Willamette Industries, Inc.

WILLAMETTE INDUSTRIES, INC. Willamette Industries, Inc., Lebanon Division and In- ternational Woodworkers of America, Local Union No. 3-265, AFL-CIO. Case 36-CA-2624 September 25, 1975 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS FANNING AND JENKINS On May 12, 1975, Administrative Law Judge E. Don Wilson issued the attached Decision in the pro- ceeding. Thereafter, the Employer filed exceptions and a supporting brief and the Charging Party filed a brief in support of the Administrative Law Judge's Decision. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge to the extent they are consistent herewith. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re- lations Board hereby orders that the Respondent Willamette Industries, Inc., Lebanon Division, Leba- non, Oregon, its officers, agents, successors, and as- signs, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) During the existence of a contract between it and the Union, changing any term of such contract without the agreement and consent of the Union. (b) In any other manner interfering with, restrain- ing, or coercing any employee in his right to join, assist, or support the Union, or any other labor orga- nization, or engage in any activity protected by the Act, or to refrain from so doing. 2. Take the following affirmative action which will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) At all times, when the Union is the representa- tive of the majority of the employees in an appropri- ate unit, bargain with it upon request with respect to wages, hours, and working conditions of its employ- ees. (b) Change any term in an existing collective-bar- gaining agreement with the Union only after the Union has agreed and consented to such change. (c) Make the jitney drivers whole for any loss of 707 wages caused them, together with interest as provid- ed in the Remedy section of the Administrative Law Judge's Decision. (d) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (e) Post at its Lebanon, Oregon, facility copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."' Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Di- rector for Region 19, after being duly signed by an authorized representative of Respondent, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respon- dent to insure that said notices are not altered, de- faced, or covered by any other material. (f) Notify the Regional Director for Region 19, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply here- with. ' In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT unilaterally, that is, without the agreement or consent of International Wood- workers of America, Local Union No. 3-265, AFL-CIO, change any term or condition or pro- vision of any contract we may have with the above-named Union while it is the collective- bargaining representative of the employees in the appropriate unit described below unless the Union agrees therewith or consents thereto. The appropriate unit is: All production, maintenance, and transpor- tation employees employed at the Lebanon, Oregon, plywood plant, excluding office cleri- cal employees, guards, professional employ- ees, and all supervisors as defined in the Act. WE WILL make our jitney drivers whole for any wages they may have lost because we unilat- 220 NLRB No. 108 708 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD erally changed our contract terms with the above-named Union and pay them appropriate interest on such losses. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce any employee in his right to join, assist, or support the Union, or any other labor organization, or engage in any activ- ity protected by the Act, or to refrain from so doing. WILLAMETTE INDUSTRIES, INC., LEBANON Di- VISION DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE E. DON WILSON, Administrative Law Judge: Based on a charge filed by International Woodworkers of America, Local Union No. 3-265, AFL-CIO, herein the Union, and thereafter amended on October 18, 1974, the Regional Di- rector for Subregion 36 of the National Labor Relations Board, herein the Board, issued a complaint and notice of hearing dated December 9, 1974, alleging that Willamette Industries, Inc., Lebanon Division, herein Respondent, had violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, herein the Act. Respondent timely denied it had violated the Act in any manner. Pursuant to due notice, a hearing in this matter was heard before me in Portland, Oregon, on January 21, 1975. The parties fully participated. General Counsel and Re- spondent filed briefs on February 25, 1975. They have been fully considered. Upon the entire record in the case and from my observa- tion of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. RESPONDENT'S BUSINESS Respondent is an Oregon corporation maintaining a ply- wood mill located in Lebanon, Oregon, where it is engaged in the manufacture of plywood and related wood products. During the past year, it has sold and shipped to purchasers outside the State of Oregon plywood manufactured at its Lebanon plant, having a value in excess of $100,000. At all material times, it has been an employer engaged in com- merce within the meaning of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION At all material times, the Union has been a labor organi- zation within the meaning of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Issues (1) Did Respondent on or about October 26, 1974, uni- laterally change the scheduling of jitney drivers and has it created a new job classification of "relief dry end jitney driver"? I (2) Did Respondent on or about October 26, 1974, uni- laterally change the work schedule of the jitney drivers and unilaterally establish a new job classification, during the term of an existing collective-bargaining agreement, and over the objection of the Union, and without agreement of the Union? B. The Facts Since about May 1962, and continuing to date, the Union has been the collective-bargaining representative for all production, maintenance, and transportation employees of Respondent employed at its Lebanon, Oregon, Plywood plant, excluding office clerical employees, guards, profes- sional employees, and all supervisors as defined in the Act, which constitute a unit appropriate for the purpose of col- lective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. At all times since May, 1962, and continuing to date, the Union has been the collective-bargaining representative of a majority of the employees in the unit described above and, by virtue of Section 9(a) of the Act, has been, and is now, the exclusive representative of all employees in said unit for the purposes of collective bargaining with Respon- dent, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employ- ment, and other terms and conditions of employment. The current collective-bargaining agreement covering the employees in the unit described above was executed December 5, 1973. This agreement was effective June 1, 1972, and remains in effect until June 1, 1975. Such rela- tionship had existed for years. The jitney drivers have always worked a "normal work schedule" as defined in article V of the collective-bargain- ing agreement described immediately above, and they have been paid overtime for any Saturday or Sunday work. Respondent, at various times during the term of the cur- rent collective-bargaining agreement, requested that the jit- ney drivers' schedule be adjusted to a variable workweek. The Union considered the request and uniformly rejected it, and continues to reject it. The matter in issue in this case is whether Respondent unilaterally modified the terms of its contract with the Union, without the consent of the Union. I cannot find that Respondent denies the unilateral change, but instead find merely that it claims it affected the change only after the Union was given notice of change and full opportunity to "bargain" with respect to such change? I find from having read the transcript much more than once, that the matter concerning which there had been a unilateral change had been the subject of a clearly "estab- lished practice" 9 and no situations arose during the term of the contract which could not have been foreseen before the parties arrived at agreement. Contract language had 1 As the complaint was amended during the hearing. Perhaps the new job classification had a different title 2 In the middle of an existing contract 3 Of many years WILLAMETTE INDUSTRIES, INC. 709 been established for years with respect to hours of employ- ment and wages including overtime , etc., and other work- ing conditions, and they had become standard through a continuing practice over many years. The record makes clear that jitney drivers for years, un- der contractual relations, had worked a 5-day week begin- ning Monday and ending Friday, it being understood that if they worked on Saturday or Sunday they were to receive overtime. Respondent, on or about August 26, 1974, changed the Monday through Friday schedule of the jitney drivers and directed that they were to work any consecu- tive 5 days fixed by Respondent without regard to overtime for Saturday and Sunday. This without the Union's con- sent. This case was heard by me in light of a contractual rela- tionship between the Union and Respondent for a period of over 10 years and a practice between the parties for a similar period. Respondent had well more than 100 employees, of whom but a few worked at jobs as jitney drivers. Without respect to other employees, dryers worked what appears to have been known as a 7-day schedule which means that the "5-day week" could begin on "any day of the week." The jitney drivers, as has already been noted, for years worked Monday through Friday, with Saturday and Sun- day as overtime days. On September 3, 1974, Respondent placed the jitney drivers on the same schedule as the dryers.4 At the time of the hearing such was not taking place. The jitney drivers were working their usual Monday through Friday shift, i.e., the 5-day schedule rather than the 7-day schedule. Until September 3, 1974, since 1968, jitney drivers were not required to work more than the 5-day schedule, viz, Monday through Friday, with time and a half for Saturday and Sunday. Respondent has failed to establish in any manner that jitney drivers were considered as part of the "dryer crew." Instead, going back to October 20, 1968, when Respondent proposed a 7-day week for jitney drivers, like the dryer crew, such was not accepted by the Union, nor was it ac- cepted thereafter. Such difference in hours of work for jitney drivers and the dryer crew was continued, even so far as the part of the present contract is concerned . As late as a Joint Plant Committee Meeting held on March 3, 1973, the original schedule for dry end and green end jitney drivers remained unchanged. Jitney drivers continued to receive overtime if they chose to work on a Saturday or Sunday or both. As I understand the record in this case , the "relief shift schedule" referred to the so-called 7-day schedule. On May 25, 1973, Respondent stated that when the relief shift was started, the jitney drivers were not included in the relief shift schedule. The jitney drivers wanted the overtime which had always been theirs.5 At no meeting between Union and Respondent did Respondent do anything but suggest it was "unhappy" with the "5-day week" of the ° The so-called 7-day week. jitney drivers. It never suggested that any part of the con- tract including article V make jitney drivers part of the dryer crew, and, in fact, at all times jitney drivers received overtime if they worked Saturday or Sunday or both, as they chose. The above is not intended to suggest that Respondent continued to express itself as pleased or satisfied with the jitney schedule. In fact, from time to time, it proposed changes in the schedule for jitney drivers and on June 15, 1973, at a Joint Plant Committee Meeting it found fault with a situation in which it alleged it could fill the weekend schedule by going outside the jitney drivers' classification, and it stated that if the jitney drivers were not going to work the weekends they would have to establish a relief shift schedule, and on June 15, 1973, Respondent com- plained that for some weekends they had to fill several jitney overtime shifts out of classification. It stated that if the situation continued, the jitney workweek would be changed to coincide with the 7-day dryer schedule .6 At this meeting Respondent did not even suggest that jitney driv- ers are "necessary to operate the dryer." Thus, we come to the Joint Plant Committee Meeting of August 6, 1974, where Respondent proposed changing the dry end and green end jitney operators' hours of work to correspond with the dry end crew schedule.7 Respondent proposed an entirely new schedule for jitney drivers, allegedly because they had refused weekend work for which they were sched- uled to work. Respondent told the Union at this meeting that the swing- and graveyard-shift dry and green jitney drivers could have their choice of accepting a new work- week schedule or be curtailed and "follow the curtailment procedure." It should be noted that Respondent at this meeting did not suggest that the jitney drivers were part of the dryer crew, but simply insisted that there be a change in the hours of work and the pay of the jitney drivers. Respondent having made its proposal, gave the Union un- til August 20, 1974, "to contact the company." The Union reported the Company's plan to the jitney drivers and they rejected the plan. Not long after August 20, the Union told Respondent that its proposed plan was rejected by the Union. Almost immediately thereafter, Re- spondent put its new schedule into effect, i.e., the one which the Union had rejected, during the existence of a contract. Almost immediately thereafter, some of the jitney driv- ers filed grievances. The Union, at a Joint Plant Committee Meeting on September 6, 1974, asked Respondent what could be gained by creating one more job and Respondent stated that by doing this it could cut out two overtime shifts per week. Glenn Colburn testified for Respondent. He was pro- duction superintendent for Respondent. I have noted that Respondent complained in negotiations that from time to time it was without sufficient employees to perform jitney drivers' work on Saturday or Sunday. Mr. Colburn testified that, one way or another, they got their full complement of jitney drivers on Saturday or Sunday. In addition to those who bore the regular classification 3 The minutes of the May 25, 1973, Joint Plant Committee Meeting indi- 6 This, during the existence of a contracts cated that Respondent was at least unhappy with this condition which had 7 This would have been contrary to years of prevailing practice within the existed for a long period of time. plant. 710 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD of "jitney drivers" there were from 12 to 14 experienced drivers who could perform jitney driver work . Failure of "jitney drivers" to show up for work on Saturday or Sun- day as they previously may have volunteered to do, re- quired Respondent to make alot of phone calls , etc., from time to time. However, Respondent always had somebody to operate the jitneys on Saturday and/or Sunday. This was simply by following the contractual procedure. It was the system that had been followed for years. For years jitney drivers volunteered for jobs on Monday and on Thursday morning they were assigned Saturday or Sunday jobs. They had complete freedom prior to the time they were supposed to report for work on Saturday or Sunday, to get in touch with Respondent, and ask to be excused from the Saturday or Sunday work for which they had volunteered, for almost any reason , having a hint of legiti- macy, such as hunting. This traditional practice according to Colburn stemmed from the collective bargaining be- tween the Company and the Union . The system of Mon- day through Friday work for jitney drivers with the privi- lege of volunteering for Saturday and/or Sunday work at time and a half came about through collective bargaining between the Union and Respondent , testified Colburn. As Colburn said, the system had been followed for years. He testified such system developed from the labor agreement between Union and Respondent. Colburn continued, testifying that in early 1973 Respon- dent became dissatisfied with the "practice" 8 which I find to have been part and parcel of the collective -bargaining contract over a period of years. He testified that the con- tractually sanctioned practice occasioned a lot of problems for Respondent. He continued, testifying that Respondent after many years found overtime to be unneeded , and they "found a way around by which you could eliminate over- time and stop spinning wheels trying to get people to come and fill in for people who did not show." He continued, stating "that as profits got squeezed, [he] commenced to look around for a place to save money ." He had been dis- satisfied with paying jitney overtime for Saturday and Sun- day assignments for about a year . He wondered why Re- spondent should pay overtime for Saturday and Sunday work when all Respondent had to do was to rearrange the work schedules, which had existed for years. He began to analyze the problem and found that such a procedure un- der the contractual arrangements for years was costing Re- spondent money and Respondent ought to reorganize its work schedules so that it would not be faced with a need- less payment of overtime as they had been paying, for years. Please remember, this is during the term of the con- tract. Mr. Colburn stated it was pretty much true that for years Respondent had had a bargaining relationship with the Union, and, whether the contract in writing said so or not, the parties lived and operated under that contract so that there was overtime work on Saturdays and Sundays for jitney drivers, and Mr. Colburn wanted to change that practice which had existed for a period of years so that there would be no overtime pay, and Respondent in the 8 Pursuant to the contract middle of a contract period went to the Union and said in effect that they had been going along now for years with these contracts and Respondent wanted then and there to stop doing what they had been doing, and they proposed that the cessation be in August . Respondent asked the Union to agree to its proposal . Respondent explained to the Union that it had a lot of reasons including the cost of overtime, unit stability, absenteeism, etc., and Respondent asked the Union to agree to its proposal . The Union re- fused and stated that they wanted the overtime that the jitney drivers had been getting over the years . As Mr. Colburn testi- fied, Respondent did not agree with the Union and pointed out to the Union that the practice under the contract was costing the Respondent money and they were having their absenteeism problems and having a variety of economic problems. Respondent wanted the Union to agree with Re- spondent to cut out overtime for Saturday and Sunday and to change the work schedules so that jitney drivers would work different hours than provided by the contract. Mr. Colburn stated that this proposal of Respondent was made "in the middle of a contract period ." The Union did not agree with the proposal , and as Mr. Colburn testified Re- spondent changed the work hours, etc., without the agree- ment of the Union. Article V of the contract through the years appeared to have provided in the second paragraph thereof, substan- tially, as follows: When dryer or press are maintaining seven (7) day schedule, work schedules for those employees only who are necessary to operate the dryer or press may be adjusted so long as such employees have two con- secutive days off. Colburn testified, as would be obvious , that a jitney driv- er does not operate a press . Without respect to the exact words of the contract, the practice of years makes it clear that the parties did not consider jitney drivers as the ones who were "necessary to operate the dryer or press." While Union and Respondent, from time to time, have had their differences, there never has been occasion for a strike or lockout. In 1973, Respondent stated that contrary to the so-called 5-day week and 7-day week Respondent was going to pre- pare a new work schedule, where everybody in the plant would work 5 days a week , with no overtime and it would try and prepare a list of employees who would begin their work on one day or another and would finish 5 days later. There were to be 5 days worked in succession whether they began on Saturday or Sunday or any other day. Bert Fanning testified that he was the industrial relations manager for Respondent in its Oregon division . His work entailed contract negotiation and administration, etc. In evaluating the testimony of Mr . Fanning, at least in part, it must be noted that the changes herein took place in the middle of a contract period, without the consent of the Union and solely as determined by Respondent. Mr. Fanning testified that he did not notify the Union with regard to the change in hours for jitney drivers that Respondent had made the change. He testified that, with respect to the change in schedule for jitney drivers, he did not tell the Union that they could WILLAMETTE INDUSTRIES, INC. take it or leave it, that the change was going to be made. As he put it, they spent a lengthy period of time trying to discuss the issue and work out their mutual problems and come to a meeting of the minds . He admitted that the Union never came to any agreement with Respondent as to the change in schedules for the jitney drivers. Mr. Fanning stated that the reasons for Respondent making its unilateral change with respect to the work schedules of jitney drivers included "crew stability," and the problem getting the right people in the right jobs to work overtime, etc. Pursuant to my question he admitted that another reason they wanted to change the work schedules of the jitney drivers was to eliminate "the necessity for overtime ." 9 He emphasized it was important, since Respondent was a very competitive business, to cut its costs. These matters were mentioned to the Union in February or March. It was as early as March that Respondent was put on notice by th jitney drivers that they were not going to agree to any change in the Monday through Friday work shift. Mr Fanning admitted that the contract language had not changed since 1969 at the latest. It is clear that the practice for jitney drivers continued for years thereafter. Mr. Fanning testified that, after Respondent exhausted everybody in the dry end and green end classification, Re- spondent had an agreement with the Union that to pacify the utility drivers, the utility drivers would be next in line to fill Saturday and Sunday vacancies before Respondent went to the "plant qualified list." According to Fanning, while they hoped such arrangement would provide two ad- ditional drivers whom they could reach immediately, in 1974 Respondent's problem was not solved. It is clear from Mr. Fanning's testimony that one of the major reasons for Respondent's unilateral change in the work schedules 10 was to save money for Respondent. According to Mr. Fanning, the decision to make the change was irrevocable when it was announced to the Union late in August. So far as Respondent was concerned its solution to the problem was the only way it feasibly could be solved.". C. Concluding Findings The writer has most carefully studied the Board's deci- sion in American Cyanamide Company, 185 NLRB 981 (1970). Here, of course, there is the most strong contention by General Counsel that Respondent could not change work schedules without the consent of the Union. I could pursue an analysis of the above decision at great length. I have analyzed it extensively in my mind. I find that it would most unduly prolong this decision were Ito set forth such analysis. Unlike the American Cyanamide case, the dryer crew, referred to in the contract, did not include jitney drivers as shown by many years of past practice. The contract could be examined only in light of what was the practice under which the parties jointly operated. For years it was the joint practice that jitney drivers would work Monday 9 Save money. 10 With resulting overtim pay. 11 Repudiation of contract obligations and collective bargaining. 711 through Friday and they had first crack at jitney driver work on Saturday and/or Sunday at time and a half or premium time. These many years of effectuating the terms of the contract make clear that jitney drivers were not con- sidered as being among "those employees only who are necessary to operate the dryer." Obviously, at least to me, the operator of a jitney was not an operator of the dryer. The contract as effectuated by the parties thereto make it clear that there were paid work schedules for the jitney drivers and such schedules may not be changed by Re- spondent without the consent of the Union. Obviously, the Union never had so agreed to a change. It is entirely unimportant that Respondent had econom- ic reasons for changing the work schedule unilaterally. Un- der Section 8(d) of the Act Respondent was explicitly for- bidden to modify the terms of the contract without the consent of the Union and, of course, the Union had the privilege of withholding its consent. Section 8(d) does not excuse unilateral changes in the contract by either party thereto because either party had a compelling economic reason or that such unilateral change may have served an apparently desirable economic objective. ... "[t]he law is its own measure of right and wrong, of what it permits, or forbids, and the judgment of the courts [and of the Board] cannot be set up against it in the supposed accommodation of its policy with the good intention of parties, and it may be, of some good results." Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. U.S., 226 U.S. 2049. I cannot find other than that Respondent' s unconcerned and deliberate unilateral change in the schedules of work, hours of work, and pay for work of the jitney drivers was anything but a violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1). There is no question but that prior to September 3, 1974, when Respondent put into effect its illegal unilateral change, jitney drivers received overtime for Saturday work and premium time for Sunday's and that they had been scheduled to work only Monday through Friday, excepting to the extent that they volunteered for Saturday and/or Sunday overtime work. There can be no question that without respect to the exact words of paragraph 5 of the contract and indeed without regard to whether or not there be any inherent ambiguity in the second paragraph thereof, the parties by their practices of many years have made it clear that jitney drivers are not included within the coverage of article V, of the contract. While sympathy may be felt and indeed ex- pressed for Respondent's economic problems, it may not unilaterally change horses in midstream. Should there have been any violation by jitney drivers of the contractual pro- visions between Respondent and the Union, Respondent was entirely free to exercise its disciplinary prerogatives. Respondent must realize that in a labor contract, as is true of all but pro forma contracts, a quid pro quo. The Union and its jitney drivers have been treated almost as men with- out a country. Their contractual rights of many years have been eliminated by the mere "say-so" of Respondent. It dealt with the Union by its mere ipse dixit. The economic problems presented in argument by Re- spondent appear to be arguments alone, with no factual 712 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD basis. It must not be forgotten that Production Superinten- dent Glen Colburn testified Respondent always had a full complement of jitney drivers on Saturday and Sunday. The drivers testified , and I credit their testimony in Coto, established in this record , that Respondent was never with- out a jitney driver on the weekend, and Respondent lost no production because of the contract and the years of prac- tice under it. Respondent in its brief refers to its unilateral change in the contracted-for working conditions as being merely "in- significant." I disagree entirely with Respondent 's claim in its brief that the working schedules of the jitney drivers were not a subject of mandatory bargaining. They not only had been bargained for but had been fixed and had become "com- mon law of the shop." It is not to be ignored that the jitney drivers were de- praved of pay be the elimination of their primary right to seek Saturday and/or Sunday work , at overtime . In no way can I look upon this unilateral change , after many years of practice, as a "slight procedural change." The entire record makes unmistakably clear that the workweek of Monday through Friday, with Saturday and/or Sunday being over- time, was a practice of many years and one which Respon- dent had sought to change for a number of years . This is not a situation involving merely "the details and the minu- tiae of employer-employee relationships." This change ef- fected the jitney workers not only in their hours of employ- ment and in their working conditions but also in the amount of wages they were entitled to receive. I am completely unconcerned with Respondent 's claim that they attempted to bargain about the change in work- ing hours of the jitney drivers . Such "bargaining" was in the very midst of a contractual period. So, too, am I most unimpressed by Respondent 's conten- tion in its brief that its unilateral change in terms of the contract, as evidence by many years of practice , did not constitute a "modification" of the contract within the meaning of Section 8(d). There is no question but that Respondent attempted to bargain during the existence of a contract, about a change in the contract . So, too, there is no question but that the Union legally refused to accept the proposals of Respon- dent which were contrary to years of practice pursuant to contracts. In its brief, Respondent concedes that after the Union membership rejected Respondent's proposal for a change, further talks would have been of no avail . Respondent de- scribes the Union as "the immovable rock." 12 Respondent concedes in its brief that every offer it made to have the contract terms , as put into practice over a peri- od of many years, changed, was refused. I reject, out of hand, Respondent's contention that be- cause it bargained extensively with the Union about jitney drivers in 1973 and 1974, it did not violate Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. I am not at all impressed with Respondent 's contention that the Board does not have authority to interpret a con- 12 Petrol! tract where the parties do not have an arbitration clause to resolve disputes between them . The fact is that the demon- strated practice of years with respect to jitney drivers clear- ly interprets their series of contracts. Respondent in its brief refers to the contract provision upon which it relied as "something of a `sleeping dog'." I find, unfortunately, that it was a "dead dog." I am not at all moved by Respondent's contention in its brief that the current bargaining agreement will terminate in a few months and the parties will then be in a position to clear up any "misunderstandings" as to the meaning of article V. I reject the idea that I should find it would not effectuate the policies of the Act to attempt to resolve the meaning of article V, especially in light of the years during which article V has been effectuated. There is no question that for years Respondent and the Union lived under a contract with no question as to the working hours, overtime, etc., and with such a solid agree- ment there could be no question that Respondent had no right to modify the terms of the existing contract without consent of the Union . Section 8(d) makes this abundantly clear, and Respondent's claim of economic problems is ir- relevant. Oak Cliff-Colman Packing Company, 207 NLRB 1063 (1973). Respondent ceased to place the jitney drivers on a 7-day schedule about December 15, 1974. In essence, it suggests that the issue is now moot , that for such reasons no Board remedy should be issued. I cannot ignore that the Board must correct past violations and thereby prevent further violations. There is no doubt in my mind that Respondent has shown contempt for the National Labor Relations Act by making a unilateral change in an existing contract. It is manifest to me that Respondent by unilaterally changing the work schedules of the jitney drivers as spelled out here- inabove, and by depriving the jitney drivers of their con- tractually guaranteed right to have the opportunity to re- ceive overtime pay, violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5). The jitney drivers must be made whole by Respondent for loss of pay with interest. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with Respondent's opera- tions described in section I, above , have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, it will be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and that it take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. I shall recommend that Respondent, at no time, unilater- ally change the scheduling of jitney drivers and that it take no unilateral action with respect to any jitney drivers while WILLAMETTE INDUSTRIES, INC. 713 such matters are the subject of and are covered by a con- tract between Respondent and the Union and particularly over the objections of the Union. At no time during the existence of a collective-bargain- ing agreement betwen Respondent and the Union shall Re- spondent make any unilateral change of any kind with respect to matters which are covered by said collective-bargaining agreement. I shall further recommend an Order that Respondent leave inviolate the terms of any collective -bargaining agreement between it and the Union, unless the Union agrees to any changes. Since wages, hours, and working conditions are manda- tory subjects of collective bargaining, Respondent shall take no action with respect to the same without the agree- ment of the Union which is the collective-bargaining repre- sentative of a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit. It shall make the jitney drivers whole for any loss of wages they may have sustained by reason of Respondent's unilateral changes in the collective -bargaining agreement with the Union, with respect to hours and other terms of their employment, as provided in F. W. Woolworth Compa- ny, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest as set forth in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962). The jitney drivers are to be made whole for loss of wages together with interest. Such shall be done in accord with prior Board decisions. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. 3. By treating its existing contract with the Union as a nullity, and unilaterally changing terms and conditions thereof, Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 4. By unilaterally changing the hours and other condi- tions of employment of the jitney drivers, Respondent vio- lated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of the Act. [Recommended Order omitted from publication.]