The Kroger Co.

512 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The Kroger Company and Retail Clerks Union Local No. 1583, AFL-CIO. Case 26-CA-5891 October 19, 1976 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS FANNING AND PENELLO On April 20, 1976, Administrative Law Judge Eu- gene George Goslee issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel and Charging Party filed exceptions and supporting briefs, and the Respondent filed an answering brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge only to the extent consistent herewith. The complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by refusing to fur- nish the Union with requested data relating to the arbitration of a grievance filed by the Union on April 7, 1975. The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the 8(a)(1) and (5) allegations since he concluded (1) that the complaint herein is barred by the Board's Spiel- berg doctrine,' and (2) Spielberg aside, the General Counsel failed to prove a violation of the Act inas- much as there was substantial compliance with the Union's request and inasmuch as all the information requested by the Union was available to it by con- tractual right which the Union failed to exercise. Contrary to the Administrative Law Judge, and for the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the complaint herein is not barred by the Board's Spiel- berg doctrine and, further, that Respondent failed and refused to furnish information requested by the Union in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. A. Facts On April 7, 1975,2 the Union filed a grievance al- leging that Respondent's implementation of a new 24-hour work schedule at some of its stores and its pay practices thereunder violated provisions of its collective-bargaining agreement with the Union.' ' Spielberg Manufacturing Company, 112 NLRB 1080 (1955) 2 Hereinafter all dates refer to 1975 unless otherwise specified. The dispute was not resolved under the grievance procedure of the contract, and was subsequently scheduled for arbitration on September 3. On June 18, the Union's attorney, Youngdahl, by letter, requested, inter alia, that Respondent furnish the Union with a list of stores where the schedule change was effected, "including the dates of such 1975 change, number of employees affected, etc." Respondent did not reply to the June 18 request. By letter dated August 21, the Union 'again requested information on the grounds of need to prepare for the September 3 arbitration hearing. The Union stat- ed it wanted to know the stores and employees af- fected by the pay practices it was grieving and the dates on which such practices for each began. Re- spondent did not furnish any of the information re- quested by the Union either prior to the arbitration hearing or during the course of those proceedings. The arbitration proceeding occurred on schedule. As more fully described infra, the Union did complain to the arbitrator that it had not received the informa- tion requested. The arbitrator issued his award on October 27; he affirmed in part and denied in part the Union's griev- ance and, noting a lack of information, remanded the case to the parties for the purpose of determining which, if any, employees were entitled to backpay. On November 3, the Union filed the instant charge. On December 10, Respondent furnished the Union with a list of three stores which had implemented the 24-hour operating plan, the dates on which the plan became effective, and the names and classifications of employees there employed who worked through midnight into a second calendar day. However, Respondent's labor relations coordinator, Michael Jameson, testified that since March 1975 as many as five to six of Respondent's stores had implemented 24-hour schedules necessitating cross-midnight work schedules.4 By letter dated December 16, the Union notified Respondent that the information contained in its De- cember 10 letter was insufficient to assess entitlement under the arbitration award inasmuch as it did not state the hours worked by each employee,' and the 3 Respondent's 24-hour work schedule, implemented in March 1975, was first adopted in 3 to 4 of Respondent's 40 stores and was later extended to 1 or 2 others The 24-hour schedule in some instances required employees to work across midnight into a second calendar day According to the Union, any employee required to work a second shift within the second 24-hour period was entitled to premium pay 4 Jameson further testified that, at the time of the hearing, "probably" four stores were still on 24-hour schedules , that only three stores currently maintain such schedules , and that of those three only two had worked on a continual 24-hour schedule. 5 Under the terms of the award, any employee who worked in excess of 8 hours on any calendar day was entitled to premium pay for each hour worked in excess of 8. Similarly , any employee who worked in excess of 40 hours on 5 calendar days would be entitled to premium pay for hours worked in excess of 40 hours on the sixth calendar day. Thus, in order to 226 NLRB No. 77 THE KROGER COMPANY Union therefore initiated a second request. Respon- dent denied the December 16 request and supplied no further information. B. Application of Spielberg The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Board's Spielberg doctrine bars the complaint herein inasmuch as the proceedings conformed with the Board's standards of regularity enumerated therein and since both Respondent and the Union exercised the opportunity to present the unfair labor practice issue at the hearing and to argue the issue in their briefs to the arbitrator. The General Counsel and Charging Party contend that deferral to the award herein is improper inasmuch as the award does not resolve the unfair labor practice issue presented for consideration by the parties. We find merit in this position. A review of the arbitration proceedings reveals that the award touched only tangentially upon the issue of Respondent's obligation to furnish requested data to the Union. Although the Union did protest the refusal of Respondent to supply the information, nowhere does the arbitrator deal with the issue on its merits. Rather, the arbitrator simply acknowledges the presence of the issue by noting that the lack of specific information as to employees affected and dates involved precluded any determination as to amounts of backpay owing. Accordingly, he remand- ed the case to the parties to determine which, if any, employees were entitled to payment in accordance with the principles set forth in his award. Thus, it is clear that, in lieu of resolving the sub- stantive issue of Respondent's duty to furnish infor- mation, the arbitrator treated the Union's request for information as a matter of compliance with the terms of the award best left for resolution by the parties. We thus conclude that the award herein does not resolve the unfair labor practice issue which the Board is called upon to decide 6 Accordingly, we do not regard the award as controlling.7 compute backpay owing, it was necessary to obtain records of the hours worked by each employee in any given week in those stores which adopted the 24-hour operating plan. 6 Moreover, assuming, arguendo, that deferral is appropriate with respect to the Union's informational requests submitted prior to issuance of the award, in no event is deferral proper with respect to requests made subse- quent thereto, since (1) it is by definition not possible to pass upon the propriety of requests made in futuro, and (2) the arbitrator did not purport to retain jurisdiction for the ,purpose of resolving future disputes over re- quests for information. Monsanto Chemical Company, 130 NLRB 1097 (1961). General Counsel sets forth several other grounds in support of his contention that this case is not a proper one for deferral under the Board's Spielberg doctrine. In view of our holding herein, we find it unnecessary to pass on these contentions. 513 C. Respondent's Other Defenses Turning to the merits, we find that the evidence amply establishes that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) by its failure to furnish the Union with infor- mation necessary to the proper administration of its collective-bargaining contract and resolution of dis- putes thereunder. Thus, Respondent supplied no in- formation to the Union prior to arbitration proceed- ings and subsequently furnished the Union with data neither complete nor otherwise sufficient to de- termine backpay under the award on December 10, some 6 months following the Union's initial request. Indeed, Respondent did not make any response to the request until the arbitration hearing, when it for the first time asserted that the request was burden- some. The Administrative Law Judge concludes, howev- er, that, even assuming Respondent's failure to com- ply with the Union's informational requests, Respon- dent is relieved of its duty to furnish requested data inasmuch as all the information requested by the Union was available to it by contractual right which the Union failed to exercise.' Thus he finds that, since the necessary data was available to the Union from a review of employee timecard records, and since section A, article 19, of the parties' collective- bargaining, agreement assures the Union access to such records, the Union itself thereby incurred an obligation to request and review such records. We disagree. Absent special circumstances, a union's right to in- formation is not defeated merely because the union may acquire the needed information through an in- dependent course of investigation.' The union is un- der no obligation to utilize a burdensome procedure of obtaining desired information where the employer may have such information available in a more con- venient form. The union is entitled to an accurate and authoritative statement of facts which only the employer is in a position to make.'° It is thus clear that where a request for relevant information' ade- quately informs the employer of the data needed, the employer either must supply such information or ad- 8 The Administrative Law Judge also notes that the Union had recovered some of the needed information pursuant to its own course of investigation. However, the fact that the Union has recovered part of the requested infor- mation does not relieve the Employer of its duty to furnish complete infor- mation 9American Beef Packers, Inc., 193 NLRB 1117, 1120 (1971). Cf Building Construction Employers Association of Lincoln, Nebraska, 185 NLRB 34 (1970), Robert J Weber and Richard K. Weber d/bla Weber Veneer & Ply- wood Company, 161 NLRB 1054, 1056 (1966). 10 S H. Kress & Co., 108 NLRB 1615, 1620-21 (1954). Moreover, assum- ing, arguendo, that the Union unknowingly already possessed all of the nec- essary information, Respondent would at least be obligated to notify the Union that it could furnish no information which the Union did not already possess 514 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD equately set forth the reasons why it is unable to comply." Furthermore, we are unable to perceive how the Union's failure to plead specifically its right to information under the terms of the contract re- lieves the Respondent of any obligation to respond thereto. The mere fact that-the Union's right to infor- mation under Section 8(a)(5) of the Act may, in addi- tion, be codified under the terms of the parties' col- lective-bargaining agreement does not create an obligation on the part of the Union to plead entitle- ment under the contract when formulating its infor- mational request. Respondent contends that compliance with the Union's request would be unduly burdensome in that it would require the examination and analysis of thousands of employee timecards in order to furnish the data requested. We are unclear as to the basis for Respondent's argument. The record evidence indi- cates that a maximum of 5 stores adopted the 24- hour operating plan for varying periods of time dat- ing from March 1, 1975. The information furnished by Respondent on December 10 indicates that, for 3 of the 5 stores which adopted the plan, only 20 em- ployees were-affected by implementation of the new schedule practice. We are thus not persuaded, even taking two additional locations into account, that Respondent would be required to examine thousands of timecards in order to comply with the Union's request. Even assuming, arguendo, that such an inves- tigation would be required and, further, that it would constitute an undue burden on Respondent, that would, at best, constitute a defense only as to the failure to comply with that part of the request which necessitated a review of employee timecards, and then only if Respondent so informed the Union." In any event, the Respondent was not excused from fur- nishing the Union with information pertaining to the remainder of the Union's request and which was in no way burdensome to produce. In sum, we are not persuaded that Respondent was relieved of its duty to furnish information either by the fact that the Union retained independent access to the information sought or by the Respondent's unsupported assertion that compliance would be un- duly burdensome. Accordingly, we conclude that Re- spondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of 'the Act by fail- ing to supply the Union with requested information pertinent to preparation of its grievance for arbitra- tion and to implementation of the arbitrator's award. " Cf. M F A Milling Company, 170 NLRB 1079, 1097 (1968). J I Case Company (Rock Island, Illinois), 118 NLRB 520 (1957), enfd 253 F 2d 149 (C.A 7, 1958) 12 Cf. J I. Case Company, supra at 523 It does not appear that Respon- dent at any time informed the Union that employee timecards constituted the only reliable source from which to compute the desired information; nor did Respondent at any time offer the Union access to such records The Remedy Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices violative of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, we shall order that it cease and desist there- from and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that` the Respondent refused the Union's request for disclosure of data which was sought for the purpose of administering the collec- tive-bargaining agreement and determining compli- ance with the arbitrator's award,. we shall order that the Respondent furnish the Union with information as to schedule changes effected by Respondent's im- plementation of its 24-hour operating plan relevant and necessary to assist the Union in appraising enti- tlement of employees to backpay under the terms of the arbitration award. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re- lations Board- hereby orders that the Respondent, The Kroger Company, Little Rock, Arkansas, its of- ficers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Retail Clerks Union Local No. 1583, AFL-CIO, as the ex- clusive bargaining representative of all employees in the appropriate collective-bargaining unit by failing and refusing to furnish the Union with relevant in- formation as to schedule changes effected by Re- spondent's implementation of its 24-hour operating plan for use in determining entitlement of unit em- ployees to backpay under the terms of the arbitration award. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with the efforts of the Union to bargain collectively with it on behalf of the employees in the appropriate unit. - 2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Furnish Retail Clerks Union Local No. 1583, as exclusive bargaining representative of all employ- ees in the appropriate unit, with the following infor- mation heretofore requested by the Union for its use in administering the collective-bargaining agreement and determining compliance with the terms of the arbitration award: the number of stores which imple- mented Respondent's 24-hour operating plan; the dates on which each store implemented the plan and, where applicable, the dates on which the plan was terminated; the names of those employees affected; and the schedule worked by each employee for each week during which the plan was in effect. THE KROGER COMPANY (b) Post at its stores in the State of Arkansas cop- ies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 13 Copies of said notice, on forms_provided by the Re- gional Director for , Region 26, after being duly signed by a representative of the Respondent, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon re- ceipt thereof,-and be maintained by it for 60 consecu- tive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to plant employees are cus- tomarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 26, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply here- with. 13 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with Retail Clerks Union Local No. 1583, AFL- CIO, as the exclusive representative of our em- ployees in the appropriate unit by failing and refusing upon request to furnish them with in- formation as to schedule changes effected by implementation of our 24-hour operating plan, for use in determining entitlement of unit em- ployees to backpay under the terms of an arbi- tration award, issued September 13, 1975. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with the efforts of the Union to bargain collectively on behalf of employees in the appro- priate unit. WE WILL furnish Retail Clerks Union Local No. 1583, as exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in the appropriate unit, with the following information for its use in administer- ing the collective-bargaining agreement and de- termining compliance with the terms of the arbi- tration award: the number of stores which implemented our 24-hour operating plan; the dates on which the plan was implemented, and, where applicable, the dates on which the plan was terminated; the names of those employees affected; and the schedule worked by each em- 515 ployee for each week during which the plan was in effect. THE KROGER COMPANY DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE EUGENE G. GOSLEE, Administrative Law Judge: This case came on to be heard before me at North Little Rock, Ar- kansas, on February 5, 1976, upon a complaint 1 issued by the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board and an answer filed by The Kroger Company, some- times referred to hereinafter as the Respondent . The issues raised by the pleadings relate to whether or not the Re- spondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, by refusing to comply with the Charging Union's request for data relating to an arbitration proceeding brought under the terms of a collec- tive-bargaining agreement. Briefs have been received from the General Counsel, the Respondent, and the Charging Union, and have been duly considered. Upon the entire record in this proceeding, and having observed the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses, I hereby make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. PRELIMINARY MATTERS (COMMERCE, JURISDICTION, AND LABOR ORGANIZATION) The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find (1) that the Respondent is engaged in the retail sale of grocer- ies from its places of business at Little Rock, Arkansas; (2) that during the 12 months preceding the issuance of the complaint it had gross revenues in excess of $500,000 and purchased products in interstate commerce valued in ex- cess of $50,000; and (3) that the Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. The complaint also alleges, the answer admits, and I find that Retail Clerks Union Local No. 1583, AFL-CIO, hereinafter called the Union, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 1 The complaint in this proceeding was issued on December 19, 1975, upon a charge filed on November 3, 1975, and duly served on the Respon- dent on that date 2 By a stipulation limited to authenticity, all parties to this proceeding jointly introduced a large volume of exhibits , reserving, nevertheless in some instances , objections to the relevancy or materiality of some documents, or portions thereof Because of the volume and length of the exhibits, I re- served ruling pending an opportunity for review Having exercised the op- portunity, I find that many of the documents are neither relevant nor mate- nal to the single issue present in this case. Accordingly , I sustain the Respondent's objection to Joint Exhs J-4 through J-7 and J-9 through J-14 I similarly sustain the Charing Union's objection to Joint Exb. J-19 As to the Charging Union's further objection to Joint Exits. J-20 through J-23, the objection is sustained to any and all contents of the documents , except those portions which reflect that requested data was furnished to the Charging Union. To the extent, moreover, that the beef of the Charging Union is directed to matters outside the scope of the complaint in this case, the contents of its brief have not been considered 516 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD II. THE APPROPRIATE UNIT AND THE UNION'S MAJORITY STATUS The complaint further alleges, the answer admits, and I find that since approximately 1947 the Union has been the recognized exclusive bargaining representative of Respon- dent's employees in the following described unit, and that the parties are signatory to a current collective-bargaining agreement: All full-time and part-time employees in the towns presently covered by this Agreement at its execution and in towns where stores may be operated by the Little Rock Division of The Kroger Co. in the state of Arkansas, including the Delicatessen Department lo- cated in the Employer's store at Rodney Parham Road and Breckenridge Drive, not already covered by another contract within the jurisdiction of Local Union #1583 excluding store managers, co-managers, meat department employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the L.M.R.A. of 1947 as amended. The current collective-bargaining agreement between the parties covers employees in about 40 retail stores in the State of Arkansas, and the record reveals that the employee complement varies from store to store from a low of 15 to a high of -about 120 employees. The essential dispute be- tween the parties, which is at issue here in the limited framework of Respondent's alleged refusal to furnish in- formation, relates to a change in scheduling work hours which the Company implemented in March 1975.3 The es- sential nature of the change was the implementation of a 24-hour schedule, which was first adopted for 3 or 4 of the total of 40 stores, and later extended to 1 or 2 others. The 24-hour schedule had the effect, at least in some instances, that employees worked across midnight into a second cal- endar day, and if a second shift was undertaken within the second 24-hour period, premium pay would, according to the Union's contention, be required. On April 7, based in part on a prior arbitration award of May 16, 1962, the Union's attorney, James E. Youngdahl, filed a grievance on grounds that Respondent's new sched- uling and pay practices violated section B of article 9 of the collective-bargaining agreement . The dispute was not resolved in the grievance processes and was subsequently set down for arbitration at a hearing conducted on Septem- ber 3. In the interim on June 18 Youngdahl wrote to the Re- spondent with respect to the selection of an arbitrator, and listed the damages sought by the Union for Respondent's alleged breach of contract . In the letter Youngdahl also requested that the Company furnish him with a list of the stores where the schedule change was effected , the dates of the 1975 change, and the number of employees affected. In his testimony Youngdahl was unsure whether the re- quest for information of June 18 was repeated between that date and August 21, and in the complete absence of any affirmative evidence, I find that the request was not repeat- ed. In any event, the Respondent did not reply to the June 18 request, and on August 21 Youngdahl sent a second letter to the Respondent repeating the request on grounds 3 All dates hereinafter are in 1975 , unless specified to the contrary of need to prepare for the September 3 arbitration hearing. The record is clear that up to the time of the arbitration hearing the Respondent made no written reply to the Union's requests. Youngdahl testified that on at least six different occasions he orally repeated his request to Re- spondent's attorney, James McHaney, but there is no spe- cificity of the dates of the oral requests, the nature of the requests, or Respondent's reply. On September 2, the day before the arbitration hearing, Youngdahl met with Mc- Haney and again requested the information. I am unable to ascertain from the record, however, whether McHaney provided, some, though not all, of the requested informa- tion at that time, or whether it was provided at the arbitra- tion hearing on the following day. The record is clear, nev- ertheless, that notwithstanding Respondent's request for a postponement, the Union chose to proceed with the arbi- tration, even though it now complains that it lacked suffi- cient data to prepare for the hearing or to adequately pre- sent its case. It is clear from the record testimony, the briefs to the arbitrator, and the arbitrator's decision, that the issue of Respondent's failure to provide information was an issue in the arbitration hearing, and that both parties agreed that this issue, as well as the other issues generated by the griev- ance, was properly before the arbitrator for a final and binding determination . In stating the Union's contentions in his award, the arbitrator included the following: 5. The Company violated Article 1, Section A, and Article 8 by failing to supply to the Union relevant facts requested by it during the processing of the scheduling-overtime grievance. The record also reflects that the Union had some rele- vant information concerning the grieved-of schedule change which it presented as documentary evidence at the arbitration hearing. Work schedules were introduced at the arbitration hearing for the three stores which had imple- mented the schedule change up to the date of the arbitra- tion hearing, and the Union also presented the names of a total of 36 employees at these three stores whose pay had been affected by the schedule change for certain specified weeks. However, the Union did not submit evidence indi- cating whether or not the named employees were full-time or part-time, or evidence for what hours the employees should be compensated . In the sum result, the arbitrator affirmed the results of the 1962 arbitration award in part, and denied it in part. However, because the Union failed to produce evidence beyond the names of the employees af- fected by the,schedule change, the arbitrator found that he could not specify what payments, if any, were due the em- ployees, and, accordingly, he remanded that portion of the case to the parties to determine the monetary back pay- ment. The arbitrator's award was issued on October 27, and on November 3 the Union filed the charge in the instant case. This was followed by an exchange of correspondence, par- ticularly between the Regional Office and the Respondent, with respect to the information requested by the Union and its availability. On December 10, as a result of discus- sions and the exchange of correspondence , the Respondent furnished the Union with a list of three stores where work THE KROGER COMPANY 517 schedules were changed by the implementation of the 24- hour operating plan, and the dates on which the change became effective. In addition, Respondent gave the Union the names and classifications of employees at the three stores who worked through midnight into a second calen- dar day. On December 16, the Union advised the Respon- dent that the information provided was not satisfactory because it was insufficient to allow the Union to compute the remedy for the contract violation found by the arbitra- tor. As a condition of withdrawing the charge the Union demanded that the Respondent furnish additional infor- mation with respect to the schedules worked by the em- ployees named in the December 10 letter, including the employee's day off, and the weeks involved in the assign- ment of across-midnight schedules. It is the contention of the General Counsel and the Union that information requested by the Union was essen- tial to both the arbitration process and to the Union's need to interpret the arbitrator's award and effectuate the reme- dy. The Respondent contends, to the contrary, - that be- cause the Union proceeded to arbitration on the issue of the requested information, the charge here is barred by the Board's Spielberg doctrine.' Apart from Spielberg, the Re- spondent argues that the complaint should be dismissed because it has provided the Union with as much informa- tion as is available, that the Union had access to the other information it is now requesting, and that the Respondent was not obligated to perform the Union's work in comput- ing data alleged to be necessary to interpret and apply the arbitrator's award. For reasons related below, I find merit in Respondent's contentions. It is clear from the record that the Union proceeded to arbitration with knowledge that the Respondent had not complied with its request for information which it now contends was essential to both the presentation of its case before the arbitrator and the interpretation and application of the award. The Union filed the grievance on April 7, and in mid-May demanded arbitration. It was not until June 18, however, that the Union initiated its first request for information. When the Respondent did not respond to the initial request, the Union waited until August 21, less than 2 weeks before the scheduled arbitration, to repeat its request. Although the Union now contends that the Com- pany failed to comply, it chose not to seek a postponement and to proceed with the arbitration schedule. The record is similarly clear that the issue of Respon- dent's obligation to furnish the information requested was before the arbitrator by agreement of the Union and the Respondent, and the Union exercised the opportunity to present the issue at the hearing and argue the issue in its brief to the arbitrator. If the arbitrator failed to decide this issue in the Union's favor, and if his award is less than a model of clarity on the issue of the schedule change and its impact, the Union cannot now complain that the right re- sult was prevented by Respondent's sins of omission. This finding is the more apparent because, as found below, the Union had access by contractual right to all of the infor- mation necessary to present its case and achieve a mean- ingful remedy. 4 Spielberg Manufacturing Co, 112 NLRB 1080 (1955). The Board is not bound, as a matter of law, by an arbi- tration award. Where, however, all parties acquiesce in the arbitration proceeding, the proceedings appear to have been fair and regular, and the arbitrator's decision is not clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act, the Board will, recognize the arbitrator's award as a means to accomplish the voluntary settlement of labor disputes.' These conditions have been met in the instant case. The Union raised the issue of Respondent's failure to supply information and acquiesced in the decision to submit this issue to the arbitrator. The arbitration proceeding appears to have been fair and regular, and it cannot be said that the arbitrator's decision is repugnant to the purposes and poli- cies of the Act. Moreover, the issues presented to the arbi- trator by agreement of the parties are clearly issues of con- tract interpretation and are appropriate for resolution by resort to the contractually agreed-upon grievance and arbi- tration provisions .6 Assuming arguendo, however, that the rule of Spielberg and later cases should not be applied here, I also find merit in Respondent's contention that the General Counsel has not proved any violation of the Act. It is apparent that the Union had some of the desired information in its posses- sion at the time of the arbitration, including the stores af- fected by the schedule change and the names of the em- ployees affected. On December 10, the Respondent furnished the Union with a list of three stores, the dates the schedule changes were instituted, as well as the names and classifications of employees' who worked shifts across cal- endar days. This is essentially the same information the Union possessed when it proceeded to arbitration on Sep- tember 3. What the General Counsel and the Union contend, nev- ertheless, is that the information obtained by the Union through its own resources, or as provided for by the Re- spondent, is not sufficient to interpret the arbitrator's award or to effectuate a complete remedy. At no time dur- ing the course of this proceeding was the General Counsel or the Union very specific about what information was desired. According to Youngdahl's testimony he verbalized at the arbitration hearing the Union's need for the stores affected by the schedule changes, the names of the employ- ees, the hours they worked, and when the schedule change started and stopped. It is clear that the Union possessed some of this information, and as best as I can detect the complaint is now that the information obtained is inade- quate to interpret the arbitrator's award and to frame a remedy. More particularly the Union now contends that it needs more in-depth data to show specifically what hours the employees worked, the days off scheduled for each em- ployee, and whether the employees affected worked a full 40-hour week in each of the weeks while the schedule change was in effect. What the record reflects is that this information, plus all the information requested by the Union, was available to it by contractual right, which the Union failed to exercise. Some of the information could have been obtained from the weekly work schedule posted 5 Sptelberg, supra at 1081-82. 6Atlantic Richfield Company, 199 NLRB 1224 (1972); Malrite of Wiscon- sin, Inc, 198 NLRB 241 (1972) 518 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD in each store, and all of the information could have been obtained from the employees' timecards. Section C of article 7 of the collective-bargaining agree- ment between the parties requires Respondent to post weekly work schedules in each store where the agreement ,is applicable. In addition, the collective-bargaining agree- ment contains a clause on "Time Cards," which provides as follows in section A of article 19: Employees will be responsible for signing in or punching, their own time cards and will be paid in accordance with time records on such cards, When requested to do so, the Employer shall make such records available at a reasonable time to an au- thorized representative of the Union for examination. Insofar as the weekly work schedules are concerned, the record reveals that the Union had access to data by reason that its stewards and business agents have access under the bargaining agreement to the premises of each store. It is uncontroverted, on the other hand, that the Respondent does not maintain a record of the weekly work schedules, and that its computerized pay system is not programmed to return the information requested by the Union. - In its entirety, the information the Union alleges was necessary' to process the grievance and arbitration, and necessary to interpret and apply the arbitrator's award, was available from the employees' timecards. As stated above, the Union has the contractual-right, upon request, to re- quire the Respondent to produce the timecards for exami- nation. The Union never made,any such request, and I am unimpressed with the argument of the General Counsel and the Union that Respondent's defense is foreclosed by evidence that the Company failed to volunteer to produce the timecards. The Union must be presumed to know the contents of its own collective-bargaining agreement, and its failure to implement section A of article 19 of the contract requires the mference that (1) the information It requested was not really required for collective-bargaining purposes; or (2) that the Union's request was not for information and data, but rather for a computation resulting from a review of the data. From the record as a whole it is clear that a review, of the timecards would have produced the information and data the Union now insists was essential to the processing of the grievance and the implementation of the arbitrator's award. It is equally clear that a- review of the timecards was a major undertaking, which the Union insisted was an obli- gation of the Respondent. The employer has an obligation under Section 8(a)(5) of the Act to furnish relevant infor- mation requested by the employees' representative, but-the obligation does not entail compliance with the bargaining agent's demand for computation or analysis of the data. As the Board has held: But it does not follow that the union is,entitled to such information in the- exact form or on the exact terms requested. "It is-sufficient if the information is made available in a manner, not so burdensome or time-con- suming as to impede, the process of bargaining." 7 "Good-faith bargaining requires only that such infor- mation be made available at a reasonable time and in a reasonable place and with an opportunity for the Union to make a copy of such information if it so desires." 8 In -summary I find and conclude that the complaint in this proceeding is barred by the Board's Spielberg doctrine. I further find and conclude, Spielberg to the contrary not- withstanding,- that on the merits, the General Counsel has failed to prove that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Respondent,- The Kroger Company, is an ',em- ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section -2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union, Retail Clerks Union Local No. 11583, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. The General Counsel has not proved that the Respon- dent violated the National Labor Relations Act in any re- spect. [Recommended Order for dismissal omitted from publi- cation.] 7 Citing The Cincinnati Steel Castings,Company, 86 NLRB 592 , 593 (1949). 8 United Aircraft Corporation (Pratt and Whitney Division), 192 NLRB 382, 389 (1971), enfd sub nom Machinists v United Aircraft Corporation, 534 F.2d 422 (C A 2, 1975), citing Lasko Metal Products, Inc, 148 NLRB 976, 979 (1964)