. New Castle Lumber and Supply Co., Division of Peter Kuntz Co., 203 NLRB 937, fn. 1 (1973); Carolina Quality Concrete Co., 193 NLRB 463, 469 (1971). Although this comment was not alleged to be a violation in the complaint, it was "part and parcel of [Respondent's) persistent antiunion campaign," was "fully litigated at the hearing," and was a matter concerning burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Ultra-Sonic De-Burring, Inc. of Texas is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act, engaged in commerce and in a business affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Communications Workers of America Local 9455, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By creating the impression that employees' union activities were under surveillance, by interrogating employ- ees regarding their union activities and the union activities of other employees, by threatening cessation of business operations if the employees selected the Union as their collective-bargaining representative, and by telling an employee that another employee had been discharged because she had engaged in union activities, 12 Ultra-Sonic De-Burring, Inc. of Texas has violated Section 8(aX1) of the Act. 4. By discriminatorily discharging Indiana Lee Zoller and Shirley Holt, Ultra-Sonic De-Burring, Inc. of Texas violated Section 8(aX3 ) and (1) of the Act. 5. A unit appropriate for collective bargaining is: All production and maintenance employees of Ultra-Sonic De- Burring, Inc. of Texas, including truckdrivers, employed at its Redwood City, California, facility; excluding office clerical employees, professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. 6. At all times material since August 10, Communica- tions Workers of America Local 9455, AFL-CIO, has been the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the employees in the above-described unit within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act and have rendered the holding of a fair election unlikely, thereby warranting issuance of a bargaining order to remedy the effects of these unfair labor practices. 8. Ultra-Sonic De-Burring, Inc. of Texas did not violate the Act by announcing on August 6, that the top pay rates of employee classifications were to be raised. THE REMEDY Having found that Ultra-Sonic De-Burring, Inc. of Texas has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and that it take certain affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act. which "Respondent had ample opportunity to offer, and in fact did offer, evidence ... ." Seemingly, therefore, the Board deems such situations to require provision of an appropriate remedy. Alexander Dawson, Inc., d/b/a Alexander's Restaurant and Lounge. 228 NLRB 165, 166 (1977); cf. GTE Automatic Electric, Inc., 196 NLRB 902 (1972). Contra: Medicine Bow Coal Company, 217 NLRB 931, fn. 2 (1975); Richman-Gordanan Stores, Inc., 220 NLRB 453, fn. 1 (1975). 1068 ULTRA-SONIC DE-BURRING To the extent that it has not already done so,13 Ultra- Sonic De-Burring, Inc. of Texas will be required to offer Indiana Lee Zoller and Shirley Holt immediate reinstate- ment to their former positions of employment or, if those positions no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, dismissing, if necessary, anyone who may have been assigned or hired to perform the work which Zoller had been performing prior to her termination on August 9, and which Holt had been performing prior to her termination on August 13. Additionally, Ultra-Sonic De-Burring, Inc. of Texas will be required to make Zoller and Holt whole for any loss of earnings they may have suffered by reason of their unlawful terminations, with backpay to be computed on a quarterly basis, making deductions for interim earnings, and with interest to be paid at the rate of 7-percent per annum. F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950); Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977). Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and upon the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER 14 The Respondent, Ultra-Sonic De-Burring, Inc. of Texas, Redwood City, California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Creating the impression of surveillance of employees' union activities, interrogating employees regarding their union activities and the union activities of other employees, threatening cessation of business operations if employees select a labor organization as their collective-bargaining representative, and telling employees that other employees have been terminated because they are active in supporting a labor organization. (b) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against employees with regard to their hire or tenure of employ- ment or any term or condition of employment for engaging in activities on behalf of a labor organization or for engaging in activity protected by Section 7 of the Act. (c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: 13 While the record discloses that Shirley Holt was reemployed by Respondent on March 14. 1977, it is unclear whether her reemployment constituted reinstatement. See Colorflo Decorator Products. Inc. 228 NLRB 408 (1977). 14 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become (a) To the extent that it has not already done so, offer Indiana Lee Zoller and Shirley Holt immediate and full reinstatement to their former positions of employment, dismissing, if necessary, anyone who may have been hired to perform the work that they had been performing prior to the dates on which they were terminated, or, if their former positions no longer exist, to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and make them whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered as a result of the discrimination, in the manner set forth above in the section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy." (b) Preserve and, make available to the Board or its agents all payroll and other records necessary to compute the backpay and reinstatement rights set forth in "The Remedy" section of this Decision. (c) Upon request, recognize and bargain with Communi- cations Workers of America Local 9455, AFL-CIO, as the collective-bargaining representative of the employees in the appropriate unit of all production and maintenance employees of Ultra-Sonic De-Burring, Inc. of Texas, including truckdrivers, employed at its Redwood City, California, facility; excluding office clerical employees, professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act, respecting rates of pay, wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of employment and, if an under- standing is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. (d) Post at its Redwood City, California, facility, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 15 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 20, after being duly signed by Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 20, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Ultra-Sonic De-Burring, Inc. of Texas has taken to comply herewith. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and it hereby is, dismissed insofar as it alleges that Ultra-Sonic De-Burring, Inc. of Texas announced an increase in pay rates on August 6, to encourage employees to abandon their support of the Union. its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 15 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." 1069