Washington Hospital Center

342 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Washington Hospital Center and Local 722, Hospital, Professional, Technical & Service Workers, Ser- vice Employees International Union,-AFL-CIO. Case 5-CA-7849 December 16, 1976 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS FANNING, PENELLO, AND WALTHER On August 17, 1976, Administrative Law Judge Benjamin K. Blackburn issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed a memorandum in reply to the Respon- dent's exceptions.' Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order, as modified herein. James Butler, a probationary admitting clerk, drafted and circulated a petition on March 16, 1976,2 suggesting that the Respondent reconsider its deci- sion to change the procedure by which patients were admitted to the hospital, a change which affected employee working conditions; six fellow employees signed the petition. That afternoon the petition was presented to the Respondent; 1 hour later two meetings of admitting department personnel were called by Macaboy, Respondent's director of patient accounts. Butler attended the first meeting at which he engaged in a heated discussion with Macaboy concerning the new procedure and the petition.3 During this meeting Butler disclosed to Macaboy that he was a probationary employee; Macaboy then realized it would be possible to discharge Butler without having to contend with the grievance-arbitra- tion procedure. Shortly after the second meeting Macaboy met with two supervisors. Thereafter, Butler was told to report to Macaboy's office and was discharged; no reason was given to him for his discharge. Macaboy testified Butler was discharged because he did not display the requisite degree of empathy with patients. This conclusion, which Macaboy did not communicate to anyone until after Butler's discharge, was based almost exclusively on an inci- dent he observed the previous week involving Butler's direction of a patient to an admitting booth by means of a "thumb jerk" motion. On the other hand, 227 NLRB No. 57 Butler's immediate supervisor, Keys,4 stated, his work performance was satisfactory, with the exception of a warning she gave him about being too friendly to patients, and that she believed he should have been given further consideration before being discharged. The General Counsel contended that Macaboy's asserted reason for discharging Butler was a pretext. As the Administrative Law Judge correctly found, Butler would not have been discharged "but for" his protected concerted activity. Macaboy himself admit- ted that prior to the events of March 16 he was contemplating transferring, not discharging, Butler. Thus the "thumb jerk" incident was clearly not the real reason for the discharge, and we agree with the General Counsel's contention that Macaboy's assert- ed reason was a pretext. We find the discharge to be a classic violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.5 ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge as modified below and hereby orders that the Respon- dent, Washington Hospital Center, Washington, D.C., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in said recommended Order, as so modified: 1. Substitute the following for paragraph 1(b): "(b) In any other manner interfering with, restrain- ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act." 2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the Administrative Law Judge. ' The Respondent has requested oral argument . This request is hereby dewed as the record, the exceptions, and the briefs adequately present the issues and the positions of the parties. 2 All dates refer to 1976 unless otherwise indicated. 3 The Administrative Law Judge found that the first meeting Macaboy called was for the employees who signed the petition , the second for the nonsigners. The Employer correctly excepts, as employees from both groups attended both meetings. We hereby correct the Adnumstrative Law Judge's inadvertent error which has no effect on our Decision herein. 4 The Respondent employed two personnel named Keys Ida Keys, Butler's immediate supervisor, and Mabel Keys, a union shop steward. The Administrative Law Judge's Decision does not specify which "Mrs. Keys" Butler approached after the first meeting with Macaboy . The record reveals he spoke to Mabel Keys, the shop steward, about taking the matter up with the Union. 5 We find it unnecessary to decide this case under the "Assuming, Arguendo" rationale used by the Administrative Law Judge as set forth in the sixth paragraph of sec II, B, of his Decision WASHINGTON HOSPITAL CENTER 343 APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a hearing in which both sides had an opportuni- ty to present their evidence, the National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act. We hereby notify you that: Upon the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after due consideration of briefs, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTION Respondent, a District of Columbia corporation, oper- ates a 900-plus bed hospital in Washington. During the 12 months just prior to issuance of the complaint, it grossed more than $250,000 and purchased supplies valued at more than $50,000 which were shipped to it directly from points outside the District of Columbia. The National Labor Relations Act gives all employees these rights: To engage in self-organization To form, join, or help unions To bargain collectively through a repre- sentative of their own choosing To act together for collective bargaining or other aid or protection To refrain from any or all these things. WE WILL NOT discharge you for engaging in protected concerted activities. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with you or attempt to restrain or coerce you in the exercise of the above rights. WE WILL offer James M. Butler, Jr., immediate and full reinstatement to his former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges, and we_ will make him whole for any earnings he lost, plus interest, as a result of his discharge on March 16, 1-976. WASHINGTON' HOSPITAL CENTER - DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE BENJAMIN K. BLACKBURN, Administrative Law Judge: The charge was filed on March 22, 1976.1 The complaint was issued on April 29. The hearing was held in Washing- ton, D.C., on June 28. The issue litigated was whether Respondent's discharge of James M. Butler, Jr., on March 16 violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, because he was discharged for engaging in protected concerted activities. For the reasons set forth below, I find that it did, thereby denying Respondent's motion to dismiss which I took under advisement at the .close of the hearing. U. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE A. Facts Respondent admits approximately 100 patients on an average day. Except for those who enter through the emergency room, they present themselves at an admissions desk where they are asked to wait in a large lounge area until Respondent is ready to process them. When Respon- dent is ready, admitting clerks take them into individual booths, prepare the necessary papers, and obtain necessary signatures. Once the paperwork-is in order, patients wait in the lounge again until escorts conduct them to their rooms. The admissions department has approximately 40 employ- ees. They man the office around-the clock. Some 10 or 12 are on duty on the first shift each day. James M. Butler, Jr., was hired as an admitting clerk on December 22,1975. His immediate supervisor was Mrs. Ida Keys, Respondent's assistant director of admissions. When he was hired_he was given a copy of Respondent's booklet for employees which states that, new employees are on probation for 3 months and, in.another place, that they will be released without severance pay, after verbal warning, if they do not measure up to the requirements of their jobs during that period. Butler joined Local 722, the Charging Party. Local 722's-contract with Respondent covers a.unit which includes admitting clerks. It provides for a 90-day probationary period during which the "probationary em- ployee will not be covered by any of the terms and conditions of this Agreement, whether or not specifically excluded, and may be discharged by the Hospital with or without cause and without recourse to the grievance or arbitration provisions of this Agreement." It also provides that Respondent-has the exclusive right to make or, change rules, regulations, policies, and practices so long as they are not inconsistent with the terms of the contract. Prior to March 9, Butler, like all the other admitting clerks, summoned incoming patients by picking up papers relating to them at -the admissions desk, calling out their names in a loud voice from that vantage point, and then leading them into his booth. When he had completed his part of the admissions process, he sent them.back to the lounge with instructions to wait for an escort. Escorts also located the patients they were to conduct to rooms by calling out their names. I Dates are 1976 unless otherwise indicated 344 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD . Daniel J. Macaboy has been Respondent's director of patients accounts for 5 years. In early 1976 Respondent's admissions process was under criticism from the medical staff. Around the first of February, when, apparently, the admissions office was between directors. Respondent's administrator asked Macaboy to assume responsibility for the process in addition to his other duties. Clifford Donahue was hired to work under Macaboy as director of admissions around the first of March. In an effort to' improve the process, Macaboy spent several days, beginning on March 9, at the admissions desk. He concluded that the system of calling out names did not accord with his theory that admitting clerks and escorts must possess and demonstrate empathy in order to make the patients' path into the hospital as painless as possible. He experimented with a system of jotting down notes as to the patients' apparel, making the notes a part of the papers which the admitting clerks picked up at the admissions desk, and having clerks and escorts locate patients by looking for the persons wearing the clothes described in the notes. Once the patient had been located in this manner, clerk or escort, as the case may be, was instructed to ask him quietly to follow along. During the 2 or 3 days when Macaboy experimented with this system, some of the employees, including Butler, found it unacceptable. They considered it a waste of time to have to walk through the lounge and, possibly, adjacent areas such as restrooms in order to match up notes with clothes. Butler had the experience of misidentifying one patient and having the person he approached speak rudely to him. On one of these days, Macaboy saw Butler jerk his thumb over his shoulder to direct a patient to his booth after calling out the patient's name? Macaboy was displeased. When Macaboy left the desk, the employees went back to the old system of calling out names for the balance of the week. However, on the morning of Monday, March 16, Macaboy ordered Mrs. Keys to put his new system into effect permanently. Mrs. Keys passed the word to the employees who were on duty, including Butler. At lunch- time, Butler drafted a memorandum, as follows: To: Director of Admitting Subject: Revision of Admitting Procedures Date: March 16, 1976 We the undersigned acknowledge the need for a complete revision'of admitting procedures. However, as admitting personnel , we also see the need for these changes to be consistent with employee needs also. We therefore suggest that all changes be brought to the attention of the employees and discussedbefore implemen- tation as policy. A specific example is the presently used system of writing a description of the people to be admitted, as opposed to the previous policy of calling a person's name. The newly initiated system causes several problems: (1) fording the described person who may be at several different locations (bathroom, lobby shop, etc.) (2) unnecessary waste of time looking for said person (3) giving other patients an uneasy feeling by seemingly looking for patients. We the undersigned acknowledge the need for professionalism & time saving devices for admitting patients. We therefore view this policy as inconsistent with these needs . We recommend that it be dropped and the previous system initiated. Butler signed the memorandum. He obtained the signatures of six other employees on duty in the admissions depart- ment at that time, including an escort named Glenford Dennis. At the end of the lunch period, Butler gave the memorandum to Donahue. Donahue gave it to Macaboy. Macaboy told Mrs. Keys he wanted to meet with all of the employees. Since calling all of them together at one time would have brought the admissions process to a halt, this was accomplished in two stages. Macaboy first met with all the employees who had signed Butler's memorandum. Donahue and Mrs. Keys were also present. The meeting was a heated one. Macaboy asked who had prepared the memorandum. Butler said he had. Macaboy asked Butler how much experience he had had in the hospital business that he was such an expert. When Butler's answer indicated less than 3 months, Macaboy realized for the first time that Butler was a probationary employee. Macaboy said the new system was better than the old and insisted that the employees at least give it a fair chance before condemning it. Butler became upset. He described the unpleasant experience he had had the week before when he approached the wrong person. He accused Macaboy of taking the memorandum as a personal affront. Macaboy did not deny the accusation. Butler's manner during the meeting was hostile and aggressive. The other employees present took their cue from him. Butler did most, although not all, of the talking for the employees. Dennis asked to be excused, and Macaboy refused to let him go. Dennis 'told Macaboy he remembered many .occasions when patients had complained about the length of time they had to wait before being admitted. The upshot of the meeting was Macaboy's order that the employees were to use the new system regardless of their complaints. As Butler left the meeting, he told Mrs. Keys he was disatisfied and wanted to pursue the matter further through the Union. Mrs. Keys said she would arrange a meeting with a union representative during Butler's lunch hour the next day. Immediately thereafter, Macaboy, Donahue, and Mrs. Keys met with the employees who had not signed Butler's memorandum. This meeting was much less heated. Maca- boy explained his new- system and why he thought it was better than the old. Mary Exum argued against it. The upshot was the same. Immediately thereafter, Macaboy discussed discharging Butler with Donahue and Mrs. Keys. Macaboy mentioned a conclusion he had reached the week before, based on the thumb-jerk incident, that Butler lacked the necessary empathy with the patients to be a satisfactory admitting clerk. Macaboy, Donahue, and Mrs. Keys agreed that the attitude Butler had displayed in the meeting put his fitness 2 This is the only significant detail about which there is any conflict in the record. I do not credit Butler's denial that he made the gesture Macaboy attributed to him. WASHINGTON HOSPITAL CENTER 345 for the job of admitting clerk in doubt. Macaboy decided to take advantage of the fact- Butler was a probationary employee, thus making Local 722's contract no obstacle, by discharging Butler forthwith. Donahue' concurred. Mrs. Keys asked for a delay of several days in order to give her an opportunity to study this previously unrevealed side of Butler's personality. Macaboy decided not to wait. Immediately thereafter, Mrs. Keys told Butler to report to Macaboy in his office. Butler refused to go unless a union representative was present. When Mrs. Keys relayed this information to Macaboy, he told her to have Butler wait. Macaboy summoned a union steward to his office. He relayed this information to Butler through Mrs. Keys. Butler then went to Macaboy's office. Donahue and the union steward were also present. Donahue told Butler he was discharged and gave him a paper to sign. Butler refused and left the office. Butler was not told the reason for his discharge. Respondent has taken no action against.Glenford Den- nis, Mary Exum, or any other employee who expressed disagreement with Macaboy's new policy on March 16, B. - Analysis and Conclusions The General Counsel contends Butler was discharged for drafting and circulating the March 16 memorandum among the other, employees in protest against a change in their conditions of employment. The -reasons advanced by Respondent in its answer to the complaint ("unsatisfactory job performance and qualifications") and in its brief ("the responsible-supervisor had determined he was not suitable for the positionhe occupied") are, therefore, a pretext,in the General Counsel's view. Respondent's defense has -two facets. One, essentially a legal argument, is that Butler's activities on March 16 are not protected. It is summarized in Respondent's brief thus: The governing law is clear concerning employee attempts to take up with an employer matters which are within the exclusive purview of a certified bargaining representative. The employer may listen and react (unless the reaction would be contrary to the terms of an existing collective bargaining agreement) without committing an unfair labor practice; but the employees by choosing to ignore their exclusively certified repre- sentative and proceed on their own, may not then argue that in doing so they were "protected" by the very law which established the exclusivity. If an employer may not rely on clear management rights as set forth in a collective bargaining agreement, but must treat as "protected" piecemeal employee attempts to diminish such rights, there is no incentive to agree in the first instance. This lesson was heeded by the Supreme Court in [Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Commu- nity Orgainzation, 420 U.S. 50 (1975)]; and it is the law of this case. In Emporium Capwell employees were discharged for picketing to protest alleged racial discrimination after invoking the grievance procedure contained in the contract between their collective-bargaining representative and their employer. They picketed against the advice of their union because they felt the grievance procedure vas inadequate. In reversing the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and agreeing with the Board that the discharges did not violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, the Supreme Court first posed the central issue thus: Before turning to the central questions of labor policy raised by these cases, it is important to have firmly in mind the character of the underlying conduct to which we apply them. As stated, the Trial Examiner and the Board found that the employees were discharged for attempting to bargain with the Company over the terms and conditions of employment as they affected racial minorities. Although the Court of Appeals expressly declined to set aside this finding, respondent has devoted considerable effort to-attacking it in this Court, on the theory that the employees were attempting only to present a grievance to their employer within the meaning of the first proviso to § -9 (a). We see no occasion to disturb the finding of the Board.. Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L P, B., 340 U.S. 474, 491(1951). The issue, then is whether such attempts to engage in separate bargaining are protected by § 7 of_the Act or proscribed by § 9(a). [Footnotes omitted.] Respondent argued that overall national policy required a limited exception to the principle embodied in Section 9(a) of the Act that the collective-bargaining agent selected by a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit- has exclusive representation rights where some employees seek to bargain separately with their employer as to the elimination of racially discriminating employment practices peculiarly affecting them. It also argued that, if-the Court fashioned such exception, legitimate employer and union interests would not be unduly compromised. After discuss- ing both of these contentions, the Court held thus; . Accordingly, we think neither aspect of respondent's contention in support of a right to short-circuit orderly, established processes for eliminating discrimination in employment is well-founded. The policy of industrial self-determination as expressed in §7 does not require fragmentation of the bargaining unit along racial or other lines in order to consist with the national labor policy against discrimination. And in the face of such fragmentation, whatever its effect on discriminatory practices, the bargaining process that the principle of exclusive representation is meant to lubricate could not endure unhampered. There is nothing in Emporium Capwell even remotely apposite to this case. Butler did not seek to bypass the Union when he drafted his memorandum and got other employees to sign it. He merely requested Respondent to reconsider the step it had taken unilaterally. When Maca- boy made it clear at his meeting with Butler and the other signers that he would not reconsider; Butler took the first step toward enlisting the Union's aid when he told Mrs. Keys he wanted to go further and she promised him a meeting with a union representative the next day. Such a sequence of events did not fragment the unit. The principle 346 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD of exclusive representation obviously continued unham- pered. The other case which Respondent relies on as establish= ing the law of this case-Norfolk Conveyor, Division of Jervis B. Webb Company, 159 NLRB 464 (1966)--is inapposite for the same reason. There an employee was discharged for insisting on arguing about wages and working conditions at a meeting called by the employer to plan a Christmas party. The Trial Examiner's discussion, adopted by the Board, begins with a finding that the employee's "discussion of wages and general working conditions was not `protected activity' because these were matters to which the Union had been designated as exclusive bargaining agent." It ends with the Trial Examiner's "opinion that, on the particular facts of this case, [he] exceeded the scope of any statutory protection he might have had when he persisted in his complaints concerning wages and working conditions after repeated reminders that the meeting had been called for discussion of plans for the Christmas party." `What ren- dered that employee's conduct on that occasion unprotect- ed was "the fact that, like the dissident employees in Emporium Capwell, he insisted on acting in derogation of his collective-bargaining representative. Here there is no such element either explicit or implicit in Butler's activities on March 16. I find, therefore, that Butler -engaged in protected concerted activities when he protested Respon- dent's new technique for contacting patients during the admissions process by drafting a memorandum, obtaining the signatures of other employees, and advocating their position during a meeting with Respondent's officials. The other facet of Respondent's defense is a factual argument., Respondent contends Macaboy discharged Butler not because of `what Butler did on March 16 but because,of a decision Macaboy had reached at the time of the thumb jerk incident the preceding week that Butler lacked- the necessary empathy with patients to continue as an admitting clerk. This argument is equally without merit,- for Macaboy's testimony alone leads inevitably to a conclusion Butler would not have been discharged on March 16 but for the fact he led an employee protest against the change Macaboy had ordered in the way they were to do their jobs. I find it unnecessary, therefore, to pass on the pretext issue raised by the General Counsel by making -a finding as to the thoughts which went through Macaboy's mind when he overruled Mrs. Keys' suggestion the discharge be put off for a few days and decided to act immediately. Assuming; arguendo, that Macaboy, as he claimed, had only his pre-March 16 observations of Butler in mind - when he reached his decision and was not consciously motivated in any degree by the events of that day, the result is still a violation of the Act. There are two crucial segments of Macaboy's testimony. Both came while he was on direct examination. The first was his response to a question by Respondent's counsel as to how he had learned, on March 16, that Butler was a probationary employee. Macaboy said: - I asked Mr. Butler, who was the spokesman at the first meeting, in fact I think [he] said more than I at the first meeting-I asked him his experience with the Hospital and how long he had been there. I was trying to find out what he was basing his judgment on. Was it experience? Had he been in the hospital business so long that he knew that this-procedure wouldn't work[?] [A]nd at that point he advised he had been_ there - something less,than three months, and, that is -how it come to light that he was a probationary employee. The second came when I inquired whether Macaboy had reached his decision to discharge Butler before March 16, thus: JUDGE BLACKBURN: Before the meetings were held on March I6th, had you any plans to terminate Mr. Butler at that time? Tim wrrNEss: I had made up my mind- that -Mr. Butler had- to be moved somehow. At that point, I did not know that he was still a probationary employee. JUDGE BLACKBURN: When did you make that deci- sion? - Tim wrrNEss: When he told me that he had been there less than three months. - JuDGE BLACKBURN: When did you make the decision that he had to be moved somewhere? - TIlE wnNEss: About one or two days before, when he had given the thumb jerk to the patient. In other words, Macaboy concluded a day or two before March 16 that Butler was an unsatisfactory admitting clerk. He decided at that time only to move him,out of that job. On March :16, . Macaboy discovered from words Butler spoke in the context of a protest by employees that he could discharge Butler without running, afoul _of the union contract. Motivated by that discovery, he decided -to discharge Butler instead of transfer him-to another job. But for the employees' protest, Butler would not have been discharged. Since, as already found, the protest sparked by Butler on March 16 was protected, it follows that he was discharged as a result of engaging in-protected-concerted activities, a classic violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record is this case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Washington Hospital, Center is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. - Local 722, Hospital, Professional, Technical & Ser- vice Workers, Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. - 3. By discharging James M. Butler, Jr., on March 16, 1976, for engaging in protected concerted activities, Re- spondent has violated Section 8(axl) of the Act: 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practice is an unfair labor practice affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Tim REMEDY In addition to the usual cease-and-desist order and notice, an order requiring Respondent to remedy the unfair labor practice found by reinstating Butler and making him whole is required to effectuate the policies of the Act. WASHINGTON HOSPITAL CENTER 347 Backpay will be computed on a quarterly basis, plus interest at, 6percent per annum, as prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962). Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, conclu- sions of law, and the entire record in this proceeding, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDERS Respondent Washington Hospital Center, Washington, D.C., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discharging- employees for engaging in protected concerted activities. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer James M. Butler, Jr., immediate and, full reinstatement to his former job or, if that job no longer exists, to' a substantially equivalent position, without 3 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges, and make him whole for any earnings he lost, plus interest, as a result of his discharge on March 16, 1976. (b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this recommended Order. (c) Post at its hospital in Washington, D.C., copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Regions 5,4 after being duly signed by Respondent's authorized repre- sentative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea- sonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 5, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. 4 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board."