Packers Industries, Inc.

182 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Packer Industries, Inc. and International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO. Cases 1-CA-10825, I-CA-11161, 1-CA-11206, and 1-CA-11274 DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE February 10, 1977 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS FANNING AND JENKINS On July 27, 1976, Administrative Law Judge Samuel Ross issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions, a brief, and his original brief to the Administrative Law Judge in support of the Adminis- trative Law Judge's Decision, and Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. SAMUEL Ross, Administrative Law Judge: These consoli- dated cases were heard before me in New Haven, Connecti- cut, on April 6, 7, and 8, and on May 4, 5, and 6, 1976, on charges and amended charges filed by International Asso- ciation of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, herein the Union, on June 27, August 5, October 29, November 13, and December 9, 1975, and on a complaint, a consolidated complaint, and on amendments to the consolidated complaint which issued respectively on Au- gust 21, 1975, and on January 27, February 27, and March 23, 1976. The said complaints as amended allege that Packer Industries, Inc., herein Respondent or the Compa- ny, engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, by terminating the employment of six employ- ees because they joined and assisted the Union and engaged in concerted activities protected by the Act, and by engaging in numerous other acts of inference with and restraint and coercion of employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. Respondent filed answers which deny the substantive allegations of the amended complaints and the commission of unfair labor practices. Upon the entire record,' including my observa- tion of the witnesses and their demeanor, and after due consideration of the briefs filed by the parties, I make the following: ORDER 2 Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the Respondent, Packer Indus- tries, Inc., Meriden, Connecticut, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. i Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge . It is the Board's established policy not to overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings. Additionally, we are satisfied that Respondent's contention that the Administrative Law Judge was biased is without meat . There is nothing in the record to suggest that his conduct at the hearing, his resolutions of credibility, or the inferences he drew were based on bias or prejudice 2 Respondent's motion to reopen the record and admit as new evidence its June 30, 1976, financial statement is denied . The financial statement would contain no relevant information not previously considered regarding Respondent's defense that the layoff of LeMay, Sprude, and Jones was motivated by financial considerations. FINDINGS OF FACT I. COMMERCE Respondent is a Connecticut corporation whose principal office and place of business is located in Meriden, Connect- icut, where it is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of aircraft parts and machines. In the operation of the said business, Respondent annually ships aircraft parts and machines valued in excess of $50,000 from its plant in Meriden to points and places outside the State of Connecticut. Respondent admits and I find that it is engaged in commerce and in operations affecting com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Respondent also admits and I find that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. i After the close of the hearing, the General Counsel moved to correct the transcript in a number of respects. No opposition has been interposed to the said motion and it is hereby granted The record has accordingly been physically corrected. 228 NLRB No. 25 PACKER INDUSTRIES 183 III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background Facts Regarding Respondent Respondent's office and plant are located at 80 Gracey Avenue, Meriden, Connecticut, in a building owned by Gracey Real Estate, a copartnership which is wholly owned by Donald F. Woods and Joseph E. Hogan, Respondent's president and vice president, respectively. Woods and Hogan also are the principal stockholders in Respondent corporation, each of them owning 44.7 percent of its stock.2 Respondent has two principal divisions which operate respectively under the trade names of Packer Machine Company and Pye and Hogan.3 Packer Machine Company manufactures machines which are used by other companies in their manufacturing operations. Pye and Hogan is primarily a machine shop which makes aircraft parts in accordance with the specifications of its customers. Em- ployees of Respondent are generally assigned to one or the other of these two divisions of Respondent, but they are transferred from one to the other as needed. There is only one payroll for the two divisions, but it is "broken down for Pye and Hogan and one for Packer (Machine)." President Woods is the manager of Packer Machine and the chief salesman of Pye and Hogan. Vice President Hogan is the manager of Pye and Hogan. Respondent subcontracts some of its lab inspection work to Meriden Metal Labs, a company which is located in the same building as that occupied by Respondent and is wholly owned by Jeffery Woods and Scott Hogan, sons of Respondent's president and vice president. Employees of Respondent also regularly do lab inspection work at the premises of Meriden Metal Labs. B. The Issues Presented for Determination 1. As previously noted, the complaints in these consoli- dated cases as amended allege that Respondent terminated the employment of six employees-Juan Acevedo, William 0. Ingraham, Jr., Richard Remillard, Roger LeMay, Alfred Sprude, and Wallace Jones-and failed and refused to reinstate them, because they joined and assisted the Union. Respondent admits that it terminated the employment of these employees and that it has not since reinstated them. It contends, however, that it fired Acevedo, Ingraham and Remillard for reasons unrelated to their union activities, and that it laid off LeMay, Sprude, and Jones because of financial difficulties which beset it, and not because of their support for the Union. 2. The complaints as amended further allege that Respondent denied employee Mario Recchioni a raise because of his support of the Union. In respect to this allegation, Respondent contends that it has not failed to grant Recchioni a raise on each of his wage reviews. 3. The consolidated complaints further allege that commencing with the date of its acquisition of knowledge of the Union's organizational campaign, Respondent 2 The remaining stock in Respondent is owned by several small stock- holders 3 Respondent also utilizes other trade names for the sale of its products. One such which it uses for sales to Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Company is Connecticut Machine Products, Inc. 4 All dates hereafter will refer to 1975 unless otherwise noted embarked on a course of conduct to discourage support of the Union and engaged in numerous acts of interference with, restraint, and coercion of employees in the exercise of their rights under the Act. Respondent's testimony in respect to the said alleged violations for the most part consists of denials of the statements attributed to its officers and agents. In respect to the balance of the said allegations, Respondent contends that the statements made by it are not coercive or violative of the Act. 4. A final issue presented herein is whether Leonard Butkiewicz is a supervisor and/or agent of Respondent within the meaning of the Act. The conflicting testimony adduced by the parties regard- ing all of the foregoing issues presents for determination primarily a question of the credibility of the witnesses and of their testimony. C. The Commencement of Union Organization On Friday, May 9, 1975,' Respondent's employees Acevedo, Ingraham, LeMay, Sprude, Recchioni, and Jesus Medina met by prearrangement at 5:30 p.m. at the Meriden Mall parking lot with Union Representative Joseph Bianca. The arrangements for this meeting had been made by Ingraham through his father who is a committeeman for the Union at Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Company in North Haven, Connecticut. At this meeting, all of the employees who were present signed union authorization cards were given additional blank cards, and were instructed by Bianca on how, when, and where to solicit signatures to the cards from other employees. Commencing with the follow- ing Monday, May 12, the employees who had attended the union meeting began handing out the Union's cards and to solicit signatures to the cards at Respondent's plant and in its parking lot adjacent to the plant during break and lunch periods and before and after working hours. D. The Respondent's Response to Union Organization Word of the union organizational campaign of the Respondent's employees promptly reached the ears of Vice President Hogan and President Woods. Woods testified that on Tuesday, May 13 (the day after solicitation of signatures to union cards began in the plant), Hogan told him that "he had heard some scuttlebutt with reference to the organization of a union in the shop." 5 Respondent thereupon engaged in the following conduct which is alleged as violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 1. Interrogation, threats, and creation of the, impression of surveillance On the morning of May 13, as employee Sprude, one of the employee union organizers, was walking back to his work station, Hogan said to Sprude, "I hear you're trying to start a union." Sprude answered, "What makes you think 5 Hogan professed a lack of recollection about when he first became aware of the union organizational campaign , but I do not credit his asserted lack of recollection of the date in light of the significant events which occurred on May 13. Moreover , as explicated infra, I regard Hogan's testimony as frequently evasive, on occasion exaggerated and/or self- contradictory, and in general unreliable and unworthy of much credence. 184 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD so, Joe? If I was interested in a union, I would go to work for a shop that had one." Hogan then said, "That's good," or "something to that effect." 6 Hogan's statement to Sprude quite obviously was de- signed to elicit information from Sprude regarding his views about the Union's organizing campaign . Viewed in the light of Respondent's manifest opposition to the representation of its employees by the Union and Sprude's false response to Hogan, his statement to Sprude clearly constituted coercive interrogation of an employee regarding his union sympathies, and I therefore find that Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. On the same morning (May 13), employee LeMay, another of the employee union organizers , was called by Vice President Hogan to a meeting with President Woods in the conference room where the foremen hold their meetings. According to LeMay's testimony, which I credit, Woods started the conversation by telling LeMay that he had heard that LeMay and Medina were trying to organize a union in the shop and that he was not going to have any union.? LeMay asked Woods how he knew that he was organizing. Woods replied that he had his sources, that he would fire anybody who was organizing for the Union, and that he would find out who they were. Woods further told LeMay that he and Hogan did not need a union, and that they could "just retire and close the shop." Woods asked LeMay what he thought about that , and LeMay answered that it was Woods' company and he could not tell Woods how to run it. Woods then asked Hogan whether he thought LeMay was organizing for the Union, and Hogan answered no. LeMay then suggested to Woods that instead of having employees come up individually to be told about Woods' 6 The findings above are based on Sprude's testimony which I regard as reliable and credit. Hogan denied that he had any conversation with Sprude on May 13 "regarding anything relating to this case " As previously noted, I consider Hogan's testimony as generally unreliable, and I therefore do not credit this denial of Sprude's testimony. r As previously noted, Medina was another of the Respondent's employ- ees who had attended the Union's first organizing meeting , signed a union card, and received a supply of blank cards for soliciting other employees to sign. 8 Woods admitted that he had a meeting with LeMay on May 13 in the conference room at which Hogan was present, but his version of the subject matter of their conversation was quite different from LeMay's. Woods testified that this meeting did not occur until after he made his speeches to all the employees about the Union. According to Woods, this meeting with LeMay was prompted by a complaint which he had received from Hogan that LeMay could not get along with Joseph Tierney , his foreman in the gnnding department of Pye and Hogan , and that he resolved this personnel problem by suggesting at the meeting with LeMay that his work station be moved from the grinding department of Pye and Hogan to the carpenter shop of Packer Machine . Woods further testified that, following this meeting, LeMay was so transferred but that he was retained on the Pye and Hogan payroll to preserve his pension rights . I place no credence in Woods' version of this meeting with LeMay and I credit the Tatter 's version of their conversation for the following reasons: I note initially that Woods did not specifically deny the statements about the Union which LeMay attributed to him. Moreover, Respondent's records in evidence of LeMay's payroll changes disclose quite clearly that on May 13 , 1975, the admitted date of this conversation, LeMay was no longer working under Tierney 's supervision, and thus belie Woods' testimony regarding the subject matter of this conversation In this regard, G. C. Exh. 10, a payroll change notice dated June 28, 1974, almost a year before Woods' admitted meeting with LeMay, states as follows : "After vacation, R. LeMay will assume responsibility for cutter grind[ing] & mach[me] Rep[air ] in new Dept." The said document which increased LeMay's rate of pay from $4.35 to $4.70 an hour effective on July I, 1974, was signed by Tierney and Hogan . Thereafter, although LeMay's wages were reviewed again on August 30, 1974, February 28, 1975, views about union organization, why didn't Woods just have a meeting with all the employees and tell them how he felt. Woods thought that was a good idea and he asked Hogan what he thought of LeMay's suggestion. Hogan said, "okay," and Woods said that they would hold the meeting with the employees downstairs in the inspection rooms Based on LeMay's credited testimony, I find that by Woods' interrogation of LeMay about his union activities, by his creation of the impression that he was engaging in surveillance of his employees' union activities, by his threat to discharge any employee who was organizing for the Union, and by his threat to "close the shop" and "retire" because of the union organizational activity, Respondent engaged in further unfair labor practices within the mean- ing of Section 8(axl) of the Act. Following his meeting with LeMay and as suggested by him, Woods and Hogan assembled all of Respondent's Pye and Hogan employees and foremen in the inspection room on the morning of May 13. Woods, who had only recently returned to the plant after hospitalization for ulcers, told the employees to gather around closely because he was unable to speak loudly. He then said that he had heard that there was union activity going on, that he did not want to hear any more talk about a union, and that if he did he would close the shop and they would all be out of work. Woods further said that the last person who tried to organize a union in the shop met with an unfortunate accident, but that he was not strong enough at that time to cause an accident .9 Based on the testimony of the employees credited above, I find that Respondent further violated Section 8(a)(l) of June 9, 1975, and August 29, 1975, and his hourly rate of pay was successively increased to $5, $5.25, and $5.50, none ofthe said wage reviews and payroll change notices were signed by Tierney, but two of them dated August 30, 1974, and February 28, 1975, bear the signature of Woods, the admitted manager of Packer Machine. (See G. C. Exh. 11, 12A, 12B, and 12C.) These documents thus clearly indicate that LeMay was transferred from Tierney's supervision to Packer Machine in July 1974, before the wage review on August 30, 1974, and thus confirm LeMay's testimony that on May 13, 1975, the date of his meeting with Woods and Hogan, Tierney was not his foreman and there was no discussion of his differences with Tierney. In the light of the foregoing, and from my assessment that Woods' testimony was frequently evasive, occasionally implausible, sometimes self-contradic- tory, and in general unreliable, I place no credence whatsoever in Woods' version of his May 13 meeting with LeMay. 9 I base my findings above on the credited corroborative testimony of Acevedo, Ingraham, Recchioni, LeMay, Sprude, and Robert Tierney, a brother of Foreman Joseph Tierney . Woods' version of this talk, although somewhat different from that of the employees credited above, conveyed substantially the same message . According to Woods, he told the employees that he had heard some scuttlebutt about a union ; that the Company was too small to have a union ; that he would not work in a shop where there was a union; that some Englishman "wanted to organize a union in a shop and one of the people went through the wall"; and that he was the man responsible for the sales and would not be involved in a company that had a union Woods' version of his May 13 talk to the employees was not corroborated by either Hogan, any of his foremen who admittedly were present, or by any employee, and I credit it only to the extent that it accords with the testimony of the employees credited above . Woods also testified that he was prompted to call this meeting, not because he had just heard from Hogan that union organization was in progress , but to thank the employees for their notes and gifts which he had received while he was ill. I regard this asserted reason for this meeting as implausible and unworthy of credence . According to his own testimony, Woods returned to the plant after his illness on May 6 or 7. However, he did not call this meeting of the employees until immediately after he heard that union organization was occurring in the plant . The timing PACKER INDUSTRIES 185 the Act by Woods' statement that he would close the plant and the employees would all be out of work if he heard any more talk about a union. I further find that Woods' story about the unfortunate accident which befell a former union organizer, and his statement that he was currently too weak to cause any accidents, constituted an implied subtle threat of future physical violence to employees who engaged in union organizational activity, and that Respondent thereby further violated Section 8(a)(1). After his May 13 meeting with Woods, LeMay received from a union representative acquaintance a printed copy of a leaflet entitled "Do You KNow" which listed 36 items of "What Foremen and Supervisors Can NOT Do," and which, if done, assertedly violated the Act.10 LeMay brought the leaflet to the plant on the morning of May 15 and gave it to Ingraham, one of the employee organizers for the Union. During the lunchbreak that day, Ingraham, accompanied by employees Medina and Recchioni, had eight copies made of the leaflet at the library and brought them back to the plant. After lunch, Ingraham posted one copy of the leaflet on the wall of the men's room over the wash basin. That same afternoon about 3:30 p.m., while Ingraham was operating one of the milling machines in the plant, he overheard a conversation between Hogan and employee Edward Towler while they were standing at Towler's machine about 2-1/2 feet away. According to Ingraham's credited testimony, Hogan told Towler that President Woods was "furious about the union business," and he asked Towler if he knew who "was organizing the union." Towler answered, "No." Hogan then said to Towler, "Well, there's $50 to somebody who can come up with the names of the organizers of this union." About 5 minutes later, Towler asked Ingraham if he knew who had put up the union leaflet in the men's room, and Ingraham replied that he did not.11 Based on Ingraham's credited testimony, I find that Respondent further violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by Hogan's interrogation of Towler as to the identity of the union organizers and by his offer of a reward for anyone who disclosed their identity. 12 2. The discharge of employee organizer Juan Acevedo Juan Acevedo was hired by Respondent on February 11, 1974, as a buffer in the burring department of Pye and Hogan at $2.50 per hour. He admittedly was an intelligent and satisfactory employee and was given progressive pay raises in July 1974 to $2.70 an hour, in September 1974 to $2.90 an hour and in December 1974 to $3 an hour. Moreover, because of his admitted intelligence, and be- cause he concededly "was a hard worker," Acevedo was assigned the additional responsibility of assisting John Pollard, Respondent's chief expediter, in moving parts from of this meeting, as well as the content of Woods' statements thereat, belies Woods' testimony regarding the purpose for convening it 10 G. C. Exh. 3. i i Hogan denied that he had any discussion with any employee regarding a $50 reward However , as previously indicated, I consider Hogan s testimony as generally unreliable and I do not credit this denial . Moreover, I regard Ingraham's testimony which withstood rigorous cross-examination in respect to this incident as more trustworthy. 2 Best Industrial Uniform Supply Company, Inc., 203 NLRB 1166, 1170 (1973) one department to another.13 Acevedo testified that before he was fired on May 15 he never received any warning or complaint about his work from any supervisor or official of Respondent. It is undisputed that no written warning notice was ever issued to Acevedo, notwithstanding that Respon- dent at all material times herein had warning notice forms available for issuance. Pollard conceded that Acevedo "at first" did the work of helping him with expediting "very well." Pollard further testified that he received no comp- laints from any supervisor about Acevedo's work before May 1975. As found above, Acevedo was one of six of Respondent's employees who attended and participated in the Union's first organizational meeting on Friday, May 9, after work. Acevedo signed a union authorization card at that meeting, and starting with Monday, May 12, he passed out union cards to other employees in the plant and solicited them to sign them before work, at lunchtime, and after work. On Thursday, May 15, after lunch, Acevedo had occasion to go to the men's room in the plant to wash his hands so that they would be clean for his next job. According to Acevedo's credited testimony, as he was washing, he saw on the wall above the wash basin the union leaflet entitled "DO You KNOW" which Ingraham had posted there. At that moment, Foreman Edward Hamelin came into the men's room, looked at Acevedo and at the leaflet on the wall, and then, without saying a word, took the paper off the wall and brought it over and showed it to Foreman John Ticino who was nearby. Then, as Acevedo walked by them on his way back to his job, he observed Hamelin, Ticino, and Clarence Rider, another foreman, gazing at him as though he "was responsible" for the presence of the poster on the men's room wall. A short while later, as Acevedo was going to the inspection department to get some boxes, he observed Vice President Hogan reading the leaflet with his face "red like tomatoes." That same afternoon at 4 p.m., Acevedo was notified by Pollard that he was fired because he was not doing his job. Acevedo disputed Pollard's statement and he said that he did everything that Pollard asked him to do in addition to tasks which were not required of him. Pollard then said that he had told Acevedo earlier that day to go back to work. Acevedo denied that Pollard had said that, and he told Pollard that the real reason for his discharge was because of the Union. Pollard, in turn, replied that that was not true. According to Pollard, Acevedo was fired because he was not moving parts from one department to another when he was requested by the department foremen to do so, but rather when he felt like doing it. Pollard testified that he first learned that Acevedo "wasn't doing his job" at the beginning of May, about 2 weeks before he fired Acevedo, and that he then promptly warned Acevedo that "if he didn't straighten out, we'd have to discharge him." Pollard 13 The record is somewhat vague as to when Acevedo started to help Pollard with parts expediting. Acevedo testified that he was already doing this work when he received his second raise in September 1974. Pollard testified that he could not remember when Acevedo began to assist hun with expediting, and he estimated the date to be "maybe four months" before he fired Acevedo on May 15, 1975. Hogan testified that Acevedo was assigned to parts expediting about 5 or 6 months before his termination. I deem it unnecessary to resolve this conflict. 186 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD further testified that he again orally warned Acevedo about a week later that "if he didn't start doing his job we'd have to discharge him." According to Pollard, the decision to fire Acevedo on Thursday, May 15, was precipitated by two complaints which he received that day from Foreman Joseph Tierney, one in the morning and another in the afternoon, regarding Acevedo's failure to move parts from his department when requested. As explicated hereinafter, I consider the testimony of Pollard and all of the other witnesses of Respondent regarding Acevedo's alleged shortcomings and his summary termination as implausible, contradictory, and unworthy of credence. In the first place, I consider Pollard's testimony regarding the oral warnings of discharge which he assertedly gave to Acevedo as unworthy of any credence. Acevedo admittedly was a hard worker and an intelligent employee until the beginning of May when, according to Pollard, the first complaint about Acevedo's failure to move parts when requested allegedly was received by Pollard. Even assuming arguendo that Pollard received such a complaint, and I do not believe that he did, I regard it impossible to believe that, upon its receipt, Pollard would then have promptly threat- ened this previously satisfactory hard worker with dis- charge as he testified he did . It is significant in this regard that although Respondent concededly had written warning notices available for use neither Pollard nor any of Respondent's other foremen who assertedly complained about Acevedo's lack of performance ever put any of their alleged complaints about his work in writing. Moreover, Pollard's testimony about Acevedo was quite implausible in other respects. For example, Pollard first testified on direct examination that when he received a complaint from a foreman that Acevedo was not moving parts as requested, he asked Acevedo, "How come?" and Acevedo replied that he "didn't have time," and that he would move the parts when he had the time. On cross-examination, however, Pollard testified that when he asked Acevedo why he had not moved the parts he replied "on a couple of occasions" that he would "do it when he got damn good and ready." When Pollard was then asked why he did not fire Acevedo when he received that response, Pollard testified, "Because we needed the extra help." I place no credence in this testimony of Pollard because I regard it as stretching credulity beyond belief that Pollard or any other supervisor would have tolerated such insubordination for an instant if it in fact had occurred. Based on the foregoing, as well as demeanor, I do not credit any of Pollard's testimony regarding Acevedo's alleged shortcomings and the comp- laints assertedly received about him. President Woods testified that the decision to fire Acevedo was made by Vice President Hogan, the manager of Pye and Hogan, where Acevedo worked. According to 14 Hogan testified that he observed 20 of his employees standing in the men's room for 10 minutes all at the same time reading the Union's leaflet "DO YOU KNOW" which was posted on the wall over the wash basin When pressed for details regarding the said incident, Hogan professed an inability to recall the name of any of the employees he allegedly had thus observed. Moreover, Hogan further professed a lack of memory as to whether he spoke to any of the employees about standing around and reading the leaflet I regard Hogan's testimony in these respects to be patently implausible and incredible is See fn 13,supra 16 For example, Ticino testified on direct examination that when he Woods, he was not consulted regarding the decision to fire Acevedo, and he had no prior knowledge of any problems with Acevedo before he was fired. However, Hogan testified contrary to Woods that he spoke to Woods about "all the dischargees" before they were terminated. I regard Woods' testimony in this respect as more reliable than Hogan's which I consider to be patently implausible in some respects. For example, Hogan testified that he personally on "numerous times" observed Acevedo stand- ing around doing nothing when he should have been working. Yet, Hogan nevertheless testified that he never spoke to Acevedo, either about his indolence, or about the complaints which he allegedly had received from Pollard. I find it impossible to believe that a plant manager like Hogan, who admittedly is in the shop all day long, would permit any employee to stand around doing nothing on numerous occasions when he should be working without even asking him why he was idle. Based on this and other implausible testimony by Hogan,14 his evasive responses to questions, and his demeanor, I place no credence in his testimony regarding either Acevedo's alleged timewasting, or about the complaints about Acevedo which he assertedly received from Pollard. The testimony of Respondent's foreman, John Ticino, about his complaints about Acevedo is similarly unworthy of any credence. Ticino testified that he complained to Pollard about Acevedo "about three weeks after he [Acevedo] took over the job" of assisting Pollard with expediting. Inasmuch as Acevedo, at the latest, took over the expediting work 4 months before he was fired,15 Ticino's testimony would thus place his first complaint about Acevedo's work in about January or February. However, Pollard testified, contrary to Ticino, that the first complaint about Acevedo's performance was not received by him until the beginning of May. Ticino further testified that prior to Acevedo's termination he also complained about his refusal to move parts when requested to President Woods and to Foremen Clarence Rider and Joseph Tierney at the weekly meetings of the supervisors. Ticino's testimo- ny in this respect conflicts with that of Woods who, as previously noted, testified that he had no prior knowledge of any problems with Acevedo before he was fired. Furthermore, although Foreman Rider testified for Re- spondent regarding the discharge on the same day of Ingraham, another of the employee union organizers, he gave no testimony about any complaints which he either made or received about Acevedo's work performance. Based on the foregoing, other contradictions and implausi- bilities, and on demeanor, I consider Ticino's testimony to be worthy of little, if any, reliance.16 I therefore place no credence in his testimony regarding his alleged complaints observed the union leaflet "DO YOU KNOW" in the men's room, Acevedo, to his knowledge, was not there. However, on cross-examination, Ticino first denied that he so testified, and later eventually testified that he did not know whether Acevedo was in the men's room at that time I place no credence in either of these responses and credit Acevedo 's testimony that Ticino observed him in the men's room reading the union leaflet Ticino also testified that after he reported the presence of the union leaflet on the men's room wall to Woods and Hogan, nobody, to his knowledge, inquired as to who posted it. Ticino further testified that he did not discuss the instant case with anyone at the Company, not even the other foremen. I regard Ticino's testimony in all these respects as patently implausible and incredible PACKER INDUSTRIES 187 to Woods, Rider, Tierney, and Pollard about Acevedo's alleged failure to move parts when requested by him. As previously noted, the complaints about Acevedo which assertedly triggered his discharge in midweek on Thursday, May 15, allegedly were made to Pollard by Foreman Joseph Tierney. Respondent failed to call Tierney to testify, and it offered no explanation for the failure to do so. I infer from the failure to call Tierney that if he had been called he would not have corroborated the testimony of Pollard and Hogan regarding the complaints which he allegedly made to them on May 15 about Acevedo's failure to move parts when requested.17 In responding to the first charge filed by the Union in Case l-CA-10825, Respondent, in a letter to Regional Board Attorney Smith dated June 30 and signed by Woods, contended that Acevedo (and Ingraham, another employee union organizer) were terminated inter alia, because of "a general turn down in business."18 However, at the hearing in this case, Respondent raised no contention and adduced no testimony that Acevedo's termination was in any way motivated by business conditions. I conclude from all the incredible, conflicting, and implausible testimony offered by Respondent for Acevedo's peremptory termination, from Respondent's apparent abandonment of the business reason therefor stated in Woods' letter to the Regional Office, and from Acevedo's credited testimony that he never received any complaints about his work from any official or supervisor of Respondent, that the reasons asserted by Respondent for his precipitate dismissal are pretexts designed to conceal the real reason for his termination. In the light of the pretextual reasons advanced for Acevedo's termination, the real motivation therefor is quite apparent. In Shattuck Denn Mining Corporation (Iron King Branch) v. N. L. R. B ., 362 F.2d 466, 470 (C.A. 9, 1966), the court of appeals aptly stated the following in respect to the assignment of pretextual reasons for the discharge of employees: Nor is the trier of fact - here the trial examiner - required to be more naif than is ajudge. If he finds that the stated motive for a discharge is false, he certainly can infer that there is another motive. More than that, he can infer that the motive is one that the employer desires to conceal - an unlawful motive - at least where, as in this case, the surrounding facts tend to reinforce that inference. The principle thus enunciated in Shattuck Denn, supra, is clearly applicable to Acevedo' s termination. Before Acevedo became one of the initial organizers of the Union, he was regarded by Respondent as an "intelli- gent" employee and a "hard" worker, and he was given 17 International Union (UAW) v. N. L.R B, 459 F.2d 1329 (C.A.D C., 1972), 2 J. Wigmore , Evidence, Sec. 285 (3rd Ed. 1940). is See G . C. Exh. 18. 19 Like Ticino, whose testimony I do not credit (see fn. 16, supra), Hamelin testified that no one was in the men 's room when he discovered the union leaflet on the wall, and that as far as he "can remember ," Acevedo was not there . I place no credence in Hamelin's testimony in this regard, and I credit Acevedo's converse testimony for the following reason On cross- examination, Hamelin was asked , inter aha, if he knew that Respondent was opposed to the Union . Hamelin twice evaded a direct response to this question and then testified obviously falsely, "I don 't know whether they're successive raises in pay. Respondent, however, was utterly opposed to the Union and, as found above on LeMay's credited testimony, President Woods had threatened to fire anybody who was organizing for the Union, and he had stated that he had his sources and would find out who the organizers were. In light of Vice President Hogan's interro- gation of Towler as to who "was organizing the union," and his offer of a $50 reward for anybody who came up with the names of the organizers, it is fairly evident that Respondent learned that Acevedo was one of those whose names it was seeking. That conclusion is also supported by the timing of Acevedo's peremptory discharge in midweek on the very same day that he was observed by Foremen Hamelin and Ticino in the men's room when they discovered the union leaflet on the wall over the sink where Acevedo was washing his hands, and by the looks Acevedo received from Hamelin, Ticino, and Foreman Rider as he left the men's room on that day.19 I conclude from all the foregoing, including the absence of any prior reprimands or warnings about Acevedo's work, the vacillating and pretextual reasons asserted for his termination, Respondent's manifest hostility to the repre- sentation of its employees by the Union, and its knowledge or suspicion that Acevedo was one of the union organizers, that Respondent terminated Acevedo's employment to discourage membership in or support by its employees of the Union, and that it thereby discriminated against Acevedo in respect to tenure of employment and engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 3. The discharge of employee organizer William 0. Ingraham, Jr. Ingraham was hired by Respondent on January 8 to work for Pye and Hogan as a Bridgeport milling machine operator at $3.75 an hour under the supervision of Foreman Clarence Rider. Prior to being hired by Respondent, Ingraham had worked 1-1/2 years for Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Company, one of Respondent's principal custom- ers, as an experimental machine operator, and he had studied the machine trade for 1 year at a technical school. As previously noted, Ingraham, through his father, made the arrangements for the first union organizational meeting which took place after work on Friday, May 9. He signed a union authorization card at that meeting, and starting Monday, May 12, he began to solicit Respondent's employ- ees to sign union cards before and after work in the Company's parking lot outside the plant and wherever he encountered them elsewhere. In addition, as noted above, on May 15, Ingraham made copies of the union leaflet "DO opposed to it or not. They haven't confided in me." Subsequently, on further cross-examination, Hamelin admitted that he had attended Woods' May 13 meeting with the employees in which Woods stated "that they didn't want a union." In the light of the foregoing, as well as demeanor, I believe the converse of Hamelin's denial of Acevedo's presence in the men's room to be true. See, e.g, N LR.B v. United Mineral & Chemical Corporation, 391 F 2d 829, 833 (C.A. 2,1968), where the court said: [T ]he . . evidence was of the very sort warranting a trier of the facts in believing the truth to be the opposite of what was asserted 188 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD You Lwow," brought them to the plant, and posted one copy on the wall of the men's room over the wash basin. At quitting time on May 15, Ingraham notified his immediate Supervisor Richard LaDeaux that he would be coming to work late the following morning because he had to go to the hospital. The following morning (May 16) between 7 and 7:30 a.m., Ingraham called Respondent's office and left a similar message with one of the girls in the office. Later that morning between 9:30 and 10 a.m., Ingraham again called the office to inform them that he was through at the hospital and would be returning to work, only to be advised over the telephone that he had been laid off. That afternoon about 3 :30 p.m., Ingraham went to Respondent's plant and was given an envelope by Hogan which contained two checks and a blue slip to the Connecticut Unemployment Office according to which the reason for his termination was that he "was not capable of doing our type of work." 20 Ingraham's wage rate was reviewed on March 21 by Foreman Clarence Rider and Vice President Hogan. According to Ingraham's credited testimony, he was told then that he would not get a raise in pay because he talked too much, and that he would be reviewed again on June 1 .21 Ingraham further credibly testified that, except for the said admonition about his verbosity, he never received any warning that his work was unsatisfactory nor any threat of discharge before he was peremptorily terminated as described above . It is undis- puted that no written warning notice was ever issued by Respondent to Ingraham. Vice President Hogan testified that he made the final decision to fire Ingraham because "he couldn't do his working. . . work was not up to our standards," and for "no other reason." However, as previously noted, in Respondent's letter to the Regional Office dated June 30, it contended that Ingraham (and Acevedo) also had been "terminated as a result of . . . a general turn down of business." At the hearing in this case, Respondent offered no testimony that his firing was motivated by financial considerations. As indicated below, I regard the testimony of Respondent's witnesses in respect to Ingraham's alleged shortcomings as contradictory, implausible, and unworthy of any credence, and I consider the asserted reasons for his sudden termination in mid-morning on May 16 as a transparent pretext to conceal the real motivation therefor. Hogan testified that on one job that Ingraham worked "almost 50 percent of the parts that he did weren't acceptable." He further testified that, at the time of Ingraham's wage review on March 21, he told Ingraham that he "would give him one more chance ," and that "if his work didn't improve, we could not keep him." Hogan also testified that the final reason for Ingraham's termination involved a job on which he had sawed some parts "in the wrong places," and then had thrown the improperly cut parts into a barrel near the handsaw where they were later discovered. Hogan estimated that these parts which Ingra- ham allegedly had scrapped were discovered in the barrel about "a week before" he fired Ingraham . When Hogan was asked, "What did you do about it at that time," he answered, "I just laid him off as soon as possible, or the next, you know, when we laid off." Previously, when Hogan had been asked by the General Counsel's representative when he made the decision to fire Ingraham , he first had evasively responded, "I don't keep a record of these dates, ma'am, I work in the shop," then he testified that he did not know when he made the decision, and finally he testified that it was on the day Ingraham was fired. I place no credence in any of the foregoing testimony of Hogan. Although Respondent concededly possesses rec- ords of the work performed by its employees, it produced none to corroborate Hogan's testimony that the work Ingraham did was not acceptable. The forms used by Respondent on its wage reviews contain provision for rating employees for ability, conduct, attendance, and production as either excellent, good, fair, or poor. On Ingraham's wage review form signed by Hogan and Rider on March 21 (G. C. Exh. 6), there appears no rating for Ingraham in respect to any aspect of his employment. I find it impossible to believe that if, as Hogan testified, Ingraham had been threatened with dismissal unless his work im- proved, a notation to that effect would not have been made on his wage review form, or at the very least, a rating of his alleged lack of ability. I conclude from the absence of any such notation on the form, and from my assessment of Hogan's testimony as generally unreliable that, as Ingra- ham testified, no such warning was given to him. Finally, I place no credence in Hogan's testimony that he based his final decision to fire Ingraham on the discovery of the bad parts which Ingraham had allegedly produced and scrapped, for even assuming arguendo that Ingraham was responsible for the improperly cut parts, if this were the real reason for his termination he obviously would have been fired upon the discovery of this alleged dereliction, and not "as soon as possible," on the "next" layoff, or about "one week later," as Hogan testified . In the light of the foregoing, I regard the assignment of these reasons for Ingraham's termination as pretexts designed by the Respondent to conceal its true motivation for his dismissal on the morning of May 16 when Ingraham was not even in the plant. We come then to the testimony about the reason for Ingraham's discharge given by Clarence Rider, Ingraham's foreman. Rider testified that he and Hogan "had a couple of talks" with Ingraham in which they assertedly told him that "his quality had to improve or we would have to terminate him." According to Rider, the occasion for this talk was Ingraham's wage review which assertedly occurred in December 1974, a date Rider "was sure of." However, when apprised by Respondent's counsel that Ingraham did not start to work for Respondent until after December 1974, and he was shown the wage review form of Ingraham which he had signed on March 21, 1975, Rider testified that that was the date that Ingraham was warned of possible discharge unless his work quality improved. But, when Rider was asked on redirect examination by Respondent's counsel to relate the conversation which had occurred on that date, his response significantly omitted any reference to any threat of discharge. Moreover, when Rider was asked when, after Ingraham was hired, he first learned that his work was unsatisfactory, Rider replied that Ingraham 20 See G . C. Exh. 8. 21 See G C. Exh. 6. PACKER INDUSTRIES 189 worked for him 3 months before he made that discovery, then Rider modified that response and said that Ingraham's work was satisfactory during that initial period "in some areas," and finally Rider contradicted his initial reply and testified that Ingraham's work was unsatisfactory in some areas during his first 3 months of employment. I conclude from all the foregoing vacillations and self-contradictions, as well as from the absence of any notation or warning on Ingraham's wage review form dated March 21 that his work was other than satisfactory, that I can place no credence in Rider's testimony regarding either the unsatisfactory nature of Ingraham's work or the alleged threat of termination if his work quality did not improve, and I credit Ingraham's contrary testimony that no such warning was given to him. According to Rider, the incident which assertedly trig- gered Ingraham's termination before the June 1 date previously set for his next wage review was the discovery by Leonard Butkiewicz (who admittedly was in charge of the department when the finding was made) of some parts which Ingraham allegedly had thrown into a scrap barrel.22 Rider testified that about 8 parts out of a lot of 210 on which Ingraham had worked were brought to him by Butkiewicz, and that the latter had told Rider that he had found them in the scrap barrel. Rider further testified that he then checked the dimensions of the parts with a pin micrometer and found that they were one 100,000th of an inch too short, and that he then asked Ingraham whether "he was the one who destroyed the parts and threw them in the garbage." Rider testified that Ingraham denied doing so, that he then told Ingraham "that he was the only one that had worked on the job in that area, so it could be no one else," but that Ingraham still denied that he had done it. According to Rider, that concluded his conversation with Ingraham, but on cross-examination Rider added for the first time that he also notified Ingraham at that time that "we were going to terminate him from the company," and that as far as he, Rider, was concerned, "as of that moment, I had fired him, yes." I place no credence whatsoever in Rider's testimony regarding the incident which assertedly triggered Ingraham's summary termina- tion on the morning of May 16 while he was not in the plant. I base this conclusion on the following considera- tions. I note initially that in Respondent's letter to the Regional Office in response to the Union's charge in this case, there is absolutely no reference to this incident which assertedly motivated Ingraham's termination. I find it impossible to believe that if such an incident had in fact occurred and had precipitated Ingraham's discharge, Respondent would not have given this reason for his termination in the letter in which it was explaining why it fired him, especially since in that same letter, it relied on a general downturn in business as one of the reasons for his termination, a ground which it apparently has since abandoned. I note further that Respondent failed to call Butkiewicz, who assertedly found the parts which Ingraham allegedly "destroyed" and threw "in the garbage," and it offered no explanation for not calling him to testify. I infer, from this failure to call Butkiewicz and to thus subject him to cross-examination regarding his alleged discovery of the scrapped parts, that if called, he would not have supported Rider's testimony regarding this incident 23 Moreover, even assuming arguen- do that scrapped parts had been found by Butkiewicz, Respondent produced no records, clearly available to it, to show that Ingraham was responsible for the defective parts. I note in this regard that when employee David A. Gerace caused 19 pieces of a part to be "junked" because of defective work he was given a written warning that a repetition would be cause for discharge.24 Admittedly, no such written warning was ever given to Ingraham. As previously noted, Ingraham credibly testified that, prior to his notification over the telephone on May 16 by the girl in the office that he had been laid off, he had not been spoken to by anyone in the Company about rejected parts, or warned about possible termination. On the other hand, Rider's testimony that he notified Ingraham on May 15 that he was being fired "as of that moment" is inconsistent with undisputed facts. Thus, if Ingraham had been so advised by Rider, he obviously would not have notified Supervisor LaDeaux that he was coming in late the next day because he had to go to the hospital, nor would he have called Respondent's office the next morning and left a similar message. Moreover, if Ingraham had been fired on May 15 as Rider testified, the office girl who received Ingraham's message on May 16 would not have relayed it to Butkiewicz who apparently was in charge of Ingraham's department on that day.25 I conclude from all the foregoing that Rider's testimony regarding this alleged conversation with Ingra- ham on the day before Ingraham actually was fired, about scrapped parts which, according to Hogan, had been found in a trash barrel about a week earlier, is worthy of no credence whatever, and moreover is inconsistent with Hogan's version of this alleged incident. In the light of the incredible testimony adduced by Respondent regarding this alleged reason for Ingraham's termination, the absence of this reason in Respondent's letter to the Region which purported to state the grounds for Ingraham's discharge, and the abandonment of the poor business reason asserted in the said letter, I conclude that all of the reasons asserted by Respondent for Ingraham's peremptory termination on the morning of May 16 while he was not working are incredible pretexts fabricated by Respondent to cloak its true motivation for this action. The real reason for Ingraham's sudden discharge is fairly apparent from the record. Ingraham, like Acevedo who was fired the day before, was one of the Union's employee organizers at Respondent's plant. Respondent was unalter- ably opposed to the representation of its employees by the Union. It was Ingraham who posted the union leaflet "Do You icxow" on the men's room wall. Respondent apparent- ly did not learn about Ingraham's connection with the union leaflet until the morning of May 16 while Ingraham was away from the plant. Months later, Hogan admitted to employee Robert Muir that Ingraham was putting the union leaflets on the men's room wall as fast as Respondent was ripping them off, and this Respondent "couldn't 22 As previously noted, one of the issues in this case which will be 23 See fn. 17, supra. considered, Infra is whether Butkiewicz is a supervisor and/or agent of 24 G.C. Exh. 20. Respondent within the meaning of the Act. 25 G.C Exh. 19. 190 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD allow." Moreover, a copy of the union leaflet admittedly was maintained by Respondent in its personnel file on Ingraham, and Respondent's witnesses were unable to explain, although asked, who put the leaflet in the said file or why. I conclude from the foregoing that it is evident that Ingraham's termination was motivated by his union activity of posting a union poster on the men's room wall at Respondent's plant and by Respondent's opposition to the Union. The record does not disclose that Respondent had any rule which prohibited employees from posting materi- als there. I therefore conclude that by terminating Ingra- ham's employment because he engaged in a union activity protected by the Act, Respondent thereby discouraged membership in or assistance to the Union by its employees, and thereby further engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 4. Additional interference with, and restraint and coercion of, employees' rights At 8 a.m. on the morning of May 16, Jesus Medina, another of the Union's employee organizers was notified by Edward Towler, a fellow employee that he had been fired and that he should go down and talk with Hogan. Medina accordingly went down to Respondent's office and met Hogan there. No one else was present. Hogan told Medina that he had been fired because he was a union leader. Medina protested that he did not want the Union in the shop, and Hogan then asked him why, if that was so, he was always talking to Ingraham. Medina answered that he talked to Ingraham because he knew him from before. In response to questions from Medina as to why Acevedo and Ingraham had been fired, Hogan said that it was because they were union leaders, but that he had put another reason on their blue slips to avoid getting into trouble. Hogan then cautioned Medina to forget what had happened and Medina returned to work. Medina continued thereafter in Respondent's employ until shortly before the hearing in this case.26 Based on the foregoing credited testimony, I find that by Hogan's May 16 statement to Medina that he, Acevedo, and Ingraham were fired because they were union leaders, Respondent further interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Act, and thus violated Section 8(aXI) of the Act. That same evening of May 16, employee Richard Remillard met Hogan at a stag party at the VFW Club in Meriden, Connecticut. In the course of the conversation which followed, Hogan told Remillard that he wished the union situation at the plant cleared up, and that Woods would close the shop rather than allow the Union in the door. Remillard replied that perhaps a union was the best thing for the Company.27 26 The findings above are based on Medina's testimony which was subjected to no cross-examination regarding this incident and which I credit in these respects. Hogan's only testimony regarding the said incident consisted of a single blanket denial that he at any time discussed the termination of Ingraham and Acevedo with any employee . As previously noted, I regard Hogan's testimony to be generally unreliable, and I do not credit this denial 27 The findings above are based on Remillard 's testimony which I credit in these respects Hogan admitted that he attended the stag party and that he Based on Remillard's credited testimony, I find that by Hogan's statement that Woods would close the shop rather than let the Union in the door, Respondent further violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 5. The discharge of Richard Remillard Remillard was hired by President Woods on October 14, 1974, to work as an inspector in Respondent's quality control department under the supervision of George Shields, quality control manager, and Robert Moulison, chief inspector. Remillard's initial rate of pay was set after bargaining with Woods at $4.60 an hour, a rate higher than all the other inspectors in the department, and equal to that paid to Chief Inspector Moulison. Prior to his employment by Respondent, Remillard had worked for a year and a half at Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, Respondent's principal customer, as an inspector of aircraft parts, and he also had worked for 2 years for United Nuclear Company doing machining, welding, and inspecting. Remillard was given his first wage review by Hogan and Shields on December 2, 1974. He was rated at that time as good in ability and conduct, and fair in attendance and production. Remillard was given no raise at that time because, as he was told, his rate of pay already was higher "than most of the inspectors in the department." 28 Remillard also was told at this wage review that there was no problem with his work perfor- mance, but that his attendance should improve. Remillard was given a second wage review on March 14, 1975, by Shields and Woods, and he was told that he would get no raise at that time "because money was tight," but that he would be reviewed again in June.29 About a week before Remillard was fired by Respondent on May 30, he became active in the union campaign at the plant. At that time, Remillard signed a union authorization card and he thereafter, before his termination, passed out union cards to three employees and spoke to several others to encourage them to join the Union. In addition, as found above, on the night of May 16, after Vice President Hogan told Remillard that Woods "would close the shop rather than allow the union in the door," Remillard told Hogan that "maybe [a] union was the best thing for the company." Later in that same conversation, after Remillard said that he hoped "eventually" to become an engineer, Hogan told Remillard that he was going to let him go from the Company, perhaps even the next day, and that he would be doing Remillard a favor by firing him. On Monday, May 19, following their discharge by Respondent, Acevedo and Ingraham returned to the plant during the employees' lunchbreak and engaged several of the employees in conversation in the Company's parking lot. While Remillard was standing next to Ingraham's truck and talking to him, Hogan drove by on his way back from lunch, and Acevedo and Ingraham waved union cards out may have met Remillard there. He testified, however, that he drank heavily that night from about 8:30 p.m. until he went home about 2.30 a.m. the following morning, and that he could not remember what, if any, statements he may have made to Remillard about the plant Remillard's testimony credited above thus stands uncontroverted. 28 Remillard's first wage review is in evidence as Resp. Exh. 11 29 The findings above are based on Remillard's testimony which I credit in these respects. There is no indication on Remillard's second wage review that his work performance was other than satisfactory. (Resp. Exh. 18 ) PACKER INDUSTRIES 191 of their car windows at him. Remillard continued working for Respondent the rest of that day and all of the following day. On the mght of May 20, after work, Shields telephoned Remillard at his home and told him that he had been fired and, when Remillard asked him why, Shields said that he did not know, but that maybe it was because Remillard could not do the job. The following day, Remillard went to the plant and picked up his inspection equipment and received a blue slip from Respondent which stated only, "Not capable of doing our type of work." 30 Respondent contends that it fired Remillard because he was an incompetent inspector who approved parts for shipment which should have been rejected, as a result of which parts which he had approved were later rejected and returned to Respondent by its customers. Respondent further contends that it fired Remillard when it did because, as a consequence of his faulty inspection of shroud segment parts which it had manufactured for Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Company, its principal customer, Pratt & Whitney rejected many of the parts it received from Respondent and ultimately canceled its contract for the said parts. In support of these contentions, Respondent introduced into evidence numerous documents which indicate that many shroud segment parts which had been shipped by Respondent to Pratt & Whitney were later rejected by the latter. I nevertheless regard the testimony of Respondent's witnesses in support of the contention that it fired Remillard either because of these rejections, or because of the alleged contract cancellation by Pratt & Whitney, to be completely false, and I regard the assertion of these reasons for his termination as pretexts by which Respondent seeks to conceal its real reason for Remillard's sudden termination after work on May 20. I base these conclusions on the following considerations. According to Shields, Remillard's supervisor and Re- spondent's principal witness in respect to the reasons for Remillard's discharge, Remillard was hired as a layout inspector, a type of inspection which requires more skill than mechanical inspection. Shields testified that Remillard was not qualified to do layout inspection, and that, after 3 or 4 months, he accordingly reassigned Remillard to mechanical inspection work. Shields further testified that Remillard's work as a mechanical inspector also was not acceptable because of the number of rejections and returns which Respondent was getting of parts which Remillard allegedly had approved. Shields testified that in November 1975 he notified Remillard that he wanted better inspec- tion31 According to Shields, in December 1974 he assigned Remillard to inspect some of the Pratt & Whitney shroud segment job which consisted of about 3,000 parts; in January or February, he put Remillard on this job "100 percent"; and, in the middle or the end of March, Shields began to receive rejections of parts from Pratt & Whitney 30 The copy of this slip which was obtained by the General Counsel from Respondent's records contains the additional notation "on our copy only, reference P&Whitney segements [sic ]." (G. C. Exh 4.) According to Hogan, it was he who instructed the office girl what to put on the blue slip, his instructions did not include any reference to the Pratt & Whitney segments, and he had no knowledge of how the additional verbiage was put on Respondent's copy of the blue slip. However, Woods testified, contrary to Hogan, that the blue slip was typed by the office secretary pursuant to his instructions, and that he ordered the additional notation thereon on the same which Remillard assertedly had approved for shipment. At that time, Shields allegedly told Remillard that "he had better do a better job of inspection." Shields further testified that Remillard's work thereafter improved some- what but that the improvement did not last,land that about a month before Remillard's termination, he told Hogan, "Remillard was not doing the job," and Hogan said, "if I felt he wasn't qualified to do the job to leave [sic] him go." However, Shields did not then fire Remillard, and when he was asked why, in the light of Hogan's alleged authoriza- tion, he did not do so, Shields replied, "Because I put him on mechanical inspection. I figured he could probably do the job there. I don't want to lose anybody unless I have to." Shields also testified that prior to his conversation with Hogan in which he assertedly was authorized to fire Remillard but didn't, he also had called Remillard up to the office, and he and President Woods talked to him about his faulty inspection work. Shields finally testified that the ultimate decision to fire Remillard was recommended by him and approved by Hogan when Shields allegedly received a telephone call from Pratt & Whitney canceling the shroud segment contract because of the numerous rejections of faulty parts which Remillard assertedly had approved for shipment to Pratt & Whitney. Shields' testimony above is rife with inconsistencies, contradictions, and implausibility, and I place no credence in any of it. His testimony that Remillard was not qualified to do layout inspections and that in November 1974 he told Remillard that he wanted better inspections is patently unworthy of any credence in the light of the wage review form which Shields signed on December 2, 1974, in which he rated Remillard's ability as "Good." Shields' further testimony that about a month and a half before Remillard was fired he and President Woods had a conference with Remillard in Woods' office in which they discussed Remillard's allegedly faulty inspection work is contrary to Woods' testimony that before Remillard's termination he had no prior knowledge that Remillard was "unknowledge- able or incapable." Shields' attempted explanation on cross-examination for not firing Remillard 1 month before his actual discharge, when he assertedly was specifically authorized by Hogan to do so, is patently implausible and self-contradictory. Thus, Shields' testimony that he did not fire Remillard at that time because he then assigned him to mechanical inspection work which he thought Remillard "could probably do" contradicts Shields' prior testimony on direct examination according to which Remillard already had been then doing only mechanical inspection work for several months. Likewise, Shields' further explana- tion that he did not want to lose anybody unless he had to is manifestly inconsistent with his testimony about Remil- lard's alleged lack of ability and his alleged responsibility for the Pratt & Whitney rejections. Another example of day that the rest of the slip was typed I place no credence in Woods' testimony and find, contrary thereto, that the additional notation was quite obviously an afterthought designed by Respondent for use in this case, for otherwise the notation would also have been included on the original blue slip which was given to Remillard 31 Since Remillard was fired on the night of May 20, 1975, and was no longer working for Respondent in November 1975, it is obvious that Shields' reference to 1975 was erroneous and that he undoubtedly meant November 1974, the only November that Remillard worked for Respondent. 192 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Shields' self-contradictory testimony is disclosed by his attempt to explain why he notified Remillard of his discharge by telephone after work . On direct examination, Shields first testified, "I got a call from Pratt and Whitney that they were cancelling the contract on this [shroud segments ] job . . . because of the rejection rate on it." Then, inconsistent with that explanation of Remillard's after work hours discharge, Shields testified that "one to two days" after he "received oral notification of the cancellation [of the contract ]," he suggested to Hogan that ,.we let him [Remillard ] go because he is unable to do our type of work," and Hogan authorized Shields to fire him. Still later, on cross-examination, Shields admitted, contrary to his testimony on direct, that he did not receive the telephone call which allegedly canceled the Pratt & Whitney shroud segments contract, that he did not know who did, and that he notified Remillard of his discharge at home at night because he was ordered to do so by Hogan during an evening production meeting of supervisors at which Hogan had told him about the alleged contract cancellation. All of the foregoing persuade me that Shields' testimony is completely unreliable. The records introduced by Respondent into evidence clearly indicate that there were many rejections by Pratt & Whitney of shroud segment parts received by it from Respondent. I find, however, that these rejections resulted, not from any lack of ability or fault of Remillard, but from the manner in which he was instructed by Shields to inspect the said parts. I base that fmding on the following. The Pratt & Whitney shroud segments job admittedly was a rush order and Remillard worked considerable overtime hours and on weekends on it. Remillard credibly testified that he had been instructed by Shields to inspect these parts on a random sample basis and not on a 100-percent basis as Pratt & Whitney required.32 Remillard also credibly testified that he had been instructed by Shields to skip the inspection of certain dimensions of the parts.33 Moreover, Remillard was not the only inspector who had worked on the inspection of these parts , and Shields admitted that he had no way of telling whether the particular parts referred to in the rejection slips in evidence had been inspected by Remillard or another inspector . Under these circumstances, I place no credence in the testimony of Shields and Hogan that they attributed the Pratt & Whitney rejections either to faulty inspection or lack of competence on the part of Remillard, for they clearly had no rational basis for doing so. Moreover, I place no credence in the testimony of Shields and Hogan that the shroud segments contract was can- celed, either as a result of Remillard's allegedly faulty inspection, or for any other reason. I base this conclusion on the following considerations. According to Shields, after he assertedly was notified orally of the cancellation of the shroud segments contract "because of the rejection rate on it," Pratt & Whitney also allegedly canceled the contract in writing. After expressions of concern by me on the absence from the record of the written contract cancellation, and of 32 Shields admitted that he sometimes instructs his inspectors to inspect on a sample basis and to report that 100-percent inspection had been performed, but he denied that he issued such instructions on the Pratt & Whitney shroud segments job. I do not credit his denial. 33 Robert Muir and Alfred Sprude similarly credibly testified that they my desire that it be "put in evidence," Respondent finally on the last day of the hearing offered what it asserted to be the said cancellation of the contract . It was a typewritten statement on a Western Union telegram form which bore no date or time, and which merely stated that Respondent was to "stop shipments [of the shroud segments] until further notice." 34 I rejected the said exhibit because President Woods, through whom it was offered, admitted that he had no recollection of ever having seen it before, and because it appears not to be a genuine telegram which, as a matter of common knowledge, always bears a date and time when it is transmitted. Moreover, Shields admitted on cross-examination that shroud segment parts which former- ly had been shipped to Pratt & Whitney in East Hartford, Connecticut, and then reshipped by Pratt & Whitney to its plant in Canada, were not just shipped directly by Respon- dent to Pratt & Whitney in Canada. I conclude from all the foregoing that Pratt & Whitney never canceled its shroud segments contract with Respondent , either because of the rejection rate, or for any other reason, and I regard the assertion of this reason for Remillard's termination as another fabrication of Respondent to becloud its true reason for his dismissal. Viewed in the light of the pretextual reasons asserted for Remillard's termination, the real reason therefor is fairly apparent from the record . Respondent is utterly opposed to the representation of its employees by the Union. On the night of May 16 at the VFW Club, Remillard disclosed to Hogan that he was prounion when he told Hogan that the Union might be a good thing for the Company. On the following Monday, May 19, Respondent also learned that Remillard was "consorting with the enemy" when Hogan observed Remillard in the company of Ingraham who, as found above, had been fired just the previous Friday because he was a union activist. Respondent thus knew or suspected that Remillard was also a union organizer. In the light of the pretextual reasons asserted for his termination, it is thus fairly apparent that the real motive for Remillard's termination was to discourage its employees from joining or supporting the Union. I therefore find that by its summary termination of Remillard for this reason, Respondent thereby further violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 6. The denial of a wage increase to Mario Recchioni Mario Recchioni was hired by Hogan to work for Respondent on January 16, 1975, as a burrer in the burr room of Pye and Hogan at $2.50 an hour. At the time he was hired, Recchioni had applied for a job as a machinist and he was told by Hogan that they had no need for one at that time, but that if a vacancy occurred he would be moved up to the milling department or the lathe depart- ment. On March 21, while still working as a burrer, Recchioni was given a 20-cent raise to $2.70 an hour. On May 9, Recchioni attended the first organizing meeting of the Union and signed a union authorization card, and he also were frequently instructed by Shields to skip the inspection of certain dimensions of parts, and Muir also testified that he often was told by Shields to approve parts which he considered defective. 34 Resp. Exh. 28 (rejected). PACKER INDUSTRIES 193 also was given a supply of union cards with which to solicit signatures from other employees. In the latter part of May or early June, Recchioni was transferred to the milling department where he was told that he would be working under the supervision of Leonard Butkiewicz and Richard LaDeaux. After working in the milling department for about a month, Recchioni asked Butkiewicz for a raise and Butkiewicz said he would talk to Hogan about it. About 10 minutes later, Butkiewicz came back and asked Recchioni if he was involved in the Union. Recchioni told Butkiewicz to go ask Jesus Medina who knew everybody who was so involved. Butkiewicz then told Recchioni that Hogan had denied him a raise because he was involved in the Union. Butkiewicz continued to ask Recchioni whether he was so involved, and Recchioni eventually admitted that he was. On July 25, Recchioni quit his employment with Respon- dent.35 The parties stipulated at the hearing that in July 1975, the wage rate of employees in Respondent's burring depart- ment ranged from $2.95 to $4.25 an hour, and that those in the milling department varied from $3.95 to $5.35 an hour. The General Counsel contends that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by its denial of a wage increase to Recchioni because of his involvement with the Union, and that it further violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by Butkiewicz' interrogation of Recchioni regarding his union activity. In respect to these alleged violations, Hogan testified that at the March 21 wage review of Recchioni, at which he was given a 20-cent raise to $2.70 an hour, the next wage review for Recchioni was scheduled for Septem- ber, and Recchioni quit before them. Hogan gave no testimony as to whether or not Butkiewicz had asked him in July for a raise for Recchioni and, if so, what his response was. Respondent did not call Butkiewicz to testify and it offered no explanation for not doing so. It contends, however, that Butkiewicz is not a supervisor or agent of Respondent within the meaning of the Act, and that it therefore is not responsible for what Butkiewicz said or asked. I reject Respondent's contention that Butkiewicz is not its supervisor and/or agent for the following reasons: Ingraham credibly testified that when President Woods went to the hospital, he was informed by Foreman Clarence Rider that Hogan was taking over Woods' office duties upstairs, that he, Rider, would be general foreman, and that Butkiewicz would be foreman. Ingraham further credibly testified that Rider then also told him that he was to report directly to either Butkiewicz or Richard LaDeaux for his assignments. Thereafter, Ingraham received his job assign- ments from Butkiewicz. Robert Tierney, another employee, similarly credibly testified that he was notified by Rider that Butkiewicz was the foreman. Hogan and Rider both denied that they ever told any employee that Butkiewicz was a foreman, but, as previously noted, I regard their testimony as unreliable and I do not credit their denials. Moreover, I note in this respect that Rider admitted that Butkiewicz was in charge of the milling department when he allegedly found the faulty parts which Ingraham assertedly had discarded in a trash barrel. I note further as The findings above are based on the testimony of Recchioni which was uncontroverted and which I credit in all these respects 36 G. C Exhs. 19 and 20. that when Ingraham called Respondent's office on May 16 to report that he would be coming in late, a note to that effect was sent by the office to Butkiewicz, and that when Respondent issued a warning notice to employee Gerace, Butkiewicz and Mrs. Roy, Woods' secretary, signed the notice as witnesses.36 I conclude from the foregoing that even assuming that Butkiewicz is not a supervisor within the meaning of the Act, Respondent held him out to its employees as such, and that, therefore, it is responsible for his conduct as its agent within the meaning of Section 2(13) of the Act. I accordingly infer from Respondent's unexplained failure to call Butkiewicz to testify, and from the significant difference between Recchioni's wage rate of $2.70 an hour and the lowest rate of $3.95 an hour which Respondent paid to its other milling department employees, that, as Recchioni was told by Butkiewicz, he was dented a wage increase by Hogan because of his involvement with the Union. I therefore find that by denying Recchioni an increase in wages for that reason Respondent discouraged membership in and support of the Union and thereby further violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. I further find that by Butkiewicz' interrogation of Recchioni about his union involvement Respondent also further violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 7. Additional interrogation and the creation of the impression of surveillance According to the uncontroverted and credited testimony of Roger LeMay, about 2 months before his employment was terminated by Respondent and thus about September 1975, while he was working in the welding shop, President Woods came over and asked him what he thought about unions in general and about a union in Respondent's shop. LeMay responded that he had worked in three or four shops that had unions which "were okay," but that "a union would not work here because too many people are scared." Woods then told LeMay that he had heard that LeMay was organizing, and he asked LeMay if he was in the Union. LeMay replied that he was not. Woods then said that he had a list of the people who were in the Union, who were not, and who were "maybe's," and that LeMay was on the union list 37 Based on the foregoing credited testimony of LeMay, I find that Respondent further violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by Woods' interrogation of LeMay regarding his union status, and by creating the impression that Respondent was engaging in surveillance of its employees' union activities by accusing LeMay of being a union organizer and by telling him that he had a list of employees which indicated their predilections in respect to the Union. 8. Woods' November 17 meetings with employees On Monday, November 17, President Woods conducted a series of eight meetings with all of Respondent's employ- ees in small groups of from 4 to 10 employees. The meetings were held in the Pye and Hogan office. At the commence- 37 Although Woods testified for Respondent regarding LeMay's subse- quent termination in November 1975, he gave no testimony regarding this conversation 194 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD meat of each meeting the employees who attended were handed two pieces of paper, one of which listed the asserted value of all the fringe benefits which Respondent provided the employees, and the other was a typewritten copy of a speech which Woods read to the employees about Respon- dent's allegedly "bad financial bind," and about the Union's continuing organizational activities . In the speech, Woods told the employees, "You don't have to belong to a union," and that if they were "pressured to join the union movement" against their wishes, they could file a charge with the Board.38 After Woods read the speech to each group, a discussion and question and answer period followed. According to the uncontroverted and credited testimony of Alfred Sprude who attended the fifth group meeting on November 17, during the course of the discussion period, an unidentified employee asked Woods how long the union activity would continue , and Woods replied that "it would go on and on and the only way to stop it would be to get these people to leave ." Sprude further testified that Woods also said that "he suspected or knew who was against him and he had a particular spot in his back for these people." 39 In the context of Woods' antiunion speech, his statement that he knew or suspected who was against him clearly was a reference to prounion employees, and Woods' further statement that he had a spot on his back for those people, although somewhat ambiguous, nevertheless subtly implied a threat of some form of reprisal against them . I according- ly find that by Woods' said statement Respondent further violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. Similarly, in view of its context, Woods' answer to an employee's question that the only way to terminate union activity from "going on and on would be to get these people to leave," appears to be another subtle threat that union activists would be forced to leave their employment by Respondent. I therefore find that by this statement Respondent further trenched on employee rights guaranteed by the Act and violated Section 8(ax 1). 9. The termination by the Respondent of three additional union activists Starting with the inception of the union organizing campaign in May 1975, the Union held meetings of Respondent's employees about once every 3 weeks. At one such meeting held on November 13, the employees who attended discussed rumors which they had heard of an impending layoff at the Company. A day or two after the union meeting, Respondent posted a notice over its timeclock signed by President Woods which stated as follows: "There will be no-none-layoffs now or in the near future and you know where these rumors come from." At the union meeting on November 13, the union represen- tative also urged the employees to be more open in their support of the Union, and Roger LeMay, Alfred Sprude, and Wallace Jones, all active union organizers, agreed to put IAM union stickers on the cars which they drove to 38 Resp. Exhs. 8-a and 8-b. 39 Woods did not deny making the statements attributed to him by Sprude, and his secretary's (Mrs. Roy's) transcribed notes of what transpired at these meetings admittedly did not purport to be a verbatim transcript of what was said. work. On Monday, November 17, LeMay, Sprude, and Jones drove to work with union stickers posted in promi- nent places on their cars, and parked their cars in Respondent's parking lot near the door where everyone goes in to work. That same day, Woods conducted his series of group meetings with Respondent's employees to discour- age their support of the Union during which he said that he knew or suspected who was against him and that he had a spot on his back for those people. Two days later, about 11:40 a.m., and in midweek on Wednesday, November 19, Respondent terminated the employment of LeMay, Sprude, and Jones allegedly for lack of work, and it has not since reinstated any of them. The complaint in this case alleges that LeMay, Sprude, and Jones were terminated because of their membership in and activities on behalf of the Union. Respondent, on the other hand, contends that these three employees were laid off because of its dire financial straits and because of the necessity to reduce overhead by eliminating the nonproduc- tive jobs on which these three employees worked. As hereinafter explicated, I place no credence whatever in the pretextual reasons asserted for the termination of these three union activists, and I conclude moreover that, even assuming that a layoff was necessary, the selection of LeMay, Sprude, and Jones was motivated by their support of the Union. (a) Roger LeMay LeMay was hired by Respondent on May 20, 1972, as a thread and surface grinder. He also did surface grinding contract work for Respondent.41 In 1974, after his vacation, LeMay was given responsibility by Respondent for cutter grinding and machine repairing. During the last "couple of months" before his termination, LeMay, in addition to his other duties, also was assigned to assist in doing piping and sheet metal work on a machine which Packer Machine was manufacturing for the Xerox Corporation. Prior to his employment by Respondent, LeMay had worked 4-1/2 years for Pratt & Whitney Aircraft as a machinist and operator of grinders, thread cutters, drill presses, and other machines. Respondent quite obviously regarded LeMay as a competent and satisfactory employee, for, in the 3-1/2 years he worked for it, he was given eight successive pay raises, the last of which, given to him on September 12, 1975, just 2 months before his termination, brought his rate of pay up to $5.50 an hour. As previously noted, LeMay was one of Respondent's employees who attended the Union's first organizational meeting. Thereafter, LeMay signed up four or five other employees to union authorization cards at Respondent's shop and, until his termination, he continued to solicit employees to sign union cards but without success. As found above, in September 1975, Woods told LeMay that he had heard that he was organizing for the Union, and that he had a list of the employees who were in the Union and that LeMay was on that list. In addition, on and after 4° The findings above are based on the credited testimony of LeMay and Sprude. 41 Contract work was work performed by Respondent 's employees as independent contractors either in Respondent's shop or in their homes. PACKER INDUSTRIES November 17, LeMay had IAM stickers in conspicuous places on his camper which he parked daily in Respon- dent's parking lot. I conclude from the foregoing, contrary to Woods' testimony, that he had knowledge of LeMay's active support of the Union before he decided to terminate LeMay's employment 42 On Wednesday, November 19, shortly before noon, while LeMay was in the process of repairing a milling machine, he was instructed to go to the foreman's office and he there met Woods and John H. Gade, the assembly room foreman of Packer Machine. Woods told LeMay that he was laid off and he gave him a blue slip which stated that it was for "lack of work." LeMay asked Woods how his layoff could be for lack of work since machines were always breaking down and needed repairing. Woods replied that the machine which Respondent had made for Xerox was now completed and that there was no more work. LeMay responded that he had not been hired to work on that machine and that he had just been helping out on it. Woods merely repeated that the machine was finished and that LeMay was laid off. LeMay then accused Woods of laying him off because he was organizing for the Union. Woods conceded that that was why he "was getting rid" of LeMay. LeMay retorted that Woods would "have to get rid of a lot of guys to get rid of the Union." Woods responded that he did not care and that he would get rid of everybody if he had to. LeMay asked Woods to repeat what he had just said before a witness other than Woods' witness, Foreman Gade. Woods replied that LeMay did not need a witness, he was "being laid off for lack of work," and he instructed LeMay to pick up his tools and leave the plant. Woods then accompanied LeMay to Respondent's carpenter shop and, while LeMay was segregating his tools from those of Respondent, Woods told LeMay that he could not under- stand why he would be organizing a union when he was making $5.50 an hour and was his "own boss." LeMay replied that "the benefits weren't any good," and that there were employees in the burr room who were lucky to be making $3 an hour. Woods then assisted LeMay in loading his tools on LeMay's truck and LeMay left the plant.43 (b) Alfred Sprude Sprude was hired by Respondent on February 28, 1972, as a first piece and layout inspector. Before that, Sprude had worked for 2 years for Pratt & Whitney Aircraft as a layout inspector of precision aircraft parts and, for 3 years before that, he had worked for the Respondent in final inspection. About 6 or 7 months after Sprude returned to work for Respondent, Woods told Sprude that "he needed 42 Woods testified that he first became aware that LeMay was interested in the Union when he notified LeMay of his termination. I place no credence in Woods' testimony to this effect. 43 The findings above are based on the testimony of LeMay whom I regard as a credible and reliable witness and credit in these respects. Woods admitted that, when he told LeMay that he was being laid off for lack of work, LeMay accused him of terminating his employment because of his union activity According to Woods, however, he then told LeMay that he did not care whether LeMay was involved with the Union, and that he did not want to know anything about it. Although Respondent called Foreman Gade to corroborate Woods' version of this conversation, all Gade could recall was that Woods told LeMay that he was being laid off for lack of work, and that LeMay then said "that he was not being laid off for that reason but for his union activities." Gade also testified that his presence at this meeting 195 a young bright intelligent individual to take over the lab," and he asked Sprude if he would be interested in taking on the job. Sprude agreed, and he thereafter spent 80 to 85 percent of his time testing parts for imperfections by the zyglo and magnoflux processes in the Meriden Metal Lab 44 When Sprude had no work to perform in the lab, he spent the balance of his time in material handling, treating parts by other processes, and working in the inspection room. Respondent quite obviously regarded Sprude as a competent and satisfactory employee, for in the 3 years and 9 months he worked for it after he was rehired in 1972 he was given eight successive raises in pay. The last such pay raise which was given to Sprude in July 1975, just 4 months before his termination, brought his rate of pay up to $4.95 an hour, and Sprude was then rated by Respondent as "Excellent" in ability, and "Good" in conduct, attendance, and production.45 As previously noted, Sprude was one of the employees who participated in the Union's initial organizational meeting where he signed a union authorization card and received a supply of additional cards to solicit other employees to sign. Following that first union meeting, Sprude passed out union cards to other employees in the street outside Respondent's plant. As found above, on May 13, the day after solicitation of signatures to union cards began at the plant, Hogan told Sprude, "I hear you're trying to start a union." Sprude thereafter attended all the Union's meetings which were held about every 3 weeks. On Monday, November 17, just 2 days before Sprude's employment was terminated in mid-morning, Sprude put an IAM union sticker on the windshield of his car which he backed into his parking space close to the entrance door to the plant so that the sticker would be visible. As found above, Woods told LeMay that he had a list of the employees who were in the Union. Moreover, Foreman Gade, a witness for Respondent, admitted that Respon- dent's was "a small shop [and] you're bound to hear about it [union activity]." I conclude from all the foregoing that Respondent knew before it terminated Sprude that he was an active supporter of the Union. On Wednesday, November 17, about 11:40 a.m., al- though Sprude was performing black oxiding of some parts, a process which would not be completed until about 2 p.m., and he had been told by Foreman Shields that more parts were coming in that day for magnaflux or zyglo testing, Hogan came into the lab with Foreman Rider and told Sprude that he was being laid off. Sprude asked Hogan why he was being laid off, and Hogan replied, "There is no work for you." Sprude remonstrated that there was plenty of with LeMay had been requested by Woods, and he admitted that he had never before been called on to participate in an employee's layoff. As previously noted, I consider Woods' testimony as generally unreliable, and I therefore credit his version of this termination meeting only to the extent that it accords with that of LeMay credited above. 44 See sec.. III, A, of this Decision entitled "Background Facts Regarding Respondent." Sprude admittedly was certified by the Magnaflux Corporation to test by its process for the period from March 2, 1973, to March 2, 1976, and he also was certified periodically by Hamilton Standard Corporation and by Avco- Lycommg, customers of Respondent, to test and inspect parts destined for them. 45 See G. C Exh. 13. 1% DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD work to do from the orders he had seen . Hogan merely reiterated, "There is no work for you, we'll have to lay you off." (c) Wallace Jones96 Jones was hired by Respondent on May 2, 1975, to work as a cutter grinder, sharpening tools, drills, and reamers at $3.50 an hour. Jones admittedly was a very skillful cutter grinder. Jones signed a union authorization card , and he attended the union meeting on November 13 at which the business representative urged the employees to be more open in their support of the Union. As noted above, Jones thereafter on November 17, placed an IAM union sticker on his car which he drove to work daily and parked in Respondent's parking lot 47 On Wednesday, November 19, just before noon, Hogan notified Jones that he was laying him off, and he gave Jones a blue slip which stated that it was for "lack of work." 48 (d) The pretextual reasons asserted by Respondent for the layoff of LeMay, Sprude, and Jones According to President Woods, the decision to lay off employees was triggered by his receipt of a financial report from Respondent's comptroller for the 4-month period from July 1 to October 31, 1975, which allegedly showed that Respondent was "getting seriously into debt," and a decline in the "backlog of orders, in sales, and in profit." Upon the receipt of this report , Woods and Hogan allegedly decided that they "had to reduce as much of the overhead as possible," that the jobs of cutter grinding, machine repair and of magnaflux and zyglo inspection were "non-productive," and so they decided "to eliminate" LeMay, Sprude, and Jones, the incumbents in those jobs. Similarly, George Slater, Respondent's comptroller, testi- fied that in November 1975 he made recommendations in writing to Woods to the effect that, unless the cost of sales and selling expense was reduced or sales increased, Woods would have "to shrink the size of the company so that the cash flow would be equated in and out." Slater further testified that he also recommended a layoff as a means of 48 Jones did not testify at the hearing According to the General Counsel, he was not available to testify because of his absence out-of-state in Florida, initially because of the illness of his mother , and subsequently because of his own eye surgery 47 I base the findings above on the credited testimony of LeMay and Sprude 48 According to Hogan, when he notified Jones that he was being laid off "because we had to cut overhead," he at the same time told Jones that if he came back in a few days, he would discuss giving him a production job. Hogan further testified that Jones never thereafter came back to discuss a job with him. When Hogan was asked on cross-examination why he did not discuss another job with Jones when he laid him off, Hogan answered, "Because I didn't feel like it." Hogan further testified that after the layoff he saw Jones handing out union leaflets to employees as they came in to work. Although uncontroverted , I place no credence in Hogan's testimony that he offered to consider Jones for other so-called productive employment, for the following reasons in addition to my previously indicated lack of regard for the reliability of his testimony. In the first place, in the light of Jones' admitted skill as a cutter grinder and Respondent's conceded need for some cutter grinding work at all times, I find it difficult, if not impossible to believe that if Hogan really intended to offer other production work to Jones, he would not have done it before, rather than after, he laid Jones off. Moreover, I am persuaded by Jones' admitted failure to follow up on Hogan's alleged achieving that objective, but he later modified that testimo- ny and stated that he only suggested to Woods that he reduce his labor costs, but did not tell Woods how that should be done. As indicated hereinafter, I place no credence in the testimony adduced by Respondent that the layoff of LeMay, Sprude, and Jones was required or motivated by financial considerations , and I regard the assignment of this reason for their precipitous discharge in midday and midweek as another pretext to conceal the real reason for their termination. Respondent failed to produce Slater's report upon which it allegedly based its decision to lay off LeMay, Sprude, and Jones, and it asserted as the reason for its failure to do so that the said report was no longer in existence . I regard this explanation as incredible. Respondent admittedly knew when it laid off LeMay that he was contending that his termination was motivated by antiunion considerations and that he intended to file charges with the Board to effectuate his reinstatement. Moreover, at the time of the layoff, there were already pending against Respondent charges filed by the Union with the Board which alleged that it had fired Acevedo, Ingraham, and Remillard because of their mem- bership in and activities on behalf of the Union. Under the circumstances, it is quite obvious that if a report existed such as that upon which Respondent allegedly based its decision to lay off LeMay, Sprude, and Jones, it would have been preserved by Respondent for defense against the charges which LeMay admittedly threatened to bring. I infer that no such report ever existed.49 Moreover, the relevant records which Respondent did produce belie its testimony regarding the financial necessity for a layoff of employees. Thus, Respondent's annual report for its fiscal year ending June 30, 1975, discloses that in that fiscal period, stockholders' equity in Respondent increased over that in the previous fiscal year by almost $100,000, and retained earnings increased by a like amount.50 Further- more, contrary to Woods' testimony regarding a decline in the backlog of orders on hand, Respondent's records in evidence disclose that the backlog increased from $880,938 on July 15, 1975, to $1,022,418 on November 15, 1975.51 It is further significant that, even assuming arguendo that Respondent had a financial need in November 1975 to offer, that no such offer was made . I consider Hogan's response on cross- examination that he did not offer to discuss other employment with Jones when he laid him off "because he didn't feel like it ," as another indication that no offer was made I note in this regard that Hogan's other testimony about Jones (whom he knew would not appear to testify) is patently false Thus, according to Hogan, he hired Jones as a surface grinder and not as a cutter grinder, and after about 10 days of working as a surface grinder Jones allegedly had told Hogan that "he would rather not work if he had to do that kind of work." Hogan assertedly then transferred Jones to cutter grinding with the admonition that when there was no more such work , he would have to let Jones go. However, contrary to Hogan's testimony that he hired Jones as a surface grinder and that Jones did surface grinding for about 10 days before he was assigned to cutter grinding, Jones' application for employment by Respondent (G. C. Exh. 15) clearly discloses that all of Jones' prior employment experience had been as a cutter grinder , and Jones' application for Respondent's group life insurance dated May 8, 1975 , 6 days after Jones was hired, clearly discloses that Jones was hired as a cutter grinder (G C Exh. 14.) 1 conclude from all the foregoing that no credence can be accorded Hogan's testimony regarding his alleged offer to consider Jones for another position. 49 See fn. 17, supra. 50 Resp. Exh. 20, Exhs. A and C. 51 Resp. Exh. 25 PACKER INDUSTRIES 197 reduce its labor costs, the layoff of 3 employees out of Respondent's then labor force of about 82 quite obviously could not make any material impact on such costs, and a much better method of reducing such costs existed but was not utilized by Respondent. In this respect, the record discloses that Respondent's employees at all times material herein regularly worked 9 hours a day and usually every Saturday, and thus a substantially greater savings in labor costs could have been effected by Respondent, if indeed it had been necessary, by the simple expedient of eliminating overtime hours for which time and a half pay is required by law. I conclude from all the foregoing that no credence can be accorded to Respondent's testimony that the layoff of LeMay, Sprude, and Jones was motivated by financial considerations. Furthermore, Respondent did not "elimi- nate" the jobs previously performed by LeMay, Sprude, and Jones, for it still required machine repair, magnaflux, and zyglo inspection, and cutter grinding to be performed after it laid off these three employees, and it merely assigned these functions to other employees for perfor- mance. Moreover, at the time Respondent decided to lay off LeMay, Sprude, and Jones, it admittedly did not consider or discuss the possible layoff of other employees who had lesser seniority, and it retained such employees in jobs which LeMay, Sprude, and Jones were capable of performing.52 In this respect, the record shows that al- though Respondent laid off LeMay who was hired on April 20, 1972, it retained MacNabola who was hired on January 14, 1974, and McDonald who was hired on September 15, 1975, just 2 months before the layoff of LeMay. Similarly, Respondent retained inspectors Miniter who was hired on August 11, 1975, 3 months before Sprude was laid off, and Muir who was hired on January 7, 1974, while laying off Sprude, an inspector who had worked for it since February 28, 1972. And, when Respondent laid off Jones, it assigned his cutter grinding work to Korab who had 2 months less seniority than Jones, an admittedly skillful cutter grinder. All of the foregoing persuade me that no credence can be given to the reasons asserted by Respondent for the sudden layoff of LeMay, Sprude, and Jones and that the assign- ment of these reasons for their termination is another pretext devised by Respondent to mask its true motivation for this action. The real reason for the midday and midweek termination of these three active union supporters is fairly apparent from the record. According to the credited testimony of employee Robert Tierney, and that of Hogan which is credited to this extent only, the following incident occurred on November 19, shortly after Jones, LeMay, and Sprude were laid off. Tierney accused Butkiewicz, who as found above is an agent of Respondent, of acting as "a stool pigeon" and of telling Hogan that Jones had given Butkiewicz "a union card this morning at 11 a.m." Butkiewicz admitted that Jones had given him a union card, but he denied that he had told anyone other than employee Dick Demanche. Tierney then went over to Demanche and asked him, "Did you rat on Wally Jones?" Demanche got 52 Hogan admitted that the layoff of no other employees other than the three who were laid off was discussed by him with Woods. 53 Woods admitted that he and Hogan had a pnvate conversation with Tierney on November 19 after Rider, Demanche, and Butkiewicz left, but, angry and went over to Butkiewicz and grabbed him and said, "How many times do I have to tell you to keep your big mouth shut," and he then punched Butkiewicz. The latter then told Hogan that he was going to quit because he was tired of being pushed around. Hogan then immediately convened a meeting in Woods' office of all the participants in this incident, where, in the presence of Woods, Hogan, and Foreman Rider, the foregoing events which had transpired were repeated. Woods then told the employees that no one had ratted on Jones, that he had fired LeMay, Sprude, and Jones for lack of work, and he instructed Rider, Demanche, and Butkiewicz to go back to work. This left only Woods, Hogan, and Tierney in Woods' office. According to Tierney, whom I credit in these respects, Woods then told him that now there were no witnesses, and he accused Tierney of being a signed member of the Union, he asked Tierney, "why you," he said that he had a good mind to go down and clear out the rest of the union supporters right now, and that he would fire anybody he caught signing cards. Woods then further told Tierney that Al Sprude "was a good man until he got mixed up in these union activities," that "LeMay was a good man, [had] a good job, and look where he ended up," and that he felt sorry for Jones, he liked him, and "you see, these people don't profit by these things [and] they only ended up on their ass." Woods finally told Tierney that if a union got in he would get in his car and leave, and that if Tierney wanted to be on Respondent's side, "Good, we're glad to have you," but "if you want to be on their side, go ahead, but get the `F' out." Tierney at that point told Woods that all he wanted was to be left alone and permitted to do his job, and Hogan said that if Tierney had any problems to come and see him.53 The foregoing incident clearly discloses the reason that LeMay, Sprude, and Jones were suddenly terminated before noon on November 19. Although Woods was asked, he was unable to furnish a plausible or credible explanation for why these three employees were fired in midday while they were busily at work on assignments for Respondent. I conclude from all the foregoing, and especially in the light of the pretextual reasons asserted for their termination, that they were fired because of their support of the Union and to discourage membership therein, and that Respondent thereby further violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. I further conclude that by interrogating Tierney about his union membership, by threatening to fire union supporters and card signers, and by in effect telling Tierney that LeMay, Sprude, and Jones had been fired because of their support of the Union, Respondent further engaged in violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of Respondent set forth in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and according to Woods, he only told Tierney that if he instigated another such incident, Respondent would have to fire hun. As previously indicated, I consider Woods' testimony to be generally unreliable, and I do not credit his version of his pnvate meeting with Tierney. 198 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I will recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and that it take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that Respondent terminated the employ- ment of Juan Acevedo, William O. Ingraham, Jr., Richard Remillard, Roger LeMay, Alfred Sprude, and Wallace Jones and that it thereafter failed and refused to reemploy them because of their membership in and activities on behalf of the Union, I will recommend that Respondent be ordered to offer them immediate reinstatement to their former positions, or, if they no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and to make them whole for any loss of earnings they may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against them by the payment to each of them of a sum of money equal to the amount he normally would have earned from the date of his termination to the date of his reinstatement, less his net earnings during the said period, with backpay computed on a quarterly basis in the manner established by the Board in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950). Backpay shall include the payment of interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum in the manner set forth in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962). Having further found that Respondent denied a wage increase to Mario Recchioni because of his membership in and activities on behalf of the Union, I will also recom- mend that Respondent be ordered to make him whole for his loss of earnings suffered as a result of that discrimina- tion from the date of such denial until Recchioni voluntari- ly left Respondent's employ on July 25, 1975, together with interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum. I will also recommend that Respondent preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social securi- ty payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze and determine the amounts of backpay due under the terms of this recommended remedy. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW I. Respondent, Packer Industries, Inc., is an employer engaged in commerce and in operations affecting com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. International Association of Machinists and Aero- space Workers, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By terminating the employment of Juan Acevedo, William O. Ingraham, Jr., Richard Remillard, Roger LeMay, Alfred Sprude, and Wallace Jones because of their membership in and activities on behalf of the above-named Union, and by denying a wage increase to Mario Recchioni for a like reason, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 4. By the foregoing conduct, by coercively interrogating employees regarding their union membership or sympa- thies; by creating the impression of surveillance of its employees' union activities; by offering a reward to employees who disclose the names of the employee union organizers ; by threatening to fire employees who sign union cards, to inflict physical punishment on employee union organizers, and to close the plant if union organization succeeds; and by telling employees that it had fired other employees because of their union organizational activities, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in this case, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER 54 Respondent, Packer Industries, Inc., Meriden, Connecti- cut, its officers, agents, successors , and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against any employee in respect to hire or tenure of employment, or any term or condition of employment, for engaging in any union or other concerted activity for mutual aid or protection protected by Section 7 of the Act. (b) Coercively interrogating employees regarding their union membership, activities, or desires. (c) Conveying to employees the impression that their union activities are being subjected to surveillance. (d) Threatening employees with discharge , plant closing, or any other reprisal to discourage union membership or su(e)oIn any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their right to self- organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through a representative of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from engaging in such activities, except to the extent that such rights may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized by Section 8(aX3) of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer Juan Acevedo, William O. Ingraham, Jr., Richard Remillard, Roger LeMay , Alfred Sprude, and 54 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings, findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 waived for all purposes. PACKER INDUSTRIES 199 Wallace Jones immediate and full reinstatement to their former positions, or, if those positions no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed, and make them and Mario Recchioni whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered as a result of the discrimination against them in the manner provided in the section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy." (b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, person- nel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze and determine the amounts of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (c) Post at its plant in Meriden, Connecticut, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 55 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 1, after being duly signed by Respondent, shall be posted by it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that the said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 1, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps have been taken to comply herewith. 55 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a hearing at which all sides had an opportunity to present their evidence, the National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act, and has ordered us to post this notice, and we intend to carry out the Order of the Board. The Act gives all employees these rights: To engage in self-organization To form, join, or help unions To bargain collectively through a representa- tive of their own choosing To act together for collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection To refrain from any and all these things. WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with these rights. WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discriminate against you in regard to hire or tenure of employment, or any term or condition of employment, for engaging in any of the activities listed above which are protected by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate you regarding your union membership, activities, or desires. WE WILL NOT convey to you by any acts or statements the impression that we are engaging in surveillance of your union activities. WE WILL NOT threaten you with discharge, plant closing or with any other reprisal to discharge union membership, activities, or support. Since it was decided that we violated the Act by terminating the employment of Juan Acevedo, William 0. Ingraham, Jr., Richard Remillard, Roger LeMay, Alfred Sprude, and Wallace Jones because they en- gaged in union and other concerted activities guaran- teed by the Act, WE WILL offer them full reinstatement to their former jobs, and wE WILL reimburse them for any losses they suffered because we fired them. Since it was also decided that we violated the Act by denying a wage increase to Mario Recchioni because he engaged in union and other concerted activities guaran- teed by the Act, WE WILL make him whole for the losses he suffered because we denied him a wage increase. WE WILL respect your rights to self-organization, to form, join, or assist any labor organization, or to bargain collectively through International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, or any other representative of your choice, or to refrain from any such activity, and WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of these rights. PACKER INDUSTRIES, INC.