International Harvester Co.

INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER COMPANY International Harvester Company and International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouse- men and Helpers of America, Automotive Chauf- feurs, Parts and Garage Employees, Local Union No. 926. Case 6-CA-7940 January 16, 1976 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND PENELLO On September 29, 1975, Administrative Law Judge James V. Constantine issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief, Respondent filed cross-exceptions and an answering brief to Gen- eral Counsel's exceptions, and the General Counsel filed an answering brief to Respondent's cross-excep- tions. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings,I findings 2 and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order, as modified herein. ORDER' Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re- lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge as modified below and hereby orders that the Respondent, Inter- national Harvester Company, Pittsburgh, Pennsylva- nia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in said: recommended Order, as so modified. 1. Delete paragraph 1(b) and substitute the follow- ing: "(b) Threatening employees, with loss of pay, loss of benefits such as vacation and sick pay, and longer working hours if the Union became the employees' bargaining representative." 2. Substitute the attached notice for the Adminis- trative Law Judge's notice. IT IS FURTHERED ORDERED that the allegations in the complaint not found herein be; and they hereby are, dismissed. Respondent filed a motion with the Adlninistrative Law Judge to cor- rect the transcript in certain respects. The motion was opposed by the Gen- eral Counsel. The Administrative Law Judge declined to rule on the motion 377 because he was "unable to recall which party's position is correct on said motion." Instead, he invited Respondent to renew its motion to the Board which it has done The Board is not in a better position than the Adminis- trative Law Judge to decide whether the transcript contains an incorrect version of testimony. The Administrative Law Judge heard the testimony, the Board did not. If the Administrative Law Judge was unable to decide whether Respondent is correct in its motion, neither is the Board Accord- ingly, the Board has no alternative but to deny the motion. The Administrative Law Judge found that Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by Branch Business Manager Hotchkiss' interrogation of employee Jeno as to how she felt about the Union and how she would vote, and by threatening Jeno with loss of pay if the Union became bargaining represen- tative In the same conversation, according to the account credited by the Administrative Law Judge, Hotchkiss told Jeno that if she was trying to get the Union in for shorter working hours "it can't do that for you. If anything, you'll . . . end up working longer hours and you'll probably lose benefits such as vacation and sick pay and the Union would only erupt more in nit-picking." The General Counsel contends that the foregoing quoted state- ments by Hotchkiss also violated Sec. 8(a)(1). We agree and so find We shall amend the Order and the notice to employees accordingly APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT question our employees regard- ing their union activities or how they would vote as to having a union. WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with loss of pay or loss of benefits such as vacation and sick pay, or longer working hours if the Union becomes our employees' bargaining representa- tive. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the excercise of rights guaranteed to them in Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. All our employees are free to become, remain, or refuse to become or remain, members of Local 926, Teamsters, or any other labor organization. INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER COMPANY DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JAMES V. CONSTANTINE, Administrative Law Judge: This is an unfair labor practice case litigated pursuant to the provisions of Section 10(b) of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, herein called the Act. 29 U.S.C. 160(b). It was commenced by a complaint issued on May 29, 1975, by the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, the latter herein called the Board, through the Regional Director of Region 6 (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania), naming International Harvester Company as the Respondent. Such complaint is based on a charge filed on December 10, 1974, 222 NLRB No. 61 378 DECISIONS' OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD by International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers -of America, Automotive Chauffeurs, Parts and Garage Employees, Local Union No. 926, herein called the Union. In substance the complaint alleges that Respondent vio- lated Section 8(a)(1) and (3), and that such conduct affects commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)' and (7) of the Act. Respondent has answered admitting some of the allegations of the complaint but denying that it committed any unfair labor practice. Pursuant to due notice this cause came on to be heard, and was heard before me, at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on July 9, 1975. The General Counsel and Respondent were represented and participated in the hearing, and had full opportunity to introduce evidence, examine and cross-ex- amine witnesses, file briefs, and offer oral argument. They both argued orally at the close of the case. This case presents the following issues: 1. Whether Respondent engaged in conduct violating Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 2. Whether Respondent discharged employee Kay Jeno for discriminatory reasons prohibited by Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. Upon the entire record in this case, and from my obser- vation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. AS TO JURISDICTION Respondent, a Delaware corporation with an office and place of business in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, which is the only facility of Respodent involved in this case, is engaged in the nonretail sale and repair of trucks and farm equip- ment. During the year preceding the issuance of the com- plaint said facility shipped goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly to points outside the Common- wealth of Pennsylvania. During said period Respondent at its said facility purchased and received goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly from States outside the Com- monwealth of Pennsylvania. I find that Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) and is en- gaged in commerce within the purview of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and that it will effectuate the purposes of the Act to assert jurisdiction over Respondent in this proceed- ing. Ii. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES Initially, certain preliminary- matters should be men- tioned here. (1) Respondent filed a motion dated August 8, 1975, to correct the transcript. It is opposed by the General Counsel. But I am unable to recall which party's position is correct on said motion. Accordingly, I do not pass on it. However, Respondent may renew said motion before the Board when it reviews my decision. (2) Respondent on Au- gust 18, 1975, filed an "amended motion to correct tran- script." I do not pass on said motion for the, same reason. (3) General Counsel has filed a motion to correct transcript dated August 8, 1975. In the absence of opposition thereto said motion is granted. A. General Counsel's Evidence Kay Jeno testified substantially as follows as a witness for the General Counsel. About mid-June 1974, Respon- dent hired her to be a service center clerk at its place of business at 1301 Beaver Avenue in Pittsburgh. About the first of November 1974, the Union commenced a drive to organize Respondent's clerical employees at said address. In the first week of November Jeno signed a card for the Union in the Respondent's ladies room and then placed it in the cabinet drawer in said room. A day or two before this she asked three of Respondent's -clerks whether they planned to sign cards for the Union. And a day or two after she signed a union card Jeno attended a union meet- ing at the union office in Pittsburgh. About a week following said union meeting Jeno spoke to Respodent's assistant service manager, Martin Wilson, on official business. During the conversation Jeno told him "things were going to change shortly because something was going to happen." Although he asked her what this meant she replied she could not answer him but he would find out soon. Almost daily thereafter Wilson asked her "what was going to happen." Finally, on or about Novem- ber 22 she answered Wilson by saying "we were trying to start a union." He replied, "Good Luck." I find no viola- tion of the Act in Wilson's inquiries. On November 25 Jeno had a conversation with Paul Hotchkiss, Respondent's branch business manager. He told her he had heard a rumor "about someone trying to start a union in the clerical section" and asked her if she knew "anything about the union or the rumor." She replied in the negative. This caused him to remark that he "couldn't understand it because the Union said they had over fifty percent majority of the clerical staff and so far everyone he had questioned had denied any knowledge of the Union." Then he asked her how she felt about the Union and how she would vote, but she replied she would "have to look into it a little more before she made any decision." Then he added that if Jeno was trying to get the Union in for shorter working hours "it can't do that for you. If anything, you'll . . . end up working longer hours and you'll probably lose benefits such as vacation and sick pay and the Union would only erupt more in nit-picking." Continuing, Hotchkiss asked her if she thought that there was some sort of problem in the office, but she did not reply. Then he added that if a problem existed she should have come to him and he would have taken care of it; and he asked her why she "did not go to him?" She replied that she did "not think it, would have,done any good." At some point in the conversation he "mentioned that the Union couldn't get them an increase in wages. If anything, they would lose pay." Later that day about 4:57 p.m. a customer paid his bill with a check for less than $50 made out to Respondent. She then placed said check and a copy of the receipt to the INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER ,COMPANY customer in her desk drawer and locked said drawer, after which she went home as her day ended at 5 p.m. As she was ill the next day, November 26, she did not report for work until November 27. On November 27 about 4 p.m. Hotchkiss ordered her to come to Branch Manager Dwyer's office where she met both of said men. Dwyer told her she was being discharged because she had left the check in the desk drawer over- night. When he stated that Jeno had "been warned repeat- edly about this subject" she replied that she had "never been warned about this particular subject." At this point Hotchkiss stated that he' "had four or five documented times of when he warned [Jeno] about this particular sub- ject." Although Jeno insisted she had never previously been warned, Hotchkiss replied, "it doesn't matter any- way." Jeno first started to handle Respondent's cashbox around the first of September 1974. Her duties required her to take it out of the vault every morning, bung it to her desk where she placed it in a locked drawer, and kept the drawer locked except when she needed the box to serve a customer. At the end of the day she took the box, which contained cash and checks, together with her receipt book, to Hotchkiss who made sure that the "receipts matched up with the money." Then he took out all the contents of said box except $50 in cash. The box with said $50 was then placed by Jeno in the vault. Once prior to November 25 Jeno had placed the cashbox overnight with $50 in it in her locked desk drawer. Hotch- kiss told her not to leave the cashbox in such drawer over- night. So she obeyed his command thereafter. But he never warned her not to leave checks in such locked desk drawer. He also informed her at least once a week that she was not to work overtime as Respondent "did not want to pay overtime." About a week following Jeno's termination on Novem- ber 27 she, accompanied by Mike Gardener of the Union and two others, asked Dwyer if Dwyer would take her back, but he replied he would not. Then Gardener asked Dwyer why Jeno had been discharged. Dwyer replied it was because Jeno had "left the check" in Jeno's drawer overnight. When Gardener asked if there were any other reasons, Dwyer answered, "No; she was a competent enough employee, but I can't afford to take chances like that and she had been warned repeatedly." When Garden- er stated that Jeno had not been warned about this Dwyer replied,,"It's just her word against ours." And when Gar- dener asked Dwyer if Dwyer would recognize the Union, Dwyer replied, "No." And Dwyer did say that he knew that Jeno probably had signed a union card. On cross-examination it was shown that Jeno's affidavit to the General Counsel did not refer to Dwyer's statement that he knew that Jeno had probably signed a union card. (See Resp. Exh. 1.) When asked to explain why it was omit- ted therefrom she testified on cross, "I didn't think it was relevant at the time." However, she claimed that "after reading the affidavit several times, I remembered then that I had left it out and I told the Union about it . . . in preparation of this case for trial." And she admitted on cross that such a statement is not contained in her second affidavit. (See Resp. Exh. 2.) Michael Gardener, secretary-treasurer of the Union, was 379 the only other witness for the General Counsel. His testi- mony may be condensed as follows. His union has repre- sented Respondent's office clericals since January 1975, as a result of winning an election conducted by the Board, In November 1974, said Union conducted an organizational drive among, and held one meeting for, the clericals. Kay Jeno was one of those attending said meeting. On Novem- ber 25 he telephoned Respondent's John Dwyer requesting recognition of the Union. A few days after Jeno was dismissed she met with John Dwyer, Respondent's branch manager, to discuss said dis- charge., Joseph Stotter, business representative of the Union, and Gardener were also present. When Gardener asked Dwyer if Jeno had been terminated for union activi- ty, Dwyer replied in the negative. Dwyer then gave as the reason for such dismissal that Jeno had left a check for $25.46 in her desk, thereby violating company policy to "leave any monies . . . that is, receipts, in her desk or over- night and she had instructions to make sure that everything is locked in the safe." Continuing, Dwyer mentioned that Respondent had lost "considerable sums of money" in the past from "previous employees in that same job." Then, replying to another question of Gardener's, Dwyer asserted that no cash was left in the desk by Jeno and that the payee named in said check was Respondent. Dwyer also stated that, although this was the only reason for dis- missing Jeno, "there are other things but we don't want to talk about it . . . . We have some documents, but we're not going to use them unless we really have to." Then Gar- dener requested that Dwyer reinstate Jeno but Dwyer re- fused to do so. Gardener also asked Dwyer to recognize the Union. But Dwyer refused to do so and stated he preferred an NLRB election to determine if the Union represented a majority. Dwyer added that he knew the Union had ob- tained signed cards from five employees, one of whom was Jena On cross-examination Gardener admitted that he did not mention in his affidavit to the Board that in his conver- sation with Dwyer the latter stated he had some documents which he, Dwyer, "could use" but was "not going to use unless we really have to" in order to sustain the discharge of Jeno. Gardener further testified he did not remember this at the time he gave said affidavit but did remember it "later on." When asked on cross "how much later on did you remember," he replied, "A hundred years later." B. Respondent's Defense At the Pittsburgh branch of Respondent involved in this case Paul Hotchkiss is branch business administrator. He gave testimony for Respondent which may be summarized as follows. Kay Jeno was hired in June 1974 as a service center clerk with the responsibility of receiving the "daily time tickets" of the mechanics and computing how many hours they worked. In addition she had other duties which he described, but only one need be set out here. This one required her "to bill the customer" for "work orders" per- formed for such customer and to see that such customer either pay for the work or charge it if he had a charge account "before he could take his truck" which had been serviced by Respondent. On or about September 4, 1974, following her 60-day 380 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD probationary period, Jeno was given written instructions "regarding the handling of company funds." He reviewed said instructions with her . She also signed a form stating she had received $50 to be used in making change in con- nection with cash transactions and also stating that she had received a copy of said instructions . (See Resp. Exh. 4.) Hotchkiss further testified that about October 12 he warned her because when she went home the day before she had left the petty cashbox in her desk. She had also received a similar warning about November 11, 1974, and was at that time told that he "couldn't tolerate the leaving of company funds in a desk overnight . It belonged in the vault and the next time it happened she could be terminat- ed." And she was also "warned . . . more than once .. . regarding the turning in of company funds promptly after receiving them on C.O .D. orders . . . . You receive it to- day, I want it to-day. I don't want it tomorrow." This last warning was occasioned by her failing to turn "funds in on the same day that it was received . . . as many as three to five days . . . both cash and checks." However, her desk drawer was always locked. On November 25, 1974, Jeno had received about $17 from a cash customer. But it was not "turned in" by her until November 27. And prior to this "there had been problems at the Pittsburgh truck sales branch regarding the handling of company funds . . . and that was the reason that I [Hotchkiss] was brought to Pittsburgh." "On November 25 Jeno did not come to work," accord- ing to Hotchkiss (I believe he meant November 26, since in the immediate paragraph above he said she received a pay- ment on November 25). As a result the service department called him that there was a customer to be served. So he went to her office "to figure a C.O.D. for a customer" and "opened her desk drawer where these would be kept." However, he found the desk drawer locked before he opened it. He found "this check and the paid copy of the service invoice" in said desk. This caused him to "blow his stack" and say to himself, "That's it. I'm through." Then on November 27 the weekly meeting of the mana- gerial employees was held. He attended it and "brought out at this meeting that I think that she should be terminat- ed." However, he , "was not aware" on this occasion "that Kay Jeno was engaged in Union activity"; but he knew that on November 25 Dwyer had received a telephone call from Gardener "indicating that the clerical office had in- tended to organize." Nevertheless, "the fact of the Union activity [did not] have any influence on the recommenda- tion" to discharge Jeno. The last previous time that "Jeno was warned regarding the handling of C.O.D. items prior to the incident which resulted in her discharge," according to Hotchkiss, "was the week ending November 15. She was warned during that week with respect to . . . being more prompt and turning the money in on a daily basis." She had not been turning the money in on a daily basis, he declared in his direct testimony. On cross Hotchkiss testified that Jeno prior to being dis- charged received 2 warnings not to leave the cashbox in her desk overnight and between 5 and 20 warnings for not turning in cash on a daily basis. He also asserted on cross that on November 25 he told Jeno that Dwyer had just received a telephone call from Gardener and Hotchkiss thereupon asked Jeno if she knew if there was any truth to the rumor that Hotchkiss' office force was going to orga- nize a union. Jeno replied, "Where I came from in Califor- nia we didn't need a union. I'd have to give that some thought." Respondent also called John Dwyer as a witness. His testimony may be abridged as follows . He is branch man- ager of Respondent's truck sales branch . Hotchkiss, Respondent's branch business administrator at its branch where Jeno was employed, brought to Dwyer's attention at a managerial meeting on November 27, 1974, that Hotch- kiss found a check in Jeno's desk and requested that "for that she should be discharged. Also, at that time, Mr. Burk- head brought to my attention several other reasons why she should be discharged." It was decided at said meeting to dismiss Jeno. Later that day Jeno, accompanied by Hotchkiss, came to Dwyer's office. Dwyer thereupon informed Jeno that, "af- ter several warnings which she had failed to heed, we had again found another violation, namely, the check which Mr. Hotchkiss had at that time in his hand and for that reason we were going to discharge her." Jeno responded that "she didn't know of several offenses , but she only knew of one and that in this specific instance [and] . . . she didn't have enough time to place it [the check] in the vault or turn it in to Mr. Hotchkiss." Then Jeno left. At the time of the above meeting Manager Dwyer was "not aware of any Union activity in which Ms . Jeno was engaged." But he "was aware that there was within the office work force some Union activity" as he had received a call on November 25 from Gardener, the Union's secre- tary-treasurer. Following Jeno's discharge Gardener came with Jeno to Dwyer's office on December 9, 1974. Dwyer informed them that he did not recognize Gardener as a representa- tive of the office clerical force and that he "did not ac- knowledge that he did recognize [Gardener], that [Garden- er] was merely a friend of Kay Jeno's coming up there and that I [Dwyer] had a reasonable doubt that he [Gardener] did represent the employees." But there was no discussion about union cards; and Dwyer denies that he said that he knew that Jeno had signed a union card . At one point in the discussion Gardener threatened "to take the office work force out on strike" and added, "Okay, we're going to put you out of business in Pittsburgh. Dwyer, you'll never do any more business ." I credit the General Counsel's evi- dence that Dwyer said he probably knew that Jeno had signed a union card and do not credit Dwyer 's denial thereof. On cross, Dwyer testified that when he discharged Jeno he told her that it was based on not only leaving a compa- ny check in her desk drawer overnight, but also because in the past she had "improperly handled cash, that she left the cash box there, that there were several occasions of this type of incident and this is the last and final occasion as far as I was concerned and I couldn't tolerate it any more." Although he previously had learned of these prior malfea- sances of Jeno's from Hotchkiss , he never mentioned them INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER COMPANY to Jeno until the day he discharged her. And Dwyer further stated on cross that Hotchkiss orally warned Jeno about said past unsatisfactory performances , and that the inci- dents giving rise to such warnings are recorded in Jeno's personnel file. C. General Counsel's Rebuttal Kay Jeno was recalled by the General Counsel to testify on rebuttal. Such testimony may be adequately com- pressed as follows. Hotchkiss never told her that she would be discharged it she left the cashbox in her desk drawer. And only once did she ever fail "to turn in a C.O.D. promptly ... that is, on the day it was turned in [to her] by a customer." But this occurred only because she received "it" late in the day and, not having "time to turn it in," she put it in her cashbox, locked the box, and placed the box in the vault. Hotchkiss told her he disapproved of this. This was the only time Jeno was "ever warned . . . about failing to turn in a C.O.D. promptly." And Jeno on this occasion, i.e. on November 25, did not take "the check" up to the vault on the second floor as this would have caused her to work a few minutes overtime (it was 5:01 p.m. when she received "the check.") But she had been instructed 'not to work overtime as overtime was against company policy. On cross Jeno admitted that on still another occasion prior to November 25 she left "an excess amount of cash" in her cashbox. (See Resp. Exh. 5.) And at least one other time she did not turn in cash the same day she received it. (See Resp. Exh. 6.) And counsel for Respondent brought out on cross that Jeno sometimes did not turn in cash to Respondent the same day she received it from customers. (See Resp. Exh. 7, 8, 9, and 10.) D. Concluding Findings and Discussion 1. As to the discharge of Kay Jeno: Upon a critical study of the entire record it is my opinion, and I find, that Ms. Jeno was discharged for cause, i.e., for not turning in some cash and a check, received by her on November 25, 1974, at the end of said day as required by Respondent's policy, and that the reason given for her discharge is not a pretext to disguise her union activity as the true cause for terminating her. While this ultimate finding is based on the entire record, it is also derived from the following subsid- iary findings, which I hereby find as facts. a. Jeno was instructed to turn in receipts, whether of cash or checks, the same day she received them. Admitted- ly she did not do this on November 25. Her excuse is that she did not do so as it would require her to work a few minutes overtime contrary to company policy. But I am not impressed by this excuse, as I cannot understand how she would lose any more than a few cents by working an extra minute or two without claiming overtime. b. She was discharged as soon as her failure to turn in such receipts was discovered on November 27, the next day that she returned to work. Hence it cannot be said that Respondent condoned her conduct on November 25 and later discharged her for union activity. Of course, it has been held that a trier of facts may find a discriminatory intent when a discharge is effected abruptly upon ascer- 381 taming unsatisfactory performance. N.L.R.B. v. Montgom- ery Ward & Co.,242 F.2d 497, 502 (C.A. 2, 1957) cert. de- nied 355 U.S. 829 (1965). But I am unable to make such a finding in this case as the General Counsel has failed to convince me that Jeno should have been permitted to work until the end of the week. Cf. State Asphalt Company, Inc., 219 NLRB No. 172 (1975). In this connection I have not overlooked the principle of law that "Direct evidence of a purpose to discriminate is rarely obtained." Corrie Corporation of Charleston 'v. N.LR.B., 375 F.2d 149, 152 (C.A. 4, 1967). "Nowadays it is usually a case of more subtlety." N.L.R.B. v. Neuhoff Bros., Packers, Inc., 375 F.2d 372, 374 (C.A. 5, 1967). Neverthe- less, I find that Respondent's purpose in terminating Jeno was not to discriminate against her for her union activity. Cf. Whitcraft Houseboat Division, North American Rockwell Corporation, 195 NLRB 1046, 1048 (1972). c. I recognize that "management is for management .... Management can discharge for good cause, or bad cause, or no cause at all ... [but] it may not discharge when the real motivating purpose is to do that which Sec- tion 8(a)(3) forbids." See N.L.R.B. v. T.A. McGahney, Sr., T.A. McGahney, Jr., Mrs. Altie McGahney Jones and Mrs. Wilda Frances McGahney Harrison, d/b/a Columbus Mar- ble Works, 233 F.2d 406, 413 (C.A. 5, 1956). However, I find that Jeno was discharged for cause, although it may be that another employer might have retained her because her conduct was not too reprehensible. Cf. N.L.R.B. v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 317 F.2d 912, 914 (C.A. 1, 1963). And I also find that "the real motivating purpose" was not dis- criminatory within the purview of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. Cf. Miller Electric Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 265 F.2d 225; 226-227 (C.A. 7, 1959). d. I have not disregarded Respondent's union animus and unfair labor practices as found elsewhere herein. This is material on the question of whether Jeno's discharge was impelled or induced by purposes interdicted by Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. Nevertheless I find that such antiunion conduct by Respondent did not enter into the decision to terminate Jeno. e. I credit Jeno that Dwyer on November 9 said he knew that Jeno "probably had signed a Union card," and thus find that Respondent had knowledge of this extent of her union activity. But it is significant `that Jeno on cross ad- mitted that she did not mention said knowledge of Dwyer in either of her two affidavits given by her to the Board and that she first "told the Union about it ... in prepara- tion of this case for trial." This convinces me that if Jeno really believed that her unionism caused her dismissal she would have told the Union or the Board about such knowl- edge long before being interviewed for the hearing. I do not credit Gardener that in this conversation Dwyer said that Dwyer "knew" that Jeno had signed a union card. f. Jeno's union activity is, on her own testimony, quite minor, i.e., she signed a union card, attended a union meet- ing, and asked three employees whether they planned to sign cards for the Union. Hence,' I cannot infer that she was discharged as an active protagonist of the Union in order to retard the Union's organizational drive or to chill employees from joining the Union. Consequently, I find that cases like N.L.R.B. v. Longhorn Transfer Service, Inc., 382 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 346 F.2d 1003, 1006 (C.A. 5, 1965) do not require a con- trary conclusion. 2. As to the alleged violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act: Crediting Jeno, I find that on November 25, 1974, Branch Manager Hotchkiss asked Jeno whether she knew anything about someone trying to start a union in the cleri- cal section. He also told Jeno that he had questioned cleri- cals but they denied any knowledge of the Union. Continu- ing, he inquired of Jeno how she felt about the Union and how she would vote. I find that such interrogation is pro- hibited by Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Also in this conversa- tion Hotchkiss told Jeno that the Union couldn't get them an increase in wages and, "if anything, they would lose pay." I find this statement exceeds "the expressing of any views, argument, or opinion" protected by Section 8(c) and that it contains a threat of reprisal which contravenes Sec- tion 8(a)(1) of the Act. Respondent's branch business administrator, Paul Hotchkiss, testified, and I credit him on this aspect of his testimony, that on November 25, 1974, he told Jeno that Dwyer had just received a call from Gardener of the Union and Hotchkiss then asked Jeno if she knew whether there was "any truth to the rumor that [his, i.e., Hotchkiss] office force was going to organize a union." I find that this inqui- ry seeks to ascertain information regarding the Union's or- ganizational drive. Hence I find it is improper interroga- tion proscribed by Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above, found to constitute unfair labor practices, occurring in connection with its operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstruct- ing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY As Respondent has been found to have engaged in un- fair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and that it take specific affirmative action, as set forth below in the recommended Order, designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. The conduct of Respon- dent in my opinion does not reflect a general disregard of or hostility to the Act, and I so find. Accordingly, I find that a broad remedial order against Respondent is not war- ranted. Rather, I find that it will accomplish the policies of the Act to enjoin Respondent from repeating the transgres- sions found above to be unfair labor practices and similar or like conduct. Upon the foregoing findings of fact and the entire record in this case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 2. Respondent is an Employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) and is engaged in commerce as defined in. Sec- tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 3. By questioning office clerical employees regarding union activity among them and how they were going to vote as to having a union, Respondent engaged in coercive interrogation violating Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 4. By telling its office clerical employees that the Union could not get them an increase in wages and, if anything, the Union would cause them to lose pay, Respondent ex- pressed views containing a threat of reprisals and thereby infringed Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 5. Respondent has not committed any other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommend- ed: ORDER' The Respondent, International Harvester Company, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a). Questioning employees regarding union activities or how they would vote as to having a union. (b) Telling employees that a union cannot get them an increase in wages and, if anything, a union would cause them to lose pay. (c) In any similar or like manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed to them in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to of-' fectuate the policies of the Act: (a). Post at its place of business at Pittsburgh, Pennsyl- vania, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 2 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 6, after being duly signed by an au- thorized representative of Respondent,'shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are cus- tomarily displayed. Reasonable steps shall be taken to in- sure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b). Notify the Regional Director for Region 6, in writ- ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps have been taken to comply herewith. IT IS ALSO ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed inso- far as it alleges violations of the Act not found herein. 1 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102 46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, recommenda- tions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of said Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its find- ings, conclusions , and Order, and all objections thereto shall be waived for all purposes 2 In the event the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board "