Local 945, Teamsters

LOCAL 945, TEAMSTERS Local 945, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Ameri- ca and Newark Disposal Service, Inc.1 Case 22- CC-681 September 16, 1977 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND MURPHY On December 15, 1976, Administrative Law Judge Marvin Roth issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the Respondent, Local 945, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Kearny, New Jersey, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall take the action set forth in said recommended Order. i The name of the Charging Party was amended at the hearing. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE MARVIN ROTH, Administrative Law Judge: This case was heard at Newark, New Jersey, on September 9, 1976. The charge was filed on July 21, 1976, by Newark Disposal Service, Inc. (herein Newark Disposal). The complaint, which issued on August 9, 1976, alleges that Local 945, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America (herein the Union or Respondent) violated Section 8(b)(4Xi) and (ii) (B) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, which section proscribes secondary boycotts. The Union's answer denies the commission of the alleged unfair labor practices. The principal issues are: (I) whether the Union picketed the Kearny, New Jersey, plant of Swift Processed Meats Company (herein Swift), and threatened to resume such picketing, for an object of forcing Swift and other persons 232 NLRB No. I to cease doing business with Newark Disposal, and with each other, and thereby violated Section 8(bX4)B); and (2) if so, whether a remedial order is warranted which would restrain the Union from engaging in any secondary boycott conduct for an object of forcing Swift or any other person to cease doing business with Newark Disposal or any other rubbish removal contractor within the State of New Jersey not represented by the Union. All parties were afforded full opportunity to participate, to present relevant evidence, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to argue orally, and to file briefs. Upon the entire record in this case and from my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and having considered the briefs submitted by General Counsel and the Union, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE BUSINESS OF THE PERSONS INVOLVED Swift, a Delaware corporation, maintains one of its plants and places of business at Kearny, New Jersey (herein Kearny plant), where it is engaged in the processing and wholesale distribution of packaged meats. In the operation of its business, Swift annually receives at its Kearny plant goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 which are transported to that plant directly from States of the United States other than New Jersey, and annually distributes from its Kearny plant products valued in excess of $50,000 which are shipped from that plant directly to points outside of New Jersey. Newark Disposal, a New Jersey corporation, maintains its office and place of business in Kearny, New Jersey, and is engaged in the business of providing rubbish removal services for industri- al and commercial customers in northern New Jersey. In the operation of its business, Newark Disposal annually receives in excess of $50,000 for services performed for firms which are directly engaged in interstate commerce. Newark Disposal's personnel consists of Peter Dellisanti and his cousin, who are coowners and president and vice president, respectively, of the corporation, and who perform all of the work of Newark Disposal. It is unnecessary to determine, for the purposes of this case, whether Newark Disposal is an employer within the meaning of the Act. I find that Swift is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, that Newark Disposal is a person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and that it would effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction herein. I1. THE RESPONDENT AND ITS AGENTS The Union is admittedly a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. The Union has a charter from the International Brotherhood of Teamsters which grants it jurisdiction to organize and represent private sanitation employees in the State of New Jersey, and, in fact, it carries out those functions throughout the State, except in the Camden area. Joseph Campisano is president of the Union, and Flan Chestnut is its business representative. Both are, I DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD as the Union admits, agents within the meaning of Section 2(13) of the Act, and have been and are now agents of the Union acting on its behalf. Ill. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES In February 1976,1 Swift and Newark Disposal entered into an arrangement whereby Newark Disposal undertook to perform solid waste removal services for Swift at the Kearny plant on a regular basis. Newark Disposal furnished and placed its waste containers at four locations on the plant premises. On an average of three times a week (normally Monday, Wednesday, and Friday mornings) Dellisanti or his cousin would come to the plant with their truck and haul away a container or containers to a disposal site. Each trip normally necessitated Newark Disposal's presence on the plant premises for about one-half hour. The number of trips (seldom less than thrice weekly, but sometimes including a fourth trip, usually on Saturday) depended upon Swift's needs. Newark Disposal was paid on a per-load basis in accordance with a purchase order executed by the parties. Dellisanti normally made his arrangements with Frank Doe, Swift's chief engineer at the Kearny plant, who awarded the contract to Newark Disposal. In Doe's absence, Dellisanti would deal with Maintenance Supervisor Walter Scanlon, Doe's immediate subordinate. Prior to February, the waste removal services were performed by Piscaty Disposal Service, which is a party to or covered by a collective-bargaining agreement with the Union. Newark Disposal does not have a contract with the Union or any other labor organization. Swift's production and maintenance employees at Kear- ny are represented by Local P-653, Meat, Food and Allied Workers and its parent organization, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workers of North America, AFL- CIO (herein collectively Meat Workers), and its drivers are represented by Teamsters Local 478. The Union, in its answer, admitted that at no time material has it had any labor dispute with Swift.2 Nevertheless, about 10:30 a.m. on Tuesday, July 13, Local 945 set up a picket line consisting of three pickets, initially accompanied by Chestnut, at the vehicular entrance to the Swift plant.3 The pickets wore signs which bore the following text: Information to the General Public-Swift Processed Meats Co. does not have a contract with Teamsters Local 945. Please do not stop patronizing this establish- ment. Go in and tell this company you prefer [sic] he does business with a union house. We will appreciate your help in helping us obtain union working condi- tions for these employees. Local 945 has elevated conditions of employment for working people through- I All dates herein are in 1976 unless otherwise indicated. 2 There was some testimony that in January Meat Workers had suggested to Swift that it might use employees who would otherwise be laid off to perform the trash removal services which Swift normally awarded to an outside contractor. However, Union Business Representative Chestnut admitted that he was unaware of such discussions, and there is no evidence that the Union's picketing related in any way to any real or apparent dispute between Swift and any of the labor organizations which represent its employees. 3 The Swift plant contains four buildings which are located on a fenced tract of some 12 to 15 acres. There is a vehicular gate (which was picketed) out the state. Through your patronage you can help. We thank you in advance. The text on the signs, which bore no caption, was in such small print that Dellisanti was unable to read it at a distance of 15 feet. Meat Workers Local President Mitchell Holloway testified that he attempted to read the sign but "couldn't make heads or tails" of it. The text of the signs falsely indicated that the Union had a labor dispute with Swift. No other employer was named, indeed, the signs did not even suggest that the Union's grievance had anything to do with a rubbish removal contractor. A picket told Holloway that they were picketing because Swift should be under contract with the Union. However, Chestnut admitted that the Union picketed Swift because there was a "non-union garbage contractor working at Swift." On the day of the picketing, Newark Disposal was not scheduled to work at the Kearny plant, nor did it perform any trash removal that day. Newark Disposal's waste containers were not visible from the gate. At the time of the picketing, Meat Workers representa- tives were meeting with Swift Labor Manager Clark Breisch to discuss certain department closings. An employ- ee came in and informed them that there were pickets at the main gate. Their immediate reaction was that the picketing was probably directed at another firm nearby. However, Meat Workers' Chief Steward Stafford went out and returned to report that they were picketing "us." Stafford obtained from the pickets a union business card with the Union's telephone number and Campisano's name printed on the front, but with Chestnut's name written on the back. Meat Workers Local President Holloway tele- phoned the Union and spoke to Chestnut, who told him that the reason for the picketing was that Swift was doing business with a nonunion sanitation company. Holloway reported this to Breisch, who instructed Holloway to tell Chestnut that if that was the problem, they needed a week to change contractors. At the time, Chief Engineer Doe was on vacation, and was scheduled to return on July 20. Chestnut told Holloway that on the basis of this represen- tation, he would remove the pickets, and in fact, Chestnut ordered the picket line removed. That same day, Mainte- nance Supervisor Scanlon talked with Dellisanti and verified that he was nonunion. Chestnut admitted in his testimony, with some equivoca- tion, that he assumed that Swift would get rid of the nonunion contractor and get a union contractor. On July 19, after first checking with Holloway, Chestnut tele- phoned Breisch and questioned him as to the "status of the situation up there," asking whether it would be necessary to return the pickets.4 Breisch answered that the situation had been remedied, that there was no need to return the and a narrow pedestrian gate. The vehicular gate is normally used by wholesaler customers picking up products, suppliers, salesmen, Swift's own trucks, and passenger cars of employees. Swift does not conduct any retail business at the Kearny plant, and the plant is not open to the general public. 4 I credit the testimony of Breisch concerning this conversation. Chestnut was somewhat equivocal, testifying that he did not recall saying anything about pickets. In view of Chestnut's own admission that he regarded replacement of the nonunion contractor as the quid pro quo for removal of the picket line, it is more likely than not that he would have raised the specter of resumed picketing. Moreover, Chestnut's patently false and self- serving assertions in his testimony, that his opinions in the matter were his 2 LOCAL 945, TEAMSTERS pickets, and that he would obtain the exact details of handling the matter. The next day, upon Doe's return to work, Scanlon briefed him on the situation and Breisch told him of Chestnut's call, explaining that if the situation were not corrected the pickets would be back. Doe then terminated the arrangement with Newark Disposal, and replaced that firm with Piscaty Disposal Service. Breisch then left a message with Chestnut's secretary, which Chestnut received, that Swift was using Piscaty, a member of the Union. In sum, as Doe informed Dellisanti, Swift ceased utilizing the services of Newark Disposal because of the threat of a resumption of picketing. I find, as Chestnut in substance admitted, that the Union picketed Swift, and threatened to renew such picketing, for an object of forcing Swift to cease doing business with Newark Disposal, and thereby violated Section 8(bX4)(B) of the Act. It is hornbook law that such conduct constitutes an unlawful secondary boycott. As indicated, the picketing was conducted at an entrance which was used exclusively by Swift, its commercial customers, deliverymen, suppliers and other firms doing business with Swift, and their employees, and the Union deliberately sought to create the false impression that its dispute was with Swift. In light of these facts, I specifically find that by its picketing the Union threatened, coerced, and restrained Swift, its customers, deliverymen, suppliers, and other firms utilizing the picketing gate, and induced and encouraged individu- als employed by them to engage in work stoppages, for an object of forcing Swift and other persons to cease doing business with Newark Disposal, and with each other. It is immaterial whether the picketing actually had the immedi- ate effect of causing work stoppages or a disruption of business between Swift and other neutral persons using the gate. 5 N.L.R.B. v. Associated Musicians, Local 802, AFL [Gotham Broadcasting Corp. (Station WINS)], 226 F.2d 900, 904-905 (C.A. 2, 1955). In fact, the picketing stopped after about 35 minutes only because the Union was satisfied that it had achieved its ultimate objective. IV. THE REMEDY General Counsel does not contend that the evidence as developed with respect to the Swift - Newark Disposal matter, standing alone, demonstrates a proclivity to violate Section 8(bX4XB) as would warrant a broad order prohibiting the Union from engaging in any secondary boycott conduct. However, General Counsel does contend that in view of the history of secondary boycott litigation involving the Union, a broad remedial order is warranted.s In support of this contention, General Counsel presented in evidence two Decisions and Orders of the Board, each of which was entered pursuant to a settlement stipulation providing for the entry of a consent order by the Board and a consent judgment by any appropriate United States Court of Appeals. The first Decision and Order 'was entered on April 27 in two consolidated cases (herein own and did not represent union policy, marked him a less than credible witness. Chestnut admitted that he had authority to set up picket lines and his actions made clear that he also had authority to decide when they should be withdraw. 5 The only evidence of a possible work stoppage consisted of hearsay testimony concerning an unidentified truckdriver. collectively the Inmont Case), pursuant to a stipulation executed by all parties on February 27. The second Decision and Order (herein the Kravitz case) was entered on July 29, pursuant to an all-party stipulation executed on June 14, 1976. As of the present hearing General Counsel anticipated that the Board would obtain court decrees in each case. Neither stipulation contained a nonadmission clause, nor did they contain any other provision governing their use in any other litigation, beyond conceding the usual jurisdictional facts and consenting to the entry of the order specified in the stipulation. The format of each Order is substantially the same. In Inmont, the Board ordered the Union in sum: to cease and desist from threatening, coercing, or restraining Gino's of New Jersey or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, or inducing or encouraging individuals em- ployed by them to engage in work stoppages, for an object of compelling Gino's or any other person to cease doing business with Sano Carting Company, Inc., or with each other; and further enjoined the Union from similarly engaging in secondary boycott conduct against Inmont Corporation, other persons, and their employees, for an object of forcing Inmont to cease doing business with Custom Disposal Service Corporation t/a D&V Disposal Service Corporation, or with each other. In Kravitz, the Board ordered the Union to cease and desist from engaging in secondary boycott conduct against M.A. Kravitz Co., Inc., Lawrence Associates, other persons and their employ- ees, for an object of forcing Lawrence, Kravitz, or any other person to cease doing business with Harry W. Fawkes Trash Collection, Delaware Valley Scrap Co., or with each other. The jurisdictional facts indicate that Inmont, Gino's, Lawrence, and Kravitz are each engaged in business in New Jersey (owning or operating, respectively, a chemical plant, fast food chain, and shopping mall), that the cases arose in New Jersey, and that Sano, D&V, Fawkes, and Delaware Valley are each engaged in New Jersey in the business of providing rubbish removal service for commer- cial users. General Counsel, while acknowledging that there is no Board authority precisely in point, requests that I take notice of the foregoing Decisions and Orders, and find therefrom, together with the evidence in this case, that the Union has demonstrated a proclivity to engage in secon- dary boycott conduct against persons doing business with nonunion rubbish removal contractors within its territorial jurisdiction, and, therefore, that a broad order is warrant- ed. The Union also concedes that there is no decisional authority in point. The Board has held that it will not rely upon a consent order or decree which contains a nonad- mission clause, as a basis for finding a proclivity on the part of a respondent to violate the Act. See Raymond Buick, Inc., 173 NLRB 1292 (1968), enfd. 445 F.2d 644 (C.A. 2, 1971), involving a minority union which obtained recogni- tion in violation of Section 8(bX I XA) of the Act. Converse- ly, the Board has found a proclivity to violate the s For ease in reference, when discussing orders in secondary boycott cases, the term "narrow order" when used herein, means an order limited both as to named secondary persons and the named primary person. A "medium order" is one which is not limited to named secondaries, but is limited to the named primary. A "broad order" is one which is not limited either to named secondaries or to a named primary. 3 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD secondary boycott provisions of the Act, based on two consent orders entered pursuant to stipulations which expressly permitted the Board to make use of each of the orders to the same extent as an adjudicated decision. Sequoia District Council of Carpenters, AFL-CIO (Nick Lattanzio d/b/a Lattanzio Enterprises), 206 NLRB 67, 69 (1973), enfd. 499 F.2d 129 (C.A. 9, 1974). In Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, Local No. 70, IBT (C&T Trucking Co.), 191 NLRB 11 (1971), which was distin- guished by the Administrative Law Judge in Sequoia, the Board declined to enter a broad secondary boycott order based, inter alia, on 13 previous settlement agreements entered into by Local 70. The Board stated that it "has frequently held that settlement agreements, and consent decrees arising therefrom, have no probative value in establishing that violations of the Act have occurred and, hence, they may not be relied upon to establish a 'proclivity' to violate the Act." The Board cited as authority a prior case involving Local 70 as Respondent Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, Local No. 70, IBT (Sam-Jo, Inc., d/b/a Smiser Freight Service), 174 NLRB 98 (1969), in which the settlements were made a part of the record, and further referred to three reported Board decisions which had been cited as authority for the Smiser decision (174 NLRB at fn. 1). However, neither C&T Trucking nor Smiser indicated whether the settle- ments were formal or informal, or whether they contained nonadmission clauses. As for the three cited decisions, two involved settlement agreements which contained nonad- mission clauses and the third involved an informal settlement agreement. See Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Helpers and Taxicab Drivers, Local Union No. 327, IBT (Greer Stop Nut Co., a division of Kaynar Mfg. Co., Inc.), 160 NLRB 1919, 1920 (1966); citing Local No. 92, International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL-CIO (R. W. Hughes Construction Co., Inc.), 138 NLRB 428, 429 (1962); and United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO (Endicott Church Furniture, Inc.), 125 NLRB 853, 854 (1959). The proposition posed by General Counsel is one which only the Board can resolve. My own view, for what it is worth, is that absent a nonadmission clause, a consent order and enforcement decree is the equivalent of, and tantamount to an adjudication that the Respondent has engaged in the conduct prohibited therein. "It is true, as a general principle, that an adjudication by consent or agreement has the same res judicata effect as judgment entered after answer and trial." Menendez v. Saks and Company, 485 F.2d 1355, 1363 (C.A. 2, 1973), reversed on other grounds sub nom, Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976). The Union argues that such an approach would discourage settlements. The more compelling consideration is that it will discourage violations of the Act. I find that the four cases of violations of Section 8(b)(4XB), including the present case, all occurring over a relatively short time span, demonstrate a proclivity on the part of the Union to engage in secondary boycott conduct directed against persons doing business with rubbish removal contractors whom it deems objec- tionable. There is another consideration which warrants a broad order in this case. Assuming, arguendo, that the consent orders do not constitute adjudications of unlawful conduct, the fact nevertheless remains that two recent Board orders prohibiting secondary boycott conduct have not deterred the Union from engaging in similar conduct not expressly prohibited by the precise wording of those orders. The violation here was clear and flagrant. Significantly, the evidence here indicates that at no time did Chestnut ever refer to Newark Disposal or Dellisanti by name. Rather, Chestnut referred only to the fact that there was a nonunion sanitation company. Indeed, Chestnut testified that Union President Campisano told him to picket Swift because there was a nonunion garbage contractor working there. It may be fairly inferred from the Union's course of conduct, including its disregard of the principle, albeit not the literal proscription of two Board orders, that it will continue to engage in secondary boycott conduct against persons dealing with nonunion rubbish removal contrac- tors unless it is prohibited by order from doing so. It is not necessary, in order to find a proclivity to violate Section 8(bX4XB), that there be more than one proven case of such conduct. See United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 690 (R.L (Bob) Moore Construction Company, Inc.), 190 NLRB 609, fn. I (1971). Indeed, this is the teaching of International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 501, et al, [Samuel Langer] v. N.LRkB., 341 U.S. 694, 706 (1951). In that case, the evidence indicated that the secondary conduct was directed against two firms. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the Board was warranted in issuing a medium order. The court declared in off-quoted language that "When the purpose to restrain trade appears from a clear violation of law, it is not necessary that all of the untraveled roads to that end be left open and that only the worn one be closed." Although Electrical Workers involved a medium order and the present case involves a proposed broad order, the principle remains the same and is still applicable. Where, as here, there is a justifiable apprehension that the Respondent may engage in unlawful conduct similar to that involved in the instant case, i.e., "presuasively ... related to the proven unlawful conduct," the order need not be limited to prohibiting the precise conduct involved in that case. Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO and Local No. 4372, etc. [Ohio Consolidated Telephone Co.] v. N.LR.B., 362 U.S. 479 (1960), quoting N.LR.B. v. Express Publishing Company, 312 U.S. 426, 433 (1941). Compare N.LR.B. v. Entwistle Manufacturing Company, 120 F.2d 532, 536 (C.A. 4, 1941). Therefore I am including in the recommended order the broad proscription requested by General Counsel. I shall also include in the order and notice an express reference to picketing and threat of picketing, as such phrases would presumably be more comprehensible to the average trash collector employee than the prolix verbiage of Section 8(bX4XB). I am further recommending that the Union be ordered to post appropri- ate notices and to furnish and give appropriate notices to Swift and Newark Disposal. However, I am not recom- mending, as requested by General Counsel, that the Union be ordered to give notice that it has no objection to Swift doing business with Newark Disposal. The Union has a 4 LOCAL 945, TEAMSTERS right to maintain its position in this regard, so long as it does not attempt to enforce that position in a manner prohibited by Section 8(b)(4XB). CONCLUSIONS OF LAW i. Swift is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and Newark Disposal is a person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By its picketing and threat to resume picketing of Swift, the Union has engaged and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(bX)(4B) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommend- ed: ORDER 7 The Respondent, Local 945, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Picketing or threatening to picket Swift Processed Meats Company or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, for an object of forcing or requiring Swift Processed Meats Company, or any other person to cease dealing in the products of or cease doing business with Newark Disposal Service, Inc., or any other rubbish removal contractor within the State of New Jersey not represented by Respondent, or with each other. (b) In any other manner or by any other means, engaging in or inducing or encouraging any individual employed by Swift Processed Meats Company or by any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting com- merce, to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities, or to perform any services; or threatening, coercing, or restraining Swift Processed Meats Company or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is to force or require Swift Processed Meats Company, or any other person, to cease dealing in the products of or cease doing business with Newark Disposal Service, Inc., or any other rubbish removal contractor within the State of New Jersey not represented by Respondent, or with each other. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is found necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Post at its business office in West Paterson, New Jersey, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 8 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 22, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be posted by Respon- dent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Furnish to the Regional Director for Region 22, signed copies of said notice for posting, if Newark Disposal Service, Inc. and Swift Processed Meats Company are willing, in their respective facilities, in the places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 22, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be forthwith returned to the Regional Director for such posting. (c) Notify Swift Processed Meats Company and Newark Disposal Service in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order that it will not, by threats to picket or by picketing or by any other unlawful manner or means, attempt to force or require Swift Processed Meats Compa- ny, or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, to cease doing business with Newark Disposal Service. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 22, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. I In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 8 In the event the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals. the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT picket or threaten to picket Swift Processed Meats Company or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, for an object of forcing or requiring Swift Processed Meats Company, or any other person, to cease dealing in the products of or cease doing business with Newark Disposal Service, Inc., or any other rubbish removal contractor within the State of New Jersey not represented by us, or with each other. WE WILL NOT in any other manner or by any other means engage in, or induce or encourage any individual employed by Swift Processed Meats Company or by any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or 5 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities, or to perform any services, or threaten, coerce, or restrain Swift Processed Meats Company, or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce where, in either case, an object thereof is to force or require Swift Processed Meats Company or any other person, to cease dealing in the products of or to cease doing business with Newark Disposal Service, Inc. or any other rubbish removal contractor within the State of New Jersey not represented by us, or with each other. LocAL UNION No. 945, A/W INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA 6