Gulf & Western Mfg., Co.

GULF & WESTERN MFG. CO. Gulf & Western Manufacturing Company, Mackin- tosh-Hemphill Division and Stanley Holava, Jr. Case 6-CA-9186 September 19, 1977 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND MURPHY On December 23, 1976, Administrative Law Judge Ivar H. Peterson issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed excep- tions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions' of the Administrative Law Judge, to modify his remedy, 2 and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the Respondent, Gulf & Western I Respondent in its exceptions and brief contends that the Administra- tive Law Judge's Decision is deficient in failing to make specific findings of fact and to articulate reasons to support the conclusion that Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)4) and (1) of the Act by disciplining and suspending employee Holava. As discussed in the Administrative Law Judge's Decision, it is undisputed that Holava suffered from a chronic asthmatic condition and had occasionally reported off work because of breathing problems. When absent from work on such occasions, he was never questioned nor disciplined by Respondent. On April 22, 1976, Holava suffered an asthmatic attack and his wife called the plant to report that he was unable to work. Later that morning Holava testified that he felt better, but not well enough to drive, and asked his father to drive him the approximately 40 miles from his home to the Pittsburgh Regional Office of the Board to file an unfair labor practice charge. Employee Espovich, who accompanied Holava, corroborated Holava's testimony that Holava had "breathing problems" while riding to Pittsburgh. The following day, Friday, April 23, Holava reported to work as scheduled. At that time he was not questioned about his absence from work nor was the matter discussed with him by anyone. On the same day the charge Holava had filed with the Pittsburgh Regional Office was served on Respondent. When Holava reported for work the on following Monday, he was directed to report to the personnel office. There he was questioned by Respondent's officials as to whether he had seen a doctor, was bedridden, or was confined to his home. Holava answered all questions in the negative. He was also asked about his trip to Pittsburgh on April 22. After the interview one of Respondent's officials remarked, "we know what we are dealing with now. Go back to work." On May 3 Holava was given a disciplinary notice listing an infraction committed by him on April 22, unauthorized use of sick leave. He was told he was also being suspended for 3 days for failing to report to work and for 232 NLRB No. II Manufacturing Company, Mackintosh-Hemphill Di- vision, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. MEMBER MURPHY, dissenting: My colleagues conclude that Respondent suspend- ed employee Stanley Holava, Jr., on May 3, 1976, for 3 days because he filed unfair labor practice charges against Respondent. I cannot agree. During the week beginning April 19, 1976, Holava was scheduled to work the 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. shift as a ladleman-helper in the open hearth department. He worked April 20 and 21. But at approximately 6:30 a.m. on April 22, Respondent was notified that Holava was ill and would not be reporting to work that day. Less than 3 hours later Holava began an 80- mile round trip to the Board's Region 6 offices in Pittsburgh in order to file a charge against Respon- dent. (He also spent 2 hours or so at the Regional Office.) The next day Holava reported for work. That same day the charge filed by Holava was served on Respondent. Thereafter, Respondent discussed the absence with Holava. In response to questioning. Holava acknowledged that he had not been bedrid- den, under the care of a doctor, or confined to his home on April 22. On May 3 Ilolava was suspended because of his failing to report for work on April 22 and for falsifying the reasons for not reporting. In my view these facts, which are undisputed, more than suffice to rebut any inference that Respondent's falsifying the reason he had been absent. Respondent admittedly did not conduct any investigation of Holava's physical condition which allegedl) prevented his doing physical labor at the plant. Respondent relied in part on the fact that the day Holava reported sick he was able to travel to Pittsburgh to file an unfair labor practice charge against Respondent. We agree with the Administrative Law Judge that the record establishes a primafacie case that "a factor" in Respondent's decision to suspend Holava was that he filed an unfair labor practice charge against Respondent and that Respondent has not come forward with adequate evidence explaining its actions. The dissent simply ignores the significant difference between the physical demands of Holava's work and those of a chauffeured drive We think Respondent was well aware of that difference, but was not concerned with whether or not Holava was justified in reporting ill. As the dissent points out, there was no reason for Holava to manufacture a reason to he off from work, since he could have filed charges earlier without the need for subterfuge. In any event we conclude that the uncontroverted facts show plainly that Holava was not disciplined for the reasons asserted but because he exercised rights protected by the Act. While we do not agree with the dissent's conclusion that Respondent would have reacted in the same manner had it learned that Holava had attended a baseball game, there is a difference. National pastime or no, the national labor policy does not protect attendance at it. The Act does protect employee access to the Board's processes. And an employee is protected regardless of the employer's honest but mistaken belief that the employee has engaged in misconduct so long as he has, as here, engaged in protected activity. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21 (1964). 2 In accordance with our decision in Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977), we shall apply the current 7-percent rate for periods pnor to August 25. 1977, in which the "adjusted prime interest rate" as used bs the Internal Revenue Service in calculating interest on tax payments was at least 7 percent. 61 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD professed reasons for suspending Holava were not its real ones. Thus, Holava had worked the entire shift the day before he had filed his charge and the day after he filed his charge. Respondent was aware of the traveling time to and from the Pittsburgh office of the Board and had every reason to believe that an employee capable of making such a trip was not too sick to work. Further, Holava had admittedly not consulted a doctor on this occasion. It was quite logical in these circumstances, therefore, for Respon- dent to conclude as it did that Holava had falsely reported that he was ill in order to have the time to file his charges with the Board.3 My colleagues, nevertheless, conclude that Holava was suspended for filing charges with the Board. Yet, there is no reason to believe that the same discipline would not have been meted out had Respondent learned that Holava had gone to Pittsburgh for some other reason, e.g., to attend a baseball game. In the absence of any evidence of disparate treatment, General Counsel simply has not established that Respondent's motive in disciplining Holava was other than its belief that Holava had not been sick as he claimed and thus had falsified the reason for his absence from work. Therefore, I am unable to find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(4) and (1) in disciplining Holava.4 Accordingly, I would dismiss the complaint. 3 I note that Holava did not work on Apnl 19 and could have filed his charges on that date. 4 I have not, as the majority states, ignored the possible difference between the physical demands of Holava's work and those of a chauffeured drive. Regardless of whether Holava was in fact too sick to work, Respondent had every reason to believe that he was not in fact sick. Thus, even assuming that Respondent erred in its conclusion that Holava falsified the reason for his absence, its belief that Holava was lying was the reason for his discharge. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21 (1964). relied on by my colleagues is inapposite. There the Court held that Sec. 8(aXI) is violated if an employee is discharged for misconduct arising out of a protected activity, despite the employer's good faith, when it is shown the misconduct never occurred. This holding does not permit the finding made by my colleagues that when an employee is suspended for what Respondent believes is misconduct (falsifying an excuse for absence) he nevertheless is protected if during the course of that misconduct he engages in activities which are protected. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE IVAR H. PETERSON, Administrative Law Judge: The hearing in this case was held in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on September 13, 1976, based upon the complaint issued by the Regional Director for Region 6 on July 20 which in turn was based upon a charge filed by Stanley Holava, Jr., on April 22, subsequently amended on May 19 and June 25. The complaint alleged that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (4) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, by suspending Holava on May 3 for 3 days because he filed charges against the Respondent. In its answer dated July 29, the Respondent, Gulf & Western Manufacturing Company, Mackintosh-Hemphill Division, admitted certain jurisdictional allegations but denied that it had engaged in any conduct violative of the Act. Upon the basis of the entire record and my observation of the witnesses as they testified, and consideration of the briefs filed with me on October 26, 1 make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. JURISDICTION The Respondent, a Delaware corporation, is engaged in the production of steel roll castings; its principal offices are located in Pittsburgh and it maintains a facility at Midland, Pennsylvania. Admittedly, it is engaged in commerce and comes within the jurisdictional requirements of the Board. It is further admitted that United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC, is a labor organization within the mean- ing of Section 2(5) of the Act. The Respondent also admits that Raymond Ansevin, its plant manager, is an agent and supervisor within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act and that it suspended Holava for a period of 3 days. It specifically denies that it suspended him because he filed unfair labor practice charges against the Respondent; on the contrary, the Respondent avers that Holava was suspended for failure to work as scheduled and for falsifying his reasons for reporting off. II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Introduction The Respondent employs approximately 230 hourly employees at its Midland plant where they are engaged in the manufacture and casting of steel rolls and steel fender parts. The employees are represented by the Union and a collective-bargaining agreement covering the production and maintenance employees has been in effect at all relevant times. Holava has been a member of the Union since he was first employed by the Respondent, approxi- mately 12 years ago, and he has worked in various departments during that period. He has also served as a grievance man and unsuccessfully ran for the office of president of the Union in April 1976. There is no dispute that Holava has suffered from a chronic asthma condition for a number of years and that these breathing problems have resulted in his intermittently reporting off work sick. Prior to 1976, Holava occasionally worked in the open hearth area. There is no dispute that Holava reported off work on account of his breathing problems both in 1969 and 1972 and he was not questioned or disciplined in any way for doing so. During the week of April 19, Holava was scheduled to work as ladleman's helper in the open hearth and worked as scheduled on April 20 and 21. He suffered an asthma attack early in the morning on Thursday, April 22, and his wife reported him off sick. Later that morning he felt better and decided to file unfair labor practice charges at the Board's Pittsburgh office. He testified that, inasmuch as he was not feeling well enough to drive the approximately 40 miles into Pittsburgh, he telephoned his father and asked that he drive him to the Board's offices in downtown Pittsburgh. His father agreed to do this and Holava then telephoned his friend, Peter Esopovich, and asked him to 62 GULF & WESTERN MFG. CO. accompany him. Esopovich. who had been employed full time by the Respondent for the past 42 years, was then on sick leave having reported off sick from April 4 through May 24, because of a fall in the pattern shop. Holava's father drove Esopovich and Holava to the Board's offices where Holava filed an unfair labor practice charge against the Respondent. The men spent 2 to 3 hours at the Board's offices and then returned home, arriving there at approxi- mately 3:30 in the afternoon. Esopovich testified that, during the drive to and from Pittsburgh, Holava "was sneezing and his eyes were tearing." The following day, April 23, Holava felt better and he went back to work in the open hearth as scheduled, from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. He was not questioned about his April 22 absence from work nor was that matter discussed with him by anyone. On Friday, April 23, the charge filed by Holava was served upon the Respondent. Thereafter, on three occasions, representa- tives of the Respondent discussed his April 22 absence with him. When Holava arrived for work on Monday, April 26, a note from Plant Personnel Manager Earl Stange was attached to his timecard, directing that he see Ansevin on his way to work. Holava went to Ansevin's office and there found Ansevin, Stange, and Donald Mattern, president of the Union. Ansevin immediately asked him why he had reported off work on April 22. As Holava began to explain that he had suffered from breathing problems and started to pull out some Primatene Mist, the medication that he carried with him, Ansevin said he did not want to see it and asked whether Holava had been bedridden, under the care of a doctor, or confined to his home on April 22. Holava answered all questions in the negative. Before anyone asked Holava where he had gone on April 22, Ansevin asked him what he was doing in Pittsburgh that day. Holava answered that he had gone to the Board's offices. Ansevin then said, "we know what we're dealing with now. Go back to work." Holava did so. On April 30, when Holava reported for work, he found another note from Personnel Manager Stange attached to his timecard, which directed that he see Ansevin on his way in to work. When Holava came to Ansevin's office, he found the latter, Stange, and Supervisor Frank Vallera in the office. Holava asked that an official of the Union be present and when Ansevin was unable to locate Mattern the meeting was rescheduled for May 3. On that date, Holava's immediate supervisor, Charles James, told him to report to Ansevin's office. Upon his arrival at Ansevin's office, Holava found that in addition to Ansevin, Stange and Mattern were also present. Ansevin gave him a disciplinary notice listing an infraction committed by him on April 22, and the pink slip indicated that it was issued on May 3. Ansevin told Holava that he would be suspended for 3 days and that this disciplinary action was not occasioned by his going to the Board's offices but, rather, for failing to report for work as scheduled and falsifying the reasons for reporting off. Mattern, the Union's president, refused to file a grievance concerning Holava's suspension. Holava was not asked to submit either a doctor's statement or certificate concerning his absence on April 22. As a matter of fact, Holava did not consult a doctor on April 22 and there is no indication in the record that he had consulted a doctor on any of the previous occasions he had reported off sick because of his breathing problem. In addition, the record shows that this occasion was the first time that he had filed a charge with the Board and was also the first time he had been warned or reprimanded by any official of the Respondent since he had been employed, a period of 12 years. The contract between the Union and the Respondent provides that "an employee . . . absenting himself from work, without just cause may be subject to discipline in accordance with the provisions of this agreement." The record shows that the Respondent, in order to determine whether "just cause" exists, makes inquiries concerning the specific reasons employees report off work, in order to determine whether the reason was "necessary" as well as whether the cause was '"just." Moreover, it is the position of the Respondent that "just cause" under the terms of the agreement is not restricted to "sick leave" and would include such other excuses as personal reasons, family deaths, and appearing in court pursuant to a subpena. In consequence, it seems evident that employees do not have to be bedridden or under the care of a physician in order to meet the "just cause" requirements of the contract. The position of the Respondent is the question of "just cause" must be determined on a case-to-case basis and the Respondent admits that it is "administratively impossible" to investigate the circumstances surrounding the absence of each employee who reports off work for reasons of illness. It is apparent, therefore, that it is unclear whether an employee must be confined to his home in order to constitute "just cause." Ansevin testified that other employees had been discip- lined because they falsified their reason for being absent. Asked to give "a couple of examples," he stated that one R. Sibert was given 3 days off because he falsely reported off when in fact investigation showed that he had been out motorcycling. Another, Clarence Simmons, was given 15 days off for reporting off on sick leave. The record indicates that the decision to suspend Sibert and Simmons was made by more than one representative of management. B. Discussion and Conclusions There is no question but that Holava, during the course of his employment, has suffered from a chronic asthmatic condition, which was clearly apparent to me from observ- ing him as a witness. This condition has, on occasion, forced him to report off work sick and, indeed, has also caused him to be hospitalized. He suffered another asthmatic attack on April 22, reported off sick, and then was driven to the Board's offices where he filed an unfair labor practice charge against the Respondent. After the Respondent received a copy of the charge, Holava, for the first time, was called into the office of Plant Manager Ansevin and questioned about his absence on April 22. Holava explained that he had been ill and, although the Respondent unearthed no evidence to dispute this, Ansevin questioned him on two more occasions about his absence on April 22 prior to suspending him for 3 days. Counsel for the General Counsel argues that "the fact that the manager of a plant with at least 250 other employees interrogated Holava on three separate occasions, when considered with the additional fact that the absence of only two other 63 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD employees have been investigated in the last 2 years- neither of whom filed charges at the National Labor Relations Board-support the conclusion that Holava was treated in a disparate manner." Government counsel argues that, inasmuch as the initiation of Board proceed- ings depends upon the initiative of individuals, the attempts of the Respondent to restrain an employee in the exercise of his right to file charges is violative of the Act, citing Minnie E. Nash v. Florida Industrial Commission, 389 U.S. 235, 238 (1967), and N.L.R.B. v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers [United States Lines Co.], 391 U.S. 418 (1968). Moreover, he points out that the prohibition in the Act against discrimination for filing charges is effective without regard to whether an employer believes the charges to be false or whether the ultimate proof sustains their validity, citing F. W. Poe Manufactur- ing Company, 27 NLRB 1257, 1270 (1940). It is the position of counsel for the General Counsel that the record establishes a prima facie case of discrimination that Holava was suspended for the reason that he filed charges. He then argues that, since this is the case, it was incumbent upon the Respondent to come forward with evidence adequately explaining its actions. He asserts that the contention of the Respondent that the activity of Holava was rendered unprotected rests altogether on the fact that he visited the offices of the Board while he was off work on sick leave, but, that the Respondent did not establish that Holava was not sick. Moreover, Government counsel contends that, even assuming that Holava was not ill, the Respondent admits that excuses such as family deaths and responding to court subpenas constitute "just cause" under the terms of the contract and, in the light of this fact and further noting that the Respondent failed to take a position whether the filing of unfair labor practice charges constitutes just cause to report off work under the collective-bargaining agreement, "clearly the contract does not prohibit such activity." Moreover, Government coun- sel contends that even if it be assumed that Holava did not report off for "just cause" that "does not answer the question whether Holava's right to consult the National Labor Relations Board is outweighed by Respondent's legitimate interest in assuring that work schedules are complied with." Accordingly, counsel for the General Counsel submits that the evidence amply supports the allegations in the complaint and requires a finding that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (4) of the Act by suspending Holava for filing charges under the Act and that, by way of remedy, the Respondent be ordered to rescind the 3-day suspension and to make Holava whole for any losses he incurred by reason of the discrimination against him, and to post appropriate cease-and-desist notices. Counsel for the Respondent, in his brief, contends that Holava falsely reported off sick on April 22, in order to go to the Board's offices. In support, he points to the testimony of Holava that he had been considering filing the charge for several months, that he worked his entire shift the day before he filed the charge and the day after he did so, and worked his entire tour of duty in the week after he filed the charge. He also notes that Holava reported off sick on only one other occasion in 1976 prior to April 22, and that was on January 8, the day after the Serbian Christmas. Thus, counsel for the Respondent asserts that the record does not support Holava's claim that he has a chronic illness, and that he was not under the care of a doctor on April 22, or shortly after reporting off sick in order to go to the Board's Pittsburgh office to file his charge. In short, counsel for the Respondent contends that Holava "offered no evidence to support his claim that he was truly sick" and that, based upon the facts in the record, the Respondent "had every reason to conclude that he falsified his reason for failing to work on April 22." Counsel for the Respondent further argues that the rights of an employee under Section 8(aX4) of the Act must be balanced against the right of his employer to operate his business in an efficient manner. He notes that Holava was scheduled to work as a ladleman helper in the open hearth department on April 22 and that Holava testified that the ladleman has a helper who works with him to prepare the ladle for heating and, if both workers are not present, the work cannot be accomplished. Holava further testified that a crew is needed to operate the open hearth and that if one man is absent he must be replaced. Thus, counsel notes that Holava's own testimony "illustrates the importance of team work in the open hearth area." Moreover, he points out that the collective-bargaining agreement between the Respondent and the Union recognizes that absenteeism imposes a burden on the Company. Counsel calls attention to the fact that Holava could have filed his charge on April 19, his day off, or on any day during the week of April 26, when he was scheduled to work the second shift or, for that matter, at any time during the 3 or 4 months that he had been considering filing a charge. He states that there is no indication in the record that April 22 was a critical date but, even if that were the case, Holava could have requested time off in advance. Instead of doing so, counsel argues that Holava "allowed his employer to schedule him for work as an essential member of a crew, and then call in just before he was due to report for work with an excuse which was factually untrue." Counsel states that the fact Holava visited the Board's offices, rather than engaging in some other activity, had nothing to do with his discipline. He argues that Holava, at the very least, had an obligation to give the Respondent an opportunity to arrange for his absence in a manner that would not disrupt the operation of the plant. In his view, Holava was at fault in deciding unilaterally when he would take time off without consult- ing the Respondent or considering its needs, the plant operations, or the convenience of his fellow workers. In the view of counsel for the Respondent, counsel for the General Counsel has failed to establish that the Respondent violated the Act. He argues that the evidence submitted is "wholly inconsistent with the General Coun- sel's contention that Holava was displaced for filing a charge"; in support he calls attention to the fact that the policy of the Respondent is to discipline employees when it discovers that they have falsified their reason for being absent. He also notes that in 1974 Holava was reprimanded for falsely reporting off sick. Moreover, other employees who have filed charges against the Respondent have not been disciplined and Esopovich, who was not scheduled to work on April 22 and who went to the Board's offices with 64 GULF & WESTERN MFG. CO. Holava, was not disciplined although he was named as a discriminatee in the original charge. In concluding his brief, counsel for the Respondent states that the conten- tions of counsel for the General Counsel "are not entirely clear but we guess she will argue that Holava did not tell his employer that he wanted to go to the Labor Board because he figured he would be disciplined if he did so." Any such argument, according to counsel, "is patently unsound," inasmuch as Holava could not expect that his visits to the Board's offices would not become known to the Respondent in view of the fact that it would be served with the charge a few days following his visit. Further, counsel argues that any contention that Holava did not ask for time off to go to the Board's offices for the reason that he felt it would not be granted is pure speculation, and he points to the testimony of Ansevin that if he had been requested by Holava for time off to go to the Board's offices he would have provided the time. Counsel for the Respondent, accordingly, concludes that counsel for the General Counsel has not met his burden of proof but has relied upon suspicion or conjecture. While the evidence here, as is frequently the case, does not lead to a clear and undoubted conclusion, on balance I am persuaded that a factor in the Respondent's decision to suspend Holava was that he filed charges with the Board. Accordingly, it will be recommended that the Respondent rescind his suspension, make Holava whole for any losses in wages he suffered, and post appropriate notices. Ill. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth above have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com- merce and the free flow of commerce. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Gulf & Western Manufacturing Company, Mackin- tosh-Hemphill Division, is an employer engaged in com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. By suspending Stanley Holava, Jr., the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(4) and (I) of the Act. 3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY It having been found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices, it will be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Inasmuch as it has been found that the Respondent discriminatorily suspended Stanley Holava, Jr., it will be recommended that he be made whole for any loss of wages suffered by reason of the Respondent's unlawful conduct, in accordance with the Board's formula set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest thereon at the rate of 6 percent per annum as set forth in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962). Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I issue the following recommended: ORDER ' The Respondent, Gulf & Western Manufacturing Com- pany, Mackintosh-Hemphill Division, Pittsburgh and Midland, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from discriminatorily suspending any of its employees or in any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Make Stanley Holava, Jr., whole for any loss of earnings he may have suffered by Respondent's unlawful discrimination against him in the manner set forth in the section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy." (b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amounts of backpay due under the terms of this recommended Order. (c) Post at its office and place of business in Pittsburgh and Midland, Pennsylvania, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 2 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 6, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees and members are customarily posted. Reason- able steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 6, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. I In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall. as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes.' 2 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT unlawfully suspend, discharge, or otherwise discriminate against any employee because of membership in or activity on behalf of United Steel- 65 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD workers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC, or any other labor organization, or for engaging in protected union activity or exercising rights guaranteed by the National Labor Relations Act. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL offer Stanley Holava, Jr., immediate and full reinstatement to his former job or, if not available, to a substantially equivalent position, and WE WILL make him whole for any wages lost as a result of our discrimination against him, plus interest. All our employees are free to become, remain, or refuse to become or remain members of said Union or any other labor organization. GULF & WESTERN MANUFACTURING COMPANY, MACKINTOSH-HEMPHILL DIVISION 66