Baptist Memorial Hospital

BAPTIST MEMORIAL HOSPITAL Baptist Memorial Hospital and American Federa- tion of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO. Cases 26-CA-5734, 26-CA-5781, and 26-CA-5875 June 30, 1976 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS FANNING AND PENELLO On January 27, 1976, Administrative Law Judge Thomas A. Ricci issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and General Counsel filed cross-exceptions and a supporting brief, including a response to Respondent's exceptions. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs' and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions I of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order, as modified here- in.4 ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re- lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended 'The Respondent's request for oral argument is hereby denied as the record and exceptions in our view adequately present the issues and posi- tions of the parties 2 The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge It is the Board's established policy not to over- rule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F 2d 362 (C A. 3, 1951) We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings. 3 The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Respondent's rule pro- hibiting uniformed employees wearing medallions and identification other than "name plates, school pins, professional registration insignia, and hospi- tal service pins," as enforced , violated Sec. 8(a)(1) We agree Notwithstand- ing this prohibition against wearing of all insignia other than professional and hospital pins, Respondent permitted employees to wear at least one other type of pin , namely, United Fund pins Since Respondent permitted the wearing of items other than those in the rule, we conclude , in agreement with the Administrative Law Judge, that the prohibition against the wearing of union buttons was not directed at any legitimate purpose of Respondent Rather, it was designed to thwart the Union's organizing campaign in viola- tion of Sec 8(a)(I) St Joseph 's Hospital, 225 NLRB 348 (1976) In so find- ing, however, we do not rely on the Administrative Law Judge's finding and conclusion that the rule on its face is unlawful The Administrative Law Judge inadvertently failed to include the name of Francis Middleton in par 2 (a) of his recommended Order and the notice to employees Accordingly , we shall make the appropriate modification in the order and notice 525 Order of the Administrative Law Judge as modified below, and hereby orders that the Respondent, Bap- tist Memorial Hospital, Memphis, Tennessee, its offi- cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order as so modified: 1. Add the name "Francis Middleton" to the end of paragraph 2(a). 2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the Administrative Law Judge. APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT place reprimand or disciplinary notices following counseling interviews in the personnel files of any of our employees for the purpose of intimidating them and coercing them with respect to their union activities. WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees con- cerning their union activites or as to how they intend to vote in union elections. WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees con- cerning the union activities of other employees. WE WILL NOT invite our employees to bring their individual grievances to us for satisfaction instead of acting through their union. WE WILL NOT offer improvements in condi- tions of employment to our employees for the purpose of inducing them to abandon their union activities. WE WILL NOT threaten to discharge employees if they persist in their prounion activities. WE WILL NOT offer to assist employees to with- draw from their union activities or from their membership in union organizing committees. WE WILL NOT spy or attempt to spy upon the union activities of our employees. WE WILL remove from the personnel files of the following employees certain disciplinary rep- rimand notices which we have placed there for the purpose of coercing them to abandoning their union activities. Those employees are named as follows: Rasher Maclin Phyllis Taylor Eddie May Pearson Gwendolyn Smith Patty Wilkins Francis Middleton WE WILL NOT prohibit the wearing of union buttons or insignia by any of our employees anywhere in the hospital premises. 225 NLRB No. 69 526 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD WE WILL NOT In any like or related manner inter- fere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights to self -organization, to join or assist American Federation of State , County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organizations, and to engage in other concerted ac- tivities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection or to refrain from any and all such activities. BAPTIST MEMORIAL HOSPITAL DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE THOMAS A. Ricci, Administrative Law Judge: A hearing in this proceeding was held on November 17, 18, 19, and 20, 1975, at Memphis, Tennessee, on complaint of the Gen- eral Counsel against Baptist Memorial Hospital, herein called the Respondent. The original complaint, later amended, issued on October 1, 1975, on a charge filed Au- gust 4, 1975, by American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union. The essential question presented is whether the Respon- dent, in a variety of ways, unlawfully restrained and coerced its employees in their efforts towards self organiza- tion in violation of Section 8(a)(I) of the Act. Briefs were filed after the close of the hearing by the General Counsel and the Respondent. Upon the entire record and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER Baptist Memorial Hospital is a general welfare corpora- tion doing business in the State of Tennessee, where it op- erates a hospital providing health care services. During the past 12 months in the course of its business it received gross revenues for services rendered to patients in an amount in excess of $250,000. I find that the Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 11. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED I find that American Federation of State , County and Municipal Employees , AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES Baptist Memorial Hospital is one of the largest in the country, with well over 4,000 employees, professionals and nonprofessionals. The Union started an organizational campaign in 1974, with widespread handbilling at the hos- pital entrances beginning sometime in September. At the start few employees participated in the distribution of union literature; in January more of them did so; and by July 1975 regular weekly meetings of an employee commit- tee were being held and more and more employees joined the committee and gave out handbills at the various en- trances. The Union sent letters to the hospital's administra- tive authorities listing the names of the union committee members-the letters are dated July 25, 28, 30, and 31, August 7, 11, 12, 21, 25, and 27, September 11, and Octo- ber 23. The Union also distributed in great numbers at the hospital entrances leaflets announcing the names of the employees who had joined the organizational committee; these were distributed on July 31 and August 4, 5, and 21. On September 19, 1975, the Union filed a representation petition seeking a Board-conducted election among over 1,500 employees, and a hearing on that petition was held in the latter part of October. The substance of the complaint-albeit it pinpoints a long series of individual acts-is that the Employer reacted to all this by resorting to coercive tactics designed to dis- suade the employees, but particularly those known to be the organizers, away from their prounion resolve. The com- plaint lists allegations of threats, interrogations , promises of benefits, and other devices aimed at intimidating the employees and thereby putting a stop to their activities. The case presents essentially a picture of.repetitive viola- tions of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act-illegal interference, re- straint, and coercion. Certain precise acts alleged are also said to have constituted violations of Section 8(a)(3), but only in a tangential sense. The Respondent denies the commission of any unfair labor practices. A. Preliminary Comment The parties spent much time in the hearing of this case; repetitive details were brought out again and again, cross- examination went on and on, like incidents were related but added little new to the story, and counsel for both sides submitted very extensive briefs. But all that is really in- volved is a program of improper interference with the at- tempt by employees to engage in collective bargaining, their statutory right. Too great delay in the administrative processing of this case could frustrate their exercise of that fundamental right. There is an election in the offing, for whatever questions need be decided in the representation case are already before the Board. The basic purpose of the Act is to assure that employees have the privilege, if they so chose, to vote on the question of union or no union, and to do so without coercion by their employer. It would be a mistake, therefore, to belabor again in unending detail here all the minutiae of the 600-page record, for such an ap- proach could only assure further delay before the Board of what in the end is no more than one step preliminary to the election that may soon be held. There are some questions of credibility, but very few. By and large the overly extended testimony was occasioned by Respondent's witnesses explaining away certain admitted statements as really innocuous, or in their opinion justified, intended as something other than what on the face of things would appear. Fourteen employees testified in sup- BAPTIST MEMORIAL HOSPITAL port of the complaint, each an employee whose name had been publicized as a member of the Union's organizing committee, and almost all of them concededly known to be such by the Respondent . All of them held the lower ranks of employment, in the sense that they do the lesser skilled work, are less trained, and in consequence less artfully ar- ticulate. In contrast, the Respondent's witnesses, virtually all supervisors and seemingly professionally qualified per- sons, were very glib , evasive, argumentative ; indeed they spoke as much injustification of their actions as they did in denial . As a group, they were much less convincing than were the rank-and-file employees. The point which I think is pervasive in the case is well illustrated by one or two incidents . At the start of the union campaign, back in 1974, high management an- nounced to its supervisory staff that henceforth there must be comprehensive documentation of every jot and tittle of reprimand talk and fault finding of employees that might take place . The instruction was repeated at a number of staff meetings in the spring of 1975 by the Respondent's expert labor relations counsel. The printed forms used for this purpose are entitled "Counseling Interview Records"; some, but only very few, had been used in the past. With advent of the Union , they came, as to some employees anyway, in a flood. It took some effort to draw the un- equivocal admission, but the supervisors finally did say that these are straight reprimand notices, placed in the per- sonnel files of the employees all the time , for use in possi- ble discipline or discharge . And, of course, they have an intimidating effect upon the employee who is made to know such things are placed in his or her file. As they spoke about this or that reprimand notice that had been written up and detailed the circumstances relat- ing to it, the supervisors repeatedly answered purely factual questions with expanded explanations of why, in a hospital trying to help sick people, rules of conduct had to be en- forced without question. Phyllis Taylor is a radiology aide, on the fob since Janu- ary 1973 . She became active in the union campaign. She was absent at times and always conformed with the system of being required to telephone in before her appointed hour if she could not come to work. She had such an ab- sence, calling in in advance, during July . On July 31, 1975, during a morning distribution of union literature, her name appeared on a leaflet as a member of the organizing com- mittee. At 4 o'clock that afternoon her supervisor, Sue Hayes, called Taylor to the office , showed her a reprimand notice, and asked her to sign it; it listed 10 precise and dated absences, starting on January 2, 1975, and ending with that of July 17. Was this only normal recording of a reprimand for improper job performance by an employee, or was it a coercive tactic aimed at putting the fear of the Employer into the aide if she persisted in her union activi- ty? Hayes had spoken to Taylor a month earlier about her absences and told her she had to improve. But throughout the 2-1/2 years of employment no notice of any kind had been placed in her personnel file. When she invited Taylor to her office that day, Hayes had the union leaflet with the girl's name on her desk and admitted she had seen the name there. She explained the delay in talking to Taylor about this absence 2 weeks earlier on the ground she, 527 Hayes, had been on vacation . But she returned on the 28th and saw Taylor that day and the next 2 days at work, yet said nothing to her then . Further, why did it become so important to have Taylor admit to delinquencies in atten- dance dating back to January 1st? It would be an under- statement to say Hayes' story is suspect . Asked had she inquired whether the girl's absence had been excused, Hayes refused to answer, and then admitted she did not care. Taylor refused to sign the reprimand because she was not sure the absences there listed were correct. Hayes told her she would put it in the employee 's personnel file any- way. In the total circumstances I find her reason for writ- ing this reprimand, for asking Taylor to sign it, and for placing it in her file was to coerce her in her union activi- ties, and therefore in every respect a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Rashire Maclin is an operating room technician, called a scrub nurse, and she worked for 2 years. She became active for the Union beginning late in 1974; she attended meet- ings, handbilled at the entrances early in 1975 , and author- ized her name on the committee leaflet by July 31, 1975. The first reprimand notice in her personnel file she was ever aware of, and asked to sign, is dated March 15, 1975. From that day on more than 30 additional reprimand no- tices have been put in her file , some signed by her and some not. Many relate to absences, some explained by her sickness or that of her child , and some for lateness-one for being 4 minutes late, one 7 minutes late, and two for having been subpenaed to testify in an NLRB hearing. Again, was the employee confronted with all these formal documents of criticism , all placed in her file after she signed or refused to sign , because it was a normal way of doing business, simply because the supervisors wanted to be able to "remember"-as some of them said-or was the Respondent's purpose to make her understand she risked her fob by continuing with her union activities ? Who ever heard of 30 written reprimand notices within a 9-month period without the employee being discharged , or at least disciplined in some way? What this means, of course, is that the record of absences and latenesses in Maclin's case are normal aspects of employment for her type of work, and her type of recruited employee. If there is any doubt of an ulterior and unlawful motive , it is disspelled by refer- ence to a single reprimand . It is dated June 5, 1974 [sic]; Maclin had never seen it or heard of it until Louise Court- ney, her immediate supervisor , asked her to sign it on July 30, 1975! Courtney's only answer to the question why did she ask the employee to sign the ancient document at all, was because "she had not signed it." For the least Court- ney was not telling the truth at the hearing. There is more that bears a logical relationship to this matter of the reprimand notices. Early in August, a few days after being asked to sign the old notice, and a few days after her name had appeared on the July 31 union leaflet as a member of the organization committee , Maclin was called to the office for a periodic evaluation. There Courtney and Robinson, the higher supervisor, talked to her. Maclin testified that Courtney told her "she was very disappointed to see my name on the list . . . she didn't know why I felt like I needed a union . . . if I was so dissatisfied with my job, why did I stay there . . . she also 528 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD told me that I could leave." Maclm thought Courtney was referring to transfer to some other department and suggest- ed it. To this Courtney answered "I'll see what I can do." Still according to Maclm, Robinson then said , "if I had had problems why had I not tried to talk to Ms. Courtney or Dr. Groner . . . to alleviate problems . . . she felt like the umon wasn't the place for Baptist." When Robinson asked her "why do you feel you need a union," Maclm said for overtime pay, which she was not receiving. The meeting ended with no talk of evaluation at all. Robinson 's testimo- ny is not really different. She recalled Courtney did say she was disappointed to see Machn's name on the union leaf- let, and that there was talk of why the employees wanted a union. Robinson also admitted asking why had not Maclm "tried . . . to talk to her employer ... if she was not satis- fied with her position . . ." When Courtney was asked at the hearing whether she had invited Maclin to leave the hospital, she avoided a direct answer; "I do that to most any of them." I credit Maclm. However indirectly the supervisors may have put it, they were interrogating her concerning her union sympathies, inviting her to present her grievances individually to them, offering to satisfy her demands to dissuade her from her resolve, and even threatening to get her out of the hospital if she did not quit. The barrage of recorded reprimands, coupled with this kind of "counsel- ing interview" talk-a pure euphemism-makes the in- tended and inevitable coercion clear. By this conduct of Courtney and Robinson the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. See New Fairview Hall Convalescent Home, 206 NLRB 688 (1973). 1 also find that by placing the June 5, 1974, reprimand in Maclin's file, the Respon- dent violated Section 8(a)(3). One other incident involving Maclin deserves mention here. On November 12, 5 days before the start of the hear- ing in this case, three more reprimand notices were placed in her file. On the 5th, her day off, Mackin came to the hospital for her paycheck. While there she asked the de- partment secretary if she could talk a moment with a Mrs. Everett, a nurse on duty. Everett was called, came to the hall, and the two spoke for a moment or two. Robinson, at a nearby desk, then asked Everett to return to her post. On November 8, Mackin did not feel well and asked for a change of assignment-to circulation nurse instead of scrub nurse. Courtney obliged her. While on duty her hus- band telephoned, she was called out, and she spoke to him. Four days later Robinson called her to the office and asked her to sign two reprimands, one for the 5th and one for the 8th. Mackin testified, without contradiction, that before that date it was an accepted practice for employees to receive occasional personal telephone calls while on duty, and that no one had ever before been criticized for it. She refused to sign the reprimands, because, she said, the secretary had approved Everett coming out to talk to her and because she had only talked to her husband once (Robinson told her she had received three calls). Robinson then called the secretary, who, in Machn's presence, said her husband had called her three times; Maclm then said "It's a lie." With this, Robinson immediately wrote up a third reprimand, for calling the secretary a liar. Maclin also testified she later learned her husband had called three times, but twice had not been connected to her. Robinson's explanation of all this tells a revealing story. She said that on the 5th she had seen Maclin talking with Everett in the hall, that for a while she did nothing because "I thought maybe .. . she had something very short she needed to tell her, I was trying to be nice." This was admis- sion that such incidents did not merit faultfinding. And perhaps this is why Robinson also found it necessary to add to the reprimand notice the following extended justifi- cation : "Mrs. Maclm should asked the nurse in charge for permission to talk to Mrs. Everett. It is not customary for personnel to be called from their assignment to see visitors unless it is an emergency or a matter of importance that should not wait. We do relay messages to our personnel." As to the November 8th incident, it is a fact Mackin only talked once on the phone. Courtney had agreed to her doing one job instead of another that day because of her physical condition. Notwithstanding, the reprimand notice relating to that day contains the following statement. "If a person is sick or unable to carry out their assigned duty then they should stay homt and not be a liability to their co-workers. And according to law scrubbing is an OR. techician's duty. There is a limit on time for phone calls and it should be observed conscientiously. The patient is paying for a service that they are getting." If what happened on the 5th and the 8th merited repri- mand at all-and I am sure it did not (what did Mrs Mac- lin have to do with the fact Mr. Mackin made two calls that were ignored?)-there is no explanation of why the notices were not written at the time. Robinson had been a participant in the first incident. Why were the notices pre- pared so belatedly? On this total record there can be no question but that all three of these personnel entries were no more than further implementation of a fixed policy to use ostensibly proper recording methods as an intimidation technique for coercing Maclm away from her union activi- ties. I find that Robinson 's conduct vis-a-vis Mackin that day constituted further violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, and that placement in her file of the three notices constituted violations of Section 8(a)(3). B. Further Incidents of Coercive Use of Reprimand File Notices As stated above, very extensive use of these warning writeups charging misbehavior to the employees, was an innovation timed with the advent of the Union. The super- visors admitted they were told the new system was being instituted because now there was a union problem. At the hearing, counsel for the Respondent contended there is nothing improper in any employer making provable rec- ords of absences, latenesses, disobedience, or of any kind of error or rule infraction by an employee. The argument then continues , as a defense to the complaint , that there can be no finding of illegal use of the reprimand system so long as it can be shown that it was very widely practiced. The theory here, apparently, is that so long as an employer treats everybody alike, whatever it may do to this employee or that must be excused. And in support of the defense, the Respondent placed into evidence the personnel files of BAPTIST MEMORIAL HOSPITAL 529 over 150 other employees, some known unioneers and others as to whom the record is silent. Many of these files contain reprimand notices in great numbers. But the theory of complaint is not that the mere act of filing written repri- mand notices , even multiple notices, is of itself sufficient proof of unfair labor practices. Rather, the allegation is that in those incidents, as shown by the evidence, where the Respondent used the method :or coercive purposes, unfair labor practices were committed. This general defense ap- proach, not substantially reasserted in the brief, is totally unpersuasive. If an employer discharges employee A be- cause of his union activity, the fact that it may have also discharged others hardly offsets the evidence of wrong- doing as to A.' Another incident on this aspect of the case involved Ed- die May Pearson, a nursing assistant working as a relief floater. She had been an employee over 4 years and joined the organizing committee. She was called into the office of Lillian Parker, her administrative supervisor, early in Au- gust, after her name appeared on the union leaflet as a committee member. Her testimony is that Parker said she was "surprised" to see her name on the leaflet, that she did not think the Baptist Hospital was a place for the Union, and then went on to explain the existing benefits the em- ployees enjoyed and asked what the employees who at- tended union meetings expected. Pearson said she had nev- er before been called into such a conference. Parker's version of this talk in her office is that she called the em- ployee in to discuss the hospital benefits with her. It was impossible to draw a coherent answer from her as to why she had invited Pearson for such a talk at all. In fact, Parker's deliberate and repetitive evasion of one straight question after another, and her clearly argumentative de- meanor as a witness, made her an absolutely discredited witness. With knowledge of the woman's now publicized union activity, she was interrogating her, pure and simple, and thereby violating Section 8(a)(l) of the Act as alleged in the complaint. On September 27, while on duty, Pearson asked permis- sion of the nurse in charge to visit a sick uncle in another ward, was given permission, and went to see him for a moment. Later in the shift she asked permission again, still of the nurse in charge, and visited the relative briefly again. She had done this before, always with permission, and nev- er been criticized. Parker said the employees are permitted to do this, but only during their breaks. A higher official of the hospital testified unequivocally that employees had al- ways been given permission to visit sick relatives by their supervisors. No one said anything in criticism to Pearson that day. But on October 2, Parker again called her to the office, where she had written up a reprimand notice about the incident, and asked why she had left her unit to go somewhere else. Sensing invitation to argument , Pearson stood silent ; she refused to sign because she had been given permission, as always. And again the question arises: Why did Parker wait 5 days to go through the impressive perfor- mance after the nurses in charge had seen everything? In addition to this reprimand-dated October 2-three other documents were later added to Pearson's file. The only date discernible on all three of them is "11-7," which I read as November 7, Parker's varying testimony, only seemingly to the contrary, notwithstanding. Now it was 10 days be- fore the start of this hearing. The first of these additional notices is a very extensive and detailed story of minute occurences during September 28, 29, and 30. The next two relate, sometimes clearly and sometimes obliquely, again to the incident of September 28 about visiting the sick rela- tive. It is not possible to understand what business -like or reasonable purpose these last formal writeups served. The best that can be understood from Parker's explanation, as offered at the hearing , is that she made all these entries so long after the event because she only learned later that Pearson had told other supervisors she had been visiting a relative, and because she, Parker, dust wanted to record the fact Pearson had not told her, Parker, about the relative! It was a meaningless explanation by the supervisor. I can only conclude that all this recording in the employee's per- sonnel file was another instance of resort to the new "docu- mentation system" for illegal coercive purposes, and I therefore find the filing of all four written notices, that of October 2 and the three of November 7, to have been vio- lations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.2 C. Coercive Interrogations and Illegal Promises 1. J. W. Terry works out of the pharmacy, delivering medicines, and became active in the Union. He testified that on August 7, after his name appeared on the union organizational committee leaflet , Grove Bowles, director of the pharmacy department, called him into the office and said : "I see your name is on the committee, so he said it surprised me." Bowles then asked "why did I want the union," and "did I know anybody working with the union." Terry answered his cousin's wife was such a per- son As they talked-as much as 30 minutes, as Terry re- called-Bowles found occasion to tell Terry he could be transferred to another department so as to have Saturdays and Sundays free. Bowles denied having asked did the em- ployee know about others who might be working for the Union, but he did admit telling the man he was "surprised" to see his name on the union list, and that Terry did say "something about ... his sister-in-law . . . some member of his family was working with the Union." Asked why he brought up the subject of the Union by saying he was sur- prised at Terry's participation, the witness gave no coher- ent answer. I do not credit his denial, and I find he unlaw- fully interrogated Terry about the identity of other prounion persons and thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 2. Leona Horton is an LPN working under Mary Chit- man, a registered nurse. On August 11, Chitman told her "I saw your name on the organizing committee . . . I was very disappointed . . . If a Union comes in don't you think that is going to make it harder on us?" When Horton re- ' Mississippi Tank Company, Inc 194 NLRB 923 (1972) Z Shattuck Denn Mining Corporation [Iron Ring Branch] v N L R B, 362 F 2d 466 (C A 9, 1966) 530 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD sponded Chitman was not to blame for arrival of the Union , the supervisor repeated "the union would make it harder on us," and then asked had anyone harassed Hor- ton to sign. The girl said no, and then suggested it was improper for them to be talking about the union activities. To this Chitman responded "I know, but I have been going to ask you about this," and then went on to ask did the girl know what she was doing, the Union would "make it much harder on us," and finally "she would help me in anyway that she could but, not in trying to organize the Union." This is all from Horton's testimony ; Chitman did not testi- fy. I find Chitman coercively interrogated the employee, threatened her with more difficult conditions of employ- ment in the event a union prevailed-however obliquely she may have articulated the thought, and offered to help her discontinue her activities on behalf of the Union, all in violation of Section 8(a)(1). 3. Another example of subtle but nevertheless clear at- tempts to influence employees away from the Union with promises of material gain appears in the also uncontradict- ed testimony of Marie Suggs , a housekeeping department employee . She said that a few weeks after her name ap- peared on the Union's July 31 leaflet , Polly Kuhnl, her supervisor, sat her down in an empty room to talk and said that Louis Speck, director of housekeeping, had told her "to ask me was there anything they had done to me to make us want a Union." Suggs' testimony continues that when she answered she was looking for "better benefits, she [Kiihnl] said that the Union didn't care anything about us, all they wanted was to get our money and, then after they got our money, they won't know what happened to us. Then she said that our benefits won't be too permanent and, after we used up all of our sick days then we wouldn't have any more." I think the message was clear enough here. Expressions of opinions are one thing, but suggestions to a housekeep- ing employee that she would end up with less sick leave allowance under a union than she was then enjoying-and it matters not how round -about the words used to get the idea across-is impermissible coercive intrusion by the Employer into the right of employees to make their own choice . I find that Kiihnl was threatening Suggs that day, and therefore committed an unfair labor practice charge- able to the Respondent. 4. The name of Dorothy Bean, another housekeeping employee, appeared on the Union's leaflet of August 20, as a new member of the committee . The same day Speck, the director, called her to his office to say, as he held the leaflet in his hand, and as she testified: "I thought you were my friend . . . I know you are not . . . Dorothy, why do you think that you all need a union?" Bean answered among other things that she had been passed over in favor of out- siders in her applications for transfer to another depart- ment. To this, Speck said "why didn't you come to me and talk to me about your transfer . . . I will tell you what I will do, I will check and see . . . and he told me to hold off because I didn't know what he had coming for me ." Speck talked to her about why it would be to her disadvantage to favor the Union, and finally asked : "how was I going to vote." She told him it was her secret. Speck's testimony is that he asked the girl in for the purpose of telling her "I thought she was a friend of mine .. . we talked some about . . . working toward the union against the hospital . . I thought that she would be a help to us as far as being a friend or employee of the hospital." Beyond this, Speck said he could not recall "What all we talked about." I credit Bean , and I find that by questioning her as to how she was going to vote , and by promising more favor- able consideration of her application for transfer, the direc- tor violated the proscriptions of the statute. 5. Vivian Cooper is a nursing assistant whose name ap- peared on the organization committee list on July 31. Her administrative supervisor , Helen Aloway, later called her into the office, commented upon her name being on the list, and "made a comment that if there was anything she can do to get my name off the leaflet she would be glad to, she and Mrs. Dubay [Dube] . . . she also . . . said, Mrs. Dubay should have talked to you several days prior to that day .. .." As they talked , Aloway said she was "shocked and amazed that I could do anything such as that," and repeated "if there was anything she could do to help me get my name off the leaflet to be sure to come to her ." The talk lasted 30 minutes. A few days later, still according to Cooper, Dubay called her to the office and said she was "shocked and surprised that my name should appear on the leaflet and if there was anything she would do she would also help me get my name off the leaflet." Aloway denied having said anything about helping Cooper leave the Union ; she also denied generally a varie- ty of statements set out in the questions put to her by Respondent's counsel . She even equivocated on whether she talked about the Union at all, but then : "I might have mentioned to her that Mrs. Dubay might talk with her, but I did not tell her about what . . . I suppose . . . I gather that she would understand this was about the union, but I did not say specifically what it would be about ." Aloway also admitted that, after seeing the girl'; ame on the union leaflet, she did ask did she know what she was doing. As to her disagreement with Cooper , I do not credit Aloway. Dubay, too, denied offering to help remove Cooper's name from the committee list. And , as she continued to testify: "I said, Cooper .. . I'm very curious . . . I dust got the surprise of my life. I saw your name on this list . . . I dust want you to tell me what prompted you to belong to a union . . . I will like to know . . . what they offer you in any way that I thought we could give you or we haven't given you already." Cooper answered the Union provided educational programs, and to this, Dubay said: "Have you tried to request formally for another position? . . . Has anyone listened or not listened to you when you have asked for it? . . . All you'll have to do is come to me, and we'll make the right requisition, and I can see if I can help you get whatever education it is you want." I consider Dubay's total testimony virtual corroboration of that of the employee . I find that both Aloway and Du- bay questioned Cooper as to her reasons for joining the Union in order to know how to bait her out of the idea, and that both of them promised her better working condi- tions as inducement for abandoning the Union , in each incident violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. BAPTIST MEMORIAL HOSPITAL - 531 D. Attempt at Unlawful Surveillance There is a house detective, Leon Cohen, a member of the hospital security department. He is on friendly terms with a porter named Charlie Carson, a known member of the organizing committee, and one day asked and arranged for Carson to go to a union meeting and report back about what went on there. The testimony about what happened was given by Carson and is uncontradicted because Cohen did not testify. Carson, whose hours are from 3 to I 1 p.m., regularly has Wednesday off, but on Wednesday morning, September 17, Cohen telephoned him to say Speck, in charge of all housekeeping work and therefor chief over both Cohen and Carson, had changed the man's day off and wanted him to come to work that day. When Carson asked why, Cohen refused to say on the telephone. Carson came to the detective's office as directed and Cohen told him there would be a union meeting the next night and he wanted Carson to go there and "come back and tell me all that you can remember." When Carson at first refused, Cohen told him it would not hurt him and on a slip wrote the address of the union meeting and scheduled hour-7 p.m. With this, Carson proceeded to his usual work station, only to have his immediate supervisor, William Jackson, say: "Today is your day off, what are you doing?" When Carson just said he had been ordered to come to work, Jackson took him to Speck's office, but after talking to the secretary, told Carson to start work. The next night Carson went to the union meeting. Mean- while, at about 6:30 p.m., Cohen telephoned Mrs. Carson at home, and asked that her husband telephone him when he returned from the meeting. Carson did that, at about midnight; Cohen asked him "What is going on"; Carson answered it seemed like everybody there was for the Union; and Cohen then said "You're not telling me ev- erything. I'll talk to you tomorrow " The next day Cohen again told Carson he was not reporting everything-"I want to know the truth." When Carson repeated he only knew all favored the Union, Cohen became angry and used abusive language. If Cohen spoke for management in this incident, it was an outright attempt to spy upon the union activities of the employees and the clearest unfair labor practice. The Respondent's defense is that Cohen was not an agent of the Company. Considering all the relevant evidence, I find that he was and that by his conduct the Respondent violat- ed Section 8(a)(1) of the Act once again. Only I week earli- er the administration had been informed that Carson was on the union organizing committee. The porter had never before been called to work on a Wednesday. Speck said it was he who made the decision to rearrange Carson's sched- ule that week, because some other man was going to be off. Three hundred people work under Speck, about 15 or so doing cleanup work at night. There is a direct superior over Carson-Mr. Jackson. Why did a security officer have to call the porter at home to tell him of the top administrator's decision? It is a fact the detective- Carson's old friend and benefactor-got the message to him. Why was Jackson kept in the dark about all this? When Carson arrived Wednesday, Jackson was surprised and even went to Speck's office-presumably because he did not need the man on that shift. In such a picture, Speck's statement in his investigation affidavit and again in his oral testimony, that "maybe" it was Cohen whom he chose to communicate with Carson, takes on great signifi- cance. When to all this is added the fact the Respondent clearly was carrying on a widespread program of illegal interrogation of employees about their union activities, Speck's past participation m those activities, and the highly indicative timing of the events, the conclusion is fully war- ranted that Carson in fact was carrying out Speck's instruc- tion in this whole affair, as he told Carson. E. No Solicitation Rule?; No Union Buttons! In the complaint, as originally written and as amended at the hearing, and in the arguments plus the evidence ad- duced, the General Counsel charges the Respondent with unlawful restraint upon the employees' right to carry on their concerted activities anywhere inside the very large hospital complex, consisting of many buildings. The sub- ject is repeatly referred to throughout the record as "rules" against solicitation, "rules" against distribution, and "rules" against wearing union buttons on their garments while in the hospital premises. But despite the lengthy rec- ord, the only "rule" that was objectively established is that involving the wearing of buttons. It appears in the hospital's employee manual, and reads as follows: Identification of uniformed employees is limited to name plates, school pins, professional registration in- signia, and hospital service pins. The wearing of me- dallions and identification other than professional and hospital is not authorized. Beyond this, there was no written "rule" on the subject of union solicitation or distribution. The complaint alleges there is one-precisely in so many words-but that phrase is only taken from an investigation affidavit by Reynolds, the assistant vice president. It sets out his then concept of what went on, but his testimony-when called as an ad- verse witness by the General Counsel-expands upon the concept and modified it considerably. There is a paucity of evidence as to how the rule-whatever it is, if there be one-was or is being implemented. As Reynolds para- phrased it in his statement, it would be clearly unlawful under Board law, for it says there shall be no solicitation at all during working hours on the employer' s premises. There were incidents, here and there, where the subject arose during personal interviews with employees, but the testimony as to what the few employees involved were told falls short of proving affirmatively that too restrictive a rule was in fact in effect, this not only from the testimony of supervisors but also that of employees. Thus, Francis Middleton, when Reynolds reprimanded him for wearing a union button inside the hospital (see below), among other things, quoted Reynolds as telling him he was free to help organize the Union "as long as it didn't interfere with my 7 Cf Summit Nursing and Convalescent Home, Inc, 196 NLRB 769 (1972) Reynolds' statement of the rule according to his affidavit reads . "No solici- tation of employees, patients or medical staff by any employee or other individuals during working hours on the employers premises " 532 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD work." Middleton also quoted Reynolds as "saying he could not do so on break times or lunch ." Middleton can- didly said he did not really remember how Reynolds had phrased it. Holding the matter of wearing union buttons in abey- ance for the moment, I do not think it is possible , or fair, to make a definitive finding on this record that this Respon- dent in fact had, or implemented, an illegal no solicitation rule. It is simply too large an institution-as said, with over 4,000 employees-to predicate so broad and precise a find- ing of pervasive illegality upon so little proof . The entire subject of union activities in hospitals is still a relatively new one, and perhaps it would be best for the Board itself, in its expertise, to advise-maybe in this very case-just what the areas for lawful solicitation and distribution in hospitals should be . After all, there is an inevitable simi- larity in the physical layout and functional operations of all hospitals. About the wearing of union buttons there is no dispute as to what the issue of the case is. Middleton , the porter, had a union button attached to his cap one day; a supervi- sor saw it in Middleton's hand near the elevator door as the man was about to leave for the day. The nearest bed on that floor, along the corridor, was about 20 feet away. The supervisor told him he was not permitted to wear the but- ton. Middleton's name had already appeared on both a union leaflet and a union letter to the Company. The next day he was called to Speck's office, where Speck criticized him for a number of faults; a reprimand notice placed in Middleton's personnel file that day includes the statement "Talked about wearing unauthorized pins, etc." My first finding is that the rule of attire as it appears unequivocally in the employee handbook which is still to- day in the hand of the employees violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act under Board law . On its face it discriminates against union insignia being worn and other medallions or badges. It is one thing to prohibit wearing of all badges; it is a different story to prohibit union buttons while permit- ting others. It was also admitted the employees are permit- ted to wear United Fund pins. There are people whose work keeps them in areas where patients have no occasion to appear, such as kitchens and related places. As the wear- ing of union buttons is only one form of solicitation, there can be no justification for distinguishing between one kind of pin and another when no one but employees have occa- sion to be present. At the hearing Reynolds, the adminis- trator, explained that when the union campaign started "We . . . told our supervisors ... that if the employees wear . . . this button you have [the union button received into evidence], that if they wear those things in nonpatient areas, that that is acceptable . . . We made this slight alter- ation to our plan of our personal appearance code ...." He then admitted he had no knowledge of employees being informed of the change , and there is no evidence so to indicate . As he continued to explain, Reynolds started dis- tinguishing between those areas of the hospital where union buttons are permitted and where they are not. At one point he said they are not permitted in the cafeteria. He then shifted, saying they are not permitted wherever patients might wander. Then, realizing the statement might outlaw buttons just about everywhere , he proceeded to take certain areas out of the proscription-the laundry room, the dining room, the laboratories, maybe the engi- neering shops, etc. It is clear on this record the employees have been told to remove union buttons and that they have complied with the instruction . It will not do, to legalize too broad a rule, for one official of so large an institution sim- ply to say it has been modified to comply with whatever the law may be. This rule, as written in the employee hand- book, must be struck. But the Respondent's more adamant position is clear. It asserts the right to prohibit the wearing of union buttons by any employee anywhere in the hospital, so long as it is possible a patient might find himself in the area at any time for any reason. And in the end the General Counsel took issue with this fixed position . The complaint, as it now stands, alleges it is illegal to exclude ordinary union but- tons anywhere in the hospital , even in a patient's room. The heart of the issue now is whether it is true, as the Respondent contends, that there is something inherently and inevitably so disturbing and controversial about a union button, or insignia, that the very sight of one on anybody's attire will endanger the health of any person who is ill, so that all union buttons must be totally banned from their sight. The only evidence offered to support this broad conclusionary assertion is an expression of opinion voiced by the Respondent's witness, Dr. Edward Garrett, a surgeon formerly chief of staff of the hospital . Dr. Garrett said it was "within the realm of possibility " that any con- troversial object could affect the proper care of patients. He continued that he thought any object touching upon the subject of labor organizations appearing in the sight of a sick person "potentially," "theoretically and perhaps ac- tually" could be detrimental to his recovery. The doctor also candidly admitted, however , he had never conducted objective studies in this area, had never heard of any, and had never heard of other physicians having had the sug- gested adverse experience . I do not deem this statement by Dr. Garrett sufficiently persuasive proof supporting the factual defense assertion made as justification by the Re- spondent for virtually banning union buttons throughout the hospital . In view of the Federal labor policy favoring collective bargaining in the health care industry, as reflect- ed in the enactment of the 1974 nonprofit hospital amend- ments to the Act, the contention that union buttons could serve as an agitating influence upon exceptionally sensitive patients is outweighed when balanced against the employ- ees' right to engage in activities protected by Section 7. Despite the unique nature of a hospital environment and the special conditions prevailing there, a general ban on the wearing of union buttons is unduly broad and in conflict with that policy of the Act which requires employers to achieve their legitimate business purposes with a minimum of interference with the rights of employees to engage in self-organization. I find that by reprimanding Middleton , and by recording the reprimand notice in his personnel file, for wearing a union button on the premises , the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. I also find that the Respondent's rule prohibiting any employees from wearing union buttons or insignia at any time in the hospital is a continuing violation of Section 8(a)(1). There were otl•ar BAPTIST MEMORIAL HOSPITAL 533 instances of supervisors telling employees not to wear union buttons at work , but no useful purpose would be served by the further details here. The cease-and-desist or- der and the remedy thus commanded would be the same. There is more detailed and conflicting testimony about still other conversations between supervisors and employ- ees in which there was talk of the Union. In some perhaps the record would support additional pin-pointed findings of illegal questioning, or individual invitations to satisfy grievances behind the Union's back. But it would be pure repetition of unfair labor practices already found to bur- den this decision with further such facts . In some instances the alleged unfair labor practices were not proved . For ex- ample : Carol Bowie testified that sometime in May her supervisor, Creedon, asked had anyone from the Union been to her home to talk about organizing the Union. On cross-examination Bowie changed it somewhat. Now it came out that Creedon asked "had anybody come to our house saying that they were from Baptist," and if so, "they are not representing Baptist ." Creedon's version is that he did not ask, but only commented to the employees, as he said he had heard, that somebody was going to people's houses saying "they were with the hospital," or "being with the hospital." Considering Bowie's total story, I believe Creedon here and make no finding of improper question- ing. Bowie also recalled Shirley Barnes, another supervisor, one day asking three girls "why did we want a union." Out of context, this might be interrogation , but considering Bowie's further testimony I make no such finding . She said the three employees were already discussing the union among themselves when Barnes asked the question. Lyn- dell Ballard, one of the other women then present , recalled two such comments by Barnes. According to Ballard, too, the employees were already themselves talking about the Union before the supervisor got into the conversation. Bal- lard quoted Barnes as asking "were we sure that what we wanted was a union ," and "were these the reasons that you want the union?" Barnes said at the hearing she knew at the time these women favored the Union, but denied ask- ing why they wanted it. She said her comment , after hear- ing them talk of what they might gam by self-organization, was: "Is that why you want a union?" I believe Barnes' version, and conclude she said nothing improper to these women. One final story merits reporting, albeit not in too great detail, because it graphically illustrated the coercive meth- od reflected throughout the record. Gwendolyn Smith and Patty Wilkins are two of seven technicians who work in the G. I. Laboratory; Katheryn Chiti is their immediate super- visor and Dr. Randolph McCloy the director of the labora- tory. Both women were active in the organizational cam- paign, went to meetings , solicited cards, and appeared on the July 31 union leaflet as committee members. Smith started work in 1967 and Wilkins in 1972. McCloy referred to Smith as a very bright and outstanding employee. No reprimand notice of any kind was placed in Wilkins' per- sonnel file before March 21, 1975. In May both were told to remove union buttons from their dresses. That same month Smith was called to the office by Chiti and asked had she had anything to do with the union literature which was seen in the conference room ; although she said no, a "counselling interview" was placed in her file. There is another reprimand notice, also found in Smith's file and received in evidence , that speaks volumes in itself. It itemizes, with exact dates, 13 absences-many followed by the word "ill" or "child ill"-covering the period July 1973 to May 1975, and then reports on certain "counselling interviews"-two for June 22 and 24, 1974, for a single incident and one for a May 7, 1975, incident of some kind. The document itself contains no explanation of how it came to be prepared at that time , or at all. Supervisor Chiti said she wrote up this notice , and gave it to Reynolds, the assistant vice-president, at his request ; she said she used to keep personal notes in a little box . Asked why Reynolds should ask for all this at that particular time, her only an- swer was he wanted it, and she did not know why. This was unquestionable resort to the "documentation " innovation that could have no purpose other than coercion , especially in the light of further "interviews" in the private office of Director McCloy on October 3. Work in the laboratory is sometimes slack, with usually more patients in the morning than in the afternoon. The director said the technicians often sit around reading a book or doing passtime puzzles; he also said they are per- mitted, when work allows, to leave the laboratory for per- sonal matters with permission of their supervisor. There is also testimony, uncontradicted, that Chiti, the supervisor, sometimes sits in the laboratory and knits when there are no patients. On Friday, September 26, at 10 minutes before 3 o'clock quitting time, the girls were sitting about idle; there were no more patients for the day. Chiti told Smith some one wanted to speak to her in the hall. Smith went out where two men, attendants from another department, were stand- ing. Smith spoke a few words, came back in to call Wilkins because one of the men wanted her , and the two returned to the corridor. They talked only a minute or two when Chiti called them back in, saying she wanted no "hanging around" the hall. The girls came in, it was just about quit- ting time, and they went home. From this incident, after Chiti had herself told the women they could step out, there evolved an incredible series of reprimand notices , all duly recorded and placed into Smith's file. On Monday, September 29, Chiti called both women into her office, criticized them for leaving the department, wrote up reprimand notices against them about what had happened the previous Friday, and placed one in each lady's file. Chiti also placed a separate writeup in each woman's file relating nothing more than what had taken place Friday, the stepping out to talk to somebody. On October 3 McCloy called Smith to his office for an inter- view. About this talk McCloy's testimony is that Chiti had told him about the Friday incident and that he had ordered her to record it. Why? "so that we could remember it ... . McCloy said he told Smith he knew of the Friday incident and asked her version of it . He told her he knew of her union activities and those of Wilkins; he called he-- in so that she could "ventilate" her problems; he asked her what her "problems" were ; it was he who brought up the subject of the Union. In the course of the extended talk Smith 534 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD complained about not being paid overtime, going without lunch, and Chat picking on her after expressly giving per- mission to step out to the hall. There was also some talk between Smith and the director that day about Smith going to school to acquire technical standing that might later help her find work elsewhere. Obviously, having called the girl in to probe into her union activities and to draw out what it was she could be bought off with, McCloy would offer some kind of help now that she spoke of going to school. Did he say he would help her, and only her, or did he say he would help anybody on the staff who wished to improve herself? This fine distinction later became the ba- sis for a much lengthier recorded disciplinary notice. The testimony by McCloy that he wanted Smith to "ven- tilate" her problems-"Q: You called her so she could talk to you? The Witness: Yes, sir."-I do not credit. He called her to interrogate her as to her reasons for favoring the Union, to find out what he might offer to wean her away from the idea, to belabor a third time the fact that a week earlier the women had stepped out into the hall after the supervisor had given permission. All this questioning was pure violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, and I so find. Over a month later, on November 5, McCloy called Smith into his office still again, and now, after another meeting with her, he had typed a single-spaced full page report detailing an extensive disciplinary interview. Mc- Cloy did not testify about the substance of his talk with Smith that day; presumably he relies on the later carefully drafted document as proof of what he said. Asked why he had prepared such a record, all he could answer was "to document the conversation." I do not believe this man. The meticulously phrased report, written 2 weeks before the start of this hearing, over I month after anything of note had happened, ending with a reminder to Smith she could be dismissed, reads like a lawyer's brief justifying his client's past conduct. I find entirely unpersuasive McCloy's defense that he wrote such a general indictment of Smith only because there had been erroneous "feedback" that he had promised to help Smith to go to school, not everybody. And to correct this error, he wrote-on November 5- about a May 1975 incident about Smith being insubordi- nate for calling Chiti a liar, about how excellent Chiti's work performance has always been, and about how he would not stand for insubordination and misrepresentation in the lab by anybody. Considering the total record reflecting McCloy's activi- ties with respect to the Respondent's reaction to the em- ployees' organizational campaign, I find he called this woman into his office on November 5, lectured her gener- ally, and filed a reprimand notice in her file that day for the purpose of further coercing her in her union activity and thereby again violated Section 8(a)(1). And the filing of the disciplinary document was a violation of Section 8(a)(3) as well. IV. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain conduct prohibited by Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, it must be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and take specific affirmative action , as set forth below, designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By placing reprimand notices into the personnel files of its employees the Respondent has been, and is violating Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 4. By the foregoing conduct, by promulgating and main- taining a rule prohibiting employees from wearing union buttons or insignia in the hospital, by interrogating em- ployees concerning their union sympathies and how they intended to vote in union elections, by interrogating them concerning the union activities of fellow employees, by asking employees to bring their grievances directly to man- agement for resolution in place of a union, by offering im- provements in conditions of employment as inducement for employees to abandon their union activities, by threat- ening to discharge employees if they persist in their pro- union activities, by offering to assist employees to with- draw from union activities, and by spying or attempting to spy upon the union activities of its employees, the Respon- dent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practic- es in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER4 The Respondent, Baptist Memorial Hospital, Memphis, Tennessee, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Placing reprimand or disciplinary interview notices in the personnel files of its employees for the purpose of coercing them in their union activities. (b) Maintaining and enforcing its rule prohibiting em- ployees from wearing union buttons or insignia in the hos- pital premises, interrogating employees concerning their union sympathies and how they intended to vote in union elections, interrogating employees concerning the union activities of fellow employees, asking employees to bring their grievances directly to management for resolution in place of a union, offering improvements in conditions of employment as inducement for employees to abandon In the event no exceptons are filed as provided by Sec. 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes BAPTIST MEMORIAL HOSPITAL 535 their union activities, threatening to discharge employees if they persist in their prounion activities, offering to assist employees to withdraw from union activities, or spying or attempting to spy upon the union activities of its employ- ees. (c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form, loin, or assist American Fed- eration of States, County and Municipal Employees, AFL- CIO, or any other labor organization, to bargain collec- tively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all such activities. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef- fectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Remove from the personnel files of the following employees the reprimand, disciplinary notices bearing the indicated dates and exhibit identification numbers: Rasher Maclin-June 5, 1974 (G.C. 12(a) ), Novem- ber 5, 1975 (G.C. 12(bb) ), November 8, 1975 (G.C. 12(cc)) and November 12, 1975 (G.C. 12(dd) ); Phyllis Taylor-July 31, 1975 (G.C. 18(a) ); Eddie May Pearson-October 2, 1975 (17p), three notices dated November 7, 1975 (17q, r, and s); Gwendolyn Smith-September 19, 1975 (16e), Sep- tember 26, 1975 (16f), and November 5, 1975 (16h); Patty Wilkins-September 29, 1975 (15c). (b) Post at its hospital in Memphis, Tennessee, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 5 Copies of said notice on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re- gion 26, after being duly signed by its representatives, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea- sonable steps shall be taken by it to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 26, in writ- ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. 5 In the event the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board "