Big John Super Stores, Inc.

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Big John Super Stores, Inc. and District Union Local 227, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO. Cases 9- CA-10672 and 9-CA-10906 September 19, 1977 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS PENELLO AND MURPHY On June 20, 1977, Administrative Law Judge Michael O. Miller issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed an answering brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the Respondent, Big John Super Stores, Inc., Fulton, Kentucky, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and it hereby is, dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not herein found. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE MICHAEL O. MILLER, Administrative Law Judge: This case was heard on March 2 and 3, 1977, in Mayfield, Kentucky, based on charges filed on September 28 and December 15, 1976, and complaints which issued on December 2, 1976, and January 31, 1977. The complaints, which were consolidated for hearing, alleged that Big John Super Stores, Inc.,' herein Respondent, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, herein the Act, by interrogating and polling its employees concerning their union activities and desires, by threatening its employees with discipline, discharge, more onerous work- ing conditions, or the closing of the store because of their The name of Respondent appears as amended at hearing. 2 General Counsel's posthearing motion that official notice be taken of 232 NLRB No. 41 union activities, and by granting a wage increase in order to discourage union membership or support. Respondent's timely filed answers denied the substantive allegations of the complaints. All parties were afforded full opportunity to appear, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to argue orally. General Counsel and Respondent filed briefs which have been carefully considered. Based on the entire record,2 including my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE RESPONDENT'S BUSINESS AND THE UNION'S LABOR ORGANIZATION STATUS-PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Respondent is an Illinois corporation operating retail grocery stores in various States of the United States, including a store in Fulton, Kentucky, the only store directly involved herein. The complaints alleged, Respon- dent's answers admitted, and I find and conclude that Respondent satisfies the Board's standards for the asser- tion of jurisdiction over retail enterprises and is an employer, engaged in commerce and in operations affect- ing commerce, within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. The complaints alleged, Respondent admitted, and I find and conclude that District Union Local 227, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO, herein the Union, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 1l. BACKGROUND Respondent's Fulton store is part of its southern division, which consists of seven stores in Kentucky and Tennessee. Five of these stores, including Fulton, were acquired from their prior owners around September 1975. None of the southern division stores were covered by collective-bar- gaining agreements. Respondent also operates nine stores in its northern division, some of which have collective- bargaining agreements. The Union commenced an organizing campaign among the employees of the Fulton store around June 1976. (All dates hereinafter are in 1976 unless otherwise specified.) Respondent learned of this campaign in late June, when it was served with the unfair labor practice charge in Case 9- CA-10423 (subsequently withdrawn or dismissed). A representation election petition was filed in late July, and a Stipulation for Certification Upon Consent Election was approved on September 3, setting an election among Respondent's Fulton store employees for October 1. That election was canceled on September 28, when the Union filed the charge in Case 9-CA-10672. No new election date has been scheduled. the "Order Cancelling Election and Notice of Cancellation of Election" in Case 9-RC-11623 is granted. 134 BIG JOHN SUPER STORES, INC. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Conduct of James L. Menees', Polling of Employees About October 18, Meat Market Manager James L. Menees circulated a petition among Respondent's Fulton store employees which stated, in essence, that the employ- ees did not wish to be represented by the Union. He secured approximately 50 signatures. Denver Perkins, who was store manager at that time, was aware of Menees' activity. Menees' testimony appears to indicate that Perkins suggested it: Q. (By Counsel for General Counsel) Okay. Now, what were your discussions with Mr. Perkins about this petition? A. Well, it was really-our discussion really-I just-I talked to some of the employees there, and it was kind of a big mess there, and so I co, : in one morning ... and he mentioned the fact of the petition. It was just mentioned . . . when I came in in the morning. And so I talked to Ruth Phipps, she's the office lady, and I talked to Ron Tanus ... in produce, and we decided . . . [w]e'll just see how the people feel about it. Menees' position as meat market manager had been included within the stipulated unit for the election. Respondent contended that it was not responsible for Menees' conduct as he was not a supervisor or, if he were found to be a supervisor, his conduct v"- noncoercive. General Counsel contended that Menees was a statutory supervisor, that the conduct was coercive, and that Respondent was responsible for that conduct and charged with such knowledge of union sympathies as Menees may have acquired. Respondent's stores have a store manager, admittedly possessed of supervisory authority, an assistant store manager, and managers in the produce, bakery-delicates- sen, and meat departments. The handbook of company policies refers to these positions as "managerial." Each of these departments has a supervisor who functions through- out one or both of Respondent's divisions. The meat department supervisor is Gene Woods, who visits the Fulton store two or three times per week and is in daily telephonic communication with the meat market manager. The meat supervisor originates and gives to the meat market managers a weekly merchandising letter, telling them what will be advertised and informing them how to merchandise and display the meats. The weekly advertise- ment is available to the managers when they make up their meat orders. Based on the needs of his inventory, Menees purchases meats for the store from wholesalers of his choice. His purchases average $10,000 per week. There are seven employees in the meat market at Fulton, including Menees and two part-time employees. All are hourly paid. At $5.25 per hour, Menees receives about 65 cents per hour more than the next highest paid individual. He also receives a quarterly bonus, based on the profitabili- ty of the department, which accounts for 4 or 5 percent of his annual income. Employees below the level of manager do not share in that bonus. Menees is paid premium pay for the overtime that he works. He schedules the work of the other employees, including the number of hours they will work, and, when overtime is required, asks them to work it. He generally secures approval for departmental overtime from the store manager. He may permit an employee to leave work early or take a day off for personal reasons. The employees generally know what work has to be performed; to the extent that an assignment of duties is required, Menees makes it. He may also train, or ask other experienced meatcutters to train, an employee. He has no independent authority to discharge or otherwise discipline an employee; when such action has been necessary, Menees has reported the problem to the store manager. Neither does he hire employees, although he does talk to applicants to determine their experience and has been asked for his opinion of them and his recommendation. All meat department employees are interviewed and hired by the meat supervisor. Menees has not been consulted when meat department employees have been granted wage increases. Menees is held out to the public and employees as the meat market manager. According to their testimony, some employees view Menees as a "boss" or supervisor; others do not. He has access to the employees' personnel records, access which is denied employees below the level of department manager. He also meets with the meat supervisor and the store manager to discuss the meat department's displays and advertising and occasionally meets with the employees to listen to their problems. In view of all of the foregoing, and particularly noting Menees' authority to make recommendations on new hires, his authority to affect an employee's earnings by sched- uling and the assignment of overtime, and the fact that, unless he is deemed to be a supervisor, the seven individuals in the meat department operate essentially without any direct supervision, I conclude that Menees is a supervisor within the meaning of the Act. Stephens Produce Co., Inc., 214 NLRB 131 (1974); Bedford Discounters, Inc., 204 NLRB 509 (1972). The inclusion of the meat market manager in the unit as stipulated to by Respondent and the Union does not estop General Counsel from contending that Menees is a supervisor. See Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 115 NLRB 645 (1956), enfd. 242 F.2d 497 (C.A. 2, 1957). I further find and conclude that Respondent was responsible for Menees' actions in polling the employees both by reason of his supervisory authority and Perkins' authorization or instigation of that poll. Respondent contended, on the authority of Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., supra, that as Menees was to be included in the unit by agreement of the Union and the Employer, employees would not deem his antiunion conduct to be the representation of management. Under such a circumstance his conduct would lack the tendency to coerce employees. However, in that case, the Board stated (115 NLRB at 647): For that reason, the Board has generally refused to hold an employer responsible for the antiunion conduct of a supervisor included in the unit, in the absence of evidence that the employer encouraged authorized, or 135 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ratified the supervisor's activities .... lEmphasis supplied.] As noted, Menees' conduct was "encouraged, authorized, or ratified" by Perkins. Accordingly, I find and conclude that Menees' conduct would tend to interfere with employee free choice, that Respondent is chargeable with that conduct, and that, by such conduct, Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. Sabine Towing & Transportation Co., Inc., 205 NLRB 423 (1973). B. Conduct Directed at Mary Woodruff Mary Woodruff was employed in Respondent's delica- tessen department in October 1975. In June 1976, she was made aware of the Union's organizational campaign by another employee and signed a union authorization card. Thereafter, she distributed some cards to other employees, discussed the Union with them, and attended union meetings. She also attended the hearing on the Union's representation petition. On October 18, according to her undenied testimony, Woodruff was approached by Me- nees, who asked her to sign his antiunion petition. She refused, telling him that he knew how she felt about the Union. On the morning of December 5, Bakery Supervisor Geraldine Knight called Woodruff into the office after observing that Woodruff appeared upset. Knight asked Woodruff what the problem was. She informed Knight that she had had a run-in with Perkins, the store manager, in which Perkins had admonished and cursed at her for allegedly walking on a freshly washed floor. Woodruff complained that she was being mistreated and picked on because of her union activities. She pointed to the union button she was wearing. Knight asked her why she wanted the Union and Woodruff told her that it was because of mistreatment such as she had been receiving.3 At this point, according to Woodruff, Knight told her: "Mary, let's keep this a secret, but . . . if the union comes in Mr. Martin has already said he will close the store." She also assured Woodruff that higher management would take a greater interest in the store in the future. Knight denied making any reference to a secret, a threat to close the store, or management's attention to improve conditions in the store. Around this same period of time, Respondent eliminated most of the delicatessen products, laid off the part-time employees, and generally altered the operation of the bakery-delicatessen department in an effort to make it profitable. Woodruff's duties changed; she was assigned to fry doughnuts and chickens. She performed this duty for several days but objected to having to do all the frying. Another employee was brought in to cook the chickens; Woodruff continued to fry doughnuts. In addition, she testified, her other duties increased and she was assigned more arduous cleaning work than she had done before or than other employees were required to do.4 On December 17, Woodruff was summoned to a meeting with Knight and the bakery-delicatessen manager, Jerry I To this point. the testimony of Woodruff and Knight are in substantial agreement. 4 The complaint did not allege, and the evidence would not support, a Tipps. According to her testimony on direct examination, Woodruff was told that her work was not satisfactory, that she was working too slow, that if she did not improve they would have to put her on the night shift (which Knight and Tipps knew was not practical for her), and that, if that did not work out, they would have to let her go. On cross- examination, Woodruff readily acknowledged that she told Knight and Tipps that she was working as fast as she intended to, that she couldn't do any more than she was doing, and that, although she had to work, she really did not like the work she was doing. Knight responded by telling her that the only alternative to the work she was doing would be a position on the night shift. She further recalled that Knight told her all of the employees were going to have to work harder in order to make the bakery a success, that the bakery was being run on a trial basis, and that this was its last chance. Woodruff told Knight and Tipps that she believed that they were doing this to her because she was in favor of the Union. Knight denied that the Union made any difference to her. Woodruff's cross- examination testimony concerning this interview is in substantial agreement with testimony of Knight and Tipps, which I credit. On December 26, Tipps gave Woodruff a "correction slip" in regard to the quality of some doughnuts which she had made. This was the first time such a slip had been issued. There was no mention of the Union. In the 2 weeks prior to January 11, 1977, Woodruff was late for work several times. She testified that there were about three such times, occasioned by adverse weather. Tipps said that there were about six incidents. Twice, Woodruff had called Tipps to report that she could not secure transportation to the store and he picked her up. On January 11, Tipps and the new store manager, Ken Jungers, told Woodruff that her tardiness was not accept- able. Woodruff complained that they were trying to "crucify" her because of her union activities and were trying to make her quit. Tipps and Jungers denied any such intention. Tipps then left and Jungers continued to talk with Woodruff. He asked her why she was so bitter toward the Company. According to Woodruff, he also asked her why she wanted the Union. She repeated her assertions that she had been badly treated by the employer and that her mistreatment was the result of her union activities. Jungers denied asking Woodruff why she favored the Union and asserted that it was Woodruff who mentioned the Union in their conversation. Geraldine Knight impressed me as a forceful and credible witness; her candid admission that she asked Woodruff why she wanted the Union bolsters the credibili- ty of the denials of other statements attributed to her. I similarly found both Tipps and Jungers to be credible witnesses. I was less favorably impressed with Woodruff's testimony and demeanor. As previously noted, her testimo- ny varied substantially from direct to cross-examination. Additionally, she displayed hostility toward Respondent and a propensity to view all actions taken by the employer as retaliation for union activities, even when those actions contention that Respondent discriminatorily assigned Woodruff more onerous or arduous work because of her union activities. 136 BIG JOHN SUPER STORES, INC. were attempts to work out accommodations with her work preferences. In this regard, I observe that Respondent did extend itself to Woodruff, bringing in another employee to relieve her of the task of frying chickens, offering her a shift with less arduous work, and picking her up on mornings when she refused to drive because of the weather. Accordingly, to the extent that there are differences in the testimony of Woodruff and her supervisors, I credit those supervisors. In each instance wherein the Union was mentioned between Woodruff and her supervisors, it was Woodruff who raised the subject. When Knight asked her why she wanted the Union, Woodruff was wearing a union button and had brought it to Knight's attention. In these circumstances, I conclude that Knight's casual and isolated question lacked the tendency to interfere with the exercise of employee rights under the Act. In so concluding, I note that the inquiry was not directed at determining Wood- ruff's union sympathies; those were openly proclaimed. Neither was it directed at determining the extent of her union activities or the sympathies or activities of other employees. The question was asked once and was not pursued. See Hobart Corporation, 228 NLRB 907, fn. 3 (1977). This case is thus distinguishable from such cases as Florida Steel Corporation, 224 NLRB 45 (1976), Bushnell's Kitchens, Inc., 222 NLRB 110 (1976), and Hanes Hosiery, Inc., 219 NLRB 338 (1975). I shall, therefore, recommend that this allegation be dismissed. Additionally, as I have found that Knight did not threaten Woodruff with either the closing of the store or with assignment to more onerous working conditions, and that Jungers did not coercively interrogate Woodruff concerning her union activities, I shall recommend that those complaint allegations be dismissed. C. Conduct Directed at Linda Wade Linda Wade is a high school student who began working for Respondent during the summer of 1976, in the bakery. She was laid off around the end of November and was recalled about a week later. On her first or second day back, Store Manager Perkins called her into his office and began to admonish her for the way work had been performed in the bakery. Wade told him, "[Y]ou haven't liked me since you started work here." At this point, Perkins got "nasty," called her a "bitch" and "fussed" at her for work that had not been done. In this conversation, as Wade testified, "he said something about the union, that slipped, and then he said he'd like to see me gone because my job wasn't good anymore because I was behind Mary [Woodruff]." Wade further testified that Perkins had observed Woodruff talking with her and several other employees, about the Union, around the beginning of November.5 General Counsel alleged that the foregoing statement to Wade constituted a threat to discharge Wade because of her union activities. The evidence reflects that Mary I Respondent did not call Perkins as a witness. Geraldine Knight, however, was present when Perkins spoke to Wade. To the extent that Knight recalled the substance of the conversation, she corroborated Wade. She did not recall Perkins making reference to Wade "being behind Mary." 6 The complaint alleged the "granting of a wage increase to discourage Woodruff's union activities were known to Respondent and it stands uncontradicted that Perkins observed Wade and others discussing the Union with Woodruff. That incident, however, occurred more than a month prior to Wade's confrontation with Perkins, a period of dormancy in union activity. The record does not establish that Woodruff was known to be a leading union proponent or that Wade was, or was suspected to be, a supporter of Woodruff in her union activities. It is not entirely clear from Wade's version of the conversation whether Perkins specifically mentioned the Union or whether Wade merely surmised that Perkins was referring to the Union when he alluded to Wade's being "behind Mary." While Perkins may have been referring to Woodruff in her role as a proponent of the Union, it is quite as likely that he was referring to problems he was having with Woodruff's work performance. In light of this ambiguity, and the other circumstances set forth above, I am constrained to conclude that General Counsel has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Perkins threatened Wade with discharge because of her union activity. Accordingly, I shall recommend that this allegation be dismissed. D. The Wage Increases In late November, Respondent's Fulton store employees received substantial wage increases: 60 cents or more per hour for the full-time employees and 25 cents per hour or more for the part-time employees, retroactive to September 1. Checks were given them for the retroactively earned wages. General Counsel contends that Respondent granted "an unusually large and unexpected wage increase, in order to unlawfully influence employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights." 6 Respondent contends that the wage increase was the same as had been granted throughout its southern division effective September I but withheld from the Fulton store employees in order to avoid creating the appearance that it was seeking to improperly influence the election. After the election was indefinitely postponed, Respondent claimed, it determined to give the increase to those employees so that they would not be penalized by the pendency of the election petition. The record reflects that when Respondent acquired the Fulton store, along with about four others, in September 1975, the employees' wage rates were near the minimum wage. The employees were told that wage rates would be reviewed and that there would be periodic increases. While corporate vice president and general supervisor, Paul York, could not recall that employees were told of any specific dates on which to expect wage increases, employee Don Elliot recalled being told that wages were reviewed twice a year, in April and September. Employee Brad Coley recalled being told that there would be raises around September. Their recollections essentially corroborate the testimony of William Harper, executive vice president who was responsible for formulation and implementation of the union activities of [Respondent's] employees." The complaint is broad enough to support the issue as framed in General Counsel's brief. Moreover. that issue was fully litigated. See Sheboygan Sausage Company, Inc.. 156 NLRB 1490. fn. 1(1966). 137 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD wage policies. Harper testified that it was Respondent's policy for all stores not covered by collective-bargaining agreements to review wages and grant increases at 6-month intervals, in April and October. In April 1976, the Fulton store employees received wage increases of approximately 5 or 6 percent, 10 cents to 15 cents per hour. In May, Harper began to formulate the policy for the wage increases to be given in the fall. That policy, he testified, was made final by the end of July or mid-August, admittedly after Respondent acquired knowl- edge of the organizational campaign in Fulton. Under that policy, the employees of all of the southern division stores would receive identical wages, $3.10 per hour after 6 months experience with higher wages paid in the meat department. This wage scale was based on a study of the rates paid by Respondent's competition, and was compara- ble thereto. When the employees in Respondent's other stores received their September increases, no mention was made of the union activity at Fulton. The Fulton employees were not told about those raises; nothing was said to them to indicate that their union activity prevented their receipt of raises. Again, when Respondent gave them the wage increases, there was no mention of the Union. No evidence was adduced to contradict Harper's credible testimony that the wage increases at Fulton were the same as those at the other southern division stores. General Counsel contended that, in speaking to its employees, Respondent had conditioned wage increases upon store profitability. As the evidence reflected that the staff of the Fulton store had decreased from approximately 64 in September of the high 40's in November, it was submitted that the store's profits could not have justified such substantial wage increases. Harper denied that the Fulton store was not profitable. He acknowledged that the bakery department therein was not showing a profit. Layoffs in the bakery, previously discussed, accounted for some of the reduction in the work force. So too, apparently, did a storewide reduction in hours. He further explained that, although the employees were told that wage increases depended upon individual store performance, this had been said to motivate the employees. It was not, however, the basis upon which he formulated wage policy. The Board, in Newport Division of Wintex Knitting Mills, Inc., 216 NLRB 1058 (1975), concisely summarized the state of the law regarding the announcement or grant of wage increases during the pendency of an election campaign: It is well established that the announcement of a wage increase during the pendency of a representation petition for the purpose of stifling an organizational campaign constitutes unlawful interference and coer- cion ... An employer's legal duty in deciding whether to grant benefits while a representation petition is pending is to determine that question precisely as if a union were not in the picture. An employer's granting a wage I In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. increase during a union campaign "raises a strong presumption" of illegality. In the absence of evidence demonstrating that the timing of the announcement of changes in benefits was governed by factors other than the pendency of the election, the Board will regard interference with employee freedom of choice as the motivating factor. The burden of establishing a justifi- able motive remains with the Employer. The question is thus one of motivation. On the record before me, I am persuaded that Respondent has satisfied its burden of establishing a justifiable motive and has overcome the presumption of illegality. Thus, I find significant that the timing of the raises followed the pattern previously announced to employees at the time of Respon- dent's acquisition, that formulation of the raises began prior to the advent of the Union, that consistent raises were given throughout the entire division, that those raises brought Respondent's wages in line with those paid by its competition, and that Respondent did not attempt to capitalize upon its planned raises by granting them prior to the scheduled election or by making reference to the Union either when it decided to withhold those raises or when it reversed that decision and granted them. See Allis Chal- mers Corporation, 224 NLRB 1199 (1976) (particularly at 1205-06); California Pellet Mill Company, 219 NLRB 435 (1975). Accordingly, I shall recommend that this allegation be dismissed. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. By coercively polling its employees concerning their union activities and desires, Respondent has engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. 2. The aforesaid unfair labor practice affects commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 3. Respondent has not violated the Act in any manner not specifically found herein. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, in order to effectuate the policies of the Act, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER 7 The Respondent, Big John Super Stores, Inc., Fulton, Kentucky, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Coercively polling its employees concerning their union activities and desires. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which I find is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 138 BIG JOHN SUPER STORES, INC. (a) Post at its Fulton, Kentucky, store, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."s Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 9, after being duly signed by its representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 9, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps it has taken to comply herewith. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found herein. I In the event this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals. the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX To engage in self-organization To form, join, or assist any union To bargain collectively through representa- tives of their own choosing To engage in activities together for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection To refrain from the exercise of any such activities. In recognition of these rights, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT coercively poll our employees concern- ing their union activities or desires. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. BIG JOHN SUPER STORES, INC. NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The act gives the employees the following rights: 139