Star Forge, Inc.

582 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Star Manufacturing Company, Division of Star Forge, Inc. and Metal Polishers, Buffers, Platers, and Al- lied Workers International Union, Local 74, AFL- CIO and District No. 122, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, and the Metal Trades Department of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Or- ganizations. Cases 13-CA-13319 and 13-CA- 13443 September 24, 1975 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS FANNING AND PENELLO On March 31, 1975, Administrative Law Judge Jerry B. Stone issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed excep- tions and a supporting brief, and the General Coun- sel filed an answering brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions 2 of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order as modified herein. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re- lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended i The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to over- rule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings. 2 The Administrative Law Judge found that Respondent violated Sec. 8(aXl) by promising benefits and threatening loss of benefits on May 29, 1974, when Plant Manager Danielson made it clear to Scott that he had had his overtime and wages reduced because he had joined the Union and that another employee had lost a 50-cent raise for the same reason . While we agree with the Administrative Law Judge that this withdrawing of benefits constituted an illegal threat of loss of benefits in violation of Sec. 8(a)(1). we do not agree with him that the same evidence is sufficient to establish the converse of the proposition ; i.e., that Respondent illegally made a promise of benefits. Accordingly, we shall dismiss the 8(a)(l) allegation concerning a promise of benefits. Members Fanning and Penello do not adopt any implication in the Ad- ministrative Law Judge's Decision that Respondent's demand for the Union membership list as the contract provided could be exercised only if Respon- dent established a legitimate purpose for having the list ; however, they agree that the Union's failure to provide the list had no relation to Respondent's duty to bargain with the Union, and the absence of the list affords Respondent no defense for its refusal to bargain. Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modified below, and hereby orders that the Respondent, Star Manufacturing Company, Division of Star Forge, Inc., Carpentersville, Illinois, its officers, agents, suc- cessors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the recommended Order, as modified herein: 1. Delete paragraph 1(c) and renumber the follow- ing paragraphs accordingly. 2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the Administrative Law Judge. CHAIRMAN MURPHY, dissenting in part, concurring in part: Contrary to my colleagues, I would find that Re- spondent withdrew recognition of the Union on July 30, 1974,' and thereafter refused to bargain with the Union because of a reasonably based doubt of the Union's majority status. Under established Board precedent a certified union, upon the expiration of the first year following its certification, enjoys a re- buttable presumption that its majority representative status continues.4 To rebut that presumption, the em- ployer need not prove that the union no longer repre- sents a majority of the employees, but only that at the time it refused to bargain there were sufficient objective considerations to support a reasonable doubt of the union's majority status.' In my opinion, the circumstances here, when viewed in their entire- ty, clearly establish that Respondent has met that test. While I concur in my colleagues' finding that Re- spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, in my opinion these violations were isolated occur- rences which involved only 1 employee out of a work force of over 80 employees and cannot reasonably be adjudged to have caused any significant erosion of union strength. Therefore, I would find these unfair labor practices were of a minimal nature and did not "taint" the objective consideration on which Respon- dent relied in withdrawing recognition from the Union.6 The facts relating to Respondent's objective con- siderations are as follows : The Union has been the certified bargaining representative of the employees since 1942 and thus Respondent and the Union have a long history of amicable collective bargaining. The latest collective-bargaining agreement was effective from September 1, 1971, until September 1, 1974, and was automatically renewable for successive 1- year periods unless, at least 60 days prior to its termi- nation, either party gave written notice of a desire to terminate. On June 11, the Union requested a meet- 3 All dates herein refer to 1974 unless otherwise noted. ° Celanese Corporation of America, 95 NLRB 664 (1951). 5 Orion Corporation, 210 NLRB 633 ( 1974). 6 Taft Broadcasting, WDAF-TV, AM-FM, 201 NLRB 801 (1973). 220 NLRB No. 76 STAR MANUFACTURING CO. 583 ing with Respondent to begin negotiating a new agreement. Pursuant to the terms of the contract, Re- spondent demanded that the Union provide a list of its current members. On July 8, Respondent again requested this list, indicating that upon receipt of such information a meeting would be scheduled. On three subsequent occasions, July 11, 15, and 20, Re- spondent renewed its request for the membership list, indicating that fulfillment of this demand was neces- sary before the parties could have a joint meeting. On July 30, Haderly, the Union's business represen- tative, called Company President Ward and said that he could not furnish the list to the Company. Ward replied, "If we don't have a list we aren't going to have a meeting." Despite the Union's contractual obligation no list was ever produced. The Respondent withdrew recognition of the Union on July 30, asserting a good-faith doubt as to the Union's majority status. Respondent contends that besides the staleness of the Union's certification and the Union's adamant refusal to furnish a list of its membership, there were, on July 30, additional significant objective indications that the Union no longer represented a majority of the unit employees. The facts reveal that, during the term of the contract, considerable changes occurred in the composition of the bargaining unit. Employee terminations within the factory unit increased at a rapid rate in relation to the unit size. While there were 180 unit termina- tions in all of 1972, during the first 7 months of 1974 there were 133 unit terminations. The Respondent's records showed that, on the date of July 30, only a small percentage of the unit employees were members of the Union. Out of a unit of 83 or 84 employees, only 22 employees or 26 per- cent of the unit had authorized the deduction of union dues from their wages-hardly a majority. While employee support cannot necessarily be mea- sured solely or exclusively by the number of employ- ees who actually become members of the union as expressed through union checkoff authorizations, nonetheless I cannot ignore the implications of such data. For as the Board observed in Convair Division of General Dynamics Corporation, 169 NLRB 131, (1968), "the sole evidence readily available to the Re- spondent as a reliable measure of union support was that provided by the employees' checkoff authoriza- tions."' Moreover, in N. L. R. B. v. H. P. Wasson & Company, 422 F.2d 558, 561 (C.A. 7, 1970), the court decreed that turnover and decrease in checkoff could reasonably give rise to genuine doubts of a union's majority status. From the inception of the contract until July 30 only two formal grievances were filed by the Union against the Company. Both were filed in June 1974, and dropped after the first step of the grievance pro- cedure, even though the disposition of the grievances was unfavorable to the employees involved. Anoth- er was filed in August but was denied at the second step of the grievance procedure and no further ap- peal was taken. In fact, Union Steward Hayden, upon receipt of a denial in June 1974 of the first grievance that he had ever filed, stated that he did not know what the next step was. Respondent most persuasively points out yet an- other objective consideration, the fact that the union steward himself opined that the Union was weak. On June 18, prior to his formal designation as union steward, Hayden expressed the opinion to Respon- dent that he would prefer to have a different union at Respondent's plant because "This Union does not keep up to date on what is happening." Hayden also asserted to Respondent that the Union was not strong enough to do what was necessary, and he him- self was going to get out before expiration of the con- tract. While each of the above objective considerations standing alone may not be enough to support a good- faith doubt of the Union's majority status, I note that Respondent did not rely on any one factor but rather relied on the cumulative effect of all the consider- ations. Considering all the factors available to Re- spondent, I find that Respondent did have an objec- tive basis for doubting the Union's majority status. I find particularly significant the age of the Union's certification, 33 years, and the apparently amicable relationship between Respondent and the Union be- fore this; the high number of terminations and rapid turnover rate; the low percentage of employees au- thorizing dues checkoffs; the Union's refusal to pro- vide Respondent with a list of its members despite a contractual obligation to do so; and, significantly, the union steward's admissions that the Union was not up to date and was weak. In conclusion, I find that, at the time it withdrew recognition, Respondent had valid reasons for doub- ting the Union's majority status and thus, in the ab- sence of proof to the contrary, I find that Respon- dent lawfully refused to bargain. Accordingly, I would dismiss that portion of the complaint. 'See Otto Klein, et al., d/b/a Artiste Permanent Wave Company, 172 NLRB 1922 (1968), and Hayworth Roll and Panel Company, 130 NLRB 604 (1961), where the fact that the union had checkoff cards from less than a majority of the employees was a decisive factor in the Board's dismissal of the 8(a)(5) complaint. 584 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate our em- ployees concerning their union membership, ac- tivities, and sympathies. WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with loss of benefits and other reprisals in order to dis- courage employee membership in and support of labor organizations. WE WILL NOT encourage and solicit employees to withdraw their membership from labor orga- nizations. WE WILL NOT reduce the assignment of over- time to and the wage rates of employees in order to discourage employee membership in and sup- port of labor organizations. WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with the Union, The Metal Trades Department of the American Federation of Labor and Con- gress of Industrial Organizations, as the exclu- sive representative of the employees in the unit herein found to be inappropriate. The appropri- ate collective-bargaining unit is: All factory employees employed by us at our Carpentersville, Illinois, facility, excluding of- fice employees, company executives, shop clerks, foremen and others in a supervisory position or in confidential relations with man- agement. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exer- cise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act except to the extent that such right may be affected by lawful agreements in accordance with Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. WE WILL, upon request, bargain with the Met- al Trades Department of the American Federa- tion of Labor and Congress of Industrial Orga- nizations as the exclusive representative of our employees in the unit found herein to be appro- priate and embody such understanding reached in a signed agreement. WE WILL make Jim Scott whole for any loss of pay suffered by reason of the discrimination against him with respect to the reduction of ov- ertime assignments and the reduction of his wage rates. All employees are free to become or remain, or refrain from becoming or remaining, members of the Metal Trades Department of the American Federa- tion of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organiza- tions, or any affiliated union therewith or any other labor organization, except to the extent provided by Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. STAR MANUFACTURING COMPANY, DIVISION OF STAR FORGE, INC. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JERRY B. STONE, Administrative Law Judge: This pro- ceeding, under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, as amended, was tried pursuant to due notice on November 20, 21, and 22, 1974, Chicago, Illinois. The charge in Case 13-CA-13319 was filed on June 3, 1974. The charge in Case 13-CA-13443 was filed on July 23, 1974, and the first amended charge in Case 13-CA- 13443 (erroneously appearing on the face thereof as Case 13-CA-13319) was filed on September 3, 1974. The order consolidating cases and the consolidated complaint was is- sued on October 11, 1974. The issues presented are (1) whether the Respondent has engaged in various acts of interrogation, promises of benefits , threats, and solicitation of withdrawals from the Union, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act; (2) whether the Respondent has discrim- inatorily reduced the hours of overtime and the wage rates of employee Jim Scott in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act; and (3) whether the Respondent has refused to bargain with the Union in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. All parties were afforded full opportunity to participate in the proceeding, and the General Counsel and the Re- spondent filed briefs which have been considered. Upon the entire record in the case and from my observa- tion of witnesses, I hereby make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER I Star Manufacturing Company, Division of Star Forge, Inc., the Respondent, is, and has been at all times material herein, a corporation duly organized under, and existing by virtue of, the laws of the State of Illinois . Respondent, at all times material herein, has maintained a facility at 2 East Main Street, Carpentersville , Illinois, where it is engaged in the manufacture of parts for agricultural equipment. Dur- ing a representative 1-year period, Respondent sold and shipped goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 from its facility in Carpentersville, Illinois, directly to points outside the State of Illinois. Based upon the foregoing and as conceded by the Re- spondent, it is concluded and found that the Respondent is now, and has been at all times material herein, an employ- er engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 1 The facts are based upon the pleadings and admissions herein. STAR MANUFACTURING CO. 585 It. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED Based upon the pleadings and admissions therein, it is concluded and found that Metal Polishers, Buffers, Platers and Allied Workers International Union, Local 74, AFL- CIO; District No. 122, International Association of Ma- chinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO; the Metal Trades Department of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations ; Local No. 1600, International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship- builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers; and Local No. 369, International Molders and Foundry Workers Union of North America, each is, and has been at all times mate- rial to this proceeding, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES The certified appropriate collective-bargaining unit re- ferred to above and covered in such collective-bargaining contract is as follows: At all times material herein, the following employees at the Respondent's facility at 2 East Main Street, Carpentersville, Illinois, have constituted a unit appro- priate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act: All factory employees employed by Respondent at its Carpenters- Ville, Illinois, facility, excluding office employees, company executives, shop clerks, foremen and others in a supervisory position or in confidential relations with management. The above referred to collective-bargaining agreement (1971-74) did not contain standard union-security provi- sions but did contain fairly typical maintenance-of-mem- bership provisions with appropriate escape clauses. A. Preliminary Issue: Supervisory Status 2 At all times material herein , the following named per- sons occupied the positions set opposite their respective names, and have been, and are now, agents of Respondent, acting on its behalf , within the meaning of Section 2(13) of the Act, and are supervisors within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act: Carson Ward President Dan Johnson Vice President R. J. Matz Secretary Jim Danielson Plant Manager Harry Daugherty Foreman William Kennedy Foreman Ray Bruening Shipping Dept. Foreman B. Setting: Collective-Bargaining History; Appropriate Bargaining Unit 3 In 1942 the Metal Trades Department of the American Federation of Labor was certified, pursuant to Section 9(a) of the Act, as the sole and exclusive collective-bargaining representative for all factory employees employed by Star Manufacturing Company, Division of Illinois Iron and Bolt, at its Carpentersville, Illinois, facility. Subsequent to 1942 and until 1971, the Metal Trades Department of the American Federation of Labor and its successor organization, the Metal Trades Department of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Indus- trial Organizations, were at all times therein parties to suc- cessive collective-bargaining agreements with Illinois Iron and Bolt, said agreements covering all factory employees at the Carpentersville, Illinois, facility of Star Manufacturing Company. In 1971 Star Forge, Inc., acquired Star Manufacturing Company, and on September 1, 1971, Star Manufacturing Company, Division of Star Forge, Inc., the successor of Star Manufacturing Company, Division of Illinois Iron and Bolt, entered into a collective-bargaining agreement effective to September 1, 1974. 2 The facts are based upon the pleadings, admissions, and stipulations. 3 The facts are based upon a composite of the stipulations of the parties and the pleadings and admissions therein. C. Jim Scott; Reduction of Overtime and Wages; Interrogation ° Jim Scott commenced his employment with the Respon- dent in March 1973 and worked thereafter until July 13, 1974. During his employment, it may be summarized, as time went on Scott worked both as a machinist and as a welder. During the time of Scott's employment, he received a number of raises, some as a result of the contract and some unrelated to the contract. Background evidence was introduced to reveal that around the time Scott was employed and later Respondent officials expressed to him their animus toward the Union. Thus, around March 1973, Plant Manager Danielson told Scott that he (Danielson) didn't care one way or the other, but the Union couldn't do anything for him. Later, around June 1973, Foreman Daugherty told Scott that at a small place, like the Respondent's, a small union couldn't really help a person, that a person could rise faster in the organi- zation if he weren't in a union. Scott did not join the Union until May 1974. During the time between his initial employment and his joining the Union, as indicated before, Scott received a number of raises and was allowed to work much overtime.5 Scott became unhappy in May 1974 concerning some tools he thought the Company should pay for but wouldn't. As a result, it appears that Scott decided to join the Union. Scott joined the Union on May 20, 1974. On May 22, 1974 Foreman Daugherty spoke to Scott and told him in effect that there would be no more unlimit- ed overtime in the machine shop, that an employee, Szut- kowski, would be the only person to continue such over- time work. The question of whether Scott continued to receive over- time as in the past was litigated. The overriding facts reveal The facts are based upon a composite of the credited aspects of Scott's and Daugherty's testimony. 5 Scott credibly testified to the effect that with respect to one raise he was told by Daugherty not to say anything about the raise to the Union, that it was not a raise covered by the contract classification . The evidence clearly reveals this raise to have been proper. Under such circumstances I find no probative value to such evidence as relating to the question of animus. 586 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the following. Prior to May 22, 1974, the Respondent had allowed the employees in the machine shop to virtually set their own overtime work on the same job they worked dai- ly. There were several other employees, like Scott, who worked overtime during the regular workdays. After May 22, 1974, an examination of the work records reveals, the other employees continued to work overtime during their regular workdays but that, as a practice, Scott did not. Scott did, however , receive some overtime , mostly on other days. It is clear from a comparison of the records that the overtime work performed by Scott was cut back. The Respondent contends in effect that it did not dis- criminate against Scott in the assignment of overtime. The Respondent contends in effect that it cut back the unlimit- ed assignment of overtime to all the employees. The facts do not support the Respondent's contentions. The other employees continued in the same pattern of overtime for a substantial period of time after May 22, 1974. Scott's over- time work was clearly reduced. As indicated later herein, Foreman Daugherty ques- tioned Scott on May 23, 1974, as to why he had joined the Union and Daugherty announced a cut in Scott's wages. The evidence reveals that later, after May 22, 1974, on occasion, Scott was offered some overtime work in the welding shop (not the machine shop) and turned the same down. Scott testified, in effect, that the reduction in over- time in the machine shop resulted in his having to make other plans to aid his income. The offer of some overtime work in the welding shop does not negate the discrimina- tion in the assignment of work as revealed otherwise .6 Considering all of the foregoing, the timing of Scott's union activity, the reduction of overtime, the Respondent's knowledge of Scott's union activity, and the evidence as to animus set forth before and hereinafter, I am persuaded that the preponderance of the evidence reveals that the Respondent discriminatorily reduced the assignment of ov- ertime work to Scott because of his union activity. Such conduct is violative of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. As indicated, on May 23, 1974, Foreman Daugherty had another conversation with Scott. The conversation took place in Daugherty's office. Daugherty asked Scott why he (Scott) had joined the Union. Scott told Daugherty that he was mad because the Company would not replace some tools that had been stolen from him. Daugherty told Scott that his wages (machine shop) were being reduced from $4.24 per hour to $3.78 per hour. It should be noted at this point that, although Scott was not told anything about his welding wages, the next time Scott performed welding work his wages were reduced from $4.81 to $4 per hour for welding. Daugherty spoke to Scott about all of the things the Company had done for him, schools and training. Scott had another conversation with Daugherty on May 23, 1974. In this conversation, Scott asked Daugherty whether he would get his wages back if he got out of the 6 If Scott worked elsewhere at such times, the earnings for such other work constitute a matter to be considered as possible offset in backpay computations If not, the declination of overtime work in the welding shop can be considered in the compliance stage as possible offset for backpay purposes Union. Daugherty told Scott that he didn't know, that he (Scott) would have to talk to Plant Manager Danielson. Later, on May 29, 1974, Scott spoke to Plant Manager Danielson and told him that he had made a mistake in joining the Union. Danielson told Scott that he knew this. Scott asked if he would get his wages back if he got out of the Union. Danielson told Scott that he was drafting a withdrawal letter for employees to submit to the Union. Scott told Danielson that he had already submitted his res- ignation to the Union and showed Danielson a copy of such letter. Danielson told Scott that he would have to earn his wages back, could perhaps do so in 6 months, that it had been like a slap in the face when Scott had joined the Union, that Scott was not worth the $4.24-per-hour rate, and that the raises had been given as an incentive for him to do better work. Danielson spoke to Scott about what the Company had done for him, schools and training. Scott asked if the training would continue and was told that it would.7 Danielson also told Scott that another employee had been up for a 50-cent raise but would not get such raise because he had joined the Union.' The General Counsel contends that the Respondent dis- criminatorily reduced Scott's wages because he had joined the Union. The Respondent contends that Scott's wages were reduced because the increases had been given him, not as merit, but as incentive to do better work, and to help him with his personal problems. It is sufficient to say that I do not credit Danielson's and Daugherty's testimony in such regard and to the effect that his work was poor. Considering all of the foregoing, I am persuaded and conclude and find that the Respondent discriminatorily re- duced the wages of Scott (both in the machine shop and in welding) because of his union membership. I find it hard to believe and don't believe that the raises given to Scott be- fore May 23, 1974, were given to him in a charitable mood. The evidence as to the timing of union activity and the wage reductions, the overtime reduction, the remarks by Daugherty and Danielson concerning the Union, Danielson's remarks about not giving another employee a raise because of his union activity, and Daugherty's re- sponse to see Danielson about a possible regaining of wag- es, all clearly persuade that the reduction in Scott's wages was because of his union activity. Such conduct is violative of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. It is so concluded. Considering all of the above, the interrogation of Scott as to why he had joined the Union occurred in a manner constituting interference with, restraint, and coercion with- in the meaning of the Act. Such conduct is violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. It is so concluded and found. Considering all of the foregoing, I am persuaded and conclude and find that the Respondent, by Danielson, so- licited and encouraged employees to withdraw from the Union. Such conduct is violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. It is so concluded and found.9 7 1 discredit Danielson's denial that he referred to drafting a letter of withdrawal from the Union Scott's testimony on this point had more of a rtn5g of truth than did Danielson's There was evidence of discussion of what the Company would do con- cerning a "closed shop ." It will be discussed later herein. 9 Such solicitation and encouragement was not necessary in Scott's case. STAR MANUFACTURING CO. D. Promise of Benefits; Threats; Loss of Benefits The General Counsel alleges and the Respondent denies that on or about May 29, 1974, Respondent, by Jim Dan- ielson, made promise of benefits and threatened the loss of benefits to an employee in order to discourage employees' union membership in, and activities on behalf of, the labor organization (involved in this proceeding). The facts relating to this allegation are the facts set forth in section C above relating to the conversation between Danielson and Scott . The facts are clear that Danielson threatened the loss of benefits to employees in such conver- sation. Thus, Danielson made it clear to Scott that he had lost benefits because he joined the Union. Danielson also made it clear that another employee had lost a 50-cent raise because he had joined the Union . By implication, Danielson's remarks about the raises to Scott not having been earned, coupled with his remarks about Scott's having joined the Union as being a slap in the face, and the threats of loss of benefits amounted to an implied promise of ben- efits to employees who did not support the Union. Such conduct, promises of benefits, and threats of loss of bene- fits, depending upon the employee's union activity or lack thereof, constitutes conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. E. Alleged Threat To Close the Plant The General Counsel alleges and the Respondent denies that (1) "On or about May 29, 1974, Respondent, by Jim Danielson, threatened its employees that Respondent would close its Carpentersville facility in order to discour- age their union membership in, and activities on behalf of, the labor organization, (in this proceeding)," and that (2) "In or about May 1974, the exact date being unknown to the Regional Director, Respondent, by William Kennedy, threatened its employees that Respondent would close its Carpentersville facility in order to discourage their union membership in, and activities on behalf of, the labor orga- nization (in this proceeding)." The General Counsel's evidence relating to the above allegation concerning Danielson consists of the testimony of Scott. The General Counsel's evidence relating to the above allegation concerning Kennedy consists of the testi- mony of Hayden. Both witnesses testified to the effect that the Respondent's official's remarks were to the effect that Re- spondent would close the doors before agreeing to a "closed shop." Although contractual provisions providing for union security are lawful, provisions providing for a closed shop are unlawful. Accordingly, even if such re- marks were made , I would not find that statements to the effect that the Respondent would close its doors before agreeing to an unlawful provision constitute unlawful con- duct. Accordingly, such allegations of unlawful conduct shall be recommended to be dismissed. The Respondent's unfair labor practices had already set the stage for Scott's withdrawal. Danielson's solicitation and encouragement resulted in Scott's showing Danielson his letter of withdrawal. F. The Refusal To Bargain 587 As has been indicated in section B, the Union has been the certified bargaining representative of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit of the employing enterprise since 1942. Since such time the Union and the employing enterprise have been in contractual relationship. The latest collective-bargaining agreement between the Union and the Respondent provided that the agreement would be in effect from September 1, 1971, to September 1, 1974, would be automatically renewable for successive 1-year pe- riods unless-at least 60 days prior to September 1, 1974, or any anniversary thereafter-either party gave written notice to the other party of a desire to terminate the agree- ment. On June 10, 1974, Frank Haderly, business representa- tive for the Union, by letter to Robert Matz (secretary of Respondent) requested the latest weighted plant average of the production and maintenance unit and hourly cost of each fringe benefit for use in preparation for the "coming negotiations." 10 Haderly, by letter to Matz, gave notice to the Respondent of termination of the current agreement at the expiration date and gave notice of readiness for negoti- ations for a new contract. On June 17, 1974, Frank Hayden, the union steward, filed a grievance with the Respondent on behalf of an em- ployee named Ervin Holtz. Thereafter, on June 18, 1974, President Ward called Hayden into his office and told him in effect that he wanted him to furnish written authoriza- tion from the Union to the effect that Hayden was author- ized to sign grievances. Hayden told Ward that this would be no problem.ll For many years and until mid-1973, the union steward had been a man named Weinke. Around mid-1973, Hay- den became the union steward. There is no evidence that prior to June 18, 1974, the Respondent had ever required formal notification from the Union as to who was union steward. Further, it is clear that the Respondent was aware that Weinke retired in mid-1973 and that from such time until June 18, 1974, Respondent made no request for for- mal notification of the new steward. Thus, even though the record reveals that Ward had heard from other employees that Hayden was the union steward, the Respondent made no request for formal notification thereto until June 18, 1974. On June 18, 1974, the same day that Ward had requested Hayden to secure formal notification of his status, Vice President Johnson replied to the Union's June 11, 1974, letter. Johnson referred to the Union's letter relating to the expiration of the contract and, pursuant to provisions in the contract, requested that the Union, by June 25, 1974, 10 Such information as requested was never provided. The General Coun- sel, however, does not allege that the Respondent has violated Sec. 8(a)(5) and (I) by failure to provide such information. 11 Ward credibly testified to the effect that after receiving notification of the June 3, 1974, unfair labor practice charges he started checking on the number of people on dues checkoff , that he had not asked for a list of union officers before he did because he and the Union had had a good relationship and no problems . It is clear that the filing of the June 3, 1974, charges triggered the Respondent's checking of those on dues checkoff, and the request for formal notification of who was the union steward , who were officers of the Union, and who were members of the Union. 588 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD furnish the Respondent a notarized list of current union members by the contract. On June 24, 1974, President Ward, by memorandum, informed Union Steward Hayden, with reference to Holtz' grievance, that he had asked him for written notice from the Union as to Hayden's authority and as to the officers, that he had received nothing to date, and that he was holding Holtz' grievance until he got such letter from the Union. Hayden later contacted Union Representative Haderly and told him of the problem concerning Respondent's rec- ognition of him as the union steward. Around July 8 or 9, 1974, Haderly contacted Matz, Respondent's secretary, and informed him that Hayden was the Union 's steward. Matz requested that this be given him in writing. On July 9, 1974, Haderly sent the Respondent a letter to the effect that Hayden was the selected union steward. In the meantime, on July 8, 1974, the Respondent, by Matz, sent a letter to the Union with a copy of its June 18, 1974, letter. In effect, the Respondent reiterated its request for a notarized list of the current union members . The Re- spondent set forth that it had not received a reply to its June 18, 1974, letter, and would appreciate a reply so that an agreeable date could be scheduled concerning the expir- ing labor contract.12 On July 11, 1974, Union Representative Haderly went to Respondent's office and spoke to Matz, Respondent's sec- retary. During this meeting Matz reiterated the Respondent's request for a list of the Union 's current members. Haderly countered by telling Matz that he want- ed certain data concerning pension rights . Haderly then told Matz that he would furnish the list of union members when the Respondent furnished the pension data . Haderly told Matz in effect that the provisions concerning the list of union members and pension data had been in the contract for years and that neither of the parties had insisted upon the same . Matz told Haderly in effect that the pension data was there, was available, but his instructions were to obtain a written list of union members.13 Haderly and Matz discussed a proposed meeting date. Haderly expressed a desire to meet in the morning but agreed with Matz for a meeting to be held on July 18, 1974, at 4:30 p .m. in the company offices. On July 12, 1974, Matz telephoned Haderly and told him that the July 18, 1974, meeting had to be canceled because President Ward would be out of town on July 18, 1974, that he would call him later about a new date. 4 12 As President Ward pointed out in his testimony, the Respondent never referred to "negotiations" only to "meetings." 13 The pension agreement provided for a written report to be furnished annually to the Union. I credit Matz' testimony to the effect as indicated Considering the "written " report aspects of the pension agreement, I am persuaded that both Matz and Haderly construed that the Respondent was withholding such report contingent upon receipt of the written list of union members. 14 The General Counsel pursued a line of questioning of witnesses appar- ently designed to elicit answers to establish an inference that Matz had intentionally set a date for a meeting that would have to be canceled, that Ward did not have a medical examination on July 18, 1974, at the Mayo Clinic, or that the medical examination was scheduled as a pretext for can- celing the July 18, 1974, scheduled meeting. It is sufficient to say that the evidence is insufficient to establish such point. On July 15, 1974, Haderly went to Respondent's facility and spoke to Matz in the latter's office. Haderly gave Matz a copy of the Union's proposals concerning a new contract, told him to study them and to call him about a date for a meeting. Matz told Haderly that he would do so. Around this time President Ward came into the office where Had- erly and Matz were speaking. Matz told Ward about the receipt of the Union's contract proposals. Ward told Had- erly that Frank Zaborek had an unfair labor practice charge against the Respondent, that this was costing the Respondent money, and the Respondent had to hire attor- neys now. Ward told Haderly that he should talk to Zabo- rek and get him to drop his charge, that they could then set up meetings.ls Ward also repeated the Respondent's request for a list of the current union members and for a list of union officials. Haderly told Ward and Matz that he had a problem of getting the list of members, that he had to wait for help from a person who worked at another plant.16 On the same date the Respondent, by President Ward, transmitted a letter to the Union. By such letter the Re- spondent returned the Union's contract proposals and in effect reiterated its request for a list of the Union's current members. On July 19, 1974, the Respondent, by letter from Ward, reiterated in effect to the Union its request for a list of the current union members and a desire to schedule a meeting (after receipt of such list)." On July 30, 1974, Haderly telephoned Ward. During the ensuing conversation Haderly told Ward that he would not get a list of the union members, and Ward told Haderly that there would be no meetings until he received a list of union members.18 Haderly, in answer to a leading question, timed this last event as occurring on August 5, 1974. I cred- it Ward's testimony fixing the time on July 30, 1974. This July 30, 1974, conversation was the last significant event that occurred concerning the refusal-to-bargain is- 15 1 credit Haderly's testimony concerning the remarks concerning Zabo- rek and the unfair labor practice charges Ward denied making such request on direct examination Considering the leading nature of the questions asked Ward and Ward's answers concerning the issue on cross-examination, I find Haderly's testimony more complete, frank, and forthright on such issue and so credit the facts. 16 Respondent's letter of July 19, 1974, sets forth in effect a claim that Haderly promised to furnish a list of the union membership by July 18, 1974. No evidence was adduced to such effect as to the events at the meet- ing on July 15, 1974. Haderly denies discussion of the union membership lists on July 15, 1974. Considering his total testimony on direct and cross, Ward's and Matz' testimony, the exhibits, and logical consistency of facts, I credit the composite testimony of Ward and Matz to the facts as set forth As to part of Haderly's testimony, I found him to be unobjective and at- tempting to build a case . However, considering the totality of the evidence, I am persuaded that Haderly had not specifically promised to furnish a list of union members by July 18, 1974. Further, I am persuaded that the refer- ence to such promise in Respondent's July 19, 1974, letter was self-serving and set forth to justify in part Respondent's intended refusal to meet with the Union 17 As noted previously, Ward in his testimony pointed out that he always used the word "meeting" and not "negotiations " Is Haderly testified to other attempts to talk to Ward and Matz over the telephone It is sufficient to say that I credit the composite effect of Ward's and Matz' testimony to the effect that they did not try to avoid conversa- tions with Haderly Haderly very well may have telephoned on an occasion or two when both Ward and Matz were out of the office and been so told by the receptionist STAR MANUFACTURING CO. sues. The Respondent concedes that it withdrew recogni- tion of the Union on July 30, 1974, and contends that it did so because it had a good-faith doubt as to the Union's majority status. Considering the issues encompassed in determination of whether there has been a refusal to bargain, I find it proper to summarize the effect of other evidence. During the relevant period of time from June 18 through July 30, 1974, the facts reveal that there were around 83 or 84 employees in the appropriate bargaining unit; that the unit had increased in size from approximately 70 employ- ees to around 83 or 84 in the past 2 years; that during the year of 1972 there had been terminations of 288 employees who had been employed in the bargaining unit; that during the first 7 months of 1974 there had been terminations of 133 employees employed in the bargaining unit; that dur- ing the life of the contract up to July 30, 1974, no formal written grievance had been processed beyond the first step of the grievance procedure; that the only two formal griev- ances filed as of July 30, 1974, were filed in June 1974; that the first-step dispositions of such grievances were unfavor- able to the employees, and the Union did not pursue such grievances via the grievance procedure thereafter; that a formal grievance filed in August 1974 was processed simi- larly; that Union Steward Hayden was not familiar with how to properly process grievances ; that the Respondent's general practice of overtime assignment was inconsistent with the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement and no grievances were filed; that an employee named Gaffga had spoken to Respondent's officials in 1973 concerning the procedure of how to get out of the Union;19 that on June 18, 1974, Union Steward Hayden expressed opinions to the effect that the Union was not up to date, was not a strong union, and that he was going to get out at a proper time before the expiration of the contract;20 that approxi- mately 22 of the bargaining unit employees had authorized the Respondent to check off their dues for the Union; that in late July 1974 Respondent estimated that there were ap- proximately 20 of its bargaining unit employees who were members; and that Respondent erroneously believed its records showed 19 of its bargaining unit employees who were on checkoff. G. The Union's Majority Status As has been set forth, the Union has been the certified exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the em- ployees in the appropriate collective-bargaining unit since 1942. From 1942 to the date of the pertinent events in this case, the Union has been in contractual relationship with the employing enterprise. Such certified and contractual status creates a presumption that a majority of the employ- ees in the appropriate bargaining unit have designated and continues to designate the Union as their collective-bar- 19 The evidence as to the discussions does not reveal that Gaffga ex- pressed an interest in getting out of the Union, that he merely inquired concerning the procedure . Even if Gaffga had expressed an interest in get- ting out of the Union , such fact would not change the ultimate findings of facts, conclusions, and recommendations in this case. 20 Hayden also told one of the Respondent 's officials that the Union was going to try to get a closed shop if it signed up over half of the employees. 589 gaining agent. Such presumption can be overcome by (1) proof that the Union does not enjoy the support of a ma- jority of the employees in the appropriate unit, or (2) a good-faith doubt of majority based upon objective criteria. The facts in this case do not support either a finding (1) that a majority of the employees do not support the Union, or (2) that there existed a good-faith doubt of majority status based upon objective criteria. The facts reveal that there were 83 or 84 employees in the appropriate collective-bargaining unit. There is direct evidence that around 22 employees expressly revealed their support of the Union by checkoff and union membership. As to the other 62 employees, the evidence of employee dissatisfaction is minimal and insignificant. The presump- tion, under such circumstances, is that, absent expressions of dissatisfaction or significant changes in the unit, a ma- jority of the employees supported the Union. As to the other 62 employees, the facts reveal that one employee around 8 months preceding the events raised a question on the procedure of how to get out of the Union, and another employee (the union steward) expressed an opinion that the Union was weak and that he was going to withdraw. The evidence as to these two employees is too insignificant to overcome the presumption of majority status. Nor does the totality of the evidence, presented by the Respondent as bearing upon the question of objective criteria, over- come the presumption of majority status. Thus, an increase in the size of the bargaining unit from 70 to 84 is an insig- nificant factor. Similarly, the number of terminations of employees on a yearly basis does not appear unusually high. In the absence of employee expressions of dissatisfac- tion, the evidence relating to the handling of grievances offers no persuasive value as to the question of majority status. The Union's failure to furnish the Respondent a list of its current union members does not constitute evidence of objective criteria to cast a good-faith doubt as to the Union's majority status.21 Thus, at least the Respondent would have to know that such list would reveal at least 16 to 19 members. Again the critical point is that under the circumstances of this case, in the absence of expressed dis- satisfaction of employees, the presumption of majority from the Union's certified status prevails. In sum, there is no evidence to reveal that a majority of the employees in the appropriate unit did not support the Union. Nor is there evidence of significant change or sig- nificant employee dissatisfaction to reveal objective criteria to overcome the presumption of majority status accorded the Union by virtue of its certified and contractual status. 22 In sum, the Union is entitled to the presumption of ma- jority status based upon its certification and contractual status, and, accordingly is and has been at all times materi- al herein the exclusive bargaining representative of the em- ployees in the appropriate collective-bargaining unit. H. Alleged Good-Faith Doubt The General Counsel contends in effect that the Respon- dent withdrew recognition from the Union on June 18, 21 Especially where the Respondent is engaging in unfair labor practices as revealed in this case. 22 Terre!! Machine Company, 173 NLRB 1480 (1969) 590 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1974, and thereby has refused to bargain in good faith with the Union since that date, and that the Respondent further bargained in bad faith with the Union on July 15, 1974, by conditioning bargaining upon the withdrawal of certain unfair labor practices. The Respondent contends that it withdrew recognition from the Union on July 30, 1974, because of a good-faith doubt that the Union represented a majority of the employees in the appropriate collective- bargaining unit. As to the question of whether the Respondent had a good-faith doubt as to the Union's majority status on July 30, 1974, I find from a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent did not have a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority status but in fact was bargaining in bad faith and using as a pretext for doing so the Union's failure to furnish a list of its current membership in accordance with the current contract. As has been indicated with reference to the question of the Union's majority status, the facts do not reveal objec- tive criteria upon which a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority status can be based. The facts do not reveal that the Respondent was aware of significant dissatisfaction among the employees upon which to base a doubt that the majority of the employees supported the Union. Dues checkoffs and membership in the Union do not negate the fact that employees who are not members of the Union may desire the Union to be their representative. Absent significant changes in the unit or evidence of dissatisfac- tion among such employees, a doubt as to their desires is not created. Such doubt is not created in this case. The facts in this case, moreover, reveal that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices, including in part unlaw- ful interrogation, discriminatory reduction of overtime and wages of an employee because of his union beliefs, and threats of loss of benefits and implied promises of benefits to dissuade employee support of the Union. Such evidence reveals a design to destroy and undermine union support. Further, the Respondent's requests for written notification of who was the union steward, lists of employees who were union members, and lists of union officers, all occurred after the Respondent became upset with the filing of unfair labor practice charges. Although the current contract accorded the Respondent the right to receive a list of the current union members, no legitimate need for the purpose of collective bargaining has been shown. Thus, the objective criteria does not reveal a basis for a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority status. Nor does the evidence reveal that the Respondent needed a list of the union members for use in negotiation of a new contract. Rather, considering the Respondent's unfair la- bor practices and the foregoing, the evidence preponder- ates for a finding that the Respondent was using its request for a list of the union members as a pretextuous means to avoid negotiations. In sum, the preponderance of the evidence reveals that the Respondent did not, on June 18, 1974, or any time thereafter have a good-faith doubt as to the Union's major- ity status but in fact was bargaining in bad faith. 1. Refusal To Bargain The facts are clear that the Union requested negotiations on June 11, 1974, and that the Respondent has refused to meet and bargain with the Union since June 18, 1974, first on the conditioning of "meeting" upon the receipt of a list of current union members, and as of July 30, 1974, on the basis of an alleged good-faith doubt of majority status. As has been indicated, the facts do not reveal that the Respondent had a good-faith doubt as to the Union's ma- jority status on June 18, 1974, or any date thereafter. The facts also reveal that the Respondent was engaged in con- duct to destroy and undermine the Union and was using the request for and failure to receive a list of union mem- bers as a pretext to refuse to bargain. Under such circum- stances, it is clear that the Respondent has refused to bar- gain in good faith with the Union since June 18, 1974.23 Such conduct is violative of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. It is so concluded and found. The facts also reveal that the Respondent, on July 15, 1974, conditioned further meetings upon the withdrawal of unfair labor practice charges. Although the evidence re- veals that the Respondent thereafter continued to request the union list of union members before "meeting," such evidence does not mean that the Respondent was indicat- ing a willingness to bargain if such a list were received. As indicated, Ward testified to the effect that he always used the word "meeting" rather than "negotiate." The overall facts reveal that the Respondent had decided not to bar- gain with the Union and was seeking information to justify a refusal to bargain . Under such circumstances, the Respondent's conditioning of meetings on July 15, 1974, upon the withdrawal of unfair labor practice charges also constitutes conduct violative of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. It is so concluded and found. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the Respondent's op- erations described in section I, above, have a close, inti- mate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices, it will be recommended that Respondent cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative ac- tion to effectuate the policies of the Act. 23 As has been indicated , the contract accords the Respondent the right to a list of the current union members . Its recourse to failure to receive such list would appear to be by enforcement of the contract. If objective criteria had existed to support a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority status, the Respondent could have refused to bargain with the Union until there was proper proof of majority status. Without a good-faith doubt, or proof of lack of majority , the Respondent can not utilize such contract right to sup- port its refusal to bargain. STAR MANUFACTURING CO. 591 Having found that the Respondent discriminatorily re- duced the amount of overtime work assigned to Jim Scott and that the Respondent discriminatorily reduced the wage rates of Jim Scott, it will be recommended that the Respon- dent make Jim Scott whole for loss of pay suffered as a result of such discrimination.24 Having found that the Respondent has refused to bar- gain collectively with the Union, it will be recommended that the Respondent, upon request, bargain with the Union as the exclusive representative of its employees in the ap- propriate unit. Because of the character and scope of the unfair labor practices herein found, the recommended Order will pro- vide that the Respondent cease and desist from in any other manner interfering with, restraining, and coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Sec- tion 7 of the Act. Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case , I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Star Manufacturing Company, Division of Star Forge, Inc., the Respondent, is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Metal Polishers, Buffers, Platers, and Allied Workers International Union, Local 74, AFL-CIO; District No. 122, International Association of Machinists and Aero- space Workers, AFL-CIO; the Metal Trades Department of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of In- dustrial Organizations; Local No. 1600, International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders, Black- smiths, Forgers and Helpers; and Local No. 369, Interna- tional Molders and Foundry Workers Union of North America, each is, and has been at all times material herein, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By reducing the hours of overtime assigned to Jim Scott and by reducing the rates of pay for Jim Scott, the Respondent has engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 4. At all times material herein , the following employees at the Respondent's facility at 2 East Main Street, Carpen- tersville, Illinois, have constituted a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act: All factory employees employed by Respondent at its Carpentersville, Illinois, facility, excluding office em- ployees, company executives, shop clerks, foremen and others in a supervisory position or in confidential relations with management. 5. By refusing to bargain with the Union on and after June 18, 1974, Respondent engaged in unfair labor practic- es within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 6. By the foregoing and by interfering with, restraining, 24 Scott is no longer an employee. Thus, the remedy will be limited as indicated. and coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaran- teed in Section 7 of the Act, Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER 25 Respondent, Star Manufacturing Company, Division of Stare Forge, Inc., Carpentersville, Illinois, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1J Cease and desist from: (at) Coercively interrogating employees concerning their union membership, activities, and sympathies. (li) Threatening its employees with the loss of benefits and',other reprisals in order to discourage employee mem- bership in and support of any labor organization. (c) Promising benefits to employees in order to discour- age employee membership in and support of labor organi- zations. (4) Encouraging and soliciting employees to withdraw their membership from labor organizations. (e) Reducing the assignment of overtime to and the wage rates of employees in order to discourage employee me bership in and support of labor organizations. (f) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union, the Metal Trades Department of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, as the ex- representative of the employees in the unit herein found to be appropriate. The appropriate collective-bar- gaining unit is: All factory employees employed by Respondent at its Carpentersville, Illinois, facility, excluding office em- ployees, company executives, shop clerks, foremen, and others in a supervisory position or in confidential relations with management. (g) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing, its employees in the exercise of their rights guar- anteed in Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent that such rights may be affected by lawful agreements in accord with Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which it is found will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, bargain with the Metal Trades De- partment of the American Federation of Labor and Con- gress of Industrial Organizations as the exclusive represen- tative of its employees in the unit herein found appropriate and embody any understanding reached in a signed agree- ment. (b) Make Jim Scott whole for any loss of pay suffered by reason of the discrimination against him with respect to 25 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes 592 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the reduction of overtime assignments and the reduction of his wage rates. (c) Preserve, and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all pay- roll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records neces- sary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this recommended Order. (d) Post at Respondent's place of business at Carpen- tersville, Illinois, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix.- 26 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by 26 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant the Regional Director for Region 13, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are cus- tomarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Re- spondent to insure that said notices are not altered, de- faced, or covered by any other material. (e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 13, in writ- ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and it here- by is, dismissed insofar as it alleges unfair labor practices not found herein. to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board."