J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc.

270 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc. and Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO. Case I1-CA-5945 September 15, 1975 DECISION AND ORDER By CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS FANNING AND JENKINS On April 18, 1975, Administrative Law Judge Marvin Roth issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel and the Charging Party filed exceptions and supporting briefs. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order, as modified herein: We agree with the Administrative Law Judge's finding that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by coercively interrogating an employee con- cerning her own and other employees' union sympa- thies and activities. The General Counsel and the Charging Party except to the omission of a specific remedy by the Administrative Law Judge for the Respondent's solicitation of the same employee to report to Respondent on the union activities of other employees. We agree. The Administrative Law Judge credited the testi- mony of employee Rogers that her supervisor, Riven- bark, "requested her to report upon the union sym- pathies of other employees." No exception was filed by Respondent to that finding. Accordingly, we shall correct this omission by amending the conclusions of law and providing an appropriate remedy in our Or- der and in the notice. The Charging Party also urges, in view of the ex- tensive unfair labor practice history of the Respon- dent, that the Board should order extraordinary rem- edies in this case. The Charging Party requests that the Respondent be required to post the notices at all of Respondent's plants in North Carolina and South Carolina; that the union be given access for 1 year to the bulletin boards at Respondent's plants in North Carolina and South Carolina; and that Respondent be required, upon request, to furnish to the Union a list of the names and addresses of all of the employ- ees at all of the Respondent's plants in North Caroli- na and South Carolina. We have considered the numerous prior violations of the Act by this same Respondent at various loca- tions. As set forth in the Decision of the Administra- tive Law Judge, the Respondent has an extraordinary history of unfair labor practice litigation before this Board and the courts. The Respondent has commit- ted violations of the Act which are iridentical or simi- lar to the violations found in this case on numerous other occasions. In J. P. Stevens and Co., Inc., 157 NLRB 869 (1966), enfd. as modified 380 F.2d 292 (C.A. 2, 1967), cert. denied 389 U.S. 1005 (1967), the court of ap- peals affirmed the Board's findings that the Respon- dent had engaged in "massive violations" of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the Act. Thereafter, in Stevens 11, 163 NLRB 217 (1967), enfd. as modified 388 F.2d 896 (C.A. 2, 1967), cert. denied 393 U.S. 836 (1968), the same court affirmed the Board's findings that the Respondent had committed additional violations of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4). The Fourth Circuit en- forced in substantial part the Board's order in Ste- vens 111, 167 NLRB 266 (1967), 406 F.2d 1017 (C.A. 4, 1968), which was based on findings of violations of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4). In Stevens V, 171 NLRB 1202 (1968), enfd. 417 F.2d 533 (C.A. 5, 1969), and Stevens VI, 179 NLRB 254.(1969), enfd. 441 F.2d 514 (C.A. 5, 1971), cert. denied 404 U.S. 830 (1971), the Fifth Circuit enforced the Board's orders against the Respondent, including a remedial bargaining order in Stevens VI. The Fourth Circuit also enforced the Board's order, 183 NLRB 25 (1970), enfd. 461 F.2d 490 (C.A. 4, 1972), relating to violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3). The Board has recently found violations of Section 8(a)(1) by the Respondent in 217 NLRB No. 90 (1975), and further violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) by the Respondent in 219 NLRB No. 156 (1975). As a result of Respondent's repeated unfair labor practice violations at its various locations, including the Wallace, North Carolina, plant here involved, the Second Circuit entered an order adjudging the Re- spondent in civil contempt of the court for continu- ing to discriminatorily discharge employees in viola- tion of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. 464 F.2d 1326 (C.A. 2, 1972), cert. denied 410 U.S. 926 (1973). In view of the extensive history of unfair labor practice violations by this Respondent and the re- peated violations of the Act which are similar to those found in this case, we find that employees of the Respondent at other plants must be assured of their rights under the Act and that other employees must be assured that they are protected against simi- lar violations by this Respondent. Accordingly, we find it necessary in these circumstances to order that Respondent post the notice at all of its plants. 220 NLRB No. 34 J. P. STEVENS & CO., INC. With regard to the additional remedies sought by the Charging Party, the Union seeks access to the plant bulletin boards and names and addresses of employees at plants in North Carolina and South Carolina. We are not persuaded that the nature and extent of the violations found in this case have signif- icantly diminished the Union's ability to initiate communication with Respondent's employees. As the remedy provided is designed to eliminate Respondent's coercive interference with employee- union organizational activities , we shall not grant the request for additional extraordinary remedies in this case. AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Delete Conclusions of Law 3 and substitute there- for the following: "3. By coercively interrogating employee Faye Rogers concerning her own and other employees' union sympathies and activities and by soliciting Faye Rogers to report to Respondent on other em- ployees' union activities, the Company has interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the ex- ercise of their rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act." ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re- lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge as modified below and hereby orders that the Respondent, J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc., Wallace, North Carolina, its of- ficers, agents, successors , and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Administrative Law Judge's recommended Order, as so modified: 1. Add the following as paragraph 1(c): "(c) Soliciting employees to report to Respondent on other employees' membership in, activities on be- half of, or sympathy for Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organiza- tion." 2. Substitute the following sentence for the first sentence in paragraph 2(a): "(a) Post at all of its plants copies of the attached notice marked `Appendix.' 13" 3. Substitute the attached notice for the Adminis- trative Law Judge's notice. APPENDIX 271 NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a trial at which all sides had a chance to give evidence, the National Labor Relations Board has found that our Company at its Carter Plant, Wallace, North Carolina , violated the National Labor Rela- tions Act and has ordered us to post this notice. The National Labor Relations Act protects em- ployees in their right to form , join, or assist labor unions or to refrain from such activity. WE WILL NOT interrogate employees concern- ing their own or other employees ' membership in, activities on behalf of, or sympathy for Tex- tile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization. WE WILL NOT solicit employees to report to us on other employees' membership in, activities on behalf of, or sympathy for Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or any other la- bor organization. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amend- ed. J. P. STEVENS & CO., INC. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE MARVIN ROTH, Administrative Law Judge : This case was tried at Wilmington, North Carolina, on March 26, 1975. The charge and amended charge were filed , respectively, on November 22, 1974, and January 21, 1975, by Textile Workers Union of America , AFL-CIO, herein called the Union. The complaint, which issued on January 29, 1975, and was amended at the hearing, alleges that J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc., herein called the Company or Respondent, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended . The Company's answer denies the com- mission of the alleged unfair labor practices. Issues The issues are: 1. Whether, during the course of an organizing cam- paign by the Union among the Company's employees at its Carter plant in Wallace , North Carolina, the Company, by its supervisor Roland Rivenbark, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by interrogating employee Faye Rogers as to how she felt about the Union and by requesting her to 272 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD report upon the union sympathies of other employees; and 2. Whether a remedial order is warranted. All parties were afforded full opportunity to participate, to present relevant evidence, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to argue orally on the evidence and the law. The parties waived the filing of briefs. Upon careful con- sideration of the arguments of counsel, the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT The Company is a New York corporation engaged in the manufacture and distribution of textile products, with plants located in several States of the United States, includ- ing plants located at Wallace, North Carolina. The Com- pany annually receives goods and raw materials at its Wal- lace plants directly from points outside the State of North Carolina valued in excess of $50,000, and annually manu- factures at its Wallace plants and ships directly to points outside of North Carolina products valued in excess of $50,000. The Board has in prior cases asserted jurisdiction over the Company's operations. Upon these undisputed facts I find that the Company is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction herein. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The complaint alleges, the Company admits and I find that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background: The Company's History of Unfair Labor Practices The Company has an extensive history of unfair labor practice litigation in the Board and courts. In J. P. Stevens & Co. v. N.L.R.B., 380 F.2d 292 (C.A. 2, 1967), cert. denied 389 U.S. 1005 (1967) (known as "Stevens I"), the court of appeals affirmed the Board's findings in 157 NLRB 869 (1966) that the Company engaged in "massive violations" of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the Act. Thereafter, in "Stevens 11" (388 F.2d 896 (C.A. 2, 1967), cert. denied 393 U.S. 836 (1968), the same court affirmed the Board's find- ings in 163 NLRB 217 (1967), that the Company commit- ted additional violations of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4). In Stevens III and IV (406 F.2d 1017 (1968) ), the Fourth Cir- cuit Court of Appeals enforced, in substantial part, Board orders in 167 NLRB 266 (1967) and 167 NLRB 258, based on findings of violation of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4). In Stevens V (417 F.2d 533 (1969)) and Stevens VI (441 F.2d 514 (1971), cert. denied 404 U.S. 830 (1971) ), the Fifth Circuit Court enforced Board orders against the Company, including a remedial bargaining order in Stevens VI. The court noted "Stevens' known predisposition to violate the law . . . unchastened by and impervious to judicial homi- lies" (441 F.2d at 516), and "the tenacity with which the Employer persists in the exercise of deep seated anti-union convictions" (417 F.2d at 534-535.1 Thereafter, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to enforce a Board order relating to charged violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) at the Company's Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina plants (449 F.2d 595 (1971), affg. in part and setting aside in part 181 NLRB 666 (1970) ), but enforced a Board order relat- ing to violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) at company plants in Shelby and Hickory, North Carolina (461 F.2d 490 (1972), enfg. 183 NLRB 25 (1970) ). On July 13, 1972, the Second Circuit Court found the Company to be in civil contempt of the decrees in Stevens I and II, by reason of the Company having engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) at several of its plants, including the Carter plant in Wallace, North Carolina, i.e., the plant here involved (464 F.2d 1326). On the basis of its findings, the court subsequently adjudged the Company and several of its supervisors in civil con- tempt of court, directing that they take certain steps to purge themselves of civil contempt, and "reserve[d] juris- diction to assess fines, issue writs of body attachment or take other appropriate action against any officer or agent of the Company and against any of the individual respon- dents responsible for noncompliance with the foregoing [purgation] provisions; of this order and the decrees of this Court" (cert. denied 410 U.S. 926 (1973) ). There is also presently pending a second civil contempt proceeding be- fore a special master of the same court, involving company plants in North and South Carolina. At the outset of the instant hearing, General Counsel requested that I take judicial notice of the foregoing cases, and I have done so. In light of those cases, and in particu- lar the civil contempt adjudication by the Second Circuit, it would appear that this case should have been prosecuted as a contempt matter before a court of appeals, rather than in an unfair labor practice proceeding. However, the General Counsel, in the exercise of his discretion under Section 3(d) of the Act, has chosen to proceed, at least initially, by way of an unfair labor practice complaint. Therefore, it is in this context that the present case must be decided. Supervi- sor Rivenbark, the Company's only witness, testified that the Company "was definitely against the Union" and that it was part of his duties to do what he legally could to keep the Union out. Whether, in this instance, the Company exceeded the bounds of legality is a matter which I have decided on the basis of the evidence adduced in this pro- ceeding. B. The Union's Organizational Campaign and the Alleged Interrogation of Employee Rogers In the early fall of 1974, the Union commenced an orga- nizational campaign among the approximately 1,200 em- 1 In Stevens 1, the Second Circuit similarly observed that "[t]here is no room for doubt of the Board 's ultimate conclusion" that Stevens "pursued a pattern of conduct the purpose of which was to crush the union movement . [wlith scant regard for the means employed other than their effective- ness . " (380 F 2d at 301.) J. P. STEVENS & CO., INC. ployees at the Company's Carter plant. The Union distrib- uted literature at plant entrances, and solicited signed au- thorization cards . This campaign promptly came to the at- tention of management .2 Faye Rogers was and is , knitter on the third shift in the tricot department at the Carter plant. Rivenbark is her im- mediate supervisor. Rogers, General Counsel's only wit- ness, testified that in early October, while Rivenbark was making his nightly rounds and coming by her machines, he apparently saw one Glisson , an employee in the tricot de- partment, attempting to get her to sign a union card. Rog- ers testified that about 3 days later, Rivenbark summoned her alone to his office. Rivenbark first discussed certain defects in her work. Rogers testified that after pausing, Ri- venbark asked her how she felt about the Union. Rogers answered that she didn't know because she had never worked under one. After pausing again, Rivenbark said "if you know of anybody that's for it, let me know." Rogers then got up and returned to work. Rogers testified that later that morning, Rivenbark approached her at her ma- chines and said "if anything comes up, don't mention my name." Rogers testified that in November, she informed Union International Representative Pope of her conversa- tion with Rivenbark , and that Pope told her "it was a viola- tion." Rogers testified that prior to speaking with Pope she had "often wondered" why Rivenbark would tell her not to mention his name should anything come up. On his direct examination Rivenbark denied seeing Glis- son attempt to get Rogers to sign a union card . Rogers indicated that Rivenbark was about 45 feet from them at the time of the incident. I might have been inclined to question whether Rivenbark could have seen a union card at that distance, even if he had seen the two employees together. However, on cross-examination Rivenbark ad- mitted that the incident occurred, but testified that he couldn't recall whether the incident occurred before or af- ter Rogers allegedly told him that an unidentified employ- ee had approached her with a "blue card" and asked her to sign it. I find that the incident occurred as testified to by Rogers. Rivenbark categorically denied questioning Rogers about her attitude toward the Union or about union adher- ents. He admitted that he summoned her to his office to discuss her work, but denied that the Union was discussed in that meeting or in any other conversation between them. He testified that on one occasion, as he was making his nightly rounds, she approached him and said that she had been approached by an employee (otherwise unidentified) with a "blue card" who asked her to sign it, but that she would not sign it. Rivenbark testified that he didn't know that a blue card meant a union card, but that he "had heard that there was union cards being passed out. And so I didn't say anything." However, Rivenbark readily identi- fied, at a distance of about 10 feet, a blue union card as being the kind of card which "I received at the gate one morning when I went out." 2 Supervisor Rivernbark 's testimony that he was not aware of any union activity at the time of his conversation with employee Rogers contradicted his earlier testimony that at the time he was in fact aware that union cards were being passed out. 273 Neither Rogers nor Rivenbark varied in their testimony concerning their alleged conversations. Neither version is inherently implausable. Rivenbark's testimony indicates that he was acutely interested in obtaining information about the Union's organizational drive, even to the point of listening in on employee conversations, e.g., by standing close enough to hear them over the factory noises, or by following employees to the smoking area or commissary. Rivenbark admittedly had reason to believe that Rogers' husband, also an employee in the plant, was opposed to the Union. Given these factors, Rivenbark's observation of Glisson with Rogers, and Rogers' apparent vulnerability as a not too competent employee, Rivenbark might well have viewed Rogers as a potential source of information about union activity? On the other hand, given Rivenbark's so- phistication in unfair labor practice law, it is also plausible that Rivenbark would have avoided discussing the Union with Rogers. In this posture, the witnesses' relative candor and the quality of their testimony with respect to related matters is of particular significance.' Here, I find Rogers to be the more credible witness. Her testimony was straightforward and consistent, even with respect to matters which might be considered adverse to her own interests. She candidly admitted that Rivenbark had good reason to criticize her work. I cannot, however, say the same for Rivenbark's tes- timony. The inconsistencies in his testimony have previous- ly been noted. I find it difficult to believe his testimony that although he had only 21 employees, whom he knew well, under his supervision, and had an intense interest in learning about union activities, he could not remember the name of a single person under his supervision who was pushing for the Union, or who told him about Rogers' hus- band, or from whom he learned that union cards were being circulated, or in what month he saw union leaflets being passed out at the gate. Therefore, I credit Rogers' testimony that Rivenbark questioned her as to how she felt about the Union and requested her to report upon the union sympathies of other employees. Rivenbark interrogated Rogers in "an atmosphere of `unnatural formality,"' specifically, after she had been summoned from her work station to his office s Rivenbark's familiarity with the do's and don'ts of Section 8(a)(1), his pregnant pauses, and the circumstances de- scribed above which apparently led him to question Rog- ers, also lead me to believe that this was no mere casual 3 Faye Rogers joined the Union on November I I, 1974 Rivenbark testi- fied that on October 17, 1974, another employee had told him that Rogers' husband had dust decided to support the Union , because he [Rogers) was angry about having been reprimanded by Rivenbark Company counsel did not question Mrs. Rogers about this matter . I am not inclined to give any weight to this hearsay testimony. In any event, it is immaterial to my dispo- sition of this case whether Rogers joined the Union for her own reasons, for her husband's reasons, or both 4 Company counsel points out that the General Counsel did not call either Pope or Glisson as corroborating witnesses. On the other hand, Gen- eral Counsel argues that the Company, although furnished with two affida- vits for use in its cross-examination, did not confront Rogers with either, thereby indicating that her testimony was consistent with both . In light of my credibility resolutions discussed infra, I am not inclined to accord con- trolling significance to either factor 5 Bonnie Bourne, an individual, d/b/a Bourne Co v. N.G.R B., 332 F.2d 47. 48 (C.A. 2, 1964) 274 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD conversation, but an intentional act on the part of the Company. Rivenbark had no legitimate reason to question Rogers as to the identity of union supporters or, indeed, as to her own views .6 Rivenbark gave Rogers no assurance against reprisal;7 on the contrary, he admonished her not to mention his name "if anything comes up." Moreover, the interrogation was conducted in the context of the Company's known hostility to the Union, and past demon- strated proclivity to violate the Act. Therefore, I find that the circumstances of the present case substantially meet the standards set by the Board in Blue Flash Express, Inc., 109 NLRB 591 (1954) for determining the coercive nature of interrogation.8 In light of the foregoing, 1 find that the interrogation here tended to interfere with, restrain, and coerce employees in the exercise of their right to support the Union's organizational effort, and thus violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. IV. THE REMEDY The Company's principal contention is that, assuming arguendo, that it violated the Act on this one occasion, the violation was a de minimus matter which does not warrant a remedial order. General Counsel concedes that but for the Company's prior history, this violation might be viewed as a minor violation, but that in light of that history, the request that Rogers inform on other employees, and Rivenbark's admonition to silence, the matter cannot be viewed so lightly. I cannot view a deliberate request, made during the course of an organizational campaign, that an employee inform management of the indentity of the Union's adher- ents as a de minimus matter. See fn. 6, supra. Moreover, the present interrogation must be viewed, for remedial pur- poses, in light of the Company's hostility to unionization and its demonstrated and well-known proclivity to violate the Act. A transgression which might be excused as "isolat- ed" or "minor" in the case of an employer without demon- strated union animus or a history of unfair labor practices, cannot be condoned in the case of an employer who has repeatedly been found to have committed serious viola-. tions of the Act. See Hecks, Inc., 191 NLRB 886 (1971)9 One may question what useful purpose would be served by entering yet another Board order against the Company, As I indicated above, this case might more appropriately have been prosecuted as a contempt matter before a court 6 See Struksnes Construction Co., Inc., 165.NLRB 1062 (1967): "'An em- ployer cannot discriminate against union adherents without first determin- ing who they are: That such employee fear is not without foundation is demonstrated by the innumerable cases in which the prelude to discrimina- tion was the employer's inquiries as to the union sympathies of his employ- ees.:" 7 See Hennepin Broadcasting Associates, Inc., 215 NLRB No. 32 (1974). 8 See also Mohawk Bedding Co., Inc., 216 NLRB No. 20, sl. op. p.l, JD at 7-8, 12 (1975). 9 Where isolated instances of interrogation have been found to be de, minimus and not warranting a remedial order, the Board has viewed the apparent lack of union animus as a significant factor in that determination. See, e.g., Tracon, Inc., 184 NLRB 147, 158 (1970); Pepsi-Cola Allied Bottlers, Inc., 170 NLRB 1250, 1256 (1968); see also N.L.R.B. v. The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company., 463 F.2d 184 (C.A. 5, 1972); J. J. Newberry Co., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 442 F.2d 897 (C.A. 2, 1971). of appeals. However, viewing this case in the context of an unfair labor practice proceeding, I find that the issuance of a Board order and the posting of appropriate notices may have a salutary effect.10 Because of the Company's demon- strated proclivity to violate the Act, I am recommending that the Company be ordered to cease and desist not only from the specific unfair labor practices found, but also from in any manner interfering with, restraining, or coerc- ing employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. However, I am recommending that the requirement for posting of notices be limited to the Carter plant, where the unfair labor practices occurred. See J. P. Stevens & Co., 183 NLRB 25 (1970).11 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW L. The Company is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By coercively interrogating employee Faye Rogers concerning her own and other employees' union sympa- thies and activities, the Company has interfered with, re- strained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act, in viola- tion of Section. 8(a)(1) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 5. An order requiring the Company to cease and desist from the unfair labor practices found herein, and to take appropriate affirmative action, is warranted and necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommend-. ed: ORDER 12 Respondent, J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc., Wallace, North Carolina, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) . Interrogating employees concerning their own or other employees' membership in, activities on behalf of, or sympathy for Textile Workers Union of America, AFL- CIO, or any other labor organization. (b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of .their rights guaran- teed in Section 7 of the Act. 10 The Union has apparently not abandoned its organizational efforts at the Carter plant. On February 19, 1975, in Case I I-RC-3987, an election was conducted which resulted in 404 votes for, and 540 votes against, the Union, with 3 challenges. Objections were subsequently filed, and the Re- gional Director has directed a hearing on those objections. ''Neither General Counsel nor the Charging Party has requested any extraordinary remedies. 12 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. J. P. STEVENS & CO., INC. 275 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef- tor for Region 11, after being duly signed by Respondent's fectuate the policies of the Act: authorized representative, shall be posted by Respondent (a) Post at its Carter plant in Wallace, North Carolina, immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 13 Cop- for 60 consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, ies of the notice on forms provided by the Regional Direc- including all places where notices to employees are cus- 13 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced b a Jud ment of a tomarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Re- spondent to insure that said notices are not altered, de- .7 g faced, or covered b other material. United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by by any Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant (b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 11, in writ- to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the National Labor Relations Board ." Respondent has taken to comply herewith.