Jewish Center for the Aged

98 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Jewish Center for the Aged and Service and Hospital Employees, Local 50, affiliated with Service Em- ployees International Union , AFL-CIO. Case 14- CA-8129 September 3, 1975 DECISION AND ORDER By MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND PENELLO On April 30, 1975, Administrative Law Judge Jen- nie M. Sarrica issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt her recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re- lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that Respondent Jewish Center for the Aged, St. Louis, Missouri, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. 1 The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to over- rule an Administrative Law Judge' s resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc. 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing her findings DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JENNIE M. SARRICA, Administrative Law Judge: Upon due notice, this proceeding under Section 10(b) of the Na- tional Labor Relations Act, as amended (29 USC § 151, et seq.), hereinafter referred to as the Act, was tried before me at St. Louis, Missouri, on February 24, 1975, pursuant to a complaint issued on November 8, 1974,' based on charges filed September 16 by Service and Hospital Employees, 1 All dates are in 1974 unless otherwise indicated. Local 50, affiliated with Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the Union, presenting allegations that Jewish Center for the Aged, hereinafter referred to as Respondent , committed unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a)(1) and (5) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. On November 19, the Respondent filed a timely answer denying that it com- mitted the violations of the Act alleged. Representatives of all parties were present and participated in the hearing. Based on the entire record including my observation of witnesses, and after due consideration of the arguments presented in the briefs filed by the General Counsel and the Respondent, I make the following: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT Respondent, a Missouri corporation with its principal office and place of business at 4815 Blair Avenue, St. Louis, Missouri, during all times material herein is and has been engaged in the operation of a proprietary professional care nursing home. During the 12-month period ending October 31, a representative period, Respondent had gross revenues from such operations in excess of $100,000. Dur- ing that same period Respondent purchased goods and ma- terials valued in excess of $10,000 and caused same to be shipped to its Blair Avenue facility from points located outside the State of Missouri. Respondent admits, and I find, that it is now, and has been at all times material here- in, an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 11. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION The Charging Party is, and has been at all times material herein, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 111. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Issue Whether Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) by insist- ing upon negotiating with respect to recognition of the in- cumbent employee representative and with respect to the scope of the established contract unit. B. Background Respondent has operated a nursing home at the 4815 Blair Avenue address where the Union since approximate- ly 1968 has represented an overall unit described in the July 14, 1971, 3-year contract as follows: Section 2 RECOGNITION The Employer recognizes the Union as the exclusive bargaining agent for all employees of the Employer, including employees in the Dietary , Laundry and Cen- tral Supply, Housekeeping and Nursing Departments but excluding maintenance employees , office clerical 220 NLRB No. 21 JEWISH CENTER FOR THE AGED 99 employees, professional employees, guards and super- visors as defined in the Act; and patients who for ther- apeutic reasons perform certain services otherwise performed by those in the bargaining unit. The Union gave timely notice under the termination provision to renegotiate the 1971 contract, and submitted written proposed changes for a number of contract sections but not including section 2 quoted above or section 23, which was a duration clause providing for a 3-year term automatically renewable for 1-year periods in the absence of timely notice for termination. Nine negotiating sessions followed, beginning on May 23.2 At these sessions the Re- spondent was represented by one or the other of its two attorneys. Before negotiations began the Union became aware that Respondent was contemplating a move of its facilities to another location. C. The Negotiations At the first meeting, in addition to the previously men- tioned written contract changes, the Union proposed add- ing to the contract a "successorship clause." The proposal was discussed but no agreement was reached. Respondent's attorney, Timothy Heinsz, informed the Union negotiators that Respondent had already sold its Blair Avenue facility and therefore the proposed successor- ship clause, which contemplated contract assumption, would be impossible to implement. Heinsz advised that Re- spondent was still occupying and operating the facility but would be phasing its patients out of the nursing home at some indefinite future and ceasing its management opera- tions there. The Union withdrew the successorship propos- al at the June 4 session and on June 18 submitted a revised successorship clause.3 Respondent presented its written proposals at the June 26 meeting. Among the contract changes requested were revisions of both section 2 and section 23. The change pro- posed in section 2 was to designate the existing provision as "(a)" and insert therein, before the word "including" at the beginning of the third line as quoted above, the phrase, "located at its facility at 4518 Blair Avenue, St. Louis, Mis- souri 63107." A new subparagraph to be added to this sec- tion was to read as follows: (b) In the event the Employer ceases its operations of caring for the elderly at its facility located at 4518 Blair Avenue, St. Louis, Missouri 63107, the parties agree that they will be bound in every way by the principles regarding successorship as announced by the Supreme Court in National Labor Relations Board vs. Burns International Security Service, 406 U.S. 272, 80 LRRM 2225 (1973), and by all other laws and cases 2 The parties stipulated that such meetings were held on the following dates: May 23, June 6, 18, and 26, and July 3, 5, 6, 13, and 14-15. At all meetings up to and including the June 26 session, Attorney Heinsz was Respondent's negotiator. Thereafter, Attorney Michael Tannler represented Respondent in bargaining. The Union was represented by its research and negotiations specialist, J. Clinton Gwin, Ann Spears Givens, a business rep- resentative, and an employee committee. 3 At these meetings the parties had reached agreement on a number of the Union's proposed changes. of the courts of the United States and the National Labor Relations Board in this regard. With respect to section 23 (Duration of Agreement), Re- spondent proposed a revised part (a) to read: (a) This agreement shall take effect as of the 14th day of July, 1974, and shall continue in effect with the express terms and conditions herein set forth until the Center ceases its operations described in Section 3(a) above, at its facility located at 4518 Blair Avenue, St. Louis., Missouri 63107, or for a period of years, whichever occurs first; provided, however, if this Agreement is still in force and effect on and if either party hereto shall desire a change, the party so desiring such change shall notify the other party in writing at least sixty (60) days prior to the expiration date of this agreement. The union negotiating committee discussed the new di- mension injected into the negotiations by Respondent's proposals relating to section 2 and section 23. Gwin and Givens testified that the Union rejected the changes pro- posed for section 2(a), whereas Heinsz testified that the Union stated it had no objection to that revision. All agree that Gwin rejected the proposed changes for section 2(b) and section 23(a). Gwin testified he advised Heinsz he would take Respondent's proposed successorship provi- sion, 2(b), to the union attorneys for advice. As to section 23, he stated that whether their contract was for I or 3 years was not particularly important to the Union but that it would not agree to "this new dimension" to terminate the agreement upon a cessation of operations by Respon- dent at the Blair Avenue address. Heinsz testified that it was the proposed revisions to section 23 which Gwin stated he would seek legal advice on. At the July 3 meeting the Union proposed a requirement for transfer of employees and for recognition on a card check in the event of relocation of Respondent's patient care operation. The Respondent's representative rejected the card check idea but suggested a private election proce- dure at any new location. Along with a new contract revi- sion proposal, the Respondent again presented a revision to section 23 which, aside from editorial revisions and the insertion of the specificity of a 3-year term, was identical to that previously presented. Tannier, who took over negotiat- ing for the Respondent on this date, testified that because of union problems with the language of its proposed sec- tion 2(b) incorporating a case citation, the Respondent negotiators decided to concentrate on the termination clause . Union representatives agree that this proposal was rejected by Gwin without discussion. Respondent's repre- sentatives testified it was their understanding that this.pro- posal was accepted.4 Meetings of July 5 and 6 were devoted to other contract provisions. At the July 13 meeting, the transfer and recog- nition problem was again discussed. The parties agreed to the right of employees to transfer to any new location and, The witnesses are in disagreement as to whether or not Heinsz was present at this meeting . Due to the fact that Heinsz admittedly was absent from all succeeding negotiating sessions due to a prolonged illness, and for various other reasons including those hereinafter indicated , t am convinced that Heinsz did not attend this meeting. 100 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD in principle, to utilize a private election procedure for rec- ognition purposes upon a 30-percent card showing checked by an arbitrator. Also at this meeting Tannier informed the union negotiators that any agreement Respondent' s negoti- ators made was subject to approval by Respondent's board. The session spanning July 14-15 was devoted primarily to economic matters. Around midnight Tannler, accompa- nied by 6 or 7 boardmembers for whom Board President Shapiro was spokesman, presented the Union with Respondent's final offer. At the same time Shapiro rescind- ed the agreement with respect to the right of employees to transfer to any new location because of the Respondent's alleged commitment to the purchaser of the premises to leave a staff with the successor when it ceased functioning at that address .5 The Union advised that it would present Respondent's final offer to its membership. Several days later the union membership voted to accept the Respondent's final offer as presented,to them by the negotiating representatives,6 and Gwin then proceeded to draft the new contract in accordance with his under- standing of the agreed-upon changes. This was presented to Respondent for signature by Givens near the end of July and referred by it to the attorneys who participated in the negotiations. In early August Heinsz, who at that time returned to work, reviewed the contract draft from the standpoint of his recollections and information supplied him by Tannler and called Givens stating that there were certain editorial and language errors in the contract as drafted as well as an error in some of the figures in the pension provisions. Heinsz testified that the problem areas were "primarily just language or misunderstandings": shall to will; clarification of lunch periods; pension figure mistake, etc., and that he told Givens that since he was not present at many negotiat- ing meetings they had better have a meeting of the negotia- tors. On August 11, Heinsz brought the draft to Givens to go over the desired changes' According to Givens, she told Heinsz she saw no problem with his suggested changes but wished to clear them with Gwin who was not then avail- able. When Gwin later told her there was no problem pre- sented by Heinsz' suggestions Givens attempted to reach Heinsz several times but was advised that he was ill. Final- ly, the matter was turned over to the Union attorney to obtain a meeting with Respondent to complete execution of the agreement . A meeting was obtained by a mediation service enlisted by the union attorney. At the meeting held September 3, in addition to the edi- 3 At one of the earlier meetings, Respondent had advised union negotia- tors that a commitment had been made to the purchaser to leave a staff available for its operation of the home after Respondent ceased to function at that location, and therefore present employees would have a job with the new employer if they wanted it. 6 The parties had not reduced to writing their agreement on the various changes but depended upon recall of oral understandings. 7 At that time, according to Heinsz, he brought with him and gave to Givens a copy of Respondent's July 3 duration proposal and she took it to the union president, reporting back that he would never agree to such a clause . Givens testified that no mention was made at this time of any revi- sion to sec. 2 or sec. 24 (the old sec. 23) of the contract draft. Hemsz admitted that he did not raise any question relating to sec. 2, asserting that this was due to an oversight. tonal and language problems on which no difficulties were encountered, Respondent raised the "hotter issues" of the recognition and termination clauses and the absence of the private election understanding. Consequently, other areas of discrepancy or needed clarification were not thoroughly explored. With respect to the private election agreement, the Union expressed its willingness to reduce that under- standing to writing and even to incorporate it into the con- tract if Respondent so desired. However, contrary to Respondent's negotiators, Gwin insisted that there had been no agreement to change section 2 and the former section 23 while Tannler stated that without them Respon- dent would not sign the agreement. According to Tannler, the parties got hung up on the recognition and termination clauses and after this meeting the Respondent's negotiators just sat back to see what would happen. They were, howev- er, staying in touch with Respondent to see what was de- veloping in connection with relocation.' C. Analysis and Findings Contrary to Respondent's contention, I view the evi- dence as a whole as establishing that the union negotiators did not agree to Respondent's proposed section 2(a), in- serting in the recognition clause Respondent's current ad- dress, on June 26 or on any other date. In this respect, I find both Gwin and Givens wholly credible witnesses on the basis of both demeanor and the internal consistency of their testimony and actions in contrast to those of Respondent's negotiators. Further, this was not a situation in which there was no comprehension of the impact of the suggested language. The parties were acutely aware throughout negotiations of the fact that a drastic change in the Respondent's normal operation was about to take place, directly affecting employees and specifically related to Respondent's continued operation at the established premises. The fact that the Union was made aware that the Respondent was considering many alternative courses of action, and the continuing uncertainty of what course it would elect, of necessity operated as a red flag for any proposal that might diminish employees rights and benefits which the Union was commissioned to protect. The alert- ness of the Union to this situation is underscored by the fact that its research and negotiations specialist was pre- sent with its business representative and actively partici- pated at every negotiation meeting. Further, it is clear that this proposal, along with two related proposals which together were clearly designed to terminate not only the contract but also the recognized status of the employees' representative, was the subject of a caucus by the union bargaining committee. Admittedly, the Union rejected the other two proposals after it had caucused. A different answer with respect to proposed sec- tion 2(a) involving the same problem is entirely inconceiva- ble. 8In this respect, proffered testimony to establish what discussions took place thereafter and what the further developments were with respect to Respondent's operation was rejected as having no relevancy to the issue of whether a negotiating impasse was reached on September 3 because of Respondent's position on the provisions of these two sections and whether the impasse in bargaining was brought about on a nonmandatory subject JEWISH CENTER FOR THE AGED 101 That the Union in fact rejected this proposal as well is further indicated by other events and testimony. Thus, Tannler testified that in view of the Union's difficulty with its proposed revision to the section 2 recognition clause, subsection (b), Respondent's negotiators decided to con- centrate upon accomplishing their objective in the reword- ing of the termination clause. And, significantly, Heinsz, who was the sole negotiator for Respondent at the June 26 meeting and who testified that the Union accepted the sec- tion 2(a) change, when he reviewed the proposed contract draft for any discrepancy and discussed these with Givens, was able to find problems with matters negotiated in his absence by Tannler but completely failed to mention the absence of his proposed section 2(a), while at the same time allegedly resubmitting Tannler's later proposed revi- sion of the termination clause. In view of the significance of the Respondent's impend- ing change of location and operations throughout the ne- gotiating period, I find it unbelievable that the language of this section would have been overlooked by him in review- ing the contract draft, as testified to by Heinsz.9 Turning now to the duration clause assertedly accepted by the Union, Respondent's witnesses testified that this oc- curred when, on July 3, Respondent's negotiators submit- ted their revised proposals for changes in section 23. As noted above, aside from rephrasing, the only change made in the proposal which had been rejected by the Union was the insertion of the 3-year term designation in the place of blanks. On the earlier occasion, the Union had indicated its satisfaction with either a 1- or a 3-year contract. Here again, Respondent contends that the Union accepted its proposal and I find to the contrary. Union representatives testified that they rejected this proposal without discussion and I credit their testimony. Gwin indicated it was his recollection that there was very little discussion of anything at that meeting because of Tannler's urgency to get away for the July 4 holiday. Respondent's witnesses did not present testimony suggest- ing that there was any real discussion of this provision on that date: Tannler merely stating, "My recollection is that at that meeting Clint Gwin agreed to the proposal" and Heinsz testifying there was a detailed status report on Respondent's anticipated relocation and the uncertainties involved preceding the proposal, a union caucus, and Gwin's statement upon return that he agreed to the propos- al.10 There is no indication of why, if this proposal had 9 In this respect, I place no reliance upon the marginal notations appear- ing in Respondent's copy of the June 26 proposals or on the related testimo- ny without regard to any comparison with the handwriting sample present- ed by the Union I note , moreover, that even those notes are inconsistent with Tannler's indication that it was the proposed change for contract Sec 2(b) and not that relating to Sec. 23 which Gwin was willing to discuss with the union attorneys. In addition to all the foregoing, there is the matter of inconsistency between Heinsz' testimony and the information contained in the statement supplied by him to the Board Regional Office during the investigation of the case . Together, these considerations convince me that at the very least Heinsz' recollection was faulty and that his testimony cannot be relied upon. 10 On the basis of matters referred to supra and in In. 9, above, and the contrary testimony of union negotiators, I find that, consistent with his Board statement in contrast to his testimony , Heinsz was not present at the July 3 meeting. Similarly, I make no finding as to who placed notations in the margin of Respondent's proposals, when such notations were made, been accepted as he asserts, Heinsz would have brought to Givens for consideration a copy of this proposal when he met with her to go over the so-called editorial, language and figure changes in the contract draft submitted by the Union and not then assert that this was a significant omit- ted change agreed upon during negotiations. As this case proves, this was not a minor matter to the parties which would qualify as mere editorial, language or figure changes. In its brief, Respondent contends that the contract lan- guage on which it insisted involved issues as to the unit covered, successorship, relocation, and subcontracting, that these are mandatory bargaining subjects as are dura- tion clauses and, in any event, refusal to sign the Union's proffered agreement does not establish that there was an impasse; there was merely disagreement as to what had been agreed upon. In addition, Respondent points to the General Counsel's failure to establish that after it refused to sign the contract, Respondent "subsequently refused any Union request to bargain for a new contract or over its future status." The section titles utilized in a contract are not in them- selves definitive of the nature of the bargaining subject placed under them by the parties and do not determine whether the issue on which bargaining founders is a man- datory or nonmandatory subject. Thus, the mere fact that the language which Respondent wished to insert in section 2(a) would fall in the bargaining unit description does not establish the subject matter it was intended to affect as purely a unit issue any more than the existence of the unit description in the recognition clause establishes all unit dis- putes as recognition issues. Similarly, the revisions sought by Respondent in the duration clause, although designat- ing a condition under which the contract could terminate before expiration of its initial period, were not necessarily limited to contract duration in their impact, and therefore to that subject. The proposals and the positions of the parties must he evaluated in light of the objectives and real issues raised, keeping in mind the circumstances facing the negotiators, i.e., a removal of Respondent's function to another loca- tion-not the cessation of Respondent's operations or the work involved. Clearly Respondent was not contemplating abandonment of its institutional purpose, but was pursuing the objective of relocation because of a changing neighbor- hood setting. Respondent fully intended to continue the care of patients of the ethnic group to which its operations were dedicated. Having sold its established facility to the Urban League, Respondent was continuing to operate the home on a contract basis during the transition period while phasing into the present facility patients of the purchasers organization and at the same time searching for facilities for its own clientele. In the latter respect, Respondent was exploring the possibility of purchasing an appropriate ex- isting patient care facility or building a new one, and was considering contracting its patients to other existing facili- ties until it could obtain a suitable location in which to reestablish its normal function. In such circumstances, em- what meaning they may have, or even whether they have any bearing upon the negotiating discussions 102 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ployees and their representatives are vitally interested in protecting their jobs as well as residual rights. Treating employees as property to be sold with the facili- ty, the Respondent committed them as a staff to the pur- chaser along with the sale of the premises and sought to assure performance of that commitment by seeking, through the proposed contract revisions involved, to de- prive employees of continued employment when their jobs with the Respondent were relocated, of any residual con- tract rights, and of continued representation by their statu- tory bargaining representative. In this light, I find merit in the General Counsel's contention that the proposed amendments to the recognition and termination clauses, considered together, had the effect of limiting Respondent's recognition of the Union as the representa- tive of its employees, and of terminating those representa- tive rights on a basis not consistent with the principles es- tablished by law.1 [ This raises the question of whether Respondent insisted upon these changes to the point of impasse and, on the basis of the facts herein, I find that it did. All parties agree that it was their understanding that agreement had been reached, and this is supported by Respondent's final offer, in the presence of its board members whose approval was required, which was accepted by the employee vote, and the drafting of the completed agreement by the Union. Thereafter, any matter preliminary to execution of a writ- ten agreement was subject only to clarification of contract language or mutual agreement. Instead, Respondent at- tempted to force inclusion of previously rejected proposals and took the stance that Respondent would not execute a contract which did not contain such changes. Since the subject matter or issue involved in those clauses was, in reality, a limitation of recognition, and not a mandatory subject of bargaining, the impasse created thereby was un- lawful.12 The fact that some clarification of contract lan- guage on agreements reached remained to be discussed be- fore they had a draft of a written contract which the parties could execute does not detract from the existence of an impasse.13 Nor was the Union required to initiate further negotiations after it had accepted Respondent's final of- fer,14 or to request bargaining for a new contract. And, certainly, at no time was it required to bargain with Re- spondent over "its future status." Accordingly, I find that Respondent bargained to im- passe with the Union over Respondent's obligation to rec- 11 The termination of a written contract does not terminate a union's representative status, nor does it deprive employees of their employment status or of residual rights in the contract or to representation. Although the parties may, by agreement, change an existing unit description or set a date or eventuality for abandonment of the representative status of the Union, these are matters concerning which neither party may insist upon to the point of impasse. i2 See Shell Oil Company, and its divisions Shell Chemical Company and Shell Development Company 194 NLRB 988, 995 (1972), Sall River Valley Water Users'Association, 204 NLRB 83 (1973), and cases cited therein. Also see Newspaper Production Company, 205 NLRB 738 (1973) 13 In view of my holding herein, I do not pass upon General Counsel's alternative position that Respondent's insistence upon those clauses was unlawful even if factually it were found that initially the Union had agreed to the clauses in dispute then refused to include them in a written contract. i4 See Rasco Olympia, Inc., d/b/a Rasco 5-10-25e 185 NLRB 894, 897 (1970). ognize the Union, and thereby engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. All employees of the Employer, including employees in the Dietary, Laundry & Central Supply, Housekeeping and Nursing Departments, excluding maintenance employ- ees, office clerical employees, professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act, and patients who for therapeutic reasons perform certain services other- wise performed by those in the bargaining unit, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 4. At all times material the Union has been and is the exclusive representative of all employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit for purposes of collective bargaining with- in the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 5. By insisting upon inclusion in the written contract of its proposals for changes in the recognition and duration clauses which in substance were limitations upon the Union's representative status, and thereby causing an im- passe in bargaining on a nonmandatory subject, Respon- dent refused to bargain in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, and has thereby interfered with employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative ac- tion designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that Respondent unlawfully insisted upon clauses limiting the Union's representative status and thereby caused an impasse on a nonmandatory subject, thus fore- closing the parties from reducing to writing the bargaining agreement reached in negotiations, I shall recommend that Respondent be ordered to meet with the Union to resolve language differences and to incorporate their under- standing in a signed contract, upon request by the Union. I shall also recommend that the Respondent be required to post at its place of business the notice attached to this Decision marked "Appendix." Upon the foregoing findings, of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: JEWISH CENTER FOR THE AGED ORDER 15 Jewish Center for the Aged, St. Louis, Missouri, its offi- cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to bargain collectively by insisting upon in- clusion in the written contract of its proposals for changes in the recognition and duration clauses which in substance were limitations upon the Union's representative status, thereby causing an impasse in bargaining on a nonmanda- tory subject. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Recognize and bargain with the Union as to the ex- clusive representative of its employees in the appropriate unit and, upon request, meet with the Union to resolve language differences and incorporate the resulting under- standing in a signed contract. (b) Post at its offices and place of business copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 16 Copies of said no- tice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re- gion 14, after being duly signed by Respondent's represen- tative, shall be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea- sonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 14, in writ- ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. 15 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 16 In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board " shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX 103 NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a hearing in which all parties had the opportunity to present their evidence, the National Labor Relations Board has found that we, Jewish Center for the Aged, violated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post this notice and keep the promises we make in this notice. WE WILL, upon request, meet with Service and Hos- pital Employees, Local 50, affiliated with Service Em- ployees International Union, AFL-CIO, as the collec- tive bargaining representative of: All employees of the Employer, including employ- ees in the Dietary, Laundry & Central Supply, Housekeeping and Nursing Departments, excluding maintenance employees, office clerical employees, professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act; and patients who for therapeutic reasons perform certain services otherwise per- formed by those in the bargaining unit, to resolve language differences we may have and in- corporate the resulting understanding in a signed con- tract. WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with your bargaining representative by insisting upon inclusion in the written contract our proposals for changes in the recognition and duration clauses which in sub- stance were limitations upon the Union's representa- tive status, thereby causing an impasse in bargaining on a nonmandatory subject, or in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employ- ees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Sec- tion 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. JEWISH CENTER FOR THE AGED