Signal Delivery Service, Inc.

SIGNAL DELIVERY SERVICE, INC Signal Delivery Service, Inc. and Raphael Rizza. Case 6-CA-8530 November 8, 1976 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS FANNING AND PENELLO On June 30, 1976, Administrative Law Judge Ju- lius Cohn issued the attached Decision in this pro- ceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed an answering brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re- lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the Respondent, Signal Delivery Service, Inc., Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JULIUS COHN, Administrative Law Judge: This case was heard at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on February 23 and 24, 1976. Upon a charge filed and served on August 11, 1975, the Regional Director for Region 6 issued the complaint in this proceeding on December 18, 1975,' alleging that Signal Delivery Service, Inc., herein called the Respondent or Company, violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by its refusal to employ Raphael Rizza because of his union and concerted activities on behalf of General Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local 249 a/w International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, herein called the Union. Respon- dent filed an answer denying the commission of unfair la- bor practices. 1 All dates hereinafter refer to 1975 Issue 843 Whether Respondent stopped calling Raphael Rizza for work and refused to employ him because he had engaged in protected concerted activities. All parties were given full opportunity to participate, to introduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to argue orally, and to file briefs. The General Counsel and Respondent submitted briefs which have been carefully considered. On the entire record in the case and from my observa- tion of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the fol- lowing: FINDINGS OF FACT I THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY Respondent, an Illinois corporation, has a place of busi- ness in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, where it is engaged in transporting merchandise for Sears, Roebuck and Co. During the 12-month period immediately preceding the is- suance of the complaint herein, Respondent performed ser- vices valued in excess of $50,000 within the Common- wealth of Pennsylvania for Sears, Roebuck and Company, and during the same period Sears, Roebuck and Company has sold products valued in excess of $500,000 and has received goods valued in excess of $50,000 from outside the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania which were shipped di- rectly to it from places outside of Pennsylvania. The com- plaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that the Com- pany is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Facts Respondent is engaged in the home delivery of appli- ances and furniture and also in store shuttle work at the Sears distribution center in Pittsburgh. Until January 3, another company, Harrison-Shields (herein called Harri- son), performed loading work for Sears at the same distri- bution center, but made no deliveries from that particular center. Harrison's dockworkers, as well as Respondent's drivers and dockworkers, were represented at this Sears' facility by the Union. By the latter part of 1974 rumors were circulating con- cerning the possibility of Harrison going into bankruptcy and the absorption of its work by Respondent. In October or November 1974 John King, Respondent's vice president for industrial relations, had discussions with the Union's representatives concerning this possibility. King informed Richard Peluso, secretary-treasurer of the Union and busi- ness agent for the employees of Respondent, that Respon- dent had applied for authority to serve some of the points 226 NLRB No. 134 844 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD involved. King said Respondent intended to accept any of the Harrison work tendered it by Sears and perform that work under its own contract with the Union and with its own employees. As predicted, the bankruptcy of Harrison occurred early in January and on or about January 20 Re- spondent commenced loading work formerly performed by Harrison. Just prior to that, King had further discussions with the Union in which he told the union representatives that he was aware of the contract between Harrison and the Union but that Respondent was not going to purchase any equipment, or have any authority, or take over any Harrison employees. At this meeting there was some dis- cussion about employing former Harrison people. Accord- ing to Peluso, the union representatives requested this of King because it is the Union's policy to persuade a compa- ny to hire the employees of another company within the same local's jurisdiction, from which it takes over loading and hauling work. King replied that Respondent would give the Union the opportunity to fill vacancies from their extra boards at the union hall, and, if Harrison employees were referred, the Company would have no objection to them. Further, if such employees gained sufficient time to complete their probationary period they would be placed on the seniority list. King stated that there was no discus- sion about calling Harrison employees in order of senior- ity. Raphael Rizza, the Charging Party, had been employed by Harrison as a dockman from 1970 until they ceased doing business in January. He testified that in January, at a meeting of former Harrison employees held in the union office, Nick Sansotta, vice president of the Union, told them that Harrison people would be called by Respondent in seniority order after the Company's own list and extra list had been exhausted. Sansotta did not testify at the hearing and the testimony of King concerning employment by Respondent of Harrison employees is corroborated by Peluso who attended the meetings with King as described above. Thomas McDonough, the union steward at Respondent during this period of time, testified that a week after the meeting in January, at which King stated that he would have no objection to calling former Harrison employees to work, he met with Norman McGowan, Respondent's re- gional manager, in his office and asked McGowan if he had any objection to using the Harrison people in accor- dance with the seniority list. Allegedly McGowan said he did not object if he could obtain a list and a day or two later McDonough gave him a list of the Harrison employ- ees in seniority order with their telephone numbers on it. Although there is no doubt that such a list was delivered to Respondent because thereafter Respondent admittedly called former Harrison employees at their homes, the ques- tion as to whether McDonough then agreed to call them in order of seniority is something else and I cannot credit McDonough in this regard. McGowan testified that it was agreed to use Harrison employees after the Company ex- hausted its own list. However, it does not appear probable that McGowan, a few days after King, his superior, met with union representatives, would make an agreement as to seniority at variance with the position taken by King. Moreover, McDonough's credibility is suspect because his testimony on other matters, particularly the extent of his duties as dispatcher and the duration of those duties, was very contradictory. In addition he should be regarded as a biased witness because he had been relieved as steward and subsequently discharged by the Company for having en- gaged in an illegal strike. His discharge by Respondent was thereafter upheld by an arbitrator and an unfair labor practice charge as to that matter was dismissed by the Re- gional Director. The collective-bargaining agreement between the Union and Respondent provided that an employee who worked 30 days within a 60-day period attained regular status and was added to the Company's seniority roster. As such he had priority over any extra or casual employee and had the right to be called to work before any such person. Any extras or casuals were probationary employees and could be discharged or not called for work at will. This require- ment for the attainment of regular status did not apply during the period from June 1 to September 1 of each year. As the Company needed additional people almost on a daily basis, its practice was to utilize first its own seniority list, as well as its own extra list which it maintained, and thereafter to call outside people whom the Company knew to be experienced, and also to call the Union's hiring hall (extra list). The purpose of delivering the list of former Harrison employees, with their telephone numbers noted thereon, was to give the Company an opportunity to call them before going to the union hall or outside. During the period from January to mid-April, Respondent called Har- rison people from this list and Rizza was called at his home five times during that interval? Peluso stated that during the January through mid-April period he had received complaints from Harrison employ- ees that they were not being called by Respondent in se- mority order and, in addition, other people besides Harri- son employees were being called by the Company before them. At least four other people besides Rizza had made this type of complaint. Peluso said that he had telephoned McGowan a couple of times and asked why he was not calling down the list, to which McGowan replied that he would sometimes have to call 10 guys before getting one, and, therefore, if he knew someone was home he would go right to him. As a result a meeting was held in mid-April attended by union representatives including Sansotta, Mat- tarochia (a committeeman), and Rizza , an ex-committee- man, on behalf of the Harrison employees, and Peluso, McDonough, Matera, a committeeman, and Tardio who represent Respondent's employees. McGowan and Tenm- nal Manager Gizzi represented the Company . Peluso in- formed the company officials that he had been receiving complaints that the older men among the Harrison em- ployees were not being called by Respondent and he felt it was unjustified that men who had only 4 or 5 months' experience were being called ahead of others who had had seniority as high as 10 or 12 years. He requested the Com- pany to work the men in accordance with the Harrison seniority list. McGowan then stated, according to Peluso, 2 Although one of these calles was made by the union steward, McDo- nough, this was at the direction of company supervisors and therefore this call cannot be attributed to a referral from the union hall SIGNAL DELIVERY SERVICE, INC that he would work the Harrison men in accordance with the seniority list. He said he would follow this in principle because he could not work someone on a tractor-trailer who could not drive. As a result McGowan was given a new list, stating also which of the people on the Harrison list could drive a tractor-trailer. McGowan testified that he would have someone from the Company call down the list but with the reservation that he would not necessarily call them in order, presumably referring to this problem about driving ability. In any case, the version of Peluso, whom I found to be a very credible witness, was corroborated at the hearing by McDonough, Matera, and Rizza, all of whom testified in similar fashion. At this point in the meeting when McGowan had al- ready agreed to utilize the Harrison seniority list, Rizza again asked McGowan whether he was going to call the Harrison people according to seniority and also asked why McGowan had not been doing that in the past. According to Peluso, McGowan reacted to Rizza by saying that he (Rizza) had representatives here, so why was he pursuing it and questioning him. McGowan said that he was under no obligation to call anybody and that Rizza and the others were lucky that he was agreeing to call them at all. This account by Peluso of McGowan's remarks to Rizza was confirmed by Rizza and the other union witnesses who attended the meeting and testified. McGowan who ap- peared as a witness did not deny it. At the meeting McGowan also stated that he reserved his right not to hire any individual who he feels is not suitable for employment. He told Peluso that he would be notified of any individual on the list whom the Company did not care to employ. On the day after the meeting, which McGowan stated occurred on April 22, according to his records, he called Peluso and told him that he did not want to have Rizza working there. Peluso asked McGowan why and the latter refused to give him a reason. He dust said that he did not want to have Rizza there anymore and that was it. McGowan confirms the conversation up to this point. But Peluso further stated that, in the course of the same conversation, McDonough mentioned that he did not think Rizza should have spoken at the meeting after the union people had already cleared the matter up. Peluso informed McGowan at this time that if he did not want the Union to refer any person to work the Company would have to write a letter to that effect. Not having received such a letter, the Union referred Rizza to jobs at Respon- dent on several occasions after the April 22 meeting. In the period from April 16 through June 30, Rizza filed 10 griev- ances charging that the Company failed to call him to work at times when it had actually called people he alleged were junior to him. At a meeting in June between King and Peluso concerning Rizza's grievances, among others, the Company rejected all but two of them. It maintained and Peluso agreed that the Company had no contractual obli- gation to call Rizza or give him employment. However, King agreed that he would pay Rizza a day's pay for each of two grievances. One of these was an occasion when a company supervisor called the union hall for a driver and Peluso referred Rizza who was the only one available at the time. The company supervisor was aware that Rizza was coming but, apparently before Rizza arrived, he was in- 845 formed that Rizza was not wanted and he did not put him to work. The other was an occasion when the Union re- ferred Rizza for work and gave him a work slip which was turned down when Rizza arrived at the Company. In any event Rizza refused to accept this in settlement of all of his grievances when informed of the Company's offer by Pelu- so. The Union has not moved any of the grievances to arbitration It is uncontradicted that, after the April 22 meeting, Riz- za was never called at home by the Company as had been the case during the times he had worked prior to that meet- ing. In addition, by letter dated July 28, Respondent wrote the Union requesting that it not refer Rizza for further employment. As a result, from that time on Rizza was no longer referred by the Union in accordance with its policy. According to McDonough and Matera, who were then respectively steward and committeeman, they discussed Rizza with McGowan sometime in May. McDonough asked why Rizza was not being called to work by the Com- pany and McGowan replied that "he's only an extra man who was not on the seniority list and he's filing griev- ances." McGowan said "he's nothing but a troublemaker" and they have enough troublemakers around there. Matera also stated that McDonough had asked whether anything was wrong with Rizza's work and McGowan replied no. McGowan testified that he probably had discussions with McDonough and Matera concerning Rizza, and stated that he probably talked about performance which is what he did with all employees. He said the matter of Rizza's filing grievances may have come up but he could not recall it. In any case McGowan said that he did not and would not have related his decision not to employ Rizza to the filing of grievances with these two gentlemen or anybody else, because the decision not to use Rizza had been made long before he had filed any grievances. The credibility of both McDonough and Maters are in doubt. I have already not- ed my reservations concerning McDonough. As to Matera, he was under 2 weeks' suspension at the time of the hear- ing. On the other hand McGowan stated that he had decid- ed not to employ Rizza prior to the filing of any griev- ances, and the first manifestation of that decision was the day after the April 22 meeting when he called Peluso. Rizza's first grievance is dated April 16, although he admit- ted not filing it with the Union until 4 days later. There is no indication when Respondent actually received that grievance. If we accept McGowan's statement that his rec- ords reflect the date of the meeting as April 22, and he spoke to Peluso about not giving work to Rizza on April 23, the timing of the receipt of the grievance would pre- sumably be close. However, Peluso stated that he was un- aware of any grievances before McGowan told him in April that he did not want Rizza anymore. On balance, I accept McGowan's statement that he decided not to em- ploy Rizza before grievances were filed and I do not credit McDonough and Matera insofar as they would indicate that the Respondent was refusing to call Rizza because he had filed grievances. As will be seen hereinafter, the Gen- eral Counsel does not strongly rely on this conversation in urging that Respondent discriminated against Rizza. McGowan testified that he first became aware of Rizza in January when he received a report from the night super- 846 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD visor to the effect that Rizza was not a good employee. He stated that he wrote to Jack Harrison of Harrison for a reference and received a letter from him dated March 15, to the effect that Rizza spent a lot of time trying to slow down production and started trouble and discontent among the employees. Then McGowan said he received a written report on March 31 from another supervisor advis- ing him not to call Rizza for work again. However, Mc- Gowan concedes that he took no action until he spoke to Peluso after the meeting of April 22. In addition, McGow- an states that he never communicated with Rizza person- ally or with the Union concerning his work habits, defi- ciencies, or performance. In this regard, of course, the Company points out that it had no obligation to state any reason why it did not want Rizza inasmuch as he was a casual or extra employee and had no seniority rights. It appears that of the 17 employees listed on the Harri- son seniority list, 8 have become regular employees of Re- spondent, of whom 4 had less seniority than Rizza at Har- rison. This means that, in accordance with the provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement, these eight employ- ees had worked 30 days within a 60-day period so as to qualify for regular status. In addition two former Harrison employees worked part time for Respondent and, it is not- ed, that several others did not desire to work for Respon- dent or had not responded to calls. Discussion Respondent had agreed in January to use the Harrison employees and call them from a list supplied by McDo- nough, the steward. This was admitted by McGowan al- though he did deny agreeing to call the employees in se- niority order. In any case Respondent did in fact use the list and called Harrison employees to work as is manifested by the fact that Rizza himself had been employed by Re- spondent on five occasions prior to the April 22 meeting. The commitment to call from the Harrison list of employ- ees was of great importance because, in effect, it gave those employees a priority over the casuals and extras at the union hall. Respondent's stated practice was to exhaust its own seniority list and extra list, as it was required by the collective-bargaining agreement, then call other qualified employees of whom Respondent was aware, and finally to call the Union and utilize the extra board there. It is estab- lished that, subsequent to the April 22 meeting, Rizza was never again called for employment by Respondent and, on the few occasions that he did work, it was as a result of referral by the Union. Thus, the issue as to whether Re- spondent's failure to call Rizza directly to work after the April 22 meeting was based on discriminatory motives is essentially the paramount question in this case. Indeed, the General Counsel has so contended. The initial question then is whether Rizza in speaking out at this meeting was engaged in protected concerted activity. I have credited the account of this meeting as tes- tified to by Peluso and generally corroborated by Rizza and the other employee witnesses who testified. There is no doubt that Rizza spoke up at the meeting demanding that McGowan call the Harrison employees in seniority order and questioning why McGowan previously had not fol- lowed this procedure. I find in all the circumstances that in speaking up at the meeting of April 22 Rizza was engaged in protected activity. He was talking about a subject in which all Harrison employees were interested, a matter having to do with their employment rights. Peluso and other union representatives testified that in the past Rizza was not the only one who had been complaining about this matter. As many as four or five former Harrison employees had voiced similar complaints which really was the reason for the meeting to be held at all. McGowan's feeling that Roza had no right or should not have spoken up at the meeting because of the presence of union officials has no merit. Rizza had been a committeeman for the Harrison employees and in any case he had been invited to attend the meeting by Peluso. Moreover, even if Rizza had been incorrect in his assertion or in his belief that the Harrison employees had a right to be called in seniority order, this does not militate against the protected nature of his right to press it. There is no requirement that any employee or other representative be correct in their assertions to make them protected. A court has noted as follows: As long as the activities engaged in are lawful and the character of the conflict is not indefensible in the con- text of the [matter] involved, the employees are pro- tected under Section 7 of the Act.3 Having determined that Rizza was engaged in activity at the April 22 meeting which is protected under the Act, the question then becomes whether Respondent thereafter re- fused to call him for employment because of such activity. Respondent has contended that it had no legal or contrac- tual obligation to call Rizza or employ him and, as a conse- quence, it was not required to advance any reason for the failure to do so. But, clearly, McGowan was angered at Rizza's remarks, coming as they did after he had already agreed with Peluso and the other union representatives as to the method which would be followed in the future. Ac- cording to Peluso, McGowan denounced Rizza for speak- ing up and told him he was under no obligation to call anyone and that Rizza was lucky to be called at all. Peluso also testified that during his conversation with McGowan the following day, the latter, in stating he did not want Rizza working for Respondent any more , also mentioned that he did not think Rizza should have spoken out after the union people had already cleared the matter up. Ap- parently, this was on McGowan's mind when he called Pe- luso. In addition, or perhaps in the alternative, Respondent contends that its failure to call Rizza after April 22 was because of his prior poor performance as an employee. However, it is well established that the mere existence of valid grounds for such action is not a defense unless the action was predicated solely on those grounds.' I am not persuaded by Respondent's assertion that it stopped call- ing Rizza after April 22 because of his poor work perfor- ' Crown Central Petroleum Corporation v N L R B, 430 F 2d 724, 731 (C A 5, 1970) N L R B v Security Plating Company, Inc, 356 F 2d 725, 728 (C A 9, 1966), Wonder State Manufacturing Company v N L R B, 331 F 2d 737, 738 (CA 6, 1964) SIGNAL DELIVERY SERVICE, INC. mance. McGowan stated that he first became aware of Rizza in January when he received a poor report from a night supervisor. He thereafter communicated with Harri- son and received a letter in March from him giving Rizza a very poor reference . In addition McGowan had another report in March from a supervisor recommending that Riz- za not be called for work again . This latter report is some- what suspect inasmuch as the supervisor , Stankiewycz, tes- tified that the loading was being done by two-man teams and no report was made concerning Rizza's partner and, in fact, he didn't even recall who Rizza's partner was. In addi- tion he was supervising other people during an evening which he indicated was quite hectic . In any case Respon- dent called Rizza during the pre-April 22 period to work five times including occasions after the supervisory reports and the Harrison reference . As often stated by Respon- dent's witnesses, it had no obligation under the contract with the Union or in any other manner to voluntarily call Rizza for work during this time . Yet it still called him a total of five times during this period . But the first occasion on which Respondent took some positive action was the day after the April 22 meeting when Rizza incurred Mc- Gowan's displeasure by talking up. He then called Peluso and told him he did not want Rizza any more . Although Peluso asked why he did not want Rizza, McGowan gave no reason and on other occasions thereafter when Peluso or the shop steward asked about Rizza no reason was ever given . However, as noted above, McGowan did tell Peluso, when he called to request that Rizza not be referred, that Rizza had spoken at the meeting when he should not have. From that point on Respondent never called Rizza again. But thereafter on several occasions Rizza was referred to work by the Union because McGowan did not take the action, requested by Peluso, of writing a letter telling the Union that it did not want it to refer Rizza . It was not until July 28 that McGowan got around to writing a one-sen- tence letter asking the Union not to refer Rizza . In view of the circumstances described above , I find that Respondent immediately stopped calling Rizza to work as soon as he spoke up and engaged in concerted activity during the meeting between union and management representatives on April 22 . On the other hand , it took no action regarding his alleged poor work performance , even after receiving an extremely poor reference from Harrison . By cutting off the direct calls to Rizza , particularly after agreeing on April 22 to call Harrison people in seniority order, Respondent ef- fectively blocked Rizza's path to attain regular status with the Company . He could not achieve this , as a practical matter, through the referral route of the union hall. Per- haps this explains its tardy submission of the letter to Pelu- so. I find , therefore, by its conduct described above, Re- spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. As indicated above, on the basis of the credibility resolu- tions concerning the conversation in May between McDo- nough and Maters and McGowan, I find that Respondent did not refuse to call Rizza to work because of his filing of grievances . This decision was implemented after the April 22 meeting, as indicated by McGowan 's call to Peluso, and Rizza was never thereafter called to work. However, on that date, Peluso himself was unaware of any grievances filed by Rizza. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE 847 The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of Re- spondent described in section I, above, have a close, inti- mate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices , I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirma- tive action designed- to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that Respondent disciminatorily failed and refused to call Raphael Rizza to work, I shall recom- mend that Respondent be ordered to place his name on its seniority list and confer on him the status of a regular em- ployee pursuant to its collective-bargaining agreement with the Union . In this connection it has been found on the basis of the credited evidence that McGowan had agreed on April 22 to work the Harrison men in accordance with the seniority list. He further said that he would follow this in principle, meaning that he could not work someone as a driver who was unable to drive . It is noted that Rizza, un- like other of the Harrison employees , had qualifications as a driver and that indeed on at least one occasion Respon- dent had used him in that capacity . It is further noted that eight former Harrison employees are now on Respondent's seniority list As four of them had less seniority than Rizza at Harrison, it is only reasonable to conclude that Rizza, with his additional qualifications as a driver, would have likewise achieved regular status at Respondent but for the discrimination . I shall further recommend that Rizza be made whole for any loss of earnings or other monetary loss he may have suffered as a result of the discrimination against him, less interim earnings, if any, plus interest at 6 percent per annum . Any backpay due is to be determined in accordance with the formula set forth in F. W. Wool- worth Company, 90 NLRB 289 ( 1950), and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962). CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6).and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By discriminatorily refusing to call Raphael Rizza to work, Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices in vio- lation of Section 8(a)(3) and ( 1) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and upon the entire record and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recom- mended: 848 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ORDERS The Respondent, Signal Delivery Service, Inc., Pitts- burgh, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to call employees for work because they have engaged in activities together for the purpose of col- lective bargaining. (b) Discouraging membership in, or activities on behalf of, General Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local 249 a/w International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, or any other la- bor organization, by refusing to call employees to work or otherwise discriminating against them in any manner with regard to their hire or tenure of employment or any terms or conditions of employment because of their union activi- ties. (c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent that such right is affected by the proviso of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to ef- fectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Place the name of Raphael Rizza on the seniority list of the Company and grant him the status of a regular em- ployee in accordance with the collective-bargaining agree- ment between Respondent and the Union, and make him whole for any loss of pay due him as a result of the dis- crimination against him, in accordance with the manner set forth in the section of this Decision entitled "The Rem- edy." (b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all pay- roll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records neces- sary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this recommended Order. (c) Post at its Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, terminal copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 6 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 6, after being duly signed by the Company's authorized representative shall be posted by it, immedi- ately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 5 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions , and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes 6 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading, "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ- ing all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Company to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 6, in writ- ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a hearing in which all sides had a chance to give evidence, the National Labor Relations Board has found that we, Signal Deliver Service, Inc., violated the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and we have been or- dered to post this notice. The National Labor Relations Act gives all employees these rights: To engaged in self-organization To form, loin, or help unions To bargain collectively through a representative of their own choosing To act together for collective bargaining or other aid or protection To refrain from any or all of these things. WE WILL NOT refuse to call employees for work be- cause they have engaged in activities together for the purpose of collective bargaining. WE WILL NOT discourage membership in or activities on behalf of General Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local 249 a/w International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, or any other labor organization, by refus- ing to call employees to work or otherwise disciminat- ing against employees in any manner with regard to their rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, hire, tenure of employment, or any term or condition of employment. WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of rights under Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL add Raphael Rizza to our seniority list and grant him the status of a regular employee in accor- dance with our contract with the Union, and WE WILL make him whole for any loss of pay or any benefits he may have suffered by reason of our discrimination against him. SIGNAL DELIVERY SERVICE, INC.