Shrewsbury Nursing Home, Inc.

SHREWSBURY NURSING HOME Shrewsbury Nursing Home, Inc. and Local 495, Service Employees International Union, AFL- CIO. Case I-CA-10839 December 7, 1976 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS FANNING AND JENKINS On June 23, 1976, Administrative Law Judge Thomas A. Ricci issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed excep- tions and a supporting brief. The General Counsel filed a brief in support of the Administrative Law Judge. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions2 of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended -Order, as modified herein. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge as modified below and hereby orders that the Respon- dent, Shrewsbury Nursing Home, Inc., Worcester, Massachusetts, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order, as so modified: Substitute the following for paragraph 2(a): "(a) Make whole Heidi Staples for any loss of pay or benefits she may have suffered by reason of the Respondent's discrimination against her with back- pay computed on the basis set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest at 6 percent per annum as prescribed in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962)." 1 The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to'credibih- ty unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd.,188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951). We have carefully examined the recordand find no basis for reversing his findings. Z It is clear from ^ the record that the Administrative Law Judge meant to describe "June 24," the date on which the armed security guard was hired, as the day after the Union began its literature distribution in view of his earlier finding that such activities commenced on June 23. We also note that in the Administrative Law Judge's discussion of the June 30 meetings between Respondent's president, Flanagan, and the employees, he mistakenly attributed to employee Peterson testimony which was actually given by employee McLean. However, since McLean was found to be a credible witness by the Administrative Law Judge, this inadvertent error does not have any bearing on the determinations he reached. 227 NLRB No. 10 DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE 47 THOMAS A. Ricci, Administrative Law Judge: A hearing in this proceeding was held on May 17 and 18, 1976, at Worcester, Massachusetts, on complaint of the General Counsel against Shrewsbury Nursing Home, Inc., here called Respondent or the Company. The complaint issued on August 29, 1975, on a charge filed June 30, 1975, by Local 495, Service Employees International Union, AFL- CIO, here called the Union. The issues in the case are whether Respondent violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act by coercive statements and conduct, and whether it illegally discharged an employee in violation of Section 8(a)(3). Upon the entire record, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: - FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT Shrewsbury Nursing Home, Inc., is engaged in the business of providing nursing care for the elderly and related services, and has its principal place of business in Worcester, Massachusetts. In the normal conduct of its business Respondent uses large quantities of medical and nursing supplies purchased and brought in interstate commerce from various States to its Massachusetts place of business. As a proprietary nursing -home it annually receives gross revenues in excess of $100,000. I find that Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED I find that Local 495, Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. in. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. A Picture of the Case Self-organizational activities among the approximately 125 employees of the home started precisely on June 23, 1975, when union representatives first appeared at the entrances and distributed their literature. Donald Flanagan is part owner of the business and president; he is the top manager who runs the operation, present at the home 3 or 4 days a week, with only three supervisors, according to him, subordinate to him. Flanagan's reaction to the employees' union activities was immediate and very much in opposi- tion. On the morning of the very day after the union distribu- tion activity started, Flanagan had a security guard hired from a detective agency, stationed at the entrance to the parking lot. The man was uniformed, armed, and parked 48 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD his automobile - described at the hearing as like the typical police car - in the parking lot. Many of the employees are high school -students working part time, or only shortly out of school. The relationship between the newly arrived armed guard and their incipient union activities could not have escaped them. Within a matter of days Respondent posted a written no-solicitation rule at various places throughout the building. There had never been no-solicitation rules promulgated within the memory of many of the employees who testified. The notice, which remained posted at least throughout the month of July, was received in evidence, and on its face proves an unfair labor practice within the clear , meaning of Board law. A week after the activity started Flanagan held a meeting on each of the three `shifts with the employees, where he spoke at length against the Union, detailing the current advantages enjoyed by the employees, and why he thought there should be no union in this nursing home . During the same period he posted a number of notices listing for the employees' attention the detailed benefits and rates of pay they already had; in one or two instances he gave or promised them additional benefits which they had not previously enjoyed. As Flanagan said at one point in his testimony, "I felt that I .should put my best foot forward, so to speak." Flanagan also found occasion a number of times during the month of July to remind employees, and to warn them, not to engage in union activities, or to solicit others to join, inside the building. He often used the phrase "on company time," or "on my time," but the rule as written and posted told the employees union talk or solicitation was never to take place anywhere in the building at any time. Flanagan even discharged one nurses aide - Heidi Staples - for asking another girl to " sign a union card in the corridor. There were other intimidating statements voiced by him, or by others on his behalf, all called improper and therefore illegal coercive threats, according to the complaint. Insofar as this record shows, made over 10 months after the short- lived self-organizational activities, all attempts by the employees to form or join a union ceased by the end of July 1975 or shortly thereafter. In its answer Respondent denies the commission of any unfair labor practices. It asserts its no-solicitation rule was of old standing and consistent with Board law. A number of the threats attributed to management representatives by employees are denied outright. There are some questions of credibility among the witnesses, but they are simply resolved. B. The No-Solicitation Rule The no-solicitation rule as posted at several locations by the Respondent a few days after June 23 reads as follows: No solicitation of any kind is allowed in this building or on nursing home grounds. Any employee found making any solicitations or taking down this notice will be subject to termination. This language clearly enough tells all employees they risk their jobs if they discuss their union activities or solicit membership anywhere in the building, and this of course had to be understood as including the staff cafeteria, employee restrooms or lounges, or any area of the building where patients never have occasion to go and where employees do no actual work. There is no need for citation of extended Board law for the rule that it is unlawful for an employer to prohibit such activities by its employees in such locations, absent extraordinary justification. See Stoddard-Quirk Manufacturing Co., 138 NLRB 615 (1962). There is no ambiguity this instance as to what the rule means and says, although, were there any ambiguity the rule would be illegal nonetheless. N.L.R.B. v. Harold Miller, Herbert Charles and Milton Charles, Co-Partners, d/b/a Miller Charles & Co., 341 F.2d 870 (CA. 2, 1965). I find that, by establishing and since that time maintaining the above no-solicitation rule, Respondent violated and is continuing to violate Section 8 (a)(1) of the Act. The General Counsel contends, and offered evidence to prove, that the rule in this instance was illegal on additional grounds. There is evidence by a number of employees that, before the rule was posted and before union activities started, other kinds of solicitation - unrelated to union activities - were permitted and were carried on, even in work areas of the home. Avon products catalogues were found at many of the nurses' desks, and such things were sold and delivered in the place itself. Other extraneous merchandise, such as jewelry, was also sold openly while people were at work stations. There were collections taken to make gifts to departing employees, all openly carried on, with supervisors participating. In this sense the rule - of long standing according to the Respondent - enforced as it was against employees to curb their union activities while permitting nonunion solicitation, was discriminatory against them, and again illegal under established Board law. Moreover, it appears clearly that the notice was posted in reaction to the new union activities. The Board has also held that a no-solicitation rule instituted for the first time for. the express purpose of curbing, newly born union activities is illegal for that reason alone. Ward Manufactur- ing Inc., 152 NLRB 1270 (1965). But nothing would be added to the case by such further findings, although I,agree the evidence of record supports_ both additional grounds. A number of employees testified directly and credibly they, in recent years, had never seen a no-solicitation rule of any kind either posted or announced. Betty Stratford, the home administrator, testified that she had seen no-solicita- tion rules posted, "many, many notices," since 1969. But she also said she had herself contributed to collections taken up in the home, even purchased dolls inside the building made by the daughter of a Mrs. Walker,'another supervisor, who worked in the home . She then went on to say that those old notices, which she remembered, had been taken down, she did not know when, of by whom, and that all that happened "quite some time ago.", Another employ- ee called by the Respondent, Frances Johnson, testified she had seen a no-solicitation rule saying, "No solicitation on the property," for over 4 years. I do not credit these women against the uniform and consistent testimony to the contrary by a number of other employees. More important, Flanagan and his supervisors agreed that whatever compa- ny policies did exist were reflected in writing in notices that were kept in a file on the desk of each of the charge nurses. That folder was received in evidence; it contains a number SHREWSBURY NURSING HOME 49 of statements relating to other matters; but there is no document even referring to the question of solicitation. Administrator Stratford's totally unsupported statement that there was a written no-solicitation rule in the various policy folders available for employee inspection but that they had "been removed from all the policy manuals" adds nothing to the defense.- Staples, a nurses aide who had worked about a year, was an active unioneer; she talked it up among the employees and solicited others to join. Flanagan considered her one of the activists. During a speech he made to the assembled night shift employees on June 30, while he was trying to convince them to abandon the Union, he said he knew the employees were accepting union literature, and,added "he would do everything in his power to keep ... the union out of the nursing home. He said that he had seen employees stop and pick up the literature." This quotation is from the credited testimony of employee Deborah Peterson. Mary McLean, another employee, testified that, at one of the talks Flanagan gave, he said "he knew pretty much who was and who wasn't for the union." This was top manage- merit telling the employees they were being watched. I fmd that, by^ these statements of Flanagan to the assembled employees the Respondent created a very clear impression that it was surveying their union activities, and thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. While on duty late in the afternoon of July 17, Staples asked another nurses aide, Patricia O'Brien, did she wish to sign a union card. O'Brien answered she did not. Flanagan testified that he learned of this incident third or fourth hand, even that he knew the request for a signature had been made-in the corridor, outside a patient's room. He made no claim, nor offered any evidence to prove, the single question interfered with work in any way. What had really happened was that O'Brien was emerging_ from 'a patient's room with food trays she was then placing in a cart in the hall for removal. After she came out of the door Staples spoke to her. The next day Flanagan summarily discharged Staples. As Staples remembered it, Flanagan gave as his reason: "You were soliciting a card last night in a patient's room . . . if you're on the premises again I'll call the police." Flanagan -admitted' he asked Staples nothing about what had happened and gave her no opportunity to explain. - The Board has held that the discharge of an employee in implementation of an illegal no-solicitation rule is in itself an unfair labor practice.' In further defense Flanagan testified he had already warned- Staples once about soliciting "on my time" or "on- Working time." If it is an unfair labor-practice to discharge a person pursuant to an illegal no-solicitation rule,^it is no less an unfair labor practice to tell her this is what will happen to her. The Respondent's purpose in discharging'Staples is shown as--illegal not only in the fact its rule had been illegally promulgated,-but also in the fact Flanagan knew she was an outstanding unioneer, he gave her no opportuni- ty to explain, he described her as an excellent employee, he Summit Nursing and Convalescent Home, Inc., 196 NLRB 769 (1972). The-fact Flanagan told this employee he was faulting her for solicitation in a working area, or during working time, cannot operate to change, and limit the proscription of the written and much publicized rule that solicitation was prohibited even when employees are not working. Flanagan said, at the hearing, that his employees were permitted to solicit in the staff dining room, did not deny that the one solicitation of O'Brien did not interfere with anyone's work that- day, and he was very adamantly opposed to collective bargaining altogether. On this entire record I find that- by discharging Staples the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. C. Other Violations of Section 8(a)(1) 1. As already mentioned, on Monday, June 30, Flana- gan called together the employees on each of the three shifts separately-and gave a talk. His purpose, as he admitted, was to dissuade them from their union resolve by listing the benefits they were enjoying. Peterson, present at one of the meetings, testified without contradiction that at her meet- ing Flanagan said, among other things, that, while some nursing homes may need unions, this one did not and that he "would do everything in his power" to keep the Union out. McLean, a nurses aide on the night shift from 11 p.m. to 7 a.m., recalled Flanagan saying at her meeting that, after a union had succeeded in establishing itself in a nearby nursing home called Parkhill, that company had discharged all the union supporters and replaced them. He told the employees, according to Peterson, to ask the Parkhill employees at a union meeting .scheduled for the next day, whether this was true or not. Stratford, the administrator, said that during one of the speeches which she had attended in the daytime -she did not- recall if Flanagan mentioned the Parkhill Nursing Home. Two other employees, Johnson and Gerner, also attended daytime meetings. Johnson recalled Flanagan saying em- ployees had resigned at Parkhill; she said she did not believe he had said they had been "fired." Gerner also recalled reference to the Parkhill Nursing Home,,,but said Flanagan did not say anyone was fired. Flanagan himself recalled telling the.employees about the Parkhill-Home that- day in the attempt to wean them away from the Union; "the information I had was probably the most potent information that I had," but he denied having said anyone was fired there because of union activities. As- to what happened at the 1 I to 7 a.m. meeting, I credit the employees against Flanagan. On` the basis of his demeanor and his deliberate evasions of questions at the hearing, I do not credit Flanagan. A number of times he refused' to answer direct questions; - it took repeated questioning to prevail upon him to admit a notice posted by the Respondent, produced by the Respondent, and signed by the home administrator, was in fact the document as on its face appears. I find that, during that night meeting of June 30, he told the employees that onion supporters at the other nursing home had been fired in retaliation. This was oblique, but nonetheless a sufficient message to them that the same discrimination would, or might one day,' be practiced against them. I find -that by telling his employees others had been discharged for union activities 'Flanagan violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. but he cannot after the event change the record evidence as to the past Indeed the Board has also said, in Summit Nursing, supra, "Nor does the fact that the respondent did not regard or intend the rule to be applicable to meal, break periods, or in the employee lounges diminish the extent of the violation:" 50 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2. On June 24, the day the Union first started distrib- uting literature at the parking lot entrance, Flanagan hired an armed guard to patrol the entrance to the building: The man stayed there 1 week and then left. A notice was posted to explain the guard's presence as "due to the recent increase in the amount of pilferage going on in the home. . . ." Flanagan explained at the hearing that he had two other reasons for hiring the guard, but these he did not explain to the employees. The first was, as he stated it, that the organizers interfered with the entering traffic, and the second that the guard should prevent organizers from entering the company property. The complaint alleges the placement of that armed guard at that point at that time constituted a form of illegal surveillance of the employees with respect to their union activities and was therefore an unfair labor practice. The truly disinterested witness on this question was the guard himself, a Mr. Russell Glynn. He said he was told by Flanagan, when he arrived, that he was to prevent strangers from interfering with employee access to the home, to watch for pilfering, and to search people and their packages if necessary. He added Flanagan told him to let him, Flanagan, know when union representatives arrived to distribute literature. Glynn said he did so, as soon as they came, and that Flanagan then emerged from the home, with his son, and stood close by watching everything that was going on all the time: Glynn added that on one occasion - when union distribution started - the police were called, but that there never was, either then or at any other time, any interference with incoming or outgoing traffic. He said he never had occasion to inspect any parcels, he never saw anything worthy of reporting to Mr. Flanagan, and he never had to tell anyone to get off the property. The conclusion is inescapable, in the circumstances, that Flanagan really had no reason for hiring the guard except to intimidate the employees by- putting him where all of them could see him at the very time of the union distribution. I find, on the total record again, that his purpose was to effectively survey the union activities of his employees, and to be sure they knew they were being watched. As such the conduct of placing that guard there that particular week, and of Flanagan himself going out at the critical times to watch the employees who chose to accept the union literature, constituted unfair labor practic- es in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, and I so find. 3. In the intensity of his opposition to the union campaign, Flanagan not only repeatedly passed the mes- sage that he would have no union activities inside the home, and made the aides understand he was watching them, but he also posted a number, of notices aimed at the same ultimate objective. The bluntest of the written statements, posted during the very first days of July, informed the employees that a few days later, the week of July 6, everybody would receive a 15-cent-per-hour across-the- board raise. Two notices were posted on July 16. The first suggested that each employee, if called at home on the telephone by any union solicitor, should tell the union- minded persons "to drop dead," or at least should think seriously before signing any union cards., The second notice that day listed in great detail the various benefits employees were receiving - vacations and holidays, life insurance, parties and Christmas turkeys, convenient lunch periods, and things of that kind. One of the specific items in that notice informed the employees for the first time that, whereas at the moment the employees were themselves paying half the cost of their Blue Cross - Blue Shield medical insurance, as of the first of the following year - January 1, 1976 - Respondent would pay the entire amount. Still another notice,' posted on July 17, informed the employees that starting immediately their timecards would no longer show the employee's name, but only his working number, and that the purpose here was to make it more difficult for union organizers to identify employees and communicate with them outside the home. The complaint in this case, with an amendment made ai the start of the hearing, lists no less than 14 items, each specifically alleged to have been a separate violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act - coercive conduct or statement chargeable to Respondent. They are all very detailed and in some instances repetitive. A pertinent consideration here must be that when a complaint is so specific, by necessary implication it must be read as intended to exclude other minor things brought out at the hearing which might, if so alleged, also be found to have been unlawful. Fairness to the Respondent requires that the record transcript be appraised in this light, for the employer is entitled to be alerted as to which incidents brought out it must defend against. For example, nothing could look like a clearer unfair labor practice than outright announcement of a raise only a week after the beginning of union activities. Indeed, the notice itself reveals that only a month before the Respondent had informed the employees there would be no such raise at that time. The notice goes on to explain how changed circumstances now warranted the raise, but the assertion, unsupported by objective proof, is highly suspect. Nevertheless, in the circumstances, I do not think an unfair labor practice finding may be predicated upon that one raise given that day because it is not set out in the pinpointed complaint. Not so with respect to the announcement then that-the Respondent had decided, on a fixed day, to grant the further benefit of paying the full instead of only half the cost of the employees' medical insurance. It will not do for Flanagan to say he was merely putting his best foot forward; the Supreme Court in N.LRB. v. Exchange Parts Company, 375 U.S. 405,409 (1964), put it another way. "The danger inherent in well-timed increases in benefits is the suggestion of a fist inside the velvet glove." I find that announcement of that new benefit on that day was an unfair labor, practice by the Respondent. As to the other notices mentioned above, because the complaint does not allege illegality in any of them, I make no findings here. 4. Arlene Wyrzkowski is a registered nurse who works as a charge nurse part time; she does two or three night shifts each week, from 11 to 7 a.m. Of the total of 25 charge nurses who work in the home, there are 3 on duty at night, each working together with 2 nurses aides with respect to about 40, patients. McLean, one of the aides who works on the night shift when Wyrzkowski 'is there, told of a phone call she received from the charge nurse one afternoon, and during which, according to McLean, the charge nurse made a number of statements clearly violative of the statute. The SHREWSBURY NURSING HOME 51 complaint repeatedly alleges Wyrzkowski was on that day acting as an agent of Respondent; it also calls her a supervisor within the meaning of the Act. As will appear below, the evidence shows clearly that Wyrzkowski made that telephone call at the express request of Flanagan; therefore whether or not she was a supervisor is beside the point. Moot as it may be, I find the evidence insufficient to prove any supervisory status in her.2 Wyrz- kowski testified that Flanagan called her at home one day and said that he had planned to put McLean in charge of a new wing that was being activated, that he had now decided he would not do that "if there was going to be trouble," and that he wanted Wyrzkowski to telephone McLean and give her this message . Wyrzkowski also testified Flanagan spoke about the Union to her in that call, stressing the benefits the employees were receiving, and adding "we really didn't need it [the Union]." As Wyrzkowski recalled it, Flanagan said to her: ". . . what's the trouble going on there with Mary McLean ...-I heard from two nurses and an aide that there was trouble." In his later testimony, after Wyrzkowski had spoken, Flanagan did not deny this conversation took place between him and the charge nurse. McLean's testimony is that Wyrzkowski called her to say Flanagan had asked her to do so, that Flanagan was upset because "what the hell was McLean doing up there when she's doing no work, nothing but soliciting union." Wyrz- kowski then asked, still according to McLean, was she involved in the Union, and when McLean denied soliciting instead of working, Wyrzkowski went on to say that Flanagan had said that, if there were a union in the place he would-close the home down, and that he knew which of the aides had signed union cards. Late that night, after midnight, while both Wyrzkowski and McLean were on duty, Flanagan came to the home and talked to McLean, in the presence of two other nurses he called to act as witnesses to what he had to say. He first asked had McLean talked with Wyrzkowski that day, and then, again according to McLean: "He says I'm up here to warn you against the union "activities on my time ... he says that if you spoke to Mrs. Wyrzkowsski then you know that you blew a good job; he says I was going to put you in charge of the self-care unit with LPNs pay but you just blew it." Flanagan's- version of what he told McLean in the presence of the other" women is: "I'm warning you that I'll terminate you if you engage in union activities in working areas on our time." At this point, according to Flanagan, the aide asked to speak to him privately "in the solarium." Flanagan went on to say, in confused testimony, that he talked for quite a while with the girl there, that they discussed the Union, that "I hit it hard with her . . . . I did say things I shouldn't have said .....I think we were discussing strikes. And I said, `if they come in I'll shut the nursing home down'." - Wyrzkowski may not have been a supervisor in her part time job, but there can be no question about the fact that 2 Wyrzkowski said that sometime in August 1974 the word "supervisor" was placed after her name on the weekly work schedule, but that it disappeared in January or February 1975. She has no authority to hire or discharge people, to discipline them, to grant requests for time off, or to recommend any such action. She is a part timer and does not enjoy a number of benefits the Company gives its full-time staff. She passes on to all the night nurses aides - not only her immediate two but the other four also - whatever message she passed on to McLean that day on the telephone she did as the selected agent of Flanagan for that purpose. What came from her therefore must be deemed as coming directly from the owner of the Company. I find that by Wyrzkowski's statement to McLean that the Respon- dent would close the entire nursing home if the employees persisted, in their prounion resolve, that he knew the identity of some of the nurses aides who had signed union cards, and that McLean was being denied a promotion because of her union activities, the Respondent violated Section 8(axl) of the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent set out in section III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of Respondent described in section I, have a close, intimate, and substan- tial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY It having been found that the Respondent committed diversified unfair labor practices, it must be ordered to cease and desist from such conduct in the future. Heidi Staples, having been, illegally discharged, must be made whole for any loss of earnings she may have suffered in consequence of the illegal discrimination against her, backpay to bear interest at 6 percent. She had, however, before the discharge, decided with fmality to leave the employment of the Company the following August 15, and so advised the Respondent in writing. There is therefore no occasion to order reinstatement as to her. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. By discharging Heidi Staples because she engaged in activity protected by Section 7 of the Act the Respondent has discriminated against her in regard to her hire and tenure or terms and conditions of employment, and thereby violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 2. By the foregoing conduct, by promulgating and maintaining a no-solicitation rule which prohibits employ- ees from soliciting for the Union in work areas during their nonwork time and- distributing union literature in nonwork areas during their nonwork time, by creating the impression it was surveying the union activities of its employees, by telling employees they would be discharged because of their union activities, by hiring an armed guard to survey the union activities of its employees, by in fact surveying the union activities of its employees, by granting increases in insurance payment benefits, and by threatening to close its place of business, all for the purpose of restraining and coercing its employees in their union activities, the Respon- directions and instructions that are left by the two supervisors for her when she arrives at I I p.m "Problems," a word that was not really defined at the hearing, came to her attention during the night. If she cannot resolve them amicably among the aides, she either calls one of the supervisors at their homes or notes the problem for attention and resolution by management the next day. She is essentially a liaison person passing on to the other rank-and- file the work orders of the home administrator and the director of nurses. 52 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD dent has engaged in and is engaging in violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDERS The Respondent, Shrewsbury Nursing Home, Inc., Worcester, Massachusetts, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discharging or in any other manner discriminating against its employees because of their union activities. (b) Promulgating or maintaining a no-solicitation rule which prohibits employees from soliciting for the Union in nonwork areas during nonwork time or distributing union literature in nonwork areas during nonwork time, creating the impression it was surveying the union activities of its employees, telling employees they would be discharged because of their union activities, hiring armed guards to survey the union activities of its' employees, surveying the union activities of its employees, granting increases in insurance benefits, or threatening to close its plant. (c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the right to self- organization, to form, join, or; assist Local 495,° Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through repre- sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all such activities. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: . (a) Make whole Heidi Staples for any loss of pay or benefits she may have suffered by reason of the Respon- dent's discrimination against her. (b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board _ or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount, of backpay due finder the terms of this Order. (c) Post at its place of business in Worcester, Massachu- setts, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 4 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 1, after being duly signed by its representatives, shall be posted by the Respondent immedi- ately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ- ing all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by it to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 1, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. 3 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 4 In the-event the Board's Order is enforced by aJudgmentofa United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE' WILL NOT promulgate or maintain a no-solicita- tion rule which prohibits employees from soliciting for the Union in work areas during their nonwork time or distributing union literature in nonworking areas during nonwork time. WE WILL NOT survey the union activities of our employees. WE WILL NOT hire armed guards in order to survey the union activities of our employees, or create the impression that we are surveying our employees' union activities. WE WILL NOT tell our employees that they will be discharged because of their union activities. WE WILL NOT grant increased benefits of any kind to our employees for the purpose of inducing them to abandon their union activities. WE WILL NOT threaten to close our business in retaliation against our employees' union activities. WE WILL pay Heidi Staples for any loss of earnings she lost as a result of our discrimination against her, plus 6 percent interest. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to join or assist Local 495, Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, or to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar- gaining or other mutual aid or protection or to refrain from any and all such activities. SHREWSBURY NURSING HOME, INC.