Wometco-Lathrop Co.

686 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Wometco-Lathrop Company and Local 1689, Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO. Cases 19-CA-7710 and 19-CA-7711 July 19, 1976 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS FANNING, PENELLO, AND WALTHER On February 3, 1976, Administrative Law Judge James T. Barker issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge only to the extent consistent herewith. The Administrative Law Judge found that, on April 29, 1975, Respondent, through Donald Hill, its president, refused to recognize the Union as the ma- jority representative of its employees in an appropri- ate bargaining unit and refused to meet and bargain with the Union as the exclusive bargaining represen- tative of those employees. He also found that Re- spondent, through Donald Hill, violated Section 8(a)(1) by threatening, in the presence of unit em- ployees, to adversely affect the fob tenure of Manag- er Jenkins and Assistant Manager Isaacson if the Union and employees continued to press their recog- nition and bargaining demands. For the reasons set forth below, we shall dismiss the complaint in its en- tirety. 1. With regard to the 8(a)(5) allegation, Respon- dent contends that Manager Jenkins did not have apparent authority when he signed the recognition agreement on April 10, 1975, recognizing the Union as the exclusive representative of Respondent's em- ployees at the Lacey Street and Goldstream Street theaters in Fairbanks, Alaska, and that the Union was well aware that the only person with authority concerning labor matters was President Hill, who was located in Anchorage. We find merit in Respondent's contention. As more fully set forth in the Administrative Law Judge's Decision, the facts show that Respondent op- erates motion picture theaters in Anchorage, Juneau, and Fairbanks, Alaska, in addition to office build- ings in Fairbanks and Anchorage. Donald K. Hill is president of Respondent and maintains his business office in Anchorage. Donald R. Jenkins is manager of Respondent's Goldstream and Lacey Street the- aters involved herein, which are located 1.2 miles apart in Fairbanks. Michael A. Isaacson is assistant manager of both theaters. The Union initiated its campaign among Re- spondent's unrepresented cashiers, doormen, ush- ers, usherettes, and concessionaries in the spring of 1975. Respondent's projectionists are covered under a statewide collective-bargaining agreement with an- other union. Whittaker, an international representa- tive of the Union, and Davis, an employee of Re- spondent, met with Assistant Manager Isaacson at the Goldstream theater on April 9 and demanded recognition as representative of Respondent's em- ployees at the Goldstream and Lacey Street theaters. Attached to the recognition agreement was a petition signed by 12 of the 18 employees working at the Goldstream and Lacey Street theaters. Isaacson read the recognition agreement but suggested that Whit- taker speak to Manager Jenkins. Although Whittaker told Isaacson he could sign the agreement, Isaacson called Jenkins on the telephone. When Isaacson completed his call, he told Whittaker that Jenkins had informed him he could sign the document with the understanding that in affixing his signature he was not binding Respondent to a collective-bargain- ing agreement. Whittaker indicated to Isaacson that the agreement was only an agreement to recognize the Union as bargaining representative in a unit of all employees of the Goldstream and Lacey Street theaters in Fairbanks, but excluding the motion pic- ture projectionists. Isaacson signed and dated the recognition agreement, as well as the petition for union representation which had been signed by a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit. As previously arranged by Isaacson, Whittaker and Hough, president of the Local, met with Manag- er Jenkins on April 10. Whittaker indicated he and Hough were representing the employees for the pur- pose of collective bargaining, that the Union repre- sented a majority of the employees, and that he de- sired that Jenkins sign a recognition agreement and a petition for union representation which had been signed by 12 employees. Whittaker explained that the petition could be the basis for either voluntary recog- nition or a Board election. Jenkins indicated that he desired to stabilize the work force and asked if the Union would be of any benefit in this regard. Whit- taker stated that fair wage rates and benefits could have such effect. When Whittaker supplied possible wage rates pursuant to a request by Jenkins, the lat- ter stated that such rates would be more than Re- spondent could afford. After Whittaker indicated that a bargaining committee of employees would for- 225 NLRB No. 92 WOMETCO-LATHROP COMPANY 687 mulate and present contract demands following rec- ognition of the Union by Respondent, Jenkins stated that he had no authority to bind Respondent with respect to contract provisions and noted that only Donald Hill, president of Respondent, had that au- thority. Following a discussion during which Whittaker asked Jenkins to sign the recognition agreement, re- sponded to Jenkins' questions, and explained that the recognition agreement did not have the effect of binding Respondent to specific contract terms, but that its legal effect would require Respondent to bar- gain for a reasonable time to achieve a collective- bargaining agreement, Jenkins signed the recognition agreement as well as the petition for union represen- tation signed by the employees and indicated that negotiations would begin at a mutually agreeable date. Subsequent to the April 10 meeting, Whittaker contacted Jenkins and indicated that he would be available for a bargaining meeting on April 29. At an undisclosed time thereafter, Whittaker received a call from Jenkins, who stated that he was in trouble with Hill as a result of his execution of the recognition agreement. Jenkins asked Whittaker to tear up the recognition agreement, but Whittaker refused to tear up the documents claiming they were valid and sug- gested that the bargaining meeting scheduled for April 29 be held. On April 29, Whittaker, Hough, and a three-member employee bargaining committee met with Hill and Jenkins. Before the bargaining proposals were presented at the April 29 meeting, Whittaker introduced the rep- resentatives of the Union and indicated that the three-member bargaining committee was comprised of Respondent's employees. Hough, the president of the Local, presented the bargaining proposals which had been prepared by the committee. At that point, Hill stated that such bargaining proposals were pre- mature because Jenkins had signed documents which he had no authority to sign, and that was the reason he was not going to attempt to negotiate a contract. Hough responded that the Union had signatures of a majority of Respondent's employees giving the Union representation rights and that Respondent's local manager had extended recognition to the Union. Hill replied that Jenkins had no authority to extend recognition, that by doing so he acted in an invalid manner, that the matter should be resolved by an election, and that there might be a problem with the union representing the projectionists. Al- though Hough summarized the events which had supported the Union's recognition and bargaining rights, Hill stated that he would not discuss contract terms and the issue should be resolved by a Board election. Hill also stated again that Jenkins had no right to do what he had done, and that if the matter were pursued Respondent might have a new manager and assistant manager by the end of the month. Hill indicated that the Union should consult with his at- torney on the matter. At the end of the meeting, one of the employees expressed concern over the fact that Jenkins might lose his job as a consequence of the controversy. The Administrative Law Judge found that on April 10, by reason of Jenkins' actions, Respondent recognized the Union as the majority representative of its unrepresented employees; that such recognition was voluntary, in that it sprang from the informed free choice of Jenkins who, at that time, was a statu- tory supervisor and the managing agent of Respon- dent clearly vested with apparent authority, and act- ing within the scope of that authority; and the fact that Jenkins failed first to obtain the specific consent of his superior, President Hill, before extending rec- ognition did not detract from the legal effect of his action. We disagree. It is well established that an agent may act for his principal only to the extent that such principal has conferred authority on his agent, real or apparent.' The record amply shows here that neither Isaacson nor Jenkins had specific authority from President Hill to negotiate with the Union; that Jenkins made it emphatically clear to Whittaker and Hough that he had no authority to represent his employer in discus- sions with the Union; that Isaacson and Jenkins signed the recognition agreements only at the insis- tence of Whittaker; and that Jenkins' conduct in signing such recognition agreement was not based on any authority granted him by President Hill. While the Administrative Law Judge correctly finds that Manager Jenkins was aware of the implica- tions of his conduct in signing both the recognition agreement and the petition for representation in view of the clarity of the language on such documents and Whittaker's explanation of the Union' s claims, it does not necessarily follow that Respondent could rely on Jenkins' conduct as authority to bind Re- spondent in the absence of evidence that such au- thority had been granted to Jenkins. Also unfounded in law or fact is the Administrative Law Judge's find- ing that, by designating Jenkins as manager of its Fairbanks operation, Respondent clothed Jenkins 1 John Over Service Company, 173 NLRB 673 (1968) Although a branch manager was empowered to hire , discharge, and discipline employees, settle grievances, represent the employer at state unemployment compensation hearings , and order repair parts, such activities fell short of proving that the branch manager had the authority to grant formal recognition to a union or negotiate a contract with it 688 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD with ostensible and apparent authority and extended implied consent to him to act as its agent in the realm of labor relations. Additionally, we note that the Union was not innocent of Jenkins' lack of authority to bind Respondent, since Hough, the president of the Local, and President Hill have been acquaintanc- es for many years. As the record fails to support the Administrative Law Judge's finding that Manager Jenkins had either real or apparent authority to bind Respondent in the field of labor relations, such authority resting solely with President Hill, it matters not what other deter- minations the Administrative Law Judge has made as to, inter alia, the Union's majority; Jenkins' naive- te in labor relations and the legal effect of his action; Respondent's alleged waiver of its right to an elec- tion when Jenkins voluntarily recognized the Union and confirmed its majority status; or bad faith evi- denced by President Hill's belated claim at the April 29 meeting that Jenkins usurped his labor relations authority. Accordingly, we conclude that the General Counsel has not met his burden of establishing by the necessary preponderance of the evidence that Isaacson or Jenkins had real or apparent authority to speak for Respondent concerning labor relations matters. Thus, Respondent's refusal to recognize or bargain with the Union and its insistence upon an election did not violate Section 8(a)(5) and (1). In view of the basis for Member Fanning's dissent, a recapitulation of certain principles of agency is necessary. As a general rule, "authority to do an act can be created by written or spoken words or other conduct of the principal which, reasonably interpret- ed, causes the agent to believe that the principal de- sires him so to act on the principal's account." Re- statement, Second, Agency §26 (1958). "[A]pparent authority to do an act is created as to a third person by written or spoken words or any other conduct of the principal which, reasonably interpreted, causes the third person to believe that the principal consents to have the act done on his behalf by the person purporting to act for him." Restatement, Second, Agency §27 (1958). "Apparent authority is created by the same method as that which creates authority, except that the manifestation of the principal is to the third person rather than to the agent. For appar- ent authority there is the basic requirement that the principal be responsible for the information which comes to the mind of the third person, similar to the requirement for the creation of authority that the principal be responsible for the information which comes to the agent. Thus, either the principal must intend to cause the third person to believe that the agent is authorized to act for him, or he should real- ize that his conduct is likely to create such belief." Restatement, Second, Agency §27, comment a (1958). Applying these principles to the present case, there is no evidence that President Hill ever conferred au- thority on either Jenkins or Isaacson to sign a recog- nition agreement. As to apparent authority, the evi- dence is equally lacking that President Hill ever led the union representatives to believe that the two men had such authority. Member Fanning's finding of ap- parent authority rests not on representations or man- ifestations by President Hill, but on the conduct of the agents. It is elementary that an agent cannot create his own authority, real or apparent. In addition to finding that Jenkins had apparent authority to sign a recognition agreement, Member Fanning also asserts that he had real authority to do so because of the distance between Fairbanks and Anchorage. According to the dissent, Jenkins "neces- sarily was clothed by Respondent with the authority to perform whatever corporate acts were necessary, including labor relations, to insure the continued and uninterrupted business operations of Respondent in Fairbanks." There is no evidence to support this statement. It is a mere apse dixit of the dissenting Member. Moreover, in the Board's experience, a company which has small widely scattered opera- tions will rarely permit local officials, who usually have no labor relations expertise, to assume initiative in labor relations matters. This is a subject matter usually handled at the highest corporate level since whatever occurs at a single operation is likely to have corporatewide ramifications.' The dissent also asserts that Respondent ratified Jenkins' conduct by failing timely to notify the Union of his limited authority. Silence by a principal can be an affirmance of an agent's unauthorized con- duct if fairly construed that it is indicative of an in- tent by the principal to treat the unauthorized con- duct as authorized. Restatement, Second, Agency §82, et seq. (1958). No such inference is possible in the present case. Here only 19 days elapsed between the date when Jenkins signed the recognition agree- ment and the date when President Hill informed union representatives that Jenkins had acted without authority. This was hardly an unreasonable period of time,' especially since there is no evidence that the 2 As evidence of centralization of personnel practices and policies by em- ployers having numerous small operations , see, e.g., the description of such practices and policies in Levitz Furniture Company of the Eastern Region, Inc, 223 NLRB 47 (1976), Western Auto Supply Company, 182 NLRB 612 (1970), The Horn & Hardart Company, 170 NLRB 988 (1968), Adams Drug Co, Inc, 164 NLRB 594 (1967), Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (Woonsocket, R 1), 156 NLRB 1408 (1966) 3 See American Bank & Trust Co v Farmers El & Mil Co, 63 Mont 612, 208 P 594 (1922) (principal held not to have ratified agent's unauthorized conduct by month's delay in disavowing agent's authority to act) WOMETCO-LATHROP COMPANY Union was prejudiced by the delay. Moreover, the Union could not reasonably have construed Presi- dent Hill's 19-day delay in apprising the Union that Jenkins had acted without authority as affirmance of Jenkins' conduct since, sometime after April 10 but before April 29, Jenkins had telephoned Union Rep- resentative Whittaker to tell the latter that Jenkins "was in trouble" with Hill because he had executed the recognition agreement and asking Whittaker to tear up the agreement. The Union was therefore put on notice even before the April 29 meeting that Jen- kins had acted with questionable authority. At the very first meeting of President Hill with the union representatives, Hill informed them that Jenkins had exceeded his authority by signing the recognition agreement. Broad Street Hospital and Medical Center, 182 NLRB 302 (1970), cited by Member Fanning in support of his ratification theory, is a far cry from this case. In that case, the Board found that the agent, one of two top officials of the employer, had acted within the scope of his authority in recognizing and bargaining with the union. As a moreover argu- ment, the Board added that at the least the employer had acquiesced in and ratified the agent's conduct which consisted of not only extending recognition but open bargaining which extended over a period of time and which actually resulted in agreement on terms and conditions of employment. However, be- fore the agreement could be incorporated in a writ- ten document and signed by the parties, the agent died. The employer thereafter attempted to repudiate the agent's conduct. Finally, there is no basis in Respondent's conduct to justify the dissent's application of an estoppel theory. Restatement, Second, Agency §27, comment d (1958). 2. As previously noted, the Administrative Law Judge found that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) when President Hill stated, at the April 29 meeting with the union representatives and the em- ployee bargaining committee, that if the Union con- tinued to pursue the matter of recognition and con- tract terms Respondent might have a new manager and assistant manager by the end of the month. In the view of the Administrative Law Judge, such statement threatened the employees before whom the statement was made and interfered with their Section 7 rights. Respondent contends that Hill did not threaten anyone since he only stated a fact concern- ing the job security of his two supervisors by indicat- ing that Jenkins did not have authority to do what he did, and if the Union held Respondent to the recog- nition agreement, he might have a new manager or assistant manager by the end of the month. We find merit in Respondent's contention. 689 It is clear from the record that Hill's remarks were directed at Jenkins for the information of Whittaker and Hough, since the employees were in no way re- sponsible for Jenkins' conduct. There is no evidence that the employees felt threatened by Hill's state- ment, nor do the facts indicate any basis for a rea- sonable inference of a threat. It is well settled that an employer may discipline, or threaten to discipline, a supervisor whether in the presence of employees or not, and that such action or threats of such action violate Section 8(a)(1) only if the employer's threat- ened action against the supervisor is based on that supervisor's refusal to participate in the commission of unfair labor practices 4 We find that the record supports a finding that Respondent, through its agent, President Hill, threat- ened to terminate Manager Jenkins and Assistant Manager Isaacson for the sole reason that they ex- ceeded their authority when they attempted to nego- tiate an agreement which recognized the Union as the representative of Respondent's employees and that such unauthorized conduct was not in the best interests of Respondent. Thus, Respondent's conduct did not constitute a threat to interfere with the rights of the employees which are protected by Section 7 of the Act. In these circumstances, we do not deem the evidence sufficient to establish the basis for an 8(a)(1) finding. Accordingly, we shall dismiss the complaint in its entirety. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re- lations Board hereby orders that the complaint here- in be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. MEMBER FANNING, dissenting: Contrary to my colleagues of the majority, I would affirm the Administrative Law Judge's Decision. The record does not warrant reversal of the Administra- tive Law Judge's findings (1) that on April 29, 1975, Respondent, through Donald Hill, its president, vio- lated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) when it refused to recog- nize the Union as the majority representative of its employees in the appropriate unit and failed and re- fused to meet and bargain with the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of those employ- ees, and (2) that on April 29, Respondent, through Donald Hill, in the presence of unit employees, threatened to adversely affect the job tenure of man- 4 Bowling Corporation of America, Inc d/b/a Algonquin Bowling Center, Inc, 170 NLRB 1768 (1968), Southwest Shoe Exchange Company, 136 NLRB 247 (1962), Leonard Niederruer Company, Inc, 130 NLRB 113 (1961), and Vanderbilt Products, Inc, 129 NLRB 1323 (1961) 690 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD agement personnel if the Union and employees con- tinued to press their recognition claims and Respon- dent thereby interfered with the Section 7 rights of its employees and violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The record shows, and the Administrative Law Judge found, that the Union represented a majority of Respondent's employees in an appropriate unit on April 10, the date that the Union made a valid de- mand for recognition to Manager Jenkins. Unlike my colleagues of the majority, I find, in agreement with the Administrative Law Judge, that Manager Jenkins was clothed with the apparent, if not real, authority to bind his principal, Respondent President Hill.5 As set forth by the Administrative Law Judge, the record indicates that on April 9 International Representative Whittaker requested that Assistant Manager Isaacson sign the recognition agreement and the petition for union representation, which had been signed by a majority of the employees at Respondent's two theaters in Fairbanks, and that Isaacson stated that Whittaker should speak to Jen- kins. When Whittaker indicated that Isaacson could sign the recognition agreement, Isaacson insisted on speaking to Jenkins and did so by placing a tele- phone call. At the conclusion of the telephone call, Isaacson informed Whittaker that Jenkins indicated that Isaacson could sign the recognition agreement with the understanding that Isaacson was not bind- ing Respondent to a collective-bargaining agreement. Significantly, at this stage of the negotiations, neither Isaacson nor Jenkins made known to Whittaker that Jenkins had no labor relations authority or that such authority resided only in Respondent's president, Hill, who was located in Anchorage, Alaska. Clearly, at this juncture, Whittaker and the Union could draw the reasonable inference that Jenkins had, at the least, apparent authority to negotiate a recognition agreement for Respondent. Further evidence of Jenkins' apparent authority is illustrated by Isaacson's and Jenkins' conduct in ar- ranging for a second meeting on April 10, this time between Whittaker and Jenkins. Again, in arranging such meeting, neither Isaacson nor Jenkins had indi- cated that such meeting was futile in the absence of Jenkins' authority to negotiate a recognition agree- ment. The record does not indicate whether Jenkins felt obliged to telephone President Hill or that Jen- kins was required to do so. At the outset of the April 10 meeting, Jenkins did not indicate that he did not have authority to sign a 5 While the majority cites John Oster Service Company, supra, as authority that Jenkins had no specific authority to bind Respondent, f find such case distinguishable, since, unlike herein , the branch manager informed the union that he had no authority to sign the recognition agreement and he was so instructed by his principal recognition agreement. Rather, his conduct was that of an agent of Respondent with apparent authority to bind his principal. Jenkins read the recognition agreement presented by Whittaker, he studied the signatures of the employees on the petition, and he agreed that the petition contained the signatures of a present majority. Jenkins asked Whittaker questions concerning the effect the Union would have on his employees and noted his desire to stabilize his work force. When Whittaker supplied a wage figure in re- sponse to Jenkins' inquiry, Jenkins stated such wage rates would be "out of line" and more than Respon- dent could afford. Certainly such conduct constitut- ed more than evidence of an insatiable and unbridled curiosity on the part of Jenkins, and Whittaker cor- rectly inferred from Jenkins' conduct that he had ap- parent authority to represent Respondent. After further discussion in which Whittaker ex- plained that after Respondent recognized the Union a bargaining committee of employees would be formed and contract proposals would be formulated and presented to Respondent, Jenkins stated he had no authority to bind Respondent with respect to con- tract provisions and noted that only President Hill had such authority. Again Whittaker and the Union could reasonably infer that Jenkins' authority was limited, and in fact did not exist, in the area of nego- tiating contract demands. However, no such limita- tion was claimed to exist with respect to Jenkins' ap- parent authority to bind Respondent in the area of recognition agreements. Not only did Jenkins grant permission to Assistant Manager Isaacson to sign a recognition agreement on April 9, but Jenkins signed an identical recognition agreement on April 10. Clearly, Jenkins was aware that his authority was limited to signing recognition agreements, having made that known to Whittaker on both April 9 and 10. In view of Whittaker's full explanations to both Isaacson and Jenkins concerning the full import of the signing of the recognition agreement and Jenkins' approval and signing of such agreements subject only to the understanding that Jenkins had no authority to bind Respondent in the area of contract demands, I find that Whittaker and the Union could reason- ably infer that Jenkins had the authority, though lim- ited, to bind Respondent to the recognition agree- ment on April 10 and that Jenkins knew that he was binding Respondent to such recognition agreement. In agreement with the Administrative Law Judge, I also find that at the April 10 meeting with Jenkins, Whittaker, in making his majority status claims and demand for recognition on behalf of the Union, was making such demand to Jenkins, who was unequivo- cally the ranking managing agent on a local basis. In view of the distance of Fairbanks, where Jenkins was WOMETCO-LATHROP COMPANY 691 located, from Anchorage, where President Hill was located, a distance of approximately 386 air miles, it becomes apparent, and business realities dictate, that Jenkins, as the ranking local agent, necessarily was clothed by Respondent with the authority to perform whatever corporate acts were necessary, including la- bor relations, to insure the continued and uninter- rupted business operations of Respondent in Fair- banks. While the record shows that at an undetermined date following the April 10 meeting Jenkins made a telephone call to Whittaker and indicated that he "was in trouble" with Hill because he should not have executed the recognition agreement and asked Whittaker to tear up the documents Jenkins had signed, I fail to understand how such evidence de- tracts from the fact that Jenkins held himself out to Whittaker and to the Union as having apparent au- thority to bind Respondent when he signed the rec- ognition agreement. Nor do I subscribe to the theory advanced by my colleagues that, in view of Hough's longstanding acquaintance with Hill, Whittaker and the Union had an ulterior motive in pursuing signa- tures to a recognition agreement from Isaacson and Jenkins. There is no support for such theory in this record. Not until the April 29 meeting, a period of 19 days, did the Union hear directly from President Hill that Jenkins had no authority to sign the recognition agreement. The record indicates that Hill was aware of the Union's demand for recognition as early as April 10 but made no effort to disclaim the conduct of either Isaacson or Jenkins until the meeting of April 29. While the Union attended the meeting to commence the discussion of contract proposals, Hill waited until this time to raise the issue that Jenkins had exceeded his authority. A reasonable inference can be made that Respondent was hopeful that the passage of time would erode the Union's support. I find that Hill's conduct in raising the issue of Jen- kins' authority and insisting on an election was belat- ed and a delaying tactic which constitutes evidence of bad faith. Thus, Respondent has failed to meet its burden of disclaiming the act of an agent who has exceeded his authority, upon its acquiring knowledge of such act, by timely notice to any known persons who may have dealt, in good faith as herein, with such agent on an inference that such agent had ap- parent authority to act for his principal. Respondent acquiesced in, and thereby ratified, Jenkins' conduct by failing to notify the Union of Jenkins' limited au- thority.' As the Union relied on the apparent author- ity of Jenkins to bind his principal, and as Respon- dent failed to timely disclaim the conduct of its agent, Jenkins, Respondent was estopped from belat- edly denying the authority of Jenkins to grant recog- nition to the Union. By such conduct, Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. Although my colleagues have copied rather lengthy sections of the Restatement of Agency to buttress their contrary conclusion, a careful reading of the sections cited by the majority illustrates full support for the position I have taken herein. My col- leagues misread the record when they find that the evidence is lacking that President Hill ever led the union representatives to believe that Jenkins had the authority to sign the recognition agreement. What the record shows, and what my colleagues ignore, is that Jenkins signed the recognition agree- ment on April 10, and President Hill made no effort to revoke Jenkins' apparent authority to act for his principal until the first bargaining meeting on April 29. Such conduct on the part of Hill, in my view, falls squarely within the language of Restatement, Sec- ond, Agency §27 (1958). "[A]pparent authority to do an act is created as to a third person by written or spoken words or any other conduct of the principal which, reasonably interpreted, causes the third person to believe that the principal consents . . . ." (Em- phasis supplied.) President Hill's motive for keeping silent for such an unreasonable time during a crucial period of negotiations can only be attributed to a desire to purchase more of that precious commodity called time. Nor can my colleagues argue that President Hill had no knowledge of Jenkins' recognition act, since the record shows that Jenkins had been in touch with President Hill between April 10 and April 29, in view of Jenkins' telephone call to Whittaker in which he stated that he was in trouble with Hill because he had signed the recognition agreement. Clearly, Hill's conduct in remaining silent, when he was obligated to revoke the agency of Jenkins, falls within Restate- ment, Second, Agency §27 (1958). "Thus, either the principal must intend to cause the third person to believe that the agent is authorized to act for him, or he should realize that his conduct is likely to create such belief." (Emphasis supplied.) In my view, Hill, as president of Respondent, had the burden of dis- pelling the Union's belief in the apparent authority of Jenkins to sign a recognition agreement upon his acquiring knowledge of such act. Clearly, Hill's fail- ure to do so may be fairly construed as indicative of an intent by Hill to treat the purportedly unauthor- ized conduct by Jenkins as authorized. President Hill was apparently willing to let stand, for a convenient period, Whittaker's impression that the only limitation placed on Jenkins' authority with 6 Broad Street Hospital and Medical Center, 182 NLRB 302 (1970) respect to labor relations was that Jenkins had no 692 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD authority to bind Respondent to a contract, notwith- standing his many opportunities to do so, but that Jenkins did have authority to sign a recognition agreement. Although the majority rejects as Ipse dixit my refer- ence to the economic reality that Jenkins was neces- sarily clothed with apparent authority to perform corporate acts, including labor relations, to insure uninterrupted business operations in Fairbanks, the majority substitutes therefor the broad generalization that it is the Board's experience that a company with widely scattered operations will rarely permit local officials to assume the initiative in labor relations matters. However, it has been my experience that the more remote an operation is the more autonomous it must be in handling daily business matters, including labor relations. The majority feebly attempts to distinguish Broad Street Hospital, supra. However, the distinctions which it makes are without substantial difference. There, as here, the union was never alerted to the purported limited authority of the individual dealing with the union; the record demonstrated that the re- spondent cloaked the individual with apparent au- thority to deal with the union and the union believed and had good reason to believe that such individual possessed the authority he exercised; and there, as here, the Restatement of Agency supported the find- ing that the individual acted within the scope of his authority in recognizing the union, and that it could be reasonably inferred that the individual's acts were acquiesced in and ratified by the respondent. Finally, and as found by the Administrative Law Judge, Respondent, through its agent, Hill, engaged in further acts of bad faith at the April 29 meeting. As the meeting neared an end, Hill reiterated that Jenkins had no authority to do what he had done and stated further that if the Union continued to pur- sue the matter of recognition and bargaining that Re- spondent "might have a new manager and assistant by the end of the month." That such statement con- stituted a threat to the employees on the bargaining committee in violation of Section 8(a)(1) is clearly documented on the record which shows that, at the end of the meeting, one of the employees expressed concern over the fact that Jenkins might lose his job as a consequence of his recognizing the Union. Thus, the employees could reasonably ask, if Respondent was prepared to discharge his manager and assistant manager for recognizing the Union, what form of punishment did Respondent have in store for em- ployees who joined or were active in the Union. Cer- tainly the employees could infer that they might not fare much better and that they could expect similar recriminations by Respondent. Accordingly, I dissent from the majority's dismiss- al of the complaint in its entirety. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JAMES T. BARKER, Administrative Law Judge: This case was heard before me, at Fairbanks, Alaska, on December 2, 1975,! pursuant to an order consolidating cases, consoli- dated complaint, and notice of hearing issued on June 20, by the Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board for Region 19. The consolidated complaint alleges violations of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, hereinafter called the Act. The charges giving rise to the consolidated complaint were filed by Local 1689, Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO, hereinafter called the Union, on May 2. Re- spondent denies the commission of any unfair labor prac- tices. The parties timely filed briefs with me. Upon the entire record in this case, and based upon my observation of the witnesses, and the briefs of the parties, I hereby make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT Wometco-Lathrop Company, hereinafter called Respon- dent, is an Alaska corporation engaged in the operation of motion picture theaters and office rentals in the State of Alaska. Respondent maintains an office and place of busi- ness located in Fairbanks, Alaska. During the 12-month period preceding the issuance of the complaint herein, Respondent had a gross volume of business in excess of $500,000, and during the same period of time, in the course and conduct of its business opera- tions, Respondent purchased and caused to be transferred and delivered to its Alaska facilities goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000, which were transported to said facility directly from States other than the State of Alaska. Upon these facts, which are not in dispute, I find that Respondent is, and has been at all times material herein, an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 11. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Local 1689, Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO, is conceded by Respondent to be a labor orga- nization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act, and I so find. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Issues The principal issues in this case are whether or not on 1 Unless otherwise specified, all dates refer to the calendar year 1975 WOMETCO-LATHROP COMPANY April 10 Respondent recognized the Union as the collec- tive-bargaining representative of its employees; and wheth- er thereafter, at a meeting on April 29, Respondent refused to meet and bargain collectively with the Umon and inter- fered with employee Section 7 rights by threatening to ter- minate the manager and assistant manager of its Fair- banks, Alaska, motion picture theaters, unless the Union and the employees present at the meeting in question aban- doned their claim that Respondent had recognized the Union. Subsumed within the recognition issue are the additional prefatory issues relating to the appropriateness of the unit and the majority status of the Union in the unit at the time of its recognition demand. In support of the 8(a)(5) allegations of the complaint, the General Counsel contends, in substance, that the manager and assistant manager of Respondent's Fairbanks motion picture theaters were agents of Respondent, fully vested with authority to grant recognition to the Union as the majority representative of the employees which the Union sought to represent. On the other hand, in challenging the legal validity of the 8(a)(5) allegations, Respondent, in ef- fect, contends that neither the manager nor assistant man- ager knowingly and with informed intention extended rec- ognition to the Union on the occasions alleged by the General Counsel; and further asserts that, in any event, neither individual was vested with apparent or ostensible authority to extend recognition to the Union. Moreover, in this latter regard, contends Respondent, notwithstanding the theoretical legal effects of the statements and conduct of the manager in arguendo extending recognition to the Union, a timely disclaimer of recognition was made by Respondent's president and principal officer which, Re- spondent asserts, had the legal effect of relieving Respon- dent of any obligation to bargain with the Union. B. Pertinent Facts Respondent operates two motion picture theaters in Fairbanks, Alaska. It also operates motion picture theaters in Anchorage and Juneau, Alaska, and office buildings in Fairbanks and Anchorage. Donald K. Hill is president of Respondent and main- tains his business office in Anchorage Donald R. Jenkins is manager of Respondent's two Fairbanks theaters, the Goldstream and the Lacey Street. Michael A. Isaacson is the assistant manager of the two theaters, which are situat- ed approximately 1.2 miles apart. Jenkins and Isaacson ex- ercise responsibility over both theaters and the authority of each extends alike to the two theaters. The Goldstream and Lacey Street theaters are the only commercial motion pic- ture theaters situated in the business area of Fairbanks. However, there is a motion picture theater at a university near Fairbanks, and one at each of the two military bases situated in the environs of Fairbanks. There is also an adult theater operated in Fairbanks. At its Goldstream and Lacey Street theaters, Respon- dent employs projectionists, cashiers, doormen, ushers, usherettes, and concessionaires performing the job tasks normally associated with their job classifications. Conces- 693 sionaires serve the public with candy bars, popcorn, ice cream, and other miscellaneous concession items, ring up sales, and make change. The employees employed in the two theaters wear no distinctive uniforms but dress in per- sonal clothing conforming to a minimum standard of neat- ness established by management. There is some inter- change of employees between the Goldstream and Lacey Street theaters on an emergency or temporary basis, and permanent transfers from one theater to another have been effected. An identical wage scale or rate for identical work tasks prevails between the two theaters. Media ads feature both theaters and engagements at one theater are not ad- vertised to the exclusion of engagements at the other. The projectionists employed by Respondent at its the- aters situated in the State of Alaska are represented under the terms of an existing collective-bargaining agreement. The Union initiated its campaign among Respondent's nonprojectionist employees in the spring of 1975 under the direction of James C. Whittaker, international representa- tive of the Union. These employees have never been repre- sented by a labor organization. On April 9, Whittaker went to the Goldstream theater for the purpose of meeting with Michael Isaacson, Respondent's assistant manager. Whittaker was accompa- nied by Aaron Davis, an employee of Respondent. In speaking with Isaacson, Whittaker introduced himself and told Isaacson that he was there for the purpose of demand- ing recognition for the employees of both the Goldstream and Lacey Street theaters. Whittaker added that he had a recognition agreement he wanted Isaacson to sign, and as- serted that the Union represented the majority of the em- ployees in the bargaining unit. Whittaker stated that, in addition to signing the recognition agreement, he desired to have Isaacson initial the petition for union representa- tion, which, Whittaker averred, had been signed by a ma- jority of the employees at the two theaters. Isaacson read the recognition agreement which was a standard form agreement of the Union. Blanks or spaces were provided on the form-agreement for incorporating a description of the unit in which recognition was being sought and for delineating the date or time at which collective-bargaining negotiations would commence. The form also contained signature lines. Prior to meeting with Isaacson, Whittaker had made a typewritten entry on the petition for union representation describing the collective-bargaining unit in which he was seeking recognition as: All employees of the Goldstream and Lacey Street theatres in Fairbanks, Alaska, excluding the motion picture projectionists in the aforestated theatres. Isaacson read the document and observed that he had be- come aware that there was an "organizing program in pro- gress." He suggested that Whittaker should speak to Jen- kins. Whittaker asserted that as assistant manager Isaacson could sign the agreement. Isaacson was insistent and stated his desire to speak with Jenkins. He inquired if Whittaker would like to speak with Jenkins. Whittaker stated that he would meet with Jenkins and suggested a meeting for 2 p in. the following day Thereupon, Isaacson went to a nearby telephone and spoke for a period of time. Whittak- 694 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD er could hear Isaacson speaking. After completing the tele- phone conversation, Isaacson stated that Jenkins had in- formed him that he could sign the document which Whit- taker had presented to him with the understanding that, in affixing his signature, he, Isaacson, was not binding the Company to a collective-bargaining agreement. Whittaker assured Isaacson that the document was "purely an agree- ment to recognize" the Union as bargaining representative of the employees. Isaacson filled in the blank which had the effect of specifying that collective-bargaining negotia- tions would commence on "a mutually agreeable date." Thereupon, Isaacson signed and dated the recognition agreement and Whittaker affixed his signature. Whittaker then submitted the petition for union representation to Isaacson for initialling. In doing so, Whittaker inquired, "Is that a majority question?" Isaacson studied the petition and answered, "Yes, it appears to be." Isaacson signed the petition. Pursuant to the previous arrangement, Whittaker met on April 10 with Jenkins, manager of Respondent's Fairbanks theaters. Whittaker was accompanied to the meetings by Fred Hough, president of the Local. At the outset of the meeting, following introductions, Whittaker informed Jen- kins that he and Hough were present on behalf of the em- ployees of the Company, "for the purpose of collective bar- gaining." Whittaker further told Jenkins that the Union represented the majority of the Company's employees and that he desired to have Jenkins sign a recognition agree- ment and to affix his signature to a petition signed by a majority of the employees. Whittaker presented an un- signed copy of the recognition agreement to Jenkins, and he also submitted a petition for union representation bear- ing the purported signatures of 15 employees. Whittaker asserted that the petition could be used by the Union, either as a basis for obtaining voluntary recognition, or to support a representation petition leading to a Board elec- tion. Jenkins studied the signatures and the petition and commented that "a few employees listed" were no longer with the Company. However, Jenkins agreed that the peti- tion contained signatures of a present majority. Jenkins added that he desired to stabilize his work force and, in substance, sought to learn if the Union would be of any benefit in this regard. Whittaker answered, in effect, that fair wage rates and benefits could have this effect. In re- sponse, Jenkins noted that the theaters had to operate on a profitable basis, and he observed that the present "boom" would not continue. Jenkins inquired as to the level of wages which the Union demanded and Whittaker supplied figures. Jenkins stated that these wage rates would be "out of line" and more than the Company could afford. Whit- taker responded by stating that, under normal process, af- ter the Company recognized the Union, a bargaining com- mittee of employees would be formed and proposals would be formulated for presentation to the Company in the form of contract demands. Jenkins stated that he had no author- ity to bind the Company with respect to contract provision and noted that only Donald Hill, president of Respondent, had that authority. At this point in the meeting, however, Whittaker again informed Jenkins that he desired Jenkins to sign the recog- nition agreement and the related petition. As a result of questions posed by Jenkins, Whittaker assured Jenkins that the recognition agreement did not have the effect of bind- ing the Company to specific contract terms. Whittaker stat- ed that by signing the recognition agreement , he was mere- ly recognizing the Union for the purposes of collective bar- gaining and that this would have the legal effect of requiring both the Company and the Union to bargain for a reasonable time in an effort to achieve a collective-bar- gaining agreement. Thereupon, Jenkins affixed his signa- ture to the recognition agreement and inserted the phrase, "mutually agreeable date," signifying the time at which ne- gotiations would commence. Jenkins also signed a copy of the petition for union representation. Following the April 10 meeting, Whittaker contacted Jenkins and informed him that the Union would be avail- able for a bargaining meeting on April 29. Thereafter, Whittaker received a telephone call from Jenkins who stat- ed that he "was in trouble" with Hill because, in substance, he should not have executed the recognition agreement. He requested Whittaker to tear up the documents which he had executed. Whittaker stated, in substance, that he could not do so because he had responsibilities to a group of employees who desired representation. Whittaker stated that the documents which Jenkins had signed were "still valid." Despite Jenkins' urgings, Whittaker refused to de- stroy the documents. Rather, Whittaker suggested that the meeting which had been scheduled for April 29 be held. On April 29, Whittaker and Hough met with Hill and Jenkins. Additionally, a three-member employee bargain- ing committee attended the meeting. At the beginning of the meeting, Whittaker took the ini- tiative in making the introductions and turned the meeting over to Hough. Hough presented to Hill the bargaining proposals which had been formulated by the committee. Hill stated that this was premature in that Jenkins had signed documents which he had no authority to sign. Hill added that for this reason he was not going to sit down at this time in an attempt to reach a contract. Hough re- sponded that the Union had signatures of a majority of the Company's employees which accorded the Union represen- tation rights. Hough further stated, in substance, that the local manager had extended recognition to the Union. Hill again asserted that Jenkins had no authority to extend rec- ognition and that, as a consequence, Jenkins acted in an invalid manner. Hill added that the matter should be re- solved by an election. At this point in time , Hill also raised a question concerning certain interunion implications of extending recognition to the Union. After this matter was discussed briefly, Hough again summarized the events which had supported the Union's recognition and bargain- ing rights . Hill stated, in effect, that he would not discuss contract terms and asserted that the issue should be re- solved by a Board election. He reiterated that Jenkins had no right to do what he had done, and he stated that if the matter were "pursued," the Company "might have a new Manager and Assistant by the end of the month." As he made this statement, Hill looked directly at the three em- ployees who were present and who comprised the bargain- ing committee. Hill added that the Union should consult with his attorney on the matter. The meeting ended on this note. As the meeting terminated, one of the employees ex- WOMETCO-LATHROP COMPANY 695 pressed concern over the fact that Jenkins might lose his job as a consequence of the developments.2 Donald Hill has been acquainted with Fred Hough for a substantial period of time. He had not previously known James Whittaker. Conclusions I find upon the basis of the foregoing that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. In concluding that Respondent breached its bargaining obligation under the Act, as alleged in the complaint, I make the predicate finding that on April 10 the Union made a valid demand for recognition and bargaining in an appropriate unit. This basic finding is further supported by the conclusion, which I reach, that the General Counsel sustained his burden of showing that, at the time of the recognition and bargaining demand, the Union repre- sented a majority of the employees comprising the bargain- ing unit. Initially, the unit comprised of all unrepresented em- ployees employed by Respondent at its Goldstream and Lacey Street theaters is clearly an appropriate bargaining unit, in light of the similarity of employee skills utilized; the incidents of interchange and transfer of employees from one theater to the other; the geographic proximity of the two theaters and environs of Fairbanks; and the com- mon management, centralized administration, and control of the two Fairbanks theaters. Petrie Stores Corporation, 212 NLRB 130 (1974). The findings herein made with respect to the recognition and bargaining demand lodged with Respondent's manag- er on April 19 are based upon evidence not materially in dispute. The occurrences of April 10 which form the grava- men of the complaint's allegations relating to Respondent's extension of recognition to the Union may not, in realistic terms, be separated from the precursor events of the previ- ous day. Thus, on April 9, after being pressed by Whittak- er, on behalf of the Union, to extend recognition, Assistant Manager Isaacson conversed by telephone at some length with Manager Jenkins. Following that conversation, Isaac- 2 All of the foregoing is based upon a careful consideration of the testimo- ny of James Whittaker, Donald Jenkins, and Donald Hill I have evaluated the testimony of Hill and Jenkins and credit it to the extent that it is consis- tent with the foregoing findings Specifically, with respect to the separate meetings of April 9 and April 10 conducted between Whittaker and Hough , on the one hand , and Isaacson and Jenkins, on the other, I have evaluated the effects, if any, upon credibil- ity of the superior experience, expertise , and sophistication of Whittaker in matters of labor relations , as compared with that of Isaacson and /or Jen- kins Isaacson was not called as a witness and I find nothing in the testimo- ny of Whittaker which would warrant a rejection of his description of the event which transpired at the April 9 meeting with Isaacson On the other hand , although Jenkins was called as a witness and testified concerning the events of the April 10 meeting, he did not, in material respects, refute the testimony of Whittaker as to the events and dialogue which comprised the substantive elements of the April 10 conference between them Thus , insofar as Whittaker's testimony relates to the factual chronology, I find no basis emanating from his experience as a labor representative for discrediting his version of the events which comprised the meeting Rather , the issue of the comparative sophistication of Respondent 's witnesses vis-a-vis Whittaker is significant only in determining whether, in the factual context of this pro- ceeding, a meeting of the minds was achieved with respect to recognition which would serve to legally bind the Company to bargain collectively with the Union son signed the recognition form which had been proffered to him by Whittaker, and he affixed his signature to the petition bearing a sufficient number of employee signa- tures to constitute a numerical majority of unrepresented employees. Isaacson did this after receiving an explanation as to the meaning of recognition and after requesting and receiving assurances from Whittaker that his act bound Respondent to no specific contract •.-rms. The inference thus to be drawn is that in signing the documents, Isaacson comprehended the distinction between a grant of recogni- tion and concomitant bargaining rights and obligations which redounded both to the Company and Union as a consequence of recognition. In essential terms, the meeting the following day be- tween Jenkins and Whittaker was a duplicate of the April 9 meeting. A paramount distinction between the two meet- ings, however, is that on the occasion of the April 10 meet- ing Whittaker was advancing his recognition and majority status claims on behalf of the Union to the top managing agent on a local basis of the business entity employing the very employees for whom the Union was claiming repre- sentation rights. On the record before me, it may not be convincingly claimed that Manager Jenkins was unaware of the nature and implications of the act he was performing in affixing his signature to the documents in question. Nei- ther document was ambiguous in its terms and it is to be remembered that Jenkins had carried on a discussion with his assistant, Isaacson, the previous day relating not only to the very documents in question, but to the issue of recogni- tion to which the documents pertained.3 Moreover, follow- ing Whittaker's explanation of the Union's claims to recog- nition and resultant bargaining rights, Jenkins specifically affirmed the Union's numerical majority in the unit. It strains matters to contend, as Respondent does, that Whit- taker practiced sophistry upon Jenkins. Rather, I find that despite the relative inexperience of Jenkins in labor rela- tions matters, when he signed the documents he was aware of the distinction between granting recognition to the Union and the ancillary bargaining right devolving to the Union from that grant of recognition. Finally, I find no merit in Respondent's challenge to Jenkins' authority. It is not inconsistent with the realities of commerce and enterprise for a designated representative possessing authority to manage the day-to-day business af- fairs of a commercial entity on a local basis to be vested with authority to extend recognition to a labor organiza- tion seeking to represent the employees over whom that managing agent exercises managerial and supervisory au- thority on a continuing day-to-day basis. By designating Jenkins as manager of its Fairbanks operation, Respon- dent clothed him with ostensible and apparent authority and extended implied consent to him to act in the realm of labor relations. That Whittaker's colleague, Hough, presi- dent of the Local, was acquainted with Donald Hill and knew that Respondent's projectionists were being repre- sented in a statewide unit, does not alter the matter, for the latter representation is by a labor organization other than the Union, and the Union was not privy to those dealings. 2 Isaacson had come back from that conversation with the understanding that he could sign recognition documents but could not commit the Compa- ny to contract terms 696 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Moreover, the record suggests that Donald Hill had ap- prised Jenkins of no limitations upon Jenkins' authority to deal in the realm of labor relations and Jenkins articulated no limitations upon his right to extend recognition when they met together on April 10. Thus, in the foregoing circumstances, I conclude and find that on April 10, by reason of Jenkins' actions, Re- spondent recognized the Union as the majority representa- tive of its theretofore unrepresented employees; and that this extension of recognition was voluntary, in that it sprang from the informed, free choice of Jenkins, who, at the time in question, was a statutory supervisor and the managing agent of Respondent clearly vested with appar- ent authority, acting within the scope of that authority. That he failed first to obtain the specific consent of his superior, Donald Hill, president of Respondent, before ex- tending recognition does not detract from the legal effect of his action. Because the recognition was voluntarily extended by Jenkins after evaluating and concurring in the validity of the Union's claim of majority status, the General Counsel correctly contends that no failure of proof with respect to the Union's majority evolved either from an absence of record evidence tending affirmatively and independently to establish the authenticity of employee signatures on the petitions supporting the recognition agreement , or from the General Counsel's decision not to evince evidence pertain- ing to the precise circumstance of signature acquisition Moisi & Son Trucking, Inc., 197 NLRB 198, fn. 2 (1972). Moreover, upon the rationale of the Board's authoritative decision in Snow & Sons, it is found that the Respondent waived its claim to seek a Board election as a condition to recognizing and bargaining with the Union in that on April 10 its agent Jenkins had voluntarily recognized the Union and had confirmed its majority status. See Fred Snow, Ha- rold Snow and Tom Snow, d/b/a Snow & Sons, 134 NLRB 709 (1961), enfd. 308 F.2d 687 (C.A. 9, 1962); Kellogg's, Inc., d/b/a Kellogg Mills, 147 NLRB 342 (1964), enfd. 347 F.2d 219 (C.A. 9, 1965); Jem Mfg Inc., 156 NLRB 643 (1966); Tony's Sanitation Service, Inc., 203 NLRB 832, 834- 835 (1973). Nor is the Respondent relieved of its recogni- tion and bargaining obligation by virtue of the claim of Hill, belatedly advanced during the course of the April 29 meeting with Whittaker, that he alone, as president of Re- spondent, had the authority to extend recognition to the Union. Indeed, Hill's claim, in and of itself, is an indica- tion of bad faith, for the clear inference of record is that Hill took no personal initiative in communicating to the Union in a timely fashion Jenkins' asserted usurpation of labor relations authority residing, arguendo, exclusively with Hill. Rather, the first inkling of claimed limitations upon Jenkins' authority was communicated to Whittaker by Jenkins orally and in a tangential manner. The thrust of the evidence is such as to infer that Hill was willing to resort to the erosive effects of the passage of time before directly addressing the issue of recognition, and did so only 3 weeks after the fact, as it were, on the occasion of the April 29 meeting, when he countermanded Jenkins' actions and demanded a Board election as a prerequisite to recog- nition. The practical effect of this action on the part of Hill was to repudiate not only Jenkins' grant of recognition to the Union but his authoritative concession of union major- ity status. Applicable here is the Board's observation in Snow & Sons Where, as here, the Employer entertains no reasonable doubt either with respect to the appropriateness of the proposed unit or the Union's representative status, and seeks a Board-directed election without a valid ground therefor, he has failed to fulfill the bargaining requirements under the Act. It is noteworthy that, during the course of the April 29 meeting, Hill demonstrated no disposition toward a full and probing discussion of the basis of the Union's recogni- tion claims. Rather, Hill rested his claim to absolution upon a disclaimer of Jenkins' authority to act on Respondent's behalf and to the advancement of a barren claim of a professed right to have the matter of the Union's representation status determined through the election pro- cesses of the Board . Instead of challenging the Union's majority status directly, he threatened adverse conse- quences with respect to the fob tenure of his manager and assistant manager if the Union and the employees persisted in advancing their bargaining claims. I find Hill's conduct on this occasion evidenced bad faith and violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act in that Hill's adamant refusal to carry on a dialogue with the Union was tantamount to withdrawing recognition of the Union, and constituted a clear-cut present and prospective refusal to meet and to bargain collectively with the Union. Further, Hill's state- ments relating to the job tenure of Jenkins and Isaacson unlawfully threatened the employees before whom the statement was made and thereby interfered with rights guaranteed employees under Section 7 of the Act, in viola- tion of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the operation of Re- spondent described in section I, above, have a close, inti- mate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that the Union represents a majority of employees in an appropriate bargaining unit, and that Re- spondent has refused to recognize and bargain collectively with the Union as the majority representative of its em- ployees in an appropriate unit, I shall recommend that Re- spondent, upon request, bargain collectively with the Union as the representative of said employees. WOMETCO-LATHROP COMPANY 697 Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in this case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Wometco-Lathrop Company is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. Local 1689, Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. On April 10, 1975, Respondent, through a representa- tive and agent vested with full authority to do so, extended recognition to the Union as the majority representative of employees in an appropriate bargaining unit. 4. On April 10, 1975, the Union was the majority repre- sentative of employees in the following described appropn- ate unit: All employees of Respondent at its Goldstream and Lacey Street theatres in Fairbanks, Alaska, excluding motion picture projectionists, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. 5. On April 29, Respondent, through Donald Hill, its president, refused to recognize the Union as the majority representative of its employees in the above-described ap- propriate bargaining unit and failed and refused to meet and bargain with the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of those employees. 6. On April 29, Respondent, through Donald Hill, in the presence of unit employees, threatened to adversely affect the job tenure of management personnel if the Union and employees continued to press their recognition claims, and did thereby interfere with rights guaranteed employees by Section 7 of the Act, and did violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. [Recommended Order omitted from publication.]