International Organization of Masters

164 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD International Organization of Masters , Mates and Pi- lots, AFL-CIO and Seatrain Lines, Inc. Case 2- CE-68 September 8, 1975 DECISION AND ORDER By MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND PENELLO On April 30, 1975 Administrative Law Judge Mor- ton D. Friedman issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief and the Charging Party filed a brief in answer to Respondent's exceptions. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions I of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended , the National Labor Re- lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that Respondent International Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots, AFL-CIO, New York, New York, its officers , agents, and representatives, shall take the action set forth in the said recommend- ed Order. 1 In his Decision, the Administrative Law Judge inadvertently referred to Anndep Shipping Corporation as "Anndepp." 2 In its exceptions, Respondent contends, as it did before the Administra- tive Law Judge, that it in no way prevented Seatrain from doing business with any other person within the meaning of Sec. 8(e) of the Act by seeking to arbitrate Seatrain's failure to comply with the clause of its collective- bargaining agreement with Respondent which required, as a condition pre- cedent to the sale of vessels owned by Seatrain or its affiliates, the execution by the purchaser of a contract with Respondent. In this regard, Respondent argues that it has made no attempt to prevent the sale of the two vessels involved herein and has not engaged in coercive action against Seatrain or the purchasers of the vessels, but rather has merely sought, pursuant to its contract with Seatrain, damages for the latter's breach of the aforemen- tioned clause. In concluding that Respondent's attempt to enforce that pro- vision of the contract through arbitration was unlawful, the Administrative Law Judge rejected this contention by Respondent based on his finding, inter alia, that Respondent has not limited its demands to mere damages, but has sought to force Seatrain to secure the manning of the two vessels by its members. We agree with the Administrative Law Judge's conclusion in this regard, but find additional support therefor. Thus, Respondent, in invoking arbitra- tion proceedings, has demanded from Seatrain damages for "lost wages .. . and contributions . . . for the period of time that the T/T Williamsburgh was, is and remains manned by licensed deck officers other than [those covered by Respondent's current collective-bargaining agreement]." These damages, which Respondent's contract with Seatrain empowers the arbitra- tor to impose , presumably would continue to mount until such time as Seatrain secures from the purchasers the execution of Respondent 's agree- ment. While Respondent has not through its demand for damages in fact prevented Seatrain from selling its vessels , this factor does not insulate Respondent's conduct from the proscription of Sec . 8(e) which , by its very terms, makes unlawful agreements to cease doing business "whether express or implied." The Board has long held that where an agreement permits the doing of business, but only under extremely onerous conditions , such an agreement impliedly prohibits the doing of business . See Amalgamated Li- thographers of America (Ind.) and Local No. 17 of the Amalgamated Lithogra- phers of America (Ind.), 130 NLRB 985, 987-988 ( 1961). Seatrain's potential liability for open-ended damages, demanded by Respondent pursuant to its collective-bargaining agreement , imposes such onerous conditions upon Seatrain's sale of its vessels as to clearly fall within this category. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE MORTON D. FRIEDMAN , Administrative Law Judge: This case was heard on January 13, 14, and 17 , 1975, at New York City upon the complaint of the General Counsel is- sued December 17, 1974, and a charge filed by Seatrain Lines, Inc., herein called the Charging Party or Seatrain, on October 1, 1974. The complaint alleges that the Respon- dent, International Organization of Masters , Mates and Pi- lots, AFL-CIO, herein called the Respondent or MM&P, has violated and is violating Section 8 (e) of the Act. The Respondent's answer, while admitting certain allegations of the complaint , denies the commission of any unfair la- bor practices and alleges certain affirmative defenses. At the close of the hearing, the parties waived oral argument. Thereafter the Respondent, the Charging Party, and the General Counsel filed briefs in support of their respective positions. Upon the entire record and from my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses , and with due consideration giv- en to the contentions advanced by the parties at the hear- ing and in their briefs, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. BUSINESS OF AFFECTED EMPLOYERS Seatrain, a Delaware corporation, maintains an office and place of business in the city and State of New York and is engaged in the business of owning and operating oceangoing vessels which are used in the transportation of goods and commodities in interstate and foreign com- merce. During the year immediately preceding the issuance of the complaint herein, a representative period, Seatrain derived gross revenues in excess of $1 million from its busi- ness operations. Seatrain Shipbuilding, Inc., herein called Shipbuilding, a wholly owned subsidiary corporation of Seatrain, is en- gaged in the business of constructing, building, and selling ships. In the years immediately preceding the issuance of the complaint herein, Shipbuilding has constructed super- tankers called the T/T Brooklyn and T/T Williamsburgh. General Electric Credit Corporation, herein called GECC, a wholly owned subsidiary of General Electric Co., 220 NLRB No. 52 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF MASTERS 165 is engaged in the business, among other things, of the pur- chasing and leasing of capital equipment, including, inter alia, vessels and ships. Seatrain, Shipbuilding, and GECC are employees and persons engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(1), (2), (6), and (7) and Section 8(e) of the Act. 11. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED As hereinafter set forth, it is found that MM&P is a labor organization within the meaning of Sections 2(5) and 8(e) of the Act. 111. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background and Issues By contract effective June 16, 1972, through June 15, 1975, Seatrain and MM&P agreed that if Seatrain or any of its subsidiaries or affiliated companies transferred any of their vessels either by sale or charter or in any other man- ner, the purchaser, charterer, or transferee would be re- quired to execute a collective-bargaining agreement with MM&P. In substance, the complaint alleges that Ship- building constructed two supertankers and thereafter transferred the ownership of the same to GECC which, in turn, bareboat chartered (without crew) the said vessels to other companies; that thereafter MM&P demanded arbi- tration with regard to Seatrain's and Shipbuilding's viola- tion of the aforementioned contract clause, and that this action on the part of MM&P constituted a reaffirmance of the aforesaid clause which violates Section 8(e) of the Act, and that thereby, by the reaffirmance of the contract, MM&P has violated and is in violation of Section 8(e) of the Act. As noted above, MM&P denies the commission of any unfair labor practices. Affirmatively, MM&P avers, among other defenses, that the subject matter of the complaint herein should be deferred to the grievance and arbitration procedures of the aforesaid collective-bargaining agree- ment pursuant to the policy of the Board to defer to arbi- tration, where such arbitration will satisfactorily dispose of the issues presented, and will conform to the requirements that such arbitration and the decision of the arbitrator will not be repugnant to the policies of the Act. In connection with the foregoing, the Respondent contends that the arbi- tration machinery set up would satisfy all of the Board's requirements for deferment and would satisfactorily dis- pose of the matters alleged as violations in the complaint. The answer further affirmatively pleads that in demanding arbitration pursuant to the grievance and arbitration pro- cedures of the collective-bargaining agreement, the Re- spondent did not in any way seek to require Seatrain or any of its subsidiaries to cease or refrain from handling any products or to cease doing business with any other person; that all that MM&P required was arbitration with regard to damages its members suffered by reason of Seatrain's failure to honor the provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement and, further, the agreement itself contained no obligation on the part of Seatrain to cease doing business with any other person. Furthermore, the answer of MM&P alleges that the sales of the T/T Brooklyn and T/T Wil- liamsburgh were not made in the regular course of Seatrain's business but were isolated events and did not constitute "doing business" within the meaning of Section 8(e). Finally, the answer states that the Offshore Division of MM&P, which is the only division involved herein, can- not be reached as a violator of Section 8(e) of the Act because the contract as drawn up between the parties re- quires only that Seatrain treat with the Offshore Division and that such Offshore Division confines its membership to individuals who are supervisors within the meaning of the Act. Therefore, according to the answer, the Offshore Division is not a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. In addition to the affirmative defenses, at the hearing and in its brief, the Respondent further contends that the entire transaction from Seatrain, to Shipbuilding, to GECC, and finally to the individuals to whom GECC bareboat chartered the said vessels was of such a nature that, in reality, the companies to whom the bareboat char- ters were made are substantially controlled by Seatrain so that such companies are, in effect, related to Seatrain and that, therefore, their employees are employees of Seatrain and, therefore, GECC, the charterers, and their subcon- tractors are not "other persons" within the meaning of Sec- tion 8(e) of the Act. Additionally, Respondent contends that the allegedly offensive clause of the contract was framed and entered into only for the purpose of preserving the jobs of the members of the Offshore Division of MM&P and has no secondary boycott purposes of in any way to prevent Seatrain, or any of its subsidiaries, from doing business with any other employer or person. Thus the issues are framed. B. The Collective-Bargaining Agreement Provisions and Events Leading to the Filing of the Charge Herein The pertinent portions of the collective-bargaining agreement, which was entered into between Seatrain and MM&P some time in June of 1969, read as follows: SECTION V. VESSELS BOUND BY THE AGREEMENT 1. Coverage of the Agreement a. Vessel Coverage. This agreement covers the Li- censed Deck Officers employed on ocean-going U.S.- flag vessels, owned, operated or bareboat chartered (both at present or at any time during the life of this Agreement) by the Company or any of its subsidiaries or affiliates (whether so at present or at any time dur- ing the life of this Agreement) as an owner, agent, operator or bareboat charterer. b. Subsidiary and Affiliate. The term "subsidiary" or "affiliate" shall be deemed to include any business en- tity whether corporate, partnership, trust, individual, or otherwise, which is effectively controlled by or ef- fectively controls the Company either directly or indi- rectly. 2. Sales and Transfers a. With regard to any sale, charter (but not including 166 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD a vessel which the Company may be operating under a bareboat charter and the charter is terminated) or any manner of transfer (except sales to foreign flag) of the Company's vessel: i. At least seventy-two (72) hours prior to the date of the effective transfer of the vessel, written notice must be given to the Organization by the Company. ii. The execution by the purchaser, charterer or transferee of the Organization's collective bargaining agreement shall be a condition precedent to any sale, charter or transfer. iii. If the Company violates subsection 2(a)(ii) above, the Arbitrator may include as part of his award, loss of wages and contributions to the various Organization Plans. iv. A violation of subsection 2(a)(ii) above shall also permit the Organization to cancel the no-strike provisions of this Agreement." Section 2 is the portion of the agreement claimed by the Charging Party and the General Counsel to be violative of Section 8(e) of the Act. Also, it should be noted that sec- tion 2.a.iii of the above-quoted portion of the bargaining agreement relates to the arbitration provisions of the agree- ment which read as follows: SECTION XXXVI GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE AND ARBITRATION * • s s All disputes relating to the interpretation or perfor- mance of this Agreement which may arise between the parties to this Agreement shall be determined by a Licensed Personnel Board consisting of two persons appointed by the Organization and two persons ap- pointed by the Company. The parties shall submit any such dispute for decision by the Board and they agree to be bound by the decision of a majority thereof. The Board shall agree to such rules of procedure as it may deem necessary. In the event no settlement is reached by the Board, the issue may be referred to the Arbitrator by either party for arbitration. The cost of the arbitration shall be borne equally by the Organization and the Compa- ny involved. The parties agree that all questions as to whether a dispute is arbitrable shall be submitted to and decided by the Arbitrator; provided however, the Arbitrator shall be without authority to amend the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. The parties agree that all questions concerning the interpretation of an award made by the Arbitrator shall be re-submitted to the Arbitrator for a decision. r * * s d. In the absence of such final disposition by the Licensed Personnel Board, the Arbitrator will then have jurisdiction of the case to render a decision as Arbitrator. Either party may request a further oppor- tunity to present additional evidence for the purpose of the arbitration proceeding. In the absence of any such request or if the Arbitrator should deny such re- quest, he will proceed to issue an award without the need of any further hearings. * s s s The foregoing section of the collective-bargaining agree- ment, which is referred to herein in the singular, is con- tained actually in two separate agreements executed on the same day between Seatrain and/or its affiliates and the MM&P. These separate agreements are virtually identical in all respects and completely identical in the respects here- to above set forth. The difference in the agreements is merely in the phase of the Seatrain's business to which the particular agreement applies, one agreement being the dry cargo agreement and the other the tanker agreement. For the purpose of this decision, however, because the agree- ments are identical in these respects, I refer to them merely as "the agreement." It should be further noted, with regard to the execution of this Agreement, although the agreement was negotiated by individual members of an association known as the American Maritime Association, herein called AMA, in former years, the AMA executed an overall agreement with MM&P on behalf of its members. However, in the 1972 negotiations preceding the entry and execution of the above agreement, MM&P refused to negotiate with the AMA as a bargaining association and permitted the Asso- ciation representative in the bargaining sessions only as an observer. Thereafter, MM&P refused to execute a collec- tive-bargaining agreement with AMA but insisted on exe- cuting separate bargaining agreements with each of the members of AMA. Thus, the agreement, heretofore re- ferred to, was executed by Thomas F. O'Callaghan, presi- dent of the MM&P, and officers of Seatrain and its subsid- iaries. Shipbuilding, through Langfitt Shipping Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Seatrain, was engaged in the building of the T/T Brooklyn for Seatrain, but on or about December 31, 1973, Seatrain sold the Brooklyn, by means of a complicated participation agreement to GECC. Al- though the details of the reason why the Brooklyn was sold to GECC and not retained by Seatrain are not completely disclosed by the record, it is obvious that the sale was made for financial reasons, because the original financing ar- ranged through Langfitt evidently was inadequate. In any event, GECC is not in the business of operating ships and, therefore, it chartered the Brooklyn without crew (bare- boat) to the East River Steamship Corporation, herein called East River, which company subcontracted the man- agement of the vessel to Andepp Shipping Corporation which then contracted the manning of the Brooklyn by licensed officers to Westchester Marine Shipping Compa- ny. As part of the foregoing transaction, and probably to induce GECC to purchase the vessel, Seatrain agreed to be an absolute guarantor that East River would fully comply with all the terms of the charter from GECC to East River. Additionally, in 1972 Shipbuilding, through another sub- sidiary of Seatrain known as "Tyler," began building a sec- INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF MASTERS and vessel named the T/T Williamsburgh. Before this sec- ond vessel was completed, Seatrain obtained a letter of commitment for its sale to Wilmington Trust as trustee for GECC. GECC, at the time of the events, herein had con- tracted to bareboat charter the vessel to Kingsway Tank- ers, Inc., herein called Kingsway. Again, Westchester agreed through Andepp, to furnish the officers and crew for the Williamsburgh . Westchester has a collective-bar- gaining agreement with Marine Engineers Benevolent As- sociation, a rival labor organization to MM&P, for the offi- cer manning of vessels for which Westchester contracts to furnish such officers. As a result of the foregoing actions on the part of Sea- train and its subsidiaries, and in pursuance of the terms of the 1972 collective-bargaining agreement between Seatrain and MM&P, on April 17, 1974, Captain Robert J. Lowen, International secretary-treasurer of MM&P and its con- tract enforcement officer, notified Seatrain by letter as fol- lows: Please be advised that we are placing on the agenda of the Licensed Personnel Board/Arbitration proceed- ings scheduled for April 24, 1974, our grievance aris- ing out of your violation of the terms of the current IOMM&P Offshore Division collective bargaining agreement by reason of the failure to man the S/S Brooklyn with IOMM&P licensed deck officers em- ployed under that agreement. It should be noted in connection with the foregoing, that at the time this letter was written, the Brooklyn was already being manned. It should also be noted in connection there- with that neither Seatrain, nor any of its subsidiaries nor GECC, had ever put a crew of any sort aboard this vessel during any of the preceding period. Shipbuilding had never been in the operating end of the shipping business, its ac- tivities being confined strictly to shipbuilding. GECC had never engaged in the actual operation of any vessel which it purchased or financed for the reason that GECC was primarily a financing corporation which purchased vessels for the purpose of leasing or chartering the same to actual operators. Thereafter, before building of the T/T Williamsburgh was completed, but after the chartering arrangements were made by GECC to Kingsway, Captain Lowen, on Septem- ber 18, 1974, sent a further letter on behalf of MM&P in which he demanded arbitration regarding: 1. The manning of the T/T Williamsburgh by IOMM&P licensed deck officers covered by the cur- rent IOMM&P Offshore Division Collective Bargain- ing Agreement. 2. The lost wages, including overtime, and contribu- tions to the various organization plans for the period of time that the T/T Williamsburgh was, is and re- mains manned by licensed deck officers other than IOMM&P Licensed Deck Officers covered by the cur- rent IOMM&PP Offshore Division Collective Bar- gaining Agreement. Thereafter, Seatrain filed an action in United States Dis- trict Court to enjoin the arbitration and, at about the same time, filed the charge in this proceeding . Thereafter, the 167 Regional Director petitioned for and obtained from the same District Court an injunction against MM&P pursuant to Section 10(1) of the Act. Thus ' matters stood at the time of the hearing herein vis-a-vis Seatrain, its subsidiaries, GECC, East River, Kingsway, and MM&P. C. The Respondent's Defense Regarding Deferral to Arbitration As heretofore set forth, the Respondent in its answer to the complaint herein asserts that the subject matter of the complaint should be deferred to arbitration pursuant to the policy of the Board adopted in Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 137 (1971), and cases evolving from that policy at both the Board and the Court levels. Respondent argues that while there has been no Board case in which an al- leged 8(e) violation has been deferred to arbitration, it con- tends that the Board and the courts have extended the theory and policy of Collyer to cases involving unfair labor practices other than refusals to bargain involving contract interpretation. Although the argument in support of Respondent's contention as set forth in its brief is very aptly presented at great length, basically, the Respondent relies upon a troika of three cases, one from the Board, one from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and one from the Supreme Court. In substance, the Respondent contends that the policy set forth in Collyer, supra, requires rejection of Board juris- diction because the matter set forth in the complaint in- volves an industrial relations dispute subject to contractu- ally established grievance and arbitration machinery and such machinery should be invoked and utilized even if the conduct complained of is, arguably, also an unfair labor practice. In support of the foregoing, the Respondent cites Wil- liam E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters District Council of Jackson- ville and vicinity, 417 U.S. 12., which involved in appeal to the Supreme Court from a Section 301 action commenced in a Florida state court for damages allegedly resulting from a jurisdictional dispute. The union defended the ac- tion upon the ground that inasmuch as the activity upon which the suit was based was arguably a violation of Sec- tion 8(b)(4)(D) of the Act, the Board had exclusive jurisdic- tion of the case and, therefore, the state court of Florida had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. In disposing of this question, the Supreme Court cited Collyer with approv- al, stating, among other things, that the Board's policy of declining to exercise jurisdiction over arguably unfair labor practices, which also violate provisions of collective-bar- gaining agreements for voluntary adjustments of disputes, highlighted Congressional purpose that Section 301 suits in state and federal courts should be the primary means for "promoting collective bargaining that [ends] with agree- ments not to strike." The court further went on to state that inasmuch as 8(b)(4)(D) actions arise out of jurisdiction dis- putes for which the Act makes a provision for out of Board settlements under Section 10(k) of the Act, the policy of the Board followed the policy of the Congress in that it is pre- ferrable, in such cases, to submit the matter to tribunals other than the Board and that, in this respect, the Board 168 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD does not, therefore, have exclusive jurisdiction. It should be noted, in the above-cited case, that the Su- preme Court relied heavily in its approval of the Collyer doctrine upon the 10(k) provision of the Act in providing for out-of-Board settlements of jurisdictional disputes. Moreover, the cited case involved a 301 action and not a Board case involving an alleged violation of the Act. Final- ly, it should be noted that Section 8(e) was in no way in- volved in the cited case. Accordingly, the cited case, inso- far as the instant proceeding is concerned, merely stands for the proposition that the Supreme Court approves gener- ally of the Collyer doctrine but does not necessarily ap- prove of the application of the Collyer doctrine in situa- tions such as are presented by the facts of the instant case. The court of appeals case cited by the Respondent in support of its contention of arbitrability is United Optical Workers v. Sterling Optical Co., Inc., 500 F.2d 220 (C.A. 2, 1974). The Sterling Optical case also involved a Section 301 action for damages and, although the issue was not before it, the Circuit Court noted that determination of whether a clause violates Section 8(e) initially was in the exclusive jurisdiction of the arbitrator pursuant to the arbitration provisions of the contract involved in the dispute. Howev- er, the 8(e) question was not before the Court and the Court's approval of the arbitrability of Section 8(e) situa- tions was dicta. Moreover, the Court dicta held that as between the District Court and the arbitrator, the arbitra- tor would be the one who had primary jurisdiction to make the initial determination as to the legality of the alleged 8(e) clause. However, as stated by counsel for the General Counsel. "The Court was not faced with a situation where the matter was pending before the Board in some other form. We do not know if the court would have taken the same position if the matter simultaneously was before the Board." I agree with this statement of counsel for the General Counsel. The issue of whether the Board or the arbitrator should have the initial determination of whether the clause involved herein is violative of Section 8(e), and therefore unenforceable, was not before the court in the Sterling Op- tical case. Accordingly, I do not find that that case is dispo- sitive of the issue of whether the Board in the instant case would necessarily defer the subject matter of the complaint herein to the arbitration provisions of the collective-bar- gaining agreement between MM&P and Seatrain. The third case cited by Respondent in support of its deferability argument is the Board case of Electronic Re- production Service Corp., 213 NLRB No. 110 (1974), which, Respondent argues, extended the Collyer doctrine holding that the Board would defer to arbitration without regard to whether the alleged violation of the Act was presented or considered in arbitration so long as it could have been pre- sented. However, although Collyer is mentioned by the Board in that decision, in actuality, the decision deals with the extension of the application of the policy set forth by the Board in Spielberg Manufacturing Company, 112 NLRB 1080 (1955). Spielberg held that the Board would not enter- tain an unfair labor practice complaint where the subject matter of the complaint had been submitted to an arbitra- tor and the arbitrator's award disposed of the subject mat- ter in a manner not repugnant to the Act. The Electronic Reproduction Service Corp., case, supra, merely extends Spielberg to the extent that the arbitrator's award will be honored and that the Board will defer to it even though there might not have been a disposition of the question of the illegality of the allegedly violative act if, in fact, such a question, or the evidence which would have resolved such question, was not presented but could have been presented to the arbitrator. Thus, the cited case refers only to cases which have already been decided by an arbitrator and not one where the subject matter has not as yet been submitted to an arbitrator as envisioned by the Collyer doctrine. In the instant case there is no assurance that the arbitrator would necessarily resolve the unfair labor practice issue of whether the contract provision and MM&P's demand for arbitration with regard to the sale or other disposition of Seatrain's vessel is violative of Section 8(e) of the Act. It is possible that the arbitrator would look beyond the contract and consider such statutory principles as are necessary to a resolution of the dispute. On the other hand, in the event of a conflict between the provisions of the contract and a principle of Board law, the arbitrator would most likely not depart from the requirements of the contract, and accord- ingly, would not, therefore, dispose of the question of whether the clause herein involved and the request for ar- bitration violate Section 8(e) of the Act.' Accordingly, I find and conclude that the cases cited by the Respondent, whether considered separately or together, do not demonstrate that the Board in the instant proceed- ing would defer to arbitration the resolution of the subject matter involved and, especially, the legality of the contract clause in question and its attempted enforcement by MM&P. There is further reason herein not to defer to arbitration aside from the foregoing. GECC, Westchester, and An- depp are not parties to the collective-bargaining agreement involved. However, they would necessarily have an interest in the subject matter of this proceeding or of an arbitration proceeding because the demand for arbitration, as I read it, requests that there be a resolution of the issue of manning the vessels. The Board has held that deferral is not war- ranted in a situation where all the parties who have impor- tant interest at stake in the unfair labor practice determina- tion are not parties to the contract and therefore would not be represented in the arbitration proceeding.' In addition to all of the foregoing it would seem that where the very demand for arbitration is alleged as a reaf- firmance of the allegedly violative contract clause, and, therefore, the demand could, in and of itself, constitute a violation of the Act, the issue of whether the demand for arbitration constitutes a violation of Section 8(e) could not be deferred because the mere acceptance of the arbitration by the arbitrator could, in effect, constitute a compounding of the unlawful act. Accordingly, I find and conclude by reason of all of the foregoing, that the Board, under its principles of Collyer, Spielberg and the spate of cases issu- ing as a result of Collyer, would find the subject matter of the complaint herein not to be deferrable to the arbitration procedures of the collective-bargaining agreement in- volved. Cf. George Koch and Sons, Inc., 199 NLRB 166, 168 (1972). Z White Front San Francisco, Inc., 203 NLRB 548 (1973), fn. 2. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF MASTERS 169 D. The Status of MM&P as a Labor Organization Having disposed of the issue of deferrability , the next issue which must be resolved is that raised by the Respondent's contention that MM&P is not a labor orga- nization within the meaning of the Act. In essence, the Respondent's contention would seem to be that the real party in interest on the labor side of the contract is the Offshore Division of MM&P, a division of the Respondent which has as members only individuals who are supervisors within the meaning of the Act and that therefore , there is no actual labor organization within the meaning of the Act involved in this proceeding . It would further seem MM&P is asserting that the fact of MM&P appearing as the signa- tory organization on the collective -bargaining agreement with which this proceeding is involved is merely evidence of a ministerial act; that MM&P is not directly involved but, rather, involved herein is the allegedly completely au- tonomous Offshore Division. To support its contention that MM&P is not a labor organization and that the Offshore Division is actually the only organization involved herein , the Respondent relies upon the testimony of Captain Lowen , the International secretary-treasurer and International contract enforcement officer. Also involved are various documents, the most im- portant of which is the revised constitution of MM&P. Ac- cording to the constitution of the Respondent, the very name implies that it consists of ship captains , mates, and pilots who command ships in harbors , rivers, inland wa- ters, and other confined areas . MM&P has about 8,600 members and is divided into five subordinate bodies, or divisions, of which the Offshore Division is one. According to Captain Lowen , the Offshore Division has about 5,700 members, all of whom work as supervisory, licensed deck officers on oceangoing ships. I accept this testimony.3 The Offshore Division has its own bylaws, its own officers, its own dues, its own property and treasury, and files its own separate reports under the Labor Manage- ment Reporting and Disclosure Act. Moreover , according to Captain Lowen, the Offshore Division has its own inter- nal membership disciplinary procedures and appeals pro- cedures and the members do not pay dues to MM&P. They pay dues only to the Offshore Division which, in turn, pays a per capita head tax of $7.50 per member to MM&P. Moreover, Captain Lowen further testified that with re- spect to collective-bargaining agreements , the Offshore Di- vision has its own separate negotiating committee , prepares its own contract demands based upon solicited member- ship suggestions . Furthermore, any agreement reached by the negotiating committee must be ratified exclusively by members of the Division. Additionally, Respondent points out that article XI, sec- tion 4 of its constitution delegates to each division the au- thority to exclusively negotiate the division's collective-bar- 7 At the hearing, Charging Party's counsel sought to elicit from Captain Lowen admissions that second and third mates were not actually superviso- ry employees. However, a careful reading of the testimony , following the rather lengthy examination of Captain Lowen in this respect, leads me to conclude that all deck officers , including the second and third officers, are, indeed, supervisory personnel. gaining agreements . Moreover, article X, section 3 of the Offshore Division's bylaws provide for bargaining proce- dures and a bargaining committee which is made up only of members from various sections of the Offshore Division from the Pacific coast, Atlantic coast, and Gulf coast in addition to the officers of the Offshore Division . That the Offshore Division does not represent or seek to represent any individuals except licensed deck officers on oceango- ing vessels is borne out not only by Captain Lowen's cred- ited testimony but also by article II , section 1 (a) of the Offshore Division bylaws which provides, "Persons eligible for membership in this organization shall possess a valid United States Coast Guard Merchant Marine Officer's li- cense certificate or other evidence of professional capabili- ty."However, both the dry cargo and tanker contracts of 1972 between MM&P and Seatrain , which contracts are referred to collectively herein as "the contract," contain no mention of the Offshore Division but states in section II of the agreement, the recognition section, that "the Company recognizes the organization [MM&P] as the sole represen- tative of its licensed deck officers on U.S . flag oceangoing vessels for the purpose of collective -bargaining." While the contract speaks in terms of licensed deck officers, and makes specific provisions for each grade of such deck offi- cers, there is, again, no reference therein to the Offshore Division. Furthermore, the collective-bargaining agree- ment is signed by Captain T. F. O'Callaghan, Internation- al president of MM&P. Captain Lowen admitted that MM&P does have some members who are employees within the meaning of the Act. These employees total approximately 225 to 275 out of a total MM&P membership of approximately 8,600 indi- viduals. However, none of these statutory employees are members of the Offshore Division . Rather, they are mem- bers of the Inland Division, a separate, autonomous divi- sion of MM&P. Furthermore, none of these statutory em- ployees are covered by the collective-bargaining agreement herein, and none of them participate in the selection of any individuals involved in the negotations of these agreements or in their ratification. Furthermore, according to Captain Lowen, none of these employees work for Seatrain or any of its affiliates or wholly owned subsidiaries. As study of MM&P's revised constitution as submitted in evidence herein reveals , although the separate divisions of the MM&P have authority to negotiate and ratify their own collective-bargaining agreements, such agreements must be made in the name of the International Organiza- tion of Masters, Mates and Pilots. Furthermore, no agree- ment may be signed by an officer without receiving the consent of the International President. Moreover, the Constitution states "No subordinate body shall purport to make the organization or any other subordinate body a party to, or refer to it as a separate entity , in any collective bargaining or other agreement without the express consent of the International President."4 4 Article 11, section 4 entitled "Collective Bargaining Agreements," p A8 of the constitution of the International Organization of Masters , Mates and Pilots, as amended to July 1974. 170 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Additionally, the same section of the International constitution provides that the International president is au- thorized to direct a subordinate body to take a vote to accept or reject a proposed contract, either by referendum ballot or by such procedures as outlined in a subordinate body's bylaws. The section further provides that prior to a subordinate body's becoming involved in a strike , lockout, boycott, law suit, or serious difficulty, such subordinate body shall notify the International President immediately of the nature of the difficulty and the action contemplated. If the action to be taken shall involve other subordinate bodies of other labor organizations the International presi- dent shall have the authority to modify or prohibit such action. Additionally, the International officers are elected by a plurality vote of the "general membership." 5 The constitution further provides that the International president has the right to "direct that a referendum vote or a vote by membership meeting be held by the membership of any subordinate body on any matter , issue, or proposi- tion when he believes that the welfare of the membership of the subordinate body would be protected or enhanced by such action . Also, the constitution provides that the In- ternational secretary-treasurer shall act as the financial of- ficer of all fully formed divisions .6 Finally, with regard to the relationship between the In- ternational and the Offshore Division the constitution states 7 "the International President shall be the executive officer of the Offshore and other fully formed divisions. The International Executive Vice-President shall be the as- sistant executive officer of the Offshore and other fully formed divisions . The International Secretary-Treasurer shall be the financial officer of the Offshore and other fully formed divisions." WIthout further reference to any precedent found by the Board or the courts that MM&P is not a labor organiza- tion, or that it is not the organization in interest in the instant proceeding, I conclude from all of the foregoing that the interrelationship between MM&P International and its various divisions , or subordinate bodies, is such that MM&P, together with its constituent organizations constitute a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. Its officers are also officers of the subordinate body. When its officers assert such control as is above recited over its subordinate bodies and actively participate in the affairs of the subordinate bodies it cannot be concluded that MM&P does not "exist for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, la- bor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment or conditions of work of statutory employees" within the meaning of the Act. However, in addition to the foregoing, it should be noted that the demands for arbitration as contained in the two letters from MM&P to Seatrain, the first dated April 17, 1974, and the second dated September 18, 1974, are both on the letterhead of MM&P and are signed by Captain Lowen, the International secretary -treasurer and MM&P's contract enforcement officer . These demands for arbitra- tion clearly demonstrate that the International is the party involved herein, and that the request for arbitration was made by the International and that the conduct of such arbitration proceedings would be in the name of the Inter- national . From this it can be assumed that such demands would be made to employers by the International should it become necessary to request arbitration on behalf of mem- bers of any division or subordinate body of the MM&P which subordinate body does, in fact, represent employees and are clearly labor organizations within the meaning of the Act. Accordingly, for this reason also I find and con- clude that MM&P does represent employees and is there- fore a labor organization within the meaning of the Act, and is also the party in interest in the contract and griev- ance proceedings. Beyond this, the Board and the courts have decided that MM&P is a labor organization . On June 12, 1972, the Board issued its decision and order in International Organi- zation of Masters, Mates & Pilots, (Marine and Marketing International Corporation), 197 NLRB 400, (1972), in which it found that MM&P did not deny that it was a labor orga- nization. Furthermore, the court of appeals in its affirma- tion of this decision 8 stated " . . . our own court has re- cently held that, because MM&P has certain locals containing statutory `employees' it constitutes a `labor or- ganization' subject to the restrictions of Section 8(b)." See International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots v. N.L.R.B., 351 F.2d 771, 777 (C.A.D.C. 1965). I, therefore, find and conclude that MM&P continues to be and is a labor organization within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(5) of the Act. With regard to the Respondent's con- tention that the activity complained of herein involves only the Offshore Division as the organization in interest, I con- clude that through applicable principles of Agency law, the Respondent Union is responsible for the conduct com- plained of in this case .9 In the instant proceeding it is clear that Captain Lowen, the International secretary-treasurer, the same individual who wrote the letter demanding arbi- tration, also acts as financial officer of all subordinate or- ganizations including not only the Offshore Division but the division of MM&P which clearly represents statutory employees. Additionally, as noted above, the International constitution provides specifically that no contract shall be made in the name of any subordinate organization except the International. Thus, the International , in all respects, has acted not only as the principal party in the complained of activity, but also as the agent of the Offshore Division for the purposes of contract execution, contract enforce- ment, and financial supervision. Accordingly , even if MM&P were not the chief party in interest here, it can certainly be held that it is the agent of the Offshore Divi- sion and therefore fully responsible for any violations which may be found upon the facts involved in this pro- ceeding.10 8486 F.2d at 1273 (1973). 9 Cf. International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots v. N.L R B, 3 Article V, section 3 of the constitution supra at 777, Riley-Stocker Construction Co, 197 NLRB 738, 742-743 6 Article V1 , section 1 , subsection (i); section 3, subsection (m). (1972): W. L Crow Construction Co., 192 NLRB 808, 812-814 (1971). 7 Article IX, section 8. 10 See International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots Marine Divi- INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF MASTERS 171 E. The Violations of Section 8(e) While the Respondent presents a number of contentions with regard to the validity of its activities and of the clause of the contract which it seeks to enforce through the de- manded arbitration proceeding, the primary question to be resolved is whether the clause in question was designed merely for the preservation of unit work or whether, in- stead, it was aimed not at protecting unit employees , that is employees in this case of Seatrain , against displacement, but rather at ensuring that if the unit work is transferred elsewhere the Union itself will not suffer , or, that members of MM&P outside the unit will be hired. Otherwise put, the primary issue here is whether the clause in question guar- antees unit work preservation or whether it is aimed at secondary employees who, in futuro, might become owners of or charterers of vessels owned or operated by Seatrain or any of its subsidiaries . As noted above, the clause in ques- tion reads, "The execution by the purchaser, charterer or transferee of the organization's collective-bargaining agree- ment shall be a condition precedent to any sale, charter or transfer." In a nearly identical factual situation to the case at bar the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of N.L.R.B. v. National Maritime Union of America, AFL-CIO [Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc.], 486 F.2d 907 (1973); cert. denied 416 U.S. 970 ( 1974), held that a clause similar to the clause above recited was an illegal union signatory clause violative of Section 8(e). In that case, Commerce Tankers Corporation (Commerce) was party to a bargaining agree- ment with the National Maritime Union (NMU) which contained a clause which provided, in substance, that if Commerce sold a ship to an American flag shipper, not already under contract with NMU, the ship would be sold with a crew provided by the NMU and Commerce would obtain from the purchaser an undertaking to abide by the NMU contract. (It should be noted at this point that the provision in the Commerce-NMU contract required only that the purchaser of a vessel from Commerce be required to agree to abide by the provisions of the collective-bar- gaining agreement whereas in a case at bar the clause re- quires that a purchaser or transferee of vessel from Sea- train, or any of its subsidiaries , be required to execute an agreement with MM&P for such vessel 's deck officers.) In any event, Commerce sold the vessel , S/S Barbara, to Van- tage Steamship Corporation (Vantage) which, together with its subsidiaries, operated vessels whose employees were represented by the Seafarers International Union (SIU). The sale from Commerce to Vantage was made without first having required Vantage to be bound by the terms of NMU's collective-bargaining agreement with Commerce . When NMU discovered that the sale was oc- curring, it sought and obtained an arbitration award against Commerce preventing the sale of the vessel to any- one unless such person was required to abide by the NMU contract . Approximately a month thereafter, the arbitra- tion award was confirmed and a preliminary injunction issued in favor of NMU by a United States District Court. In the interim, Vantage filed a charge with the Board alleg- ing a violation of Section 8(e). Upon consideration of all of the foregoing facts, the Board and the Court of Appeals, in enforcing the Board's order, held that, although the ques- tion was a close one, the purpose of the contract was not to preserve the jobs of the men aboard the vessel at the time of the sale but was, rather, for the purpose of preserving these jobs for NMU members in general. In other words it was for the purpose of preserving jobs for all members of the NMU and not for the purpose of preserving the jobs of the employees who had been employed on the vessel by Commerce. The court came to this conclusion, as did the Board, by reason of the fact that it was a practice to re- move all seamen from a vessel whenever a vessel was sold. As a consequence, the men working on the vessel lost their jobs regardless of which union gained control of the vessel. The Board and the court reasoned that in view of this prac- tice, there were no jobs to be preserved. In applying the clause involved in the case at bar to the facts, there is even a greater weight to be given the reason- ing of the Board and the court in the cited case. In the case at bar, neither of the vessels sold to GECC, the Brooklyn and the Williamsburgh, had ever been manned by any crew, let alone a crew represented by MM&P. Accordingly, in this particular instance the clause becomes not one of work preservation for crews which had manned the Brook- lyn and the Williamsburgh but, actually, by attempting to enforce the provision of the contract in question, MM&P sought to acquire work for its members in the maritime industry generally. This, in and of itself, renders the clause and its demanded application unlawful. Additionally, the demands for arbitration sent by Cap- tain Lowen on behalf of MM&P to Seatrain on April 17 and September 18, 1974, constituted reaffirmance of the foregoing contractual provision within the 6 months pre- ceding the filing of the charge by Seatrain. This is so be- cause the action by MM&P to enforce the contract by arbi- tration constituted a new "entering into" within the provisions of Section 8(e). The Board, in the past, has found that a unilateral reaffirmation of an 8(e) clause with- in the 10(b) period is a violation of the Act." The Board has stated, "In the instant case, the Respondent concedes that it refused to deliver or sell beer to Angel in May 1961, because of its contract with the Union. It is plain that the Respondent was therefore enforcing or `living up to' clause 17(b)(2) of the contract, which we have found to be unlaw- ful. As we are persuaded that such enforcement, whether or not it was sought, assented to, or acquiesced in by the other party to the contract, is within the scope of the prohi- bition of Section 8(e) against entering into such contract we accordingly find that the Respondent by complying with the terms of the unlawful clause, violated that section of the Act." 12 Accordingly, I find and conclude that by demanding ar- bitration of the sale of the Brooklyn and the Williamsburgh and the manning of such vessels, the Respondent in this case is "living up to" the contractual clause in question and sion, International Longshoremen 's Association, AFL-CIO, 219 NLRB No 9 11 See Dan McKinney Co., 137 NLRB 649, 654 (1962); cf., Milk Drivers (1975). and Dairy Employees, Local Union No. 537, 147 NLRB 230, 231 (1964) 12 Dan McKinney Co, supra, 656-657. 172 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD that the demand for arbitration, therefore, constitutes a reaffirmation tantamount to "entering into," within the prohibition of Section 8(e) of the Act. We come now to other contentions made by the Respon- dent in support of its argument that its actions are not prohibited by Section 8(e) of the Act. One contention which bears consideration is based upon the fact that Sea- train, as heretofore set forth, specifically , in writing, has guaranteed in its participation agreement with GECC and Wilmington Trust that it would remain responsible for any violation on the part of the bareboat charterer of the T/T Brooklyn of the terms of the charter agreement . Inasmuch as East River, the bareboat charterer of the Brooklyn, has subcontracted, through Andepp Shipping Corporation, for the manning of the vessel with officer personnel to be sup- plied by Westchester, Westchester's employees are employ- ees of East River. Since Seatrain remains responsible for any default on the part of East River , Seatrain is thus effec- tively the employer of Westchester's employees, the deck officers. Otherwise put, since under the provisions of Seatrain's guarantee to GECC, East River's obligation and liabilities are the obligations and liabilities of Seatrain, the Brooklyn's officers can look to Seatrain for payment of their salaries, wages, and other benefits . Seatrain is thus effectively, their employer. Therefore, the impact of the alleged 8(e) clause is primary as applied here. I cannot, through this rather labyrinthian reasoning, conclude that Seatrain is the employer of the Westchester- supplied deck officer crew, or that Seatrain has retained for itself any control over the vessel sold to GECC. There is no question as to the legitimacy of the transfer of the vessels to GECC. Therefore, the sale to GECC falls within the proscription provided in the collective -bargaining agree- ment that the execution by the purchaser, charterer, trans- feree of MM&P's collective-bargaining agreement shall be a condition precedent to a any sale, charter, or transfer. The mere fact that Seatrain guaranteed to GECC that it would save GECC harmless for any loss it might incur through bareboat chartering the vessel to any ultimate charterer was part of the inducement for GECC to take title to the vessel . There is nothing in this guarantee to save GECC harmless which gives Seatrain control over the charterer of the vessel from GECC. There does not exist, so far as the record in this case reveals, any contractual rela- tionship between Seatrain and East River. Accordingly, I find this contention to be without merit. Another contention raised by the Respondent is that the sale of the T/T Brooklyn and the TIT Williamsburgh were not sales which would come within the provision of Section 8(e), which states that a contract which provides that an employer cease "doing business with any other person or employer." Respondent claims that the sales of the Wil- liamsburgh and the Brooklyn were isolated; that ordinarily Shipbuilding builds only for Seatrain or Seatrain subsid- iaries and affiliates and not for sale to others and that it was only a financial crisis which caused Seatrain to sell the vessels. I find no merit in this contention . I find inapposite the cases cited by the Respondent in support of this argu- ment. Introduced into evidence was a brochure of Seatrain Shipbuilding Corporation for circulation to the maritime industry in which its facilities at the old Brooklyn Navy Yard in Brooklyn, New York, are depicted and which show, furthermore, that these facilities were constructed for the. building of vessels which certainly would not be limited to vessels owned only by Seatrain or its subsid- iaries. This brochure would not have been necessary had Seatrain created Shipbuilding only for the purpose of building Seatrain operated ships . Accordingly, I find and conclude from the entire record, including the record made in the United States District Court in the 10(1) proceeding brought by the Regional Director on behalf of the General Counsel of the Board to enjoin MM&P from proceeding with the arbitration proceeding, that the construction and sale of the T/T Brooklyn and the T/T Williamsburgh were not isolated instances but were examples of the normal course of business envisioned by Shipbuilding in taking over the facilities and modernizing the same at the Brook- lyn Navy Yard. Moreover, the same defenses were raised in the Vantage case where the Board held a single transaction , the sale of a vessel from one owner to another, even though the seller was not in the ship selling business, constitutes "doing business." The Board held that transfers of ships from one shipping company to another is "the normal course of busi- ness" in the maritime industry, and such sales, therefore, constitutes "doing business" within the meaning of Section 8(e). 13 Another argument advanced by MM&P is that MM&P has in no way impeded the transfer of the vessels involved herein and that the seeking of arbitration was merely for the purpose of assessing damages for the breach of the contract and the backpay that would be due its members but for the fact that Seatrain violated the agreement. How- ever, the letter of September 18 regarding the prospective sale of the Williamsburgh, which Captain Lowen sent to Seatrain demanding arbitration, would seem to require more than the mere fixing of lost earnings. In that letter MM&P specifically stated that the relief sought was the following: "The manning of the T/T Williamsburgh by IOMM&P licensed deck officers covered by the current IOMM&P Offshore Division collective bargaining agree- ment." Accordingly, it must be concluded that more than mere damages are being sought by the demanded arbitration. The only interpretation that can be given the above-quoted excerpt from the letter of September 18 is that MM&P is requesting the manning of the Williamsburgh, which has been sold to another person, by members of the MM&P and, thereby, seeking to force the purchaser of the Wil- lianuburgh to adhere to the terms of its collective-bargain- ing agreement with Seatrain. MM&P, through arbitration, is seeking to enforce the clause proscribed by Section 8(e). Another theory advanced by the Respondent is that in- asmuch as the purchaser and the charterer of the vessels herein had no contract with any other labor organization to man the vessels, the seeking to enforce the clause by arbitration in no way prevented Seatrain from doing busi- ness with any other person within the meaning of Section 8(e). To bolster its position Respondent argues that unlike 13 National Maritime Union ( Vantage Steamship Corporation ), 196 NLRB 1100, 1101 (1972). INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF MASTERS the situation in the Vantage case, supra, there were no at- tempts by MM&P to prevent the sales before a contract of sale was signed nor was there any threat of picketing or any other coercive action by MM&P against Seatrain to limit the sale to a purchaser who would execute MM&P's bargaining agreement . Counsel for the General Counsel answers this contention in the following manner. "In the instant case the record establishes that there were never any MM&P employees on the vessels in question. Thus, without conceding that the vessels prior to their manning were or logically could be considered as falling within the scope of any bargaining unit, the MM&P would compound an already tenuous defense by maintaining that a work preservation defense applies to jobs in futuro. Such proposi- tion has not heretofore been sanctioned by either the Board or the Courts." I agree with the General Counsel's argument and therefore find this contention of the Respon- dent to be without merit. Finally, we come to what seems to be an inference that East River and Kingsway are nonexistent organizations and are merely subterfuges to enable Seatrain to man ves- sels without supplying the officer personnel from the mem- bership of MM&P. It is true that Captain Lowen testified that when he sought to make contact with these two orga- nizations he was unable to find them at the addresses given nor was he able to find a telephone number for either of them. However, the sales of the Brooklyn and the Wilhams- burgh were made not to the charterers but to GECC. Ac- cordingly, even if it could be inferred that East River and Kingsway are fictitious organizations fronting for some other organization, the Section 8(e) prohibition is applica- ble to the sale of the vessels from the Seatrain to GECC and not to GECC's charters to East River and Kingsway from GECC. Therefore, whatever deceit might be inferred in the formation and use of Kingsway and East River as charterers cannot be a defense to the Respondent's at- tempted application of the unlawful contractual clause. This is especially so inasmuch as the proof that Kingsway and East River are fictitious organizations was literally left hanging without any evidentiary tie-in to Seatrain aside from Seatrain's role as guarantor of East River's perfor- mance viz-a-viz GECC. F. Concluding Findings By reason of all of the foregoing, I find and conclude that Respondent's demand for arbitration as set forth in its letters containing such demands on A pril 17 and Septem- ber 18, 1974, constituted reaffirmance of the contractual clause which requires the execution by the purchaser, char- terer, or transferee of the organization's collective-bargain- ing agreement as a condition precedent to any sale, charter, or transfer. This provision on its face is clearly unlawful, the demand for arbitration pursuant to this clause is, there- fore, a reaffirmance of such clause and under all of the circumstances heretofore recited, and taking into consider- ation all of the contentions advanced by the Respondent, such reaffirmance constitutes violations of Section 8(e) of the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE 173 The unfair labor practices of the Respondent set forth in section III, above occurring in connection with its opera- tions set forth above, have a close, intimate, and substan- tial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the sev- eral States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow thereof. V. THE REMEDY Having found Respondent, International Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots, AFL-CIO, has engaged in certain unfair labor practices , it will be ordered that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmation ac- tion designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Seatrain, Shipbuilding, GECC are employers or per- sons engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(1), (2), (6), and (7) and 8(e) of the Act. 2. MM&P is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By demanding arbitration pursuant to article V, sec- tion 2, subsection it of its collective-bargaining agreement effective June 16, 1972, through June 15, 1975, with Sea- train regarding the sale of the T/T Brooklyn and the T/T Williamsburgh, MM&P has demanded and is demanding that Seatrain refrain from selling or transferring ownership of the said vessels without Seatrain first complying fully with the terms and provisions of the aforesaid collective- bargaining agreement. 4. By the acts and conduct described in the foregoing paragraph, MM&P has reaffirmed the agreement with Sea- train and by said reaffirmation, MM&P has entered into an agreement requiring Seatrain to cease doing business with GECC and with other persons and has thereby en- gaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(e) of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommend- ed: ORDER 14 Respondent, International Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots, AFL-CIO, its officers, agents, and repre- sentatives shall: 1. Cease and desist from entering into, maintaining and enforcing or giving effect to article V , section 2 of its col- lective-bargaining agreement with Seatrain Lines, Inc., ef- 14 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes 174 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD fective June 16, 1972 , or any like or related clause or claus- es in any other collective-bargaining agreement whereby an employer agrees to cease and refrain from doing busi- ness with any other person within the meaning of Section 8(e) of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action: (a) Post at the Respondent's business offices and meet- ing halls copies of the attached notice marked "Appen- dix." 15 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 2, after being duly signed by Respondent Master, Mates and Pilots' representatives shall be posted by said Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to members and employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 2, in writ- ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government To all members of International Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots, AFL-CIO, and to all employees of Sea- train Lines, Inc. WE WILL NOT enter into, maintain, enforce, or give effect to article V, section 2, of our collective-bargain- ing agreement with Seatrain Lines, Inc., effective June 16, 1972, or any other contract provision whereby any employer ceases and refrains or agrees to cease or re- frain from doing business with any other person with- in the meaning of Section 8(e) of the Act. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF MASTERS, MATES AND PILOTS, AFL-CIO 15 In the event the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Relations Board."