J/B Industries, Inc.

162 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD J/B Industries, Inc. and Kathryn Jenkins. Case 13- CA-14300 June 24, 1976 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS FANNING AND JENKINS On March 30, 1976, Administrative Law Judge Leonard M. Wagman issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep- tions and a supporting brief, and the General Coun- sel filed an answering brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order, as modified below.' ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re- lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modified below, and hereby orders that the Respondent, J/B Industries, Inc., Aurora, Illinois, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Administrative Law Judge's recommended Or- der, as so modified. Substitute the following for paragraph 1(c): "(c) In any other manner interfering with, restrain- ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of their ' The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge It is the Board's established policy not to over- rule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F 2d 362 (C A 3, 1951) We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings 2In par I(c) of his recommended Order, the Administrative Law Judge uses the narrow cease-and-desist language, "like or related," rather than the broad injunctive language, "in any other manner," the Board traditionally provides in cases involving serious 8(a)(3) discrimination conduct See N L R B v Entwistle Mfg Co, 120 F 2d 532, 536 C A 4, 1941), Electrical Fittings Corporation, a subsidiary of I-T-E Imperial Corporation, 216 NLRB 1076 (1975) Accordingly, we shall modify the order to require Respondent to cease and desist from in any manner infringing upon employee rights rights to self-organization, to form, join, or assist la- bor organizations, including Communication Work- ers of America, AFL-CIO, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, to en- gage in concerted activities for the purpose of collec- tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or refrain from any and all such activities , except to the extent that such rights may be affected by an agree- ment requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in conformity with Section 8(a)(3) of said Act." DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE LEONARD M. WAGMAN, Administrative Law Judge: A hearing in the entitled proceeding was held before me on November 6 and 7, 1975, at Chicago , Illinois, on the com- plaint of the General Counsel against the Respondent, J/B Industries , Inc., referred to hereinafter as the Company. The Regional Director of Region 13 issued the complaint in this proceeding on August 29, 1975, upon a charge filed by Kathryn Jenkins on May 14, 1975, and alleged therein that the Company violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (29 U.S .C. 151, et seq.), referred to herein as the Act, by threatening to discharge employees rather than permit them to become unionized, and by discharging employees Kathryn Jenkins and Judith Watson because of their union activity. The Company filed an answer denying the commission of any unfair labor practices. Following the close of the hearing, the General Counsel and the Company filed briefs Upon the entire record in this case, from my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses and upon careful consid- eration of the briefs, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT AND THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The Company, an Illinois corporation, is engaged in the manufacture of appliance parts at Aurora, Illinois, where it maintains a plant and the office involved in the instant proceeding. In the course and conduct of its business, the Company annually purchases and receives at its Aurora, Illinois, facility, directly from points outside the State of Illinois, goods and services valued in excess of $50,000. I find, and the Company admits, that at all times material herein the Company was an employer engaged in com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, re- ferred to herein as the Union, is, and at all times material herein has been, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 225 NLRB No. 24 J/B INDUSTRIES, INC 163 11. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Union Activity I In late April 1975, Kathryn Jenkins, a company office clerical employee, met with some of her fellow clericals at the Company's facilities, in the women's lounge and dis- cussed their complaints about office working conditions. Office clerical Kitty Hott complained that the office was dirty. Judy Watson 2 noted that the Company had pur- chased a new automobile and given it to one of its execu- tives. At this, Jenkins remarked that "it wasn't fair, because 11 the office machinery was so inadequate and so old... . She also remarked that the typewriters were over 20 years old. When Jenkins asked the group if they had ever thought of taking action about their complaints, Watson replied that nothing could be done. Employee Holt specu- lated that "if you try to do anything you will lose your job." Jenkins suggested a union and then turned to the possibility of talking to the president of the Aurora Chap- ter of the National Organization for Women. Later that same month, in the women's lounge, Jenkins and employee Kitty Hott discussed their respective atti- tudes toward a union. When Holt expressed opposition, Jenkins argued that the advantages of a union outweighed the disadvantages. Early in May, Watson brought a carbon copy of a com- pany check to Jenkins' desk and asked Jenkins and Com- pany Secretary -Treasurer Ronald M. Hill the purpose of the disbursement. Jenkins answered that the money was to purchase an automobile for Ray Choate, a member of the Company's management At this, Watson angrily ques- tioned the need. Jenkins also asked Hill why the Company bestowed new cars on its men and burdened the women with "such old and inadequate office machinery." In the discussion which ensued, Jenkins accused the Company of sexual discrimination, a charge which Hill promptly denied. At this, Jenkins suggested that her friends at N.O.W might be interested in determining if in fact the Company was guilty of such discrimination. Hill laughed and said, "You're a women libber, huh?" In another conversation during the first week in May, Judy Watson asked Company President Gregory Brinda why the Company did not transfer her to another higher paying job and then suggested that she would accept work in the plant. Brinda said there weren't any higher paying jobs in the factory. When Watson suggested a transfer to the machine shop, Brinda rebuffed her. As she turned to leave, Watson expressed displeasure, adding "I have to work like a man, and take the money home as a man, but working here, I can't do it. Even if I went to work in the factory you wouldn't pay me the same." Kathryn Jenkins, who had witnessed this conversation, and was leaving with Watson loudly remarked: "Don't they know that this is sex discrimination?" i My findings of fact regarding the union activity of Kathryn Jenkins and Judy Watson are based on their uncontradicted testimony 2 The Company disputed Watson's status, claiming that she was either a supervisor , as defined in Sec 2(11) of the Act, or a managerial employee I shall treat this issue below In early May, office employee Linda Pounds asked Sec- retary-Treasurer Ronald Hill why the Company did not provide pregnancy benefits. In passing, she suggested that as the Company was providing automobiles to male em- ployees, it should also provide pregnancy insurance to the women. Ray Choate, who was present as Pounds spoke, made light of Pounds' remarks. However, Kathryn Jenkins, who had also witnessed the discussion, protested that the Company's benefits were limited to its male employees and that Pounds was entitled to similar benefits. On or about May 6, Jenkins met with Judy Watson, Lin- da Pounds, Kitty Holt, Pam Hagerman, and Nancy Ken- neavy in the women's lounge at the company plant. Jen- kins reported that she had called the local N.O.W. chapter, talked to its president about their problem, and was now ready to proceed if the employees wanted her to. The group authorized Jenkins to proceed. From her desk on the morning of May 7, Jenkins tele- phoned N.O W.'s Chicago chapter for further assistance. The Chicago chapter recommended that Jenkins contact either the Retail Clerks or the Communications Workers (the Union). At noon that same day, Jenkins met in the company lounge with Watson, Pounds, Holt, Kenneavy, and Hager- man and reported the Chicago Chapter's recommendation. The group told Jenkins to call the Union. Early that afternoon, Jenkins telephoned the Union, and explained the purpose of her call to the woman who an- swered the Union's phone. The upshot of this conversation was that Mr Disch, a union representative, would contact Jenkins later that afternoon. Late on the same afternoon, Disch called Jenkins at the plant. Watson joined in the conversation to answer some of Disch's questions about the Company. Disch suggested that he would contact the Company's president. Jenkins and Watson asked Disch to wait until they had determined employee sentiment in this regard. That evening, Jenkins contacted employees Hogle, Hag- erman, and Kenneavy. Watson contacted employee Hott. Both spoke to employee Pounds. The five contacted em- ployees agreed that they wanted to meet with Disch and find out more about the Union. After Watson and Jenkins had completed their calls, they conferred and agreed that Jenkins would immediately call Disch to set up a meeting and would ask him to contact Company President Gregory Brinda. Whereupon, Jenkins telephoned Disch and asked him to contact Company President Gregory Brinda and then call her back to set up an employee meeting. In his testimony, President Brinda admitted that, on or about May 7, he received a phone call from Mr. Disch who identified himself as an official of the Union, and stated that he had been in touch with some of Brinda's employ- ees. Brinda asked Mr. Disch to identify himself formally. Thereafter, President Brinda received a letter dated May 8, 1975, bearing the Union's name, addressed to him, and signed "Edward A. Disch, CWA Representative." The let- ter, referring to "our telephone conversation of last eve- ning," read as follows: The employees of J B Industries, Incorporated have contacted us about organizing their union. We will be 164 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD talking with the employees, explaining their rights and responsibilities as members of CWA. Enclosed is a pamphlet from the NLRB which out- lines the rights of employees under the Act. Brinda's testimony reflects uncertainty as to when he first saw this letter. First he testified that he received it "sometime within a week of that May 8th date." Two sen- tences later, he testified that- "It was a matter of five or six days before that letter actually hit my desk, and I opened it." However, Brinda also testified that after receiving Disch's letter he contacted his attorneys to discuss its con- tents and then called a meeting of company supervisors to explain the union matter to them. The witnesses agree, and I find, that this meeting occurred during the middle of the day on May 12. From this circumstance and Brinda's cred- ited testimony that he had the letter when he consulted his attorneys, I find that, at the latest, Brinda first read the letter on the morning of May 12. I also find from Brinda's admission as to the timing of his conversation with Disch, the undisputed time reference in Disch's May 8 letter to Banda, and Jenkins' testimony regarding the evening of May 7, that the conversation occurred that same evening. On the evening of May 7, after he had talked to Presi- dent Brinda, Union Representative Disch reported this conversation to Jenkins and remarked that either he or Jerry Turner, the Union's steward, would contact her later to arrange an employees' meeting. At or about 11:30 a.m., on the next day, Jenkins tele- phoned Disch from her desk to discuss the contemplated meeting Disch instructed Jenkins to call Turner at an Au- rora hotel. Jenkins reached Turner and the two, in consul- tation with Watson, Pounds, Kenneavy, and Hott, sched- uled a meeting for 5 p.m. that day at Watson's home. However, later in the afternoon, Turner told Jenkins that he could not attend the scheduled meeting and that he would contact her again that same evening On May 9, Jenkins called Disch from her desk at the Company's office and complained that there had been no union meeting. He agreed to hold a meeting, if Turner could not. That same day, Turner called Jenkins at her desk and offered to hold a meeting that evening. Instead, Jenkins, after getting Watson's agreement, suggested a lunch hour meeting on the Company's premises, on Monday, May 12. Turner agreed. On Monday, Turner appeared at the company office, at noon. Judy Watson met him, explained that Kathryn Jen- kins and two other employees were absent from work and suggested cancellation of the meeting. Turner agreed and left. Watson immediately told employee Hott that the meeting was canceled, and that if Jenkins called Hott was to tell her of the cancellation and suggest that Jenkins con- tact Turner to reschedule the meeting. Watson then went to lunch. B. Judy Watson's Discharge While Watson was at lunch, on May 12, President Bren- da held a supervisors' meeting at which he announced "the fact that [he] had been contacted by a union." Shortly after Watson returned from lunch, President Brinda appeared in her office, asked if he could speak to her, and requested that she accompany him downstairs.' Watson accompa- nied Brinda. When they arrived downstairs, Brinda told Watson of the dust concluded supervisors' meeting. At this, Watson asked: "Well, why are you talking to me?" Brinda an- swered. "Because you are a supervisor." When Watson protested that she was not a supervisor, Brinda remarked: "To me you always have been, Judy." After Watson chal- lenged this last assertion, the two embarked upon an argu- ment about Watson's status and that of other individuals who Brinda claimed were also supervisors. Watson re- marked that it seemed "funny that all of a sudden we got all these supervisors." Brinda explained that he had been "notified that a union is going to try to come into this company"; that he had contacted his attorneys, and had "found out a few things we can do and we can't do while they are talking to our people." He remarked that management could not make promises, harass the employees, or "be stricter in areas where we have not been strict before." He continued: But what we can do is talk to the people about what a union is really doing, that they aren't really for the people, that they are more taking the money, and that those-that our people could lose some benefits that they are getting from J/B Industries right now that they might lose if there was a union. In areas where we haven't been strict we would have to crack down on. Brinda went on to speculate that the Union would cam- paign just outside the building. At this, Watson said, "Greg you know that I know something about this union. . She went on to reveal that the Union was "not trying to come into [Brinda's] Company" but that his employees had "called in a union." Brinda's response to this was, "I hire these new people, these women libbers, and now look at the problems I've got." Watson continued: 3 Brinda's testimony and that of company witnesses Thomas Crain and Roy Choate was at variance with Watson's account of her May 12 encoun- ter with Brenda Thus, according to Brinda, after he had left word that Watson was expected at the supervisors ' meeting, she arrived 20 minutes late He also testified that Watson "said emphatically she didn't give a damn one way or the other about the union or J/B Industries and had applied for work with an employment agency " Finally, Brinda denied making any of the threats attributed to him by Watson Crain, an independent contractor who ranked the Company as his second largest customer, and Choate, the Company's gasket product manager, both testified in support of Brenda's assertion that Watson arrived at the meeting late and by herself Crain also testified that he heard Watson say that "she really didn't give a damn about J/B Industries or the union, that she had given her name with an employ- ment agency, and that she would be leaving" As Watson appeared more conscientious about trying to remember de- tails of this incident and appeared to be providing a fuller and more straightforward account than that presented by Brinda and Crain, I have credited Watson's version of her May 12 conversation with Brinda In mak- ing my appraisal, I noted that, while Brinda denied making any threats, he did not provide his complete recollection of his remarks to Watson on May 12 1 also noted that Crain was willing to testify about details of Watson's remarks but was anxious to gloss over Brinda's part of the conversation In rejecting Choate's testimony that Watson came to the situs of the supervi- sors' meeting by herself, I have noted that he was Brmda's subordinate and thus likely to tailor his testimony to support Brmda who did not impress me as being a frank witness J/B INDUSTRIES, INC 165 They've got legitimate gripes, Greg . . . There are some areas that I think they've got legitimate gripes to want a union in here. Brinda's reaction to Watson's remarks was. "They ought to know that there is no way in hell that I'm going to let a union in my company." At another point in their discus- sion, about the Union, Brinda warned : "I can find legiti- mate reasons to fire every person in this building right now, whether it be absenteeism, tardiness or incompetency." Watson responded : "What will you fire me for, Greg? .. . I've not been absent , I'm not tardy, and I damn sure ain't incompetent." Brinda replied : "Judy, I would fire you." At this point, Brinda asked : "What is your position on this?" Watson answered : "I don't know enough to really judge; so far I have stayed in the middle on this whole union... . But you are telling me I can't sign one of those white cards?" To this, Brinda answered "no." Watson then de- clared her neutrality with respect to the Union, "until we decide whether or not I'm a supervisor." The conversation turned to Watson's discontent . Watson told Brinda that she was "unhappy," that she was "not making enough money and the headaches are too great." Brinda replied , "Judy if you need any more money, you are going to have to go somewhere else." At this, Watson re- ported that she intended to do just that and was "looking for another job." She added that she would seek a new job with the help of an employment service, and quit the Com- pany when she found ajob She also revealed that she had told Secretary-Treasurer Ronald Hill of her intentions, and had asked Hill for a letter of recommendation , and that Hill had refused to give such a letter until she submitted a letter or resignation . The conversation ended soon after this exchange. I find from Watson's uncontradicted testimony that 4 weeks prior to her May 12 conversation with Brinda, Wat- son had discussed with Hill her decision to seek another job At that point, Watson asked Hill for a letter of recom- mendation to assist her . Hill refused unless she gave him an undated letter of resignation Watson withdrew her re- quest. I also find from Watson's testimony that, approxi- mately I week later, Watson told Hill she needed a long lunch hour because of a job interview After she had ex- plained thejob opportunity, Hill answered . "If that is what you want, Judy, then I'm glad for you, but I do think you are making a big mistake " When Judy Watson arrived at the company office on the morning of Tuesday, May 13, Hill invited her into his of- fice.' When Watson sat down, Hill began : "Judy from the conversation you had with Greg yesterday, we feel that it's no longer beneficial for us for you to remain with our com- pany any longer." When Watson asked, "Why?" Hill re- plied: "Because of what you said to Greg." When Watson sought clarification , Hill replied : "You told Greg you were My findings regarding Watson 's May 13 conversation with Hill are based upon Watson's version As between Watson and Hill, Watson im- pressed me as the more reliable witness As will appear below, in connection with Watson's status and Kathryn Jenkins ' discharge , Hill's testimony was burdened with exaggerations and misstatements These infirmities suggested that Hill was more interested in exonerating the Company than in providing fact looking for another job. Therefore , it is not to the advan- tage of J/B Industries to have you employed here any lon- ger." He then gave Watson a paycheck. Hill instructed Watson to take her effects and leave the plant without speaking to anyone . The conversation soon ended and Watson left the plant. The General Counsel contends that Watson was an em- ployee entitled to the protection of the Act and that the Company discharged Watson because of her union activi- ty. The Company argues that the Act did not protect Wat- son because she was not an employee within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Act.5 Thus, according to the Compa- ny even if Watson's union activity caused her discharge, the Company did not violate Section 8(a)(3) and ( 1) of the Act, which extends only to exployees , as defined in Section 2(3) of the Act . In the alternative, the Company argues that, even if the Act protected Watson, the General Coun- sel has failed to establish the unlawful motive by a prepon- derance of the evidence . For the reasons set forth below, I find merit in the General Counsel 's contentions. Assuming that Watson was an employee entitled to the Act's protection , there is ample factual support for the con- tention that her discharge on May 13, 1975, was in reprisal for her known or suspected role in the attempt to organize the Company's office employees . Watson's union activity began at noon on May 7 when she met with employees Jenkins, Pounds, Hott , Kenneavy , and Hagerman and joined in the decision to contact the Union . Later that af- ternoon and evening, she assumed a leading role in the discussions with the Union and in the decisions to author- ize the Union to reveal the incipient organizing campaign to President Brinda, and to schedule a union meeting. On May 8, Watson participated in planning a union meeting which was scheduled for 5 p.m. at her home, but was can- celed. On May 9 and 12 Watson's union activity continued as she first assisted in planning a union meeting for the latter date, and then, on the appointed day, a workday, met the Union's representative and canceled the meeting. In sum, Watson had much to do with the Union's letter of May 8 which notified President Brinda that an organizing campaign was about to begin among his employees, and which provoked him into alerting his supervisors on May 12 That Brinda at least suspected as much of Watson was amply established by credited evidence. The first sugges- tion of this suspicion was that on May 12 Brinda sought Watson out and proceeded to talk about the contemplated union campaign and his thoughts about how the Company 5 Sec 2(3) of the Act provides as follows The term "employee" shall include any employee , and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless the Act ex- plicitly states otherwise , and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connnection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural labor- er, or. in the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse , or any individual having the status of an independent contractor , or any individual em- ployed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time, or by any other person who is not an employer as herein defined 166 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD might respond. Further, Brinda did not challenge Watson's assertion that he knew she knew "something about the union." This remark coupled with her statements that the employees had "legitimate gripes to want a union in here" and that the employees had sought out the Union were apt to confirm Brinda's suspicion. For Watson's remarks echoed her complaints made just a few days before in which she complained that the Company was engaging in sexual discrimination. It was also likely that by May 12 Secretary-Treasurer Hill had informed Brinda of Watson's complaint about Ray Choate's new car. From these cir- cumstances, Brinda was apt to conclude that Watson's dis- content had pushed her to seek out the Union. Watson asserted that she was neutral and would remain so pending determination of whether or not she was a supervisor. However, Brinda was not likely to accept such an expres- sion of neutrality. For, by that point, Brinda had seen a connection between Watson's militant protests against what she viewed as sexual discrimination and the appear- ance of the Union's letter a few days later Brinda was also likely to view Watson's remark that the employees had "le- gitimate gripes to want a union in here" and her query about signing "one of those white cards," an obvious refer- ence to a union authorization card, as evidence of sympa- thy and support for the Union. Thus, I find that by the end of their conversation Brinda had confirmed his belief that Watson was a union activist. In his remarks to Watson on May 12, Brinda made plain his intense dislike for the Union and his intentions toward those who supported it. In the context of his remarks about telling employees "what a union is really doing," he made a threat of reprisal when he spoke of warning "that our people could lose some benefits that they are getting from J/B Industries right now that they might lose if there was a union." In the same context, Brinda threatened the em- ployees with more onerous working conditions, when he remarked: "In areas where we haven't been strict we would have to crack down on." Brinda's response to Watson's prounion remarks also suggested his intent to resist the Union by any means available to him. Thus, he warned that "there [was] no way in hell that [he was] going to let a union in [his] company." I also find that in their context, Bnnda's remarks about finding "legitimate reasons to fire" employees constituted a threat to use pretext to root out union supporters among his employees. He also pointed this threat at Watson in particular. For, when Watson suggested that it would be difficult to find a reason to discharge her, Brinda quickly revealed that he would have no difficulty in overcoming that obstacle. He replied: "Judy, I would fire you." Assum- ing that Watson was an employee protected by the Act. Brinda's threat of reprisals, including discharge, to eradi- cate support for the Union among his employees not only provided evidence of unlawful motive in Watson's dis- charge, but were also independent violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.' The timing of Judith Watson's discharge provides fur- ther evidence of the Company's unlawful design. For less than 24 hours after her confrontation with Brinda, in which he had threatened the use of discharges to counter the Union's organizing efforts, the Company discharged Wat- son, a union activist. Thus, I cannot attribute the timing of Watson's discharge to mere coincidence. In sum, assuming that the Act protected Watson, the confrontation between Brinda and Watson on May 12, Brinda's expressions showing union animus and intent to resort to unlawful discharge as a means of defeating the Union, and the quickness with which Watson's discharge followed that confrontation convince me of the Company's unlawful motive. In its brief, the Company contends that union activity had nothing to do with Watson's discharge. Instead, the Company urges that Watson was discharged because, . . . she stated to Brinda that she did not give a damn about the Company and had made application for new employment with an employment agency and was abandoning her job in the immediate future. (This comes as close to quit as anything could.) However, this reason does not find support in company witness Hill's testimony that, when he discharged Watson on May 13, he told her that "she had expressed her disin- terest with the Company to the president and we could no longer continue this arrangement." Also, according to President Brinda's testimony, he decided to discharge Wat- son because "she put [him] on notice." Moreover, I have found from Watson's credited testimony that when she asked Hill to explain the reason for her discharge he made a general reference to her remarks to Brinda on the previ- ous day. Thus, neither of the two versions of Hill's May 13 explanation squares with Brinda's testimony as to his rea- son for discharging Watson. Further, the reasons given in the quoted portion of the Company's brief make yet anoth- er departure from Brinda's reason; i.e., "she put me on notice." In sum, I find the Company's explanation of its treatment of Watson to be shifting and inconsistent, a cir- cumstance which suggests that such explanation rests upon pretext. In any event, none of the stated reasons withstands anal- ysis. I have previously rejected the Company's testimony that Watson told Brinda "that she did not give a damn about the Company." Apart from the reasons I have here- tofore given for rejecting this testimony, it seems unlikely that Watson would have voiced such sentiment about the Company, when it was likely that she would need a favor- able reference from Brinda in her quest for a new job. Thus, I do not accept the Company's claim that she in- dulged in such intemperate language. The further assertion that Watson told Brinda that she "was abandoning her job in the immediate future" is whol- ly without evidentiary support Watson's credited testimo- ny shows that she told Brinda of her efforts to seek em- It is well established that where, as here, the facts underlying the violation 6 The complaint alleged that Brenda's threat to discharge employees in are fully developed at the hearing, an unfair labor practice finding can be reprisal for their union activity as a violation of Sec 8(a)(l) of the Act, but based on the issues litigated as well as those specifically alleged in the did not allege his other threats However, I am not thereby precluded from complaint See, e g , Phillips Industries, Incorporated, 172 NLRB 2119 finding these additional threats were also violative of Sec 8(a)(I) of the Act (1968), fn 2 J/B INDUSTRIES, INC 167 ployment elsewhere, and added, "and when I find a job I will leave." According to Brinda's testimony regarding this same portion of their May 12 conversation, Watson told him "that she had her name, her application in with an employment agency and was seeking other employment." Company witness Crain's versions of Watson's references to job hunting was that "she had given her name with an employment agency, and that she would be leaving." Thus, the Company's versions of Watson's May 12 remarks co not attribute any immediacy to her expressed plan to leave the Company. Instead, I find from Watson's credited testi- mony that in substance she told Brinda she would not quit her current job with the Company until she secured a new job. I also find from Watson's credited testimony that her remarks about seeking a new job did not afford Bnnda reasonable ground for saying- "She put me on notice." For, Watson's remarks revealed only that her quest for a new job was in progress. That Brinda felt compelled to exaggerate the import of Watson's remarks suggested that the Company found itself hard pressed to find a lawful excuse for discharging her. Indeed, prior to May 12, the Company treated Watson's remarks about her job hunting in a casual manner. Thus, it appears that though the Company knew of her intentions as early as 4 weeks prior to May 12, when Watson revealed them to Secretary -Treasurer Hill, the Company took no action against her. Neither Hill nor any other official warned her that the Company viewed her announcement as "notice." Further, 3 weeks before Watson's job hunting achieved significance in Brinda's thoughts, Hill had greet- ed her report on a specific job opportunity with a congratu- latory remark and his opinion that she was "making a big mistake." However, again there was no warning that her job hunting was jeopardizing her current employment with the Company. It was on May 12, only after Brinda had confirmed his suspicion of Watson's leading role in the incipient union campaign, that Watson's job hunt loomed as a reason for discharging her. In short, the Company saw Watson's expressed intention to find another job as a pre- text to rid itself of a leading union advocate. I now turn to the question of Watson's status. As men- tioned above, the Company contends that "Watson was a supervisor within the meaning of the . . Act, or, alterna- tively, a managerial employee not entitled to the protection of the Act." The General Counsel urges that at all times material to this case, Watson was an employee protected by the Act. I shall deal first with the contention that Wat- son was a supervisor. As defined in Section 2(11) of the Act, the term "supervi- sor" denotes- ... Any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such ac- tion, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment. It is settled that this section is to be read in the disjunctive, and that possession of anyone of the enumerated powers establishes supervisory status. Ohio Power Company v. N.L. R. B., 176 F.2d 385, 387 (CA. 6, 1949), cert. denied 338 U S 899; Great Central Insurance Company, 176 NLRB 474, 475 (1969). The Company hired Judith Watson in early March 1974, as an accounts receivable clerk, at an hourly wage rate of $3. As did employee Jenkins and other indisputed employ- ees, Watson was hourly paid, punched a timeclock, and received time and a half for overtime. In contrast, Presi- dent Brinda, Secretary-Treasurer Hill, and other members of management were salaried, did not punch a timeclock, and did not receive time and a half for overtime. At the time of discharge, Watson's $4 hourly rate was the highest rate among the hourly paid company office personnel, and was 50 cents higher than the rate received by employee Kitty Hott, the next highest hourly paid person in the of- fice. In testimony which I credit, and which shows that she was not a company supervisor, Watson described her job duties as of May 12 and 13 as follows: I did the payroll, as far as breaking down the time on the time cards, and it went to Ron and were okayed, and then I put it on a computer print-out sheet I handled the company's hospitalization insur- ance, paying the bills for each month and fill out the forms when any employee had a claim and submitting them to the insurance company. I handled accounts payable, from attaching receiving tickets to verifying prices, checking prices, extensions and filling them for payment, and when they became due, I typed the check for payment. Accounts receivable, I posted in- voices, posted cash receipts, typed financial state- ments, did the daily deposits to the bank I did typing for International Business Services which is a sister company of J/B Industries, did billing for Internation- al Business Services. I did answer the phone a little bit for J/B Industries. I checked the billing after the girls did the billing. It would come to me and I would quickly go through it, checking for the right salesmen, correct coding, right billing paint and shipping paint, referring back to original orders and then it would go down to the rest of the billing process. Did collection calls for accounts receivable for J/B Industries. Then there was another phone line in the company for Bea- con Soap Products. I answered the phone. I took or- ders, did the billings, filled out tax forms each month for that company, and mostly that was it. There may have been something small, but mostly that was it The Company's attempt to demonstrate that Watson en- joyed one or more of the 2(11) indicia of supervisory au- thority fell short of its objective. Company Secretary-Trea- surer Hill testified that Watson was "the office supervisor that was responsible for the group billing leader... . When asked to flesh out his conclusionary testimony that Watson was "the office supervisor," Hill's testimony boiled down to the assertions that Watson scheduled the use of a computer and made corrections on invoices, neither of which provided support for his conclusion. For, there was no showing that in performing these functions Watson ac- 168 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD tually directed or assigned any employees, or that she exer- cised "independent judgment " Hill also testified that Watson had recommended that the Company hire employee Kathryn Jenkins. However, in his testimony Hill conceded and I find that, before the Company hired Jenkins, she was interviewed by John Bren- da, President Brinda's father, whom the Company em- ployed as a consultant, Company Vice President Lee Lar- son, and Hill himself. I also find from Hill's testimony that when he was satisfied that "she was relatively competent," he "turned her over to [Watson]" for testing and evalua- tion. Hill's further testimony was that it was only on Hill's order that Watson gave Jenkins "a letter to type and talked about her background," and then reported to Hill. Accord- ing to Hill when he asked Watson if Jenkins was "accept- able" Watson answered: "Yes, I think she'll work out." Hill then hired Jenkins. Watson's credited version of her role in the hiring of Kathryn Jenkins shows only that at Hill's direction she administered a typing test and a calculating machine exer- cise to Jenkins; that Hill asked for an appraisal of Jenkins' performance, and for Watson's opinion as to whether Jen- kins should be hired. However, whichever version is cred- ited, Hill's concessions leave little doubt that Watson did not effectively recommend Jenkins' hire. Further, in evalu- ating Jenkins, Watson did not exercise her independent judgment. Instead, she acted under Hill's instructions. Nor does it appear from Kathryn Jenkins' testimony that Watson was acting on her own when she gave work directions to Jenkins. For, according to Jenkins' credited testimony, Secretary-Treasurer Ronald Hill was the source of such directions as Watson conveyed to Jenkins In his testimony, Hill does not contradict Jenkins. Instead, when questioned about Jenkins' relation with Watson, Hill testi- fied that "Kathryn worked for Judy," and then went on to testify that the relationship ended in late April 1975, when he assumed direct supervision over Jenkins. When asked to detail "what control or what direction of authority if any Judy have over Jenkins," Hill made the following admis- sion: The work load through the invoices to be entered, be- cause they were reviewed by Judy before being sub- mitted to Kathy for the accounts receivable ledgers. Judy also did the cash receipts, so once she had com- pleted the deposit, then that would go on to Kathryn for entry into the accounts receivable ledgers. Thus, none of the testimony regarding Watson's work rela- tionship with Jenkins reveals evidence of "authority . . . responsibly to direct" Jenkins. The Company also attempted to establish through Hill's testimony that Watson effectively recommended the hire of employee Veronica Hansen However, Hill's testimony suggests that the Company hired Hansen on Watson's rec- ommendation not because of any authority granted to Watson, but at least in part because of the special circum- stances that Watson "knew her as a friend" and thought well of her. Thus, even if I credited Hill's testimony regard- ing Watson's role in the Company's decision to hire Veron- ica Hansen, it would not sustain the Company's position. For there was no showing that the Company ever told Watson that she had authority to hire or to recommend the hire of employees or that she exercised such authority either before or after the hiring of Veronica Hansen. I therefore view Watson's role in Hansen's hire as an isolat- ed incident and thus insufficient evidence to establish that Watson enjoyed authority "to hire .. . or effectively to recommend such action" as required by Section 2(11) of the Act In an attempt to show Watson as having authority effec- tively to recommend wage increases, Hill testified that in late April Watson told him that she would not recommend a wage increase for Jenkins. However, apart from the fact that I credit Watson's testimony denying that she ever made such a remark to him, Hill admitted later in his testi- mony that he granted a wage increase to Jenkins in late April. It thus appears that Watson's recommendation was not effective, a circumstance which does not assist the Company's position Hill also testified that Watson effectively recommended a wage increase for employee Hagerman. However, Watson's credited testimony shows that in late February 1975 she warned Hill that Hagerman was looking for ajob because "she had never gotten the raise she was supposed to get" and that Hill then asked Watson to bring Hagerman's file to him. However, this incident shows that, on one isolated occasion, Watson alerted the Company that it had possibly overlooked giving an expected wage increase to an employee who was unhappy about the mat- ter. The Company has not shown that Watson exercised authority effectively to recommend employee wage in- creases or that the Company expressly authorized her to make such recommendations. Hill testified that in December 1974, before his depar- ture for a Florida vacation, Watson complained to him about employee Veronica Hansen's work performance; that Hill authorized Watson to terminate Hansen; and that while Hill was on vacation Watson telephoned him and announced that Hansen was no longer with the Company. However, the suggestion that Watson used independent judgment is cast in doubt by Hill's further testimony to the effect that he made the initial determination that Hansen's poor work was serious and that he instructed Watson that "if you have any further problem, terminate her," and that she was to "see Gregory [Brinda] on it and explain what you are doing " Watson's credited testimony shows that she telephoned Hill to complain "that Veronica wasn't doing any of her work," and said that she, Watson, "didn't know what to do about it"; that Hill suggested discharge; that Watson an- swered: "No, I don't think it's that bad," and suggested that Hill talk to Hansen instead. I also credit Watson's testimony that when she told Brinda of Hansen's personali- ty conflict with Hill and that Hansen "was not doing her own work," Brinda decided to fire Hansen and asked for "her final check." In essence, Watson's credited testimony shows that she neither discharged Hansen nor effectively recommended that the Company do so Nor is there any showing that the Company told her that she enjoyed any authority to recommend or effectuate discharges or that she did so. Finally, Hill testified that in February 1975 he told Wat- J/B INDUSTRIES, INC. son that John Brinda was moving from the front office and that she and Hill were "moving forward to take over the entire office," and would have the entire office operation under them and that she would be "supervisor in charge of this." However, Watson's credited version of the conversa- tion was as follows: A. Ron Hill told me that John Brinda and the sales people were going to be moving to the back of the offices and that we were going to be moving up front very shortly. They were-they had been previously talking of it, but now we were really going to move and he said that they-he would take charge of the office up front. And I asked him why and he said because it needed to be straightened out. There were problems up there and that together with my knowl- edge and with him, maybe we could straighten out the order processing, the way orders were processed in the company. Q. Did he at any time during that conversation say that you were a supervisor? A. No. Here again there was no showing that the Company clothed Watson with any supervisory authority as ex- pressed in Section 2(11) of the Act. Finally, although it is undisputed that Watson enjoyed authority to work overtime as required by her workload, Hill admitted that she had no authority to assign overtime to others. Nor was there any showing that she ever recom- mended overtime for others. In sum, I find no evidentiary support for the contention "that Watson was a supervisor within the meaning of the ...Act... The Company also contended that Watson was a mana- gerial employee, and thus not covered by the Act,' on the grounds that Watson (1) had exclusive control over the Company's personnel files; (2) met salesmen and ordered supplies for the Company; (3) approved credit for custom- ers; and (4) "sent out dunning letters over her own signa- ture to customers " Upon consideration of the evidence bearing upon this issue, I find no merit in the Company's contention. In General Dynamics Corporation, Convair Aerospace Division, San Diego Operations, 213 NLRB 851, 857 (1974), the Board defined managerial employees as: . . . those who formulate and effectuate manage- ment policies by expressing and making operative the decisions of their employer, and those who have dis- cretion in the performance of their jobs independent of their employer's established policy . . . managerial status is not conferred upon rank- in-file workers, or upon those who perform routinely, but rather it is reserved for those in executive-type positions, those who are closely aligned with manage- ment as true representatives of management. It is this standard which I now apply to the facts regarding Watson's duties while in the Company's employ. The facts regarding Watson's credit function are based on her testimony. In processing customers' orders, Watson 7 N L R B v Bell Aerospace Company, 416 U S 267, 289 (1974) 169 checked a "hold," a listing of customers whose accounts were in arrears. Applying the Board's test to the preceding description of Watson's functions, I find no ground for characterizing her as a managerial employee. Her credit and purchasing functions were routinized and did not call for the exercise of independent judgment. None of the re- maining aspects of Watson's job, as itemized by the Com- pany, were shown to require the exercise of independent judgment. Nor has there been any showing that Watson formulated policy or that she enjoyed discretion indepen- dent of established company policy. Accordingly, I find that Watson was not a managerial employee. See Bell Aero- space, A Division of Textron, Inc., 219 NLRB 384 (1975). Having rejected the Company's contention that Watson was not protected by the Act because she was either a supervisor or a managerial employee, I find that Watson was an employee entitled to such protection. I also find that on May 12, 1975, the Company violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, by threatening Watson and other em- ployees with various reprisals, including discharge because of their union activity, and, that by discharging Watson on May 13, 1975, the Company violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. C. Kathryn Jenkins' Discharge 8 Kathryn Jenkins did not go to work on Monday, May 12, 1975, because her baby was ill. At 8 a.m., her usual starting time, Jenkins called the Company to report her absence. She explained to employee Kitty Hott, who an- swered the office phone, that her baby was ill with a fever, her regular babysitter could not take care of the child, and it was likely that she, Jenkins, would be absent on May 13. On Tuesday, Jenkins' baby remained ill and developed a rash. Jenkins called the company office before 8 a.m., and told employee Linda Pounds of her baby's plight. Jenkins also said she would return to work that day, if she could obtain a babysitter Shortly after Jenkins' and Pounds' tele- phone conversation had ended, Company Secretary-Trea- surer Ronald Hill telephoned Jenkins and announced her termination because of "a bit of a problem here with [her] absenteeism ." Jenkins expressed surprise at his termination "without a warning." Hill then remarked that on the previ- ous Friday, May 9, she failed to punch in or out on her lunch hour, and had not advised anyone of her wherea- bouts Jenkins answered that she had gone to lunch with three other employees; that all four had gone and returned together; and that Linda Pounds knew where they were going. Jenkins also asked Hill if he wasn't making her an example "for the other girls." Hill did not dispute her as- sertions but denied her insinuation. Finally, Jenkins questioned the absence of a warning, Hill answered that he needed "someone responsible" for her position, adding that she had been a good worker and could use him as a reference. I find ample factual ground for the General Counsel's contention that the Company discharged employee Ka- thryn Jenkins because it knew or suspected that she was a 8 My findings of fact regarding Jenkins' discharge are drawn from her credited testimony 170 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD leading union activist. On May 7, 8, and 9 Jenkins was the leader in seeking out the Union and then encouraging the Union to organize the Company's office clerical employ- ees. At the same time, she attempted to organize support for the Union among her fellow office clericals. Jenkins conducted much of her union activity at the Company's facilities, at her desk and in the women's lounge. As did Watson, Jenkins, earlier in May, revealed her unhappiness with company policy. She asked Hill why the Company gave new cars to its male employees and re- quired its women to work with old and inadequate office machinery. In this same conversation, Jenkins accused the Company of sexual discrimination and suggested that she would complain to N.O.W. At this, Hill labelled Jenkins as "a women libber." At another point, during the first week in May, Jenkins joined Watson in complaining to Brinda that the Company was engaging in sexual discrimination. Jenkins also joined Linda Pounds in complaining to Hill that the Company was guilty of sexual discrimination in granting benefits. As in Watson's case, I find that on May 12 Brinda strongly suspected that Jenkins' outspoken displeasure with the Company's treatment of female employees had prompted her to bring the Union in as a force for change. Such suspicion was reflected when in expressing his hostili- ty toward the Union and those employees who supported it, he remarked: "I hire these new people, these women libbers, and now look at the problems I got." For, by his reference to "new people," he was alluding to the fact that the Company had hired Jenkins on February 24, 1975, less than 3 months before Further, by his description of "these new people" as "women libbers" he was showing his un- derstanding that Jenkins' protests about sexual discrimina- tion were linked with the Union's incipient organizing campaign Little need be said at this point about Brinda's sentiment toward the Union and its employee supporters. I have found that on May 12, 1 day before the Company dis- charged Jenkins, Brinda made clear his willingness to re- sort to pretext as a means of getting rid of union support- ers. I have found that at his direction, the Company in fact unlawfully discharged union activist Watson on May 13, and, in attempting to conceal its unlawful motive, resorted to a pretext. From this I find it likely that Brenda harbored a desire to rid the Company of the second union activist. A final element in the General Counsel's case is the tim- ing of Brinda's decision to terminate Jenkins. In his testi- mony, Brinda admitted that he made the decision on May 12. This timing of Jenkins' unheralded discharge, on the day following Brinda's unlawful warning of reprisal against union activists and his remarks indicating suspicion that Jenkins was such an activist, provides further support for the General Counsel's contention. The Company claims that union activity played no part in its decision to discharge Jenkins. Instead, the Company urges that it discharged Jenkins because "excessive absen- teeism and tardiness disqualified her to continue in a res- ponsible clerical position." In support of its position, the Company points to its record showing that during her em- ployment with the Company Jenkins did not complete a 40-hour week or work on a Saturday However, I find no merit in the Company's defense because of its pretextual nature. The evidence makes plain that the Company condoned Jenkins' tardiness and absenteeism prior to May 12. Thus, I find from Jenkins' credited and undisputed testimony that during the week ending April 26, 1975, the Company granted her a 25-cent increase and that Ronald Hill as- sured her that she "was doing Just fine." It was only when Brinda became aware of her union activity that Jenkins' attendance record was raised as ground for discharge. Thus, as in Watson's discharge, the Company again carried out Brinda's threat to resort to pretext in ridding itself of employees suspected of union activity. In short, here, as with Watson, the Company failed to overcome the strong evidence of unlawful motive. Instead, the unpersuasive ex- planation provided further cause for suspicion that union animus pushed the Company's hand. Accordingly, I find that the Company discharged Jenkins in violation of Sec- tion 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act Upon the foregoing findings of fact and the entire rec- ord, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. J/B Industries, Inc., is an employer engaged in com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act 3. By threatening employees with discharge, loss of em- ployment benefits, and more onerous conditions of em- ployment because they supported Communications Work- ers of America, AFL-CIO, the Company has interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, thereby engag- ing in unfair labor practices violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 4. By discharging employees Judith Watson and Ka- thryn Jenkins, the Company engaged in unfair labor prac- tices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 5 The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY The recommended Order will contain the conventional provisions in cases involving findings of interference, re- straint, coercion and unlawful discharges, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. This will require the Company to cease and desist from the unfair labor practic- es found, to offer reinstatement with backpay to Judith Watson and Kathryn Jenkins, and to post a notice to that effect. In accordance with the usual requirements, rein- statement shall be to the two employees' respective former positions or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges. Each of the discriminatees shall be made whole for any loss of earnings each may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against her, by payment to each of a sum of J/B INDUSTRIES, INC. money equal to that which she normally would have earned from the date of the initial discrimination to the date she is offered reinstatement by the Company, less net earnings, if any, during such period, to be computed in the manner prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962). Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDERS The Respondent, J/B Industries, Inc., Aurora, Illinois, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discouraging membership in, support for, or activi- ties on behalf of Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, by discriminat- ing in any manner against any of its employees in regard to their hire and tenure of employment, or any term or condi- tion of employment, because of their union membership, sympathies, or activities. (b) Threatening discharge, loss of employment benefits, more onerous working conditions or other reprisals be- cause its employees engage in union activity. (c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor or- ganizations, including Communications Workers of Ameri- ca, AFL-CIO, to bargain collectively through representa- tives of their own choosing, to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all such activities. 2. Take the following affirmative action, which I find will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer Judith Watson and Kathryn Jenkins immedi- ate and full reinstatement to their respective former jobs or, if these positions no longer exist, to substantially equiv- alent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and make each of them whole for such loss of pay she may have suffered as a result of the Respondent's discrimination against them, in the manner set forth in the section entitled "The Remedy." (b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all pay- roll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records neces- sary or useful to an analysis of the amounts of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (c) Post at its plant and office in Aurora, Illinois, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 10 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 13 shall, after being duly signed by an author- ized representative of the Company, be posted immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for 60 consec- utive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. The Company shall take reasonable steps to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 171 (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 13, in writ- ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Company has taken to comply herewith. 9 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes 10 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a hearing at which all sides had the chance to give evidence, the National Labor Relations Board found that we, J/B Industries, Inc., violated the National Labor Rela- tions Act, and ordered us to post this notice and to keep our word about what we say in this notice. The law gives you the right: To form, join, or help unions To choose a union to represent you in bargaining with us To act together for your common interest or pro- tection To refuse to participate in any or all of these things. The Board has ordered us to promise you that: WE WILL NOT discharge you, or otherwise discrimi- nate against you because you have engaged in orga- nizing activity for, or are a member or supporter of, Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other union. WE WILL NOT interfere with your rights. WE WILL NOT threaten you with discharge, loss of benefits, more difficult working conditions, or other reprisals because you are a member of or are helping Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other union. The Board found that we violated the law because we discharged employees Judith Watson and Kathryn Jenkins because they supported the Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO. Accordingly, WE WILL offer these two employees re- instatement to their former jobs or to jobs substan- tially equivalent, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and will make them whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered because we discharged them, with interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum. J/B INDUSTRIES, INC.