Associated Adverting Specialists, Inc.

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Associated Advertising Specialists, Inc. and Harris- burg Typographical Union, No. 14. Case 4-CA- 8184 September 16, 1977 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS JENKINS, PENELLO, AND MURPHY On May 26, 1977, Administrative Law Judge Robert E. Mullin issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge, to modify his remedy,2 and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the Respondent, Associated Advertising Specialists, Inc., Harrisburg, Pennsylva- nia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order, except that the attached notice is substituted for that of the Administrative Law Judge. i The General Counsel has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings. I In accordance with our decision in Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977), we shall apply the current 7-percent rate for periods pnor to August 25. 1977, in which the "adjusted prime interest rate" as used by the Internal Revenue Service in calculating interest on tax payments was at least 7 percent. APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT refuse to pay our employees their July 1976 wage bonus because of a pending representation proceeding. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL make whole employees in the appro- priate unit for the bonus payment discriminatori- ly withheld from them in July 1976, with interest thereon at the rate of 7-percent per annum. ASSOCIATED ADVERTISING SPECIALISTS, INC. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE ROBERT E. MULLIN, Administrative Law Judge: This case was heard on December 16, 1976, in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, pursuant to charges duly filed and served,' a complaint issued on October 14, 1976, and an amendment to the complaint issued on November 24, 1976. The complaint, as amended, presents questions as to whether the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. In its answer, duly filed, the Respondent conceded certain facts with respect to its business operations, but it denied all allegations that it had committed any unfair labor practices. At the hearing, the General Counsel and the Respondent were represented by attorneys. All parties were afforded an opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce relevant evidence, and to file briefs. At the close of the hearing, the Respondent presented oral argument, but the General Counsel did not. On January 21, 1977, the General Counsel submitted a comprehensive brief on the issues in the case. Upon the entire record, including the arguments of counsel, and from my observa- tion of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT The Respondent, a Pennsylvania corporation, with an office and place of business in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, is engaged in flatbed silk screen printing. During the 12- month period preceding the issuance of the complaint, a I The original charge was filed on August 30, 1976, an amended charge on September 13, 1976, and a second amended charge on October 12, 1976. 232 NLRB No. 9 50 ASSOCIATED ADVERTISING SPECIALISTS representative period, it sold goods and performed services for firms which, in turn, made sales to customers directly outside the State of Pennsylvania, valued in excess of $50,000. Upon the foregoing facts, the Respondent con- cedes, and it is now found, that Associated Advertising Specialists, Inc., is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 11. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Harrisburg Typographical Union, No. 14, hereinafter the Union or Local 14, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Introduction The Respondent was incorporated in or about January 1974, with Mike Santini as its president and C. Edward Bulgin as its secretary-treasurer. Each of the foregoing, in addition to being an officer, is a part owner of the business. At the outset of the Respondent's formation and for sometime thereafter Santini and Bulgin were not only the officers, but also the entire work force and performed all tasks connected with the operation of the firm. Finally, in May 1974, William Gelbaugh was hired as an employee. In September of that year, William Balsbaugh was hired, and in April 1975, Marlin McCleaf was employed. Some part- time workers were also hired, but the three above-named individuals constituted the Respondent's only full-time employees until about July 1976. Sometime early in June 19762 employee McCleaf contacted representatives of the Union and shortly thereaf- ter the three full-time employees met with Al Rudy and Jack Sanders, both of whom were organizers for the Charging Party. All of the employees signed authorization cards and in a letter dated June 22 the Union demanded that the Respondent recognize and bargain with it as the majority representative of a unit composed of the full-time silk screen printing production employees. This demand was declined in a telegram wherein the Respondent stated that it was not satisfied that the Union represented a majority of the employees and suggested that the latter seek an election. Thereafter the Union filed a representation petition and on August 19, at an election conducted by the Board and held pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, all four eligible voters3 cast votes for the Union. There were no objections to the election and, in due course, the results were certified by the Board. On August 23, the employees were let off 2 hours before the normal closing time, according to the General Counsel for discriminatory reasons, but according to the Respon- dent for lack of work. On August 27, employees McCleaf and Ranney were laid off, and on September 21 McCleaf was discharged. The layoff and the discharge are issues in this case. 2 All dates hereinafter are for the year 1976, unless specifically noted otherwise. B. The Alleged Violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3); Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law With Respect Thereto The Respondent began operations as a small print shop where, initially, the two officers and part owners performed all the production line work. As business increased, a few employees were added, but Santini, who did much of the art and design work, and Bulgin, who was largely responsible for sales, continued to perform many rank-and- file duties. Neither of the officers viewed unions with any favor. Balsbaugh testified that at the time of his employment interview in September 1974 Santini told him that he did not like unions and that he would close the shop before letting a union come in. McCleaf testified that at the time he was hired in April 1975, Bulgin told him that he would fire any employee that tried to bring a union into the shop. On the other hand, Balsbaugh further testified that during the summer of 1976 and after Local 14 requested recognition, Bulgin told the employees that if the Union won at the forthcoming Board election the Company would have its attorney negotiate a contract with the Union. In December 1974 and at the end of the first year of the Respondent's existence the two full-time employees, Balsbaugh and Gelbaugh, received a bonus based on the number of months they had been employed. In December 1975 Balsbaugh and Gelbaugh received bonuses based on a 'division of 1 percent of the company profits and McCleaf, who had been hired in April of that year, received a bonus based on the length of his service with the Respondent. In January 1976 Bulgin and Santini met with the three employees and told them of a new bonus plan. This latter would involve the Company's setting aside an amount each month which would total $500 for each of the employees at the end of the year. However, the employees were cautioned that the Respondent also was instituting a bonus default system and that each time an employee failed to unplug an electric fan, left a solvent can uncovered, or was guilty of any other negligence, he would be docked $1. The employees were likewise informed that a record of errors and omissions would be maintained on a wall chart in the shop. The latter practice quickly became a sore point with the work force and many complaints about this type of tally system were registered with Bulgin and Santini. On or about June 15, Bulgin met with the employees to discuss their dissatisfaction with the Respondent's bonus system. During the meeting Bulgin announced the aboli- tion of the default chart and a substantial revision of the bonus plan. According to the president, subject to the approval of the Respondent's accountant, and provided the weekly billings exceeded a minimum of $5,000, thereafter each employee would receive a bonus of $60 a month, with the first bonus to be paid at the end of July. 3 On July 6, a fourth employee, Vern Ranney, Jr., had come to work for the Respondent. 51 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The Respondent first became aware of employee interest in a union when Local 14 made its demand for recogni- tion.4 As found earlier, in a letter to the Respondent dated June 22, the Union claimed a majority and requested recognition. That same day, Union Representatives Rudy and Sanders met with Santini and Bulgin and at that time the Respondent's officials declined to recognize Local 14 without an election. McCleaf testified that after this meeting Santini asked him whether he knew anything about the Union's interest in representing them and that he answered in the affirmative. After the Respondent declined the union demand, arrangements were reached between the Company and the Union for a consent election which, as noted earlier, was eventually held on August 19. Bulgin testified that subsequent to the union request for recognition he discussed with the Respondent's counsel the advisability of proceeding with plans to pay the July bonus. According to Bulgin, counsel advised against payment on the ground that such action might be construed as an attempt to influence the election. Bulgin further testified that upon receiving this advice he relayed it to the work force. As a result, no bonus was paid in July, although the Respon- dent's weekly billings that month were over $5,000. It is an unfair labor practice for an employer to change the terms and conditions of employment of his work force because of union considerations. A substantial line of cases have held that an employer may not, because of a pending election, or other union activity, withhold wage or fringe benefit improvements which his employees would other- wise receive. GAF Corporation v. N.LR.B., 488 F.2d 306, 307-309 (C.A. 2, 1973); N.LR.B. v. United Aircraft Corp., Hamilton Standard Division, 490 F.2d 1105, 1109-1110 (C.A. 2, 1973); N.L.R.B. v. Dothan Eagle, Inc., 434 F.2d 93, 97-99 (C.A. 5, 1970); N.LR.B. v. Dan Howard Mfg. Co., 390 F.2d 304, 307 (C.A. 7, 1968). In a restatement of the law on this issue the Board recently held as follows: . . . an employer withholding pay raises and/or benefits from employees who are awaiting the holding of a Board election, or have chosen a union as their bargaining representative, has violated the Act if the employees otherwise would have been granted the pay raises and/or benefits in the normal course of the employer's business. [Florida Steel Corporation, 220 NLRB 1201, 1203 (1976).] That is the situation here, where, admittedly, the Respondent did not pay the employees their bonus in July because of the Respondent's concern that such action might be construed as an attempt to influence the election. Since the announcement of the bonus plan was made prior to the Respondent's knowledge that the employees were engaged in union activity and the July receipts exceeded the $5,000 a week minimum which Bulgin told them the month before would be sufficient to assure them of a bonus, they should have received the bonus for the month of July. In the light of the above cases it is now held that it 4 This finding is based on Bulgin's credible, undenied, and uncontradict- ed testimony. I Subsequent to July the Respondent's gross receipts never met the was a violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) for the Respondent to withhold this payment. Late in July, Bulgin and Santini met with the employees and engaged in some discussion of the pending election. Employee Ranney testified that the next day Bulgin told him that the Union had telephoned to complain that, at the meeting the day before, Bulgin had browbeaten the employees. According to Ranney, Bulgin credited McCleaf with having instigated this complaint and referred to the latter as a "troublemaker." Employee Balsbaugh testified that about this same time Bulgin spoke to him about what he described as a longstanding desire to get rid of McCleaf and stated that in the past this objective had always been thwarted by Santini who was a personal friend of McCleaf. According to Balsbaugh, Bulgin told him that since the Union had come upon the scene, however, Santini and McCleaf were no longer friends, so that whether the Union won or lost the election "Marlin McCleaf was going to be terminated." The election was held on Thursday, August 19. The following Monday, August 23, the employees were released about 2 hours before their normal quitting time and sent home. The General Counsel alleged that this was a discriminatory layoff, an allegation that is denied by the Respondent. Several of the General Counsel's witnesses testified that there had been prior occasions when they had finished their work early and still had received a full day's pay. Employees McCleaf and Balsbaugh both testified that on the afternoon in question there was work in the shop to which the employees could have been assigned. Neverthe- less, McCleaf conceded that on the preceding Friday a piece of equipment known as a hydrospray had broken, that its pump had to be repaired and that at the time both Santini and Bulgin were engaged in trying to secure parts in order to get the hydrospray back in operation. On direct examination, McCleaf testified that the management did not tell the employees why they were being laid off that Monday afternoon. On cross-examination, however, he acknowledged that either Bulgin or Santini had specifically told them that the layoff was necessitated because the hydrospray was broken and that thereafter nothing could be done because both Bulgin and Santini were involved in getting that equipment back in commission. McCleaf further acknowledged that although he had testified as to certain orders which were in the shop and awaiting completion that he did not know whether they involved jobs which had to be laid out by Santini, who specialized in art and design work. He further conceded that he could not recall how much time Santini spent on the repair of the hydrospray that Monday and the amount of time that Bulgin was absent from the shop looking for a replacement pump. According to Bulgin, the hydrospray pump had broken on Friday and all attempts to repair it then had been unsuccessful. On Monday, Bulgin spent the day looking for the necessary replacement pump and when one was found Santini worked for the rest of the afternoon and evening $5,000 per week minimum which Bulgin established in June as a condition to payment of a monthly bonus. 52 ASSOCIATED ADVERTISING SPECIALISTS getting the hydrospray back in working order. Bulgin testified that in mid-afternoon, when the four employees were standing around doing nothing, Santini announced that he would be unable to finish the repair work in time for the men to go back to duty before the end of the shift and, for that reason, he would send them home. According to Bulgin, the employees then were released for the balance of the day. He acknowledged that there had been occasions in the past when the men had finished all their orders before 5 p.m. on a Friday afternoon that they had been let off, with pay, for 30 minutes or an hour, but that this had never occurred during the early part of the week, or for any period as long as 2 hours. Bulgin's explanation for the release of the employees on the mid-afternoon of August 23 was credible. Accordingly, it is now found that paragraph 6 of the complaint, which alleged that that action was discriminatory, should be dismissed. The layoff of Ranney and McCleaf Both of the above-named employees were laid off on August 27, according to the General Counsel for discrimi- natory reasons, but according to the Respondent, because there was no work for them to do. Bulgin credibly testified that the Respondent had two part-time employees for some while during the first 6 months of 1976. One was his own son who quit in July and the other was a girl who left in August. According to Bulgin, no bargaining unit employees were laid off until the part-time employees were terminated. On the afternoon of August 27, Santini notified Ranney and McCleaf that they were being laid off for lack of work. It was undenied that the layoffs were made in accordance with seniority and that both Balsbaugh and Gelbaugh, who were kept, had much more time with the Company than either McCleaf or Ranney. Thereafter, the Respondent did not hire any replacements. On or about September 27, the Respondent offered reemployment to Ranney but the latter declined the offer. On October 20, both Balsbaugh and Gelbaugh were laid off and since that time all of the production work at the shop has been performed by Santini and Bulgin. The General Counsel sought to establish that the layoff of McCleaf and Ranney was unnecessary, that there was work for them to do, that, after their departure, Bulgin and Santini performed many of the duties which formerly had been done by the rank-and-file employees, and that the real motive for the layoff of McCleaf and Ranney was a discriminatory attempt by the Respondent to stifle the Union. There was substantial evidence that at the time of the layoff the Respondent's business had gone into a decline. The parties stipulated that the record of gross receipts for the period from June through November was as follows: June July August September October November $33,261 22,564 17,460 20,121 6,228 10,434 Bulgin testified that the receipts were, in general, for work that had been completed from I to 2 months earlier, since billings were ordinarily made at the end of a month and the terms of the billing customarily permitted the customer from 30 to 60 days for payment. According to Bulgin, because of this characteristic of their business volume, a slump which began in August was not fully reflected until the month of October when there was, very clearly, a substantial decline in the Respondent's gross receipts. It is very evident from the record that a downturn in the Respondent's business volume began in the latter part of the summer and that it continued after the layoff of both McCleaf and Ranney to the point that on October 20 Gelbaugh and Balsbaugh, the two remaining employees, were laid off. As a result, from that time until at least the date of the hearing in this matter, the Respondent's entire work force consisted of only the two officers, Santini and Bulgin, who then were engaged in trying to salvage the business. In view of the foregoing background, I conclude and find that the General Counsel has not proved by a preponder- ance of the evidence that McCleaf and Ranney were discriminatorily laid off on August 27. The discharge of McCleaf Marlin McCleaf was discharged by letter dated Septem- ber 21, purportedly because he sought to take away one of the Respondent's best customers after he went in business for himself. The General Counsel, on the other hand, alleges that his discharge was discriminatory, and a violation of Section 8(a)(3). The facts in connection with this incident are set forth below. According to Bulgin, the Respondent's two principal customers were Rite-Aid and Lehrman, the latter being a subsidiary of the former. McCleaf estimated that these two firms accounted for from 75 to 90 percent of the Respondent's business. The Respondent had had an arrangement with the former firm, in particular, whereby it did a substantial volume of silk screen work each month for a variety of signs and banners which Rite-Aid used in its advertising. Early in September, and while on layoff status, McCleaf submitted to Duane Swenson, the printing manager for Rite-Aid, a bid wherein McCleaf offered, in great detail, to do the type of weekly job which the Respondent had been performing for Rite-Aid over a long period of time. Swenson promptly informed Bulgin about McCleafs bid. Shortly thereafter Bulgin secured from Swenson a copy of the bid which McCleaf had submitted. Bulgin thereupon discovered that the bid was for work which the Respondent had been performing regularly for Rite-Aid and that McCleaf was proposing to do exactly the same type of work for substantially less. According to Bulgin, for 3 years prior to this time the Respondent had an arrangement with Rite-Aid whereby it performed a large volume of printing for that customer each month without the necessity of submitting bids. Bulgin testified, credibly and without contradiction, that as a result of McCleaf's offer to Rite-Aid, an officer of Rite- Aid advised him that to retain their patronage the Respondent would have to submit a new bid. Bulgin 53 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD adopted this suggestion and thereafter offered to do the printing for Rite-Aid at a rate that was 25 percent less than it had been performing the work. Nevertheless, Bulgin's efforts were unsuccessful and the Respondent did not succeed in retaining Rite-Aid as a customer.6 In the meantime, in a letter dated September 21, President Santini wrote as follows to McCleaf: During the past two weeks we have been investigat- ing reliable reports that you have been attempting to establish your own business in competition with us. We have now obtained definite proof that you have submitted your own bids for silk screen work directly to one of our valued customers, therefor, we have no alternative but to terminate your employment as of this date. McCleaf acknowledged that when he submitted his bid to Rite-Aid he had, as he put it, "a general idea" as to what the Respondent's bid had been. He further conceded that when formulating his own bid he took this information into account and tried to underbid the Respondent. The General Counsel endeavored to establish at the hearing that earlier, while McCleaf had been a full-time employee of the Company, he had also been in business for himself, but without jeopardizing his relationship with the Respondent. The evidence offered in support of this contention, however, was not persuasive. Thus, McCleaf testified that on one occasion he secured a printing order from a local department store which he filled. However, this work was done at the Respondent's shop and McCleaf conceded that in this instance he got the job for the Respondent and was paid a commission by Bulgin for doing so. McCleaf also testified as to another occasion when he did some outside work while a full-time employee by printing some T-shirts for bars and restau- rants. This work was also done at the Respondent's plant and, on cross-examination, he conceded that these were small jobs which did not place him in competition with the Respondent because he was not trying to take away any customers from the Company. In view of the foregoing, it is now found that in the history of McCleafs employment with the Respondent there had been no prior experience from which it could be alleged that the Respondent had condoned any instance wherein McCleaf had been in direct competition with the Employer. McCleaf's attempt to secure the Rite-Aid work which the Respondent had had for a very substantial period set in motion a chain of events which, the latter could assert, was directly responsible for the loss of its principal customer. The Respondent now contends that, as an employee on layoff status, McCleafs action constituted "disloyalty" and that it was for this reason that he was discharged. There is, of course, authority that such conduct could constitute justifiable grounds for termination. Vincent C. Vandemot- ter, d/b/a Rex Printing Company, 227 NLRB 1144 (1977).7 See also Boeing Airplane Company v. N.LR.B., 238 F.2d 6 Bulgin testified that it was on or about October I that the Respondent learned that it had lost the Rite-Aid business. The successful bidder was a third party and neither the Respondent nor McCleaf. 7 "Respondent did not learn until after its unlawful discharge of Mann 188, 189-195 (C.A. 9, 1956); Marshall Maintenance Corp., 145 NLRB 538, 739-740 (1963). The General Counsel contends that the real reason for McCleaf's discharge was his union activities, rather than any act of disloyalty. It is true that McCleaf had been a leader among the employees in the organization of the shop, and that Bulgin, in particular, considered him a "troublemaker." On the other hand, McCleafs union activities did not accord him any immunity from the rules which applied to all other employees. As the Board stated in another case "[He] was a union leader, and the Respondent may well have welcomed the opportunity of getting rid of him, but neither his activities nor the Respondent's attitude gave him privileges greater than those of other employees." Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company, 85 NLRB 1222, 1224 (1949). Counsel for the General Counsel vigorously prosecuted this matter and submitted a thorough brief to support his theory of the complaint. In view of the above findings, however, it is my conclusion that the General Counsel has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that McCleaf was terminat- ed for his union activities. Accordingly, it will be recom- mended that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleges that McCleaf was discharged in violation of the Act. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Respondent is engaged in commerce and the Union is a labor organization, all within the meaning of the Act. 2. By withholding a bonus payment at the end of July 1976 to its employees in the bargaining unit, the Respon- dent has engaged, and is engaging, in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. 3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 4. The General Counsel has not proved that the Respondent engaged in any violations of the Act other than as herein specifically found. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, it will be recommended that the Respondent be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu- ate the policies of the Act. Having found that the Respondent discriminatorily failed to award the bonus in July 1976 which the Respondent had promised previously to the employees, it will be recommended that the Respondent be ordered to make whole all those employees so deprived, retroactive to the date the benefits should have been granted to the affected employees, with interest thereon at 6-percent per annum. Upon the foregoing findings and conclusions and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, there is issued the following recommended: on July 18, 1975, the extent to which Mann was personally soliciting business on behalf of Delta Ihis own print shop] from Respondent's customers, which would have justified his discharge." [Emphasis supplied.] Rex Printing Company, supra. 54 ASSOCIATED ADVERTISING SPECIALISTS ORDER8 The Respondent, Associated Advertising Specialists, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Withholding, because of a pending representation proceeding, a wage bonus payable in July 1976. (b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Make whole, as provided in "The Remedy" section of this Decision, all those employees in the appropriate unit for any loss of pay they may have suffered by reason of the discriminatory withholding of the wage bonus payable in July 1976. (b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all 8 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions. and recommended Order herein shall. as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. payroll records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this recommended Order. (c) Post at its shop in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 9 Copies of the notice on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 4, after being duly signed by an authorized representative of the Respondent, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicu- ous places, including places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 4, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. IT IS ALSO ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleges unfair labor practices not found herein. 9 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." 55