Classe Ribbon Co., Inc.

406 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Classe Ribbon Company, Inc. and United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America, AFL-CIO. Case 10-CA- 11423 December 17, 1976 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS FANNING AND JENKINS of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (Act).4 More particularly, the questions for decision are as follows: 1. Did Respondent violate Section 8(aXI) of the Act by threatening employees? 2. Did Respondent violate Section 8(aX3) of the Act by suspending and later discharging employee Hellen Stanley? Upon the entire record and my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, and having taken into account the arguments made and the briefs submitted,5 I make the following: On February 19, 1976, Administrative Law Judge Alvin Lieberman issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the Charging Party filed exceptions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the Respondent, Classe Ribbon Company, Inc., Anniston, Alabama, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order.' i In agreeing with the Administrative Law Judge that Respondent did not violate Sec 8(a)(3) of the Act when it discharged Helen Stanley . Chairman Murphy and Member Fanning note that, when Respondent initially established that it had an honest belief that she had engaged in misconduct for which she was discharged , the burden of going forward with evidence to prove that she did not in fact engage in such misconduct passed to the General Counsel As the General Counsel did not meet this burden of demonstrating the misconduct did not in fact occur, it has not been proven that Respondent violated Sec 8 (a)(3) in Stanley's discharge See, e g, Farmers Co-Operative Gin Association , 161 NLRB 887, 911 (1966) In such circumstances, Chairman Murphy and Member Fanning agree with the Administrative Law Judge 's dismissal of this portion of the complaint. Member Jenkins finds it unnecessary to decide this issue and would simply affirm the Decision below, inasmuch as it was found by the Administrative Law Judge that Stanley had in fact engaged in such misconduct DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE ALVIN LIEBERMAN, Administrative Law Judge: The hearing in this proceeding, with all parties except the Charging Party represented, was held before me in Anni- ston, Alabama, on November 13 and 14, 1975, upon the General Counsel's complaint' dated October 10, 1975,2 and Respondent's answer.3 In general, the issues litigated were whether Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) 227 NLRB No. 68 FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTION Respondent, a Delaware corporation , is engaged at Anniston, Alabama, in the manufacture of narrow fabrics, ribbons, tapes, and webbing. During 1974, a representative period, Respondent shipped goods valued at more than i At the end of the General Counsel's case-m-chief par 11 of the complaint was dismissed on consent Also at the end of the General Counsel's case-in-chief I granted Respondent's motion, over the General Counsel's objection , to dismiss par 8 of the complaint because it was my recollection at the time that no evidence had been offered to support that paragraph In his bnef the General Counsel urges that I reconsider my ruling in this regard and I have done so Upon reconsideration and upon reading the stenographic transcript of the hearing , which was not available to me when I made my ruling, I find that the General Counsel did adduce evidence which , prima facie, sustained the allegations of par 8. My ruling, having been erroneous, is therefore withdrawn and par. 8 of the complaint is hereby reinstated However, that paragraph will be dismissed on the ground that it has not been established by a preponderance of the evidence . In this connection, the General Counsel called only one witness, Calvin Lackey. to support the paragraph of the complaint here under consideration His testimony, which was also the only evidence offered by the General Counsel to establish par 12 of the complaint , was denied by Mather Hood. Respondent's assistant manager On the basis of the demeanor of these witnesses I believe Hood and not Lackey Accordingly. not only will par 8 of the complaint be dismissed for the reason set forth above, but also par 12 2 The charge pursuant to which the complaint was issued was filed on August 15, 1975 3 During the hearing Respondent's answer was amended to admit the allegations of par 7 and 13 of the complaint The former asserts that Respondent interrogated employees in violation of Sec 8(axl) of the Act and the latter that Respondent suspended and later discharged employee Hellen Stanley a In pertinent part these sections provide- Sec 8(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer- (I) to interfere with, restrain , or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7: (3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization Sec 7, insofar as relevant, states Sec 7 Employees shall have the right to self-organization , to form, join, or assist labor organizations , to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing , and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection S Although all the arguments of the parties and the authorities cited by them, whether appearing in their briefs or made orally at the hearing, may not be discussed in this Decision , each has been carefully weighed and considered CLASSE RIBBON COMPANY 407 $50,000 to customers located outside the State of Alabama. Accordingly, I find that Respondent is engaged in com- merce within the meaning of the Act and that the assertion of jurisdiction over this-matter- by the National Labor Relations Board (Board) is warranted. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America, AFL-CIO (Union), is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. r, III. INTRODUCTION Briefly, this case is concerned with events following the Union's institution of an organizing campaign among Respondent's employees. These included, the complaint alleges, Respondent's interrogating and -threatening em- ployees in violation of Section 8(a)(1)' of the Acts and Respondent's suspending and discharging Hellen Stanley in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1). Although Respondent denies having threatened employ- ees, it admits the complaint's assertion that it interrogated them in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. It also admits suspending and discharging Stanley. Respondent contends, however, that it was justified in doing so because of an honest belief that Stanley misconducted herself while soliciting employees to sign union cards. IV. PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 7 A. Respondent's Business As already noted, Respondent is engaged in manufactur- ing narrow fabrics, ribbon, tapes, and webbing . It employs some 240 people. Respondent's plant is -operated on a three-shift basis. Although each shift- normally runs 8 hours, in some departments employees have been sent home before com- pleting a particular shift because there was no further work for them to do that day. - Respondent's employees started their vacations on Fri- day, June 27, 1975,8 and did not return to work until Monday, July 14. During this period Respondent's plant was closed. B. The Union's Organizing Campaign Acceding to requests that he do so, on about June 25, 1975, Tommy Stanley, an employee of Respondent and the husband of Hellen Stanley9 whose discharge is alleged in the complaint as having been violative of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, conferred with a representative of the Union concerning the organization of Respondent's employees. At this meeting the Union's representative gave Tommy Stanley union cards to be signed by employees. - B The complaint also alleged other violations of Sec. 8(a)(l), but these allegations as set forth in fn. 1, above, will be dismissed. r The purpose of these findings is to furnish a frame of reference within which to consider the facts relating to Respondent's alleged unfair labor practices and to the conclusions to which they may give rise To the extent that the contentions of the parties relate specifically to the findings made here they will be treated here, although they, as well as the findings, may again be considered in other contexts During the vacation period the Stanleys were busily engaged in procuring signatures to union cards:,This they did by, among other things, visiting employees at their homes and Hellen Stanley, herself, called between 40 to 50 employees on the telephone. Through the efforts of the Stanleys and several people who were supplied with cards by Tommy Stanley, 96 union cards were signed before the vacation period was over. The Union's organizing campaign continued after Re- spondent's employees returned to work following their vacations. In this regard, union-literature was distributed, meetings were held, a union committee on which the Stanleys served was formed, and employees (including the Stanleys) wore union buttons. On September I 1 the Union prevailed at a representation election. Later that month the Union was certified as the representative of Respondent's employees. V. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Facts, Contentions and Conclusions Concerning Respondent's Alleged Violations of Section 8(a)(1)10 At the hearing Respondent conceded that it was- opposed to the unionization of its employees. In support of Respon- dent's opposition to the Union, Respondent's supervisors sought to dissuade employees from joining the Union. Thus, it appears from undisputed and uncontradicted testimony given by several -employees II that during the Union's organizing campaign supervisors told them that upon the Union's advent Respondent would close its plant and go out of business; that neither supervisors nor other employees would be able to assist them in their work, as was then the situation; that they would not be guaranteed 8 hours' work on each shift; and that, instead of the practice which then obtained, specific time periods would be set for rest and meal `breaks which employees would be required to adhere to strictly. It needs no citation of authority nor is extended discus- sion necessary to establish that the foregoing statements were coercive of rights guaranteed to employees in Section 7 of the Act. Accordingly, I conclude that by threatening to close its plant, to reduce working time, and to impose more onerous working conditions upon employees should the Union become their bargaining agent, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I further conclude that Respon- dent also violated Section 8(a)(1) by, as alleged in the complaint and admitted in the answer, "interrogat{ing] its employees concerning their union membership, activities and desires, and the union membership, activities and desires of other employees." 8 All dates hereinafter mentioned without stating a year fall within 1975. 9 Hellen Stanley was employed by Respondent as a weaver. 10 It will be remembered that in its answer, as amended at the hearing, Respondent admitted the complaint's allegations concerning the interroga- tion violations of Sec. 8(a)(l) of the Act. 11 Respondent called no witnesses to deny the testimony given by these employees. Nor did Respondent, in its beef, argue that it did not violate Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act in the manner set forth here. 408 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD B. Facts, Contentions, and Conclusions Concerning Respondent's Alleged Violations of Section 8(a)(3) The complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act by suspending and subsequently disc- harging Hellen Stanley. Respondent admits that it suspend- ed and then discharged Stanley. It contends, however, that it did not transgress Section 8(a)(3) in doing so because it honestly believed, based on reports it received, that Stanley threatened three employees, J. D. Turley, Geraldine Grif- fin, and Patricia Johnson, while soliciting their signatures to union cards. Before discussing the facts upon which Respondent's contention is based it would be well, I think, to set forth at the outset the legal principle upon which it is grounded. An employer may escape liability for discharging an employee by establishing an honest belief that he miscon- ducted himself while engaging in activity which otherwise would be protected, unless it develops that he did not do so. As the Board held in this regard in Rubin Bros. Footwear, Inc., 99 NLRB 610, 611 (1952), "the honest belief of an employer that striking employees have engaged in miscon- duct provides an adequate defense to a charge of discrimi- nation in refusing to reinstate such employees, unless it affirmatively appears that such misconduct did not in fact occur." 12 Although Rubin Bros. dealt with strikers' miscon- duct during a protected strike, the rule there laid down has been applied in cases dealing with misconduct during the course of other types of protected activity, including the solicitation of signatures to union cards, the situation presented here. See, for example, Continental Woven Label Company, Incorporated, 160 NLRB 1430, 1431 (1966), and Burnup & Sims, Inc, 137 NLRB 766, 711-773 (1962), affd. 379 U.S. 21. The questions for decision, therefore, in determining the propriety of Stanley's discharge and the applicability of Respondent's Rubin Bros. defense are whether Respondent had an "honest belief' that Stanley "engaged in miscon- duct" while soliciting signatures to union cards and whether "it affirmatively appears" that she did so? These issues will be separately considered below. 1. Respondent's "honest belief' After Respondent's plant reopened on July 14, 1975, following the vacation period 13 Mather Hood, Respon- dent's assistant manager, was informed by supervisors that they had received complaints from employees that Hellen Stanley was seeking signatures to union cards in an objectionable manner. Early in August two employees, J. D. Turley and Geraldine Griffin, complained to Hood that Stanley had threatened them with discharge unless they signed union cards. Information concerning a similar threat by Stanley to a third employee, Patricia Johnson, was given to Hood by a supervisor. On August 14, after having been notified of these complaints, George Toedte, Respondent's plant manager, discussed them with Stanley . She denied having threatened anyone. In view of her denial she was informed that the matter would be investigated and that in the meantime she was being suspended. During the next several days Hood spoke again to the two employees who had personally made the complaints against Stanley and to the supervisor who had given him the information received from Johnson. Although Hood im- pressed upon them the seriousness of their accusation, the two employees reiterated what they had originally told him and at Hood's request each signed a statement setting forth what they claimed Stanley had said to them about being discharged unless they signed a union card. After considering the oral and written statements he received during his investigation, speaking to other mem- bers of Respondent's management staff, and conferring with Respondent's lawyer, Hood concluded, as he testified, that the "complaints [against Stanley] were valid" and that her employment with Respondent should be terminated. Accordingly, on August 19, Hellen Stanley was discharged. Having conducted what appears to have been a careful investigation of the complaints made against Stanley and having thoroughly evaluated its results, which, apparently, established to Respondent's satisfaction that the accusa- tions against Stanley were meritorious, I find that Respon- dent, in fact, honestly believed that Stanley had threatened employees with discharge while soliciting their signatures to union cards, an activity which would otherwise have been protected. Accordingly, I conclude that the first leg of Respondent's defense based on Rubin Bros., supra at 611, has been established. 2. Hellen Stanley's "misconduct" Respondent discharged Hellen Stanley because , it con- tends and as I have found , it honestly believed that she threatened three employees, J. D. Turley, Geraldine Grif- fin, and Patricia Johnson, with discharge unless they signed union cards . Respondent's honest belief that she did so will not, as Rubin Bros. teaches, provide it with "an adequate defense" to the complaint's allegation that Stanley was discriminatorily discharged if "it affirmatively appears that such misconduct did not in fact occur." With this precept in mind Stanley's conduct vis-a-vis the above-named employees will be considered. a. J. D. Turley J. D. Turley, employed by Respondent as an electri- cian, testified that early in the week in which Respondent's plant reopened following its vacation shutdown Hellen Stanley asked hun to sign a union card and he refused to do so. Turley further testified that later in the same week Stanley told him that there was "a rumor . . . that [he] and [his] wife [who also worked for Respondent] was the two that brought the union into this plant and [that if he and his wife] will sign a union card, the union can stand behind [them and protect them] . . . but, unless [they] sign a card and join the union [they] they will be one of the first . . . to be laid off." Turley stated, in addition, that Stanley also said to him on this occasion that "if [he and his wife] signed 12 Rubin Bros was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Court In N L R B v Burn up & Sims, Inc, 379 U S. 21, 23 (1964). at 203 F 2d 486 (1953) However, it was cited with approval by the Supreme 13 It will be remembered that the plant closed for vacation on June 27 CLASSE RIBBON COMPANY 409 the card the union's going to stand behind [them] . . . and [they] could not be fired." Although Stanley admitted that she asked Turley many times to sign a union card, she denied making the statements he attributed to her. This testimonial conflict need not be resolved. Even if Stanley had told Turley what he said she told him, it would not, in my opinion, have constituted a threat of discharge unless he signed a card, as Respondent contends. Given Respondent's professed opposition to the Union, I view Stanley's statement to Turley not as a threat, but as solicitous advice that he and his wife sign cards and join the Union and thus obtain the Union's protection should Respondent discharge them or seek to do so because of the "rumor" concerning their having "brought the Union into [the] plant." Accordingly, I conclude that Stanley did not threaten Turley with discharge unless he signed a union card and became a member of the Union. b. Geraldine Griffin During the evening of Friday, June 27, 1975, the first day on which Respondent's plant was closed for vacation, Hellen Stanley and her husband, Tommy Stanley, went to the-home of Barney and Geraldine Griffin, both employees of Respondent,,to buy beans grown by the Griffins in their garden. When the Stanleys arrived at the Griffin house, the Griffins were eating and the Stanleys joined them at their table. While all four were seated, the Union was discussed. In this regard, Hellen Stanley testified that although her husband and Barney, Griffin talked about the Union, she did not participate, nor did she during the conversation between her husband and Mr. Griffin "[mention] union to either [Mr. or Mrs. Griffin ]." Geraldine Griffin testified, with corroboration from her husband, that while the Union was under discussion Tommy Stanley put some union cards on the table and asked the Griffins to sign,14 and that upon her refusal to do so Hellen Stanley said "the people that don't go union will lose their jobs." After the Griffins finished their meal, they and the Stanleys went outside to put the beans the Stanleys had come for into their automobile. While this was being done, Geraldine Griffin further testified, the Griffins were again asked to sign union cards and she once more refused. Upon her second refusal, Geraldine Griffin related, with confir- mation from her husband, that Hellen Stanley told her that "it was going union and that if [she and her husband ] din't sign [a card] and go union with them . . . [they] would be the first ones that would lose [their ] jobs." Geraldine Griffin also recounted that during the first or second week after she returned to work following the 14 When queried about this, Hellen Stanley first testified that no union cards were shown to the Griffins. At a later point in her examination, however, she stated that she didn't "recall seeing any union cards down there." 15 During the General Counsel's case-in-chief Hellen Stanley testified that she "first got involved with the Union about a week after [Respondent's employees ] was off on vacation."-She also stated during the General Counsel's case-in-chief that, although in the vacation period, which started on June 27 and continued through July 11, she called between 40 to vacation period Hellen Stanley said to her that "if [she] didn't sign a card and go with the union [she] would be fired." c. Patricia Johnson Patricia Johnson works for Respondent as a floor hand in its weave shop. She testified that during the evening of Saturday, June 28, 1975, the second day of Respondent's plant vacation shutdown, she received a telephone call from Hellen Stanley. Johnson further testified that during their conversation, which was entirely related to the Union,15 she expressed doubt as to whether "a union [could] work in a place like [Respondent's plant.]" In reply to this, Johnson related, Stanley said that the Union "is going to come in, and ... everybody that's not for the union will be done away with." 3. Credibility Hellen Stanley generally denied "threaten[ing] anybody in any way concerning the Union or union cards." Specifically she denied making threats in this area to Geraldine Griffin and Patricia Johnson. Because of incon- sistencies in her testimony and other factors to be discussed below Stanley's denials are suspect. Concerning the inconsistencies, Stanley first testified, as already noted, that she did not become "involved with the Union" until about a week after Respondent's plant had closed for vacation, nor did she talk to "any employees about the Union . . . during the first couple of days" of the vacation. However, Stanley changed her testimony and admitted calling Johnson and discussing the Union with her on the second day of the vacation. Furthermore, and as also already noted, while Stanley was being examined concerning what transpired at the Griffin home on June 27, 1975, she first stated categorically that no union cards were shown to the Griffins. But later, Stanley again changed her testimony and said she did not "recall seeing any union cards down there." Also casting doubt upon the veracity of Hellen Stanley's denial that she made the statements attributed to her by Geraldine Griffin during the evening of June 27 while she and Tommy Stanley, her husband, were at the Griffin home is the fact that the denial is uncorroborated. Although Tommy Stanley was available to corroborate his wife's denial, if it was in fact truthful, the General Counsel did not call upon him to do 50.16 In this regard, Tommy Stanley was present throughout the hearing and was called by the General Counsel for examination about other relevant matters. Yet, he was not questioned by the General Counsel concerning what occurred at the Griffin home during the evening in question. The General Counsel's failure to do so gives rise 50 employees and spoke to them about the Union, she "didn't talk to any employees about the Union ... during the first couple of days after [the vacation] started." However, when Stanley was recalled by the General Counsel as a rebuttal witness, her testimony indicated that she agreed with Johnson as to the date of her telephone call to 'Johnson, which, as Johnson testified, was made during the vacation's second day, not its second week. 16 In contrast to this lack of corroboration Geraldine Griffin's testimony as to what was said by Hellen Stanley was supported , as I have pointed out, by Barney Griffin. 410 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD to the inference, which I draw, that had this been done Tommy Stanley would not only not have corroborated his wife's denial, but would have given testimony favorable to Respondent. Cf. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. U.S., 306 U.S. 208, 226 (1939). An additional factor detractive of Hellen Stanley's credibility is her testimony regarding another incident at the Griffin home. She testified, as above adverted to, that although her husband and Barney Gnffin talked about the Union, she did not participate in that discussion, nor did she even mention the Union. Because Stanley appeared to be a garrulous woman, I find her testimony that she said nothing while this conversation was in progress to be incredulous. Finally, insofar as Stanley's credibility is concerned, it must be borne in mind that three witnesses, Geraldine Griffin, Barney Griffin, and Patricia Johnson testified that Stanley stated that employees who failed to sign union cards would be discharged, whereas only one witness, Stanley, herself, testified that she did not do so. Although it is possible that the testimony of the three could have been contrived and that of the one truthful, "if there was fabrication, it would seem more probable that it was the one, rather than the four [here three], who was lying." Fred Stark, et al., 213 NLRB 209 (1974). For the foregoing reasons it is my opinion that Stanley was dissembling in her denials. Accordingly, I credit the testimony given by the Griffins and Johnson that Stanley made the statements they ascribed to her. I find, therefore, that Hellen Stanley threatened Geral- dine Griffin and Patricia Johnson with discharge unless they signed union cards. "(A] statement by one employee to another that the latter would have to join [a] union to keep his job is outside the area of protected activity." 17 Inasmuch as it "affirmatively appears" that Stanley misconducted herself by making statements of this nature, I further find that the second leg of Respondent's Rubin Bros. defense 18 has been estab- lished. Accordingly, I conclude that Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(3) of the Act by suspending and then discharg- ing Hellen Stanley. This being the case, my order will provide for the dismissal of so much of the complaint as alleges that Respondent did so. VI. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The unfair labor practices engaged in by Respondent occurring in connection with its operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. 17 Continental Woven Label Company, Incorporated, 160NLRB 1430, 1431 (1966) 18 Rubin Bros Footwear, Inc, 99 NLRB 610, 61 1 (1952) 19 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, VII. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(I) of the Act, my order will require Respondent to cease and desist therefrom and to take such affirmative action as will effectuate the policies of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in this case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act and is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean- ing of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By the following conduct Respondent has engaged, and is engaging, in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act: a. Coercively interrogating employees concerning their union membership, activities, and desires and concerning the union membership, activities, and desires of other employees. b. Threatening to close its plant, to reduce employees' working time, and to impose more onerous working conditions upon employees upon the Union's becoming their collective-bargaining representative. 4. Respondent has not engaged in any other unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 5. Respondent did not engage in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act by suspending and thereafter discharging Hellen Stanley. 6. The unfair labor practices engaged in by Respondent as set forth in Conclusion of Law 3, above, affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and upon the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER i9 The Respondent, Classe Ribbon Company, Inc., Anni- ston, Alabama, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Coercively interrogating employees concerning their attitude toward, relationship to, knowledge of, activities on behalf of, or regarding any other matter relating to United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization. (b) Threatening to close its plant because United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America, AFL- CIO, or any other labor organization, is, or should become, the collective-bargaining representative of any of its em- ployees. conclusions, and Order herein shall, as provided in Sec . 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and order and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes CLASSE RIBBON COMPANY 411 (c) Threatening employees with reduction in working time, with imposition of more onerous working conditions, or with any other form of reprisal, or effectuating any such threats, for joining, assisting, or in any manner supporting United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization. (d) -Threatening employees with reduction in working time, with imposition of-more onerous working conditions, or with any other form of reprisal, or effectuating any such threats, because United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, is, or should become, the collective-bargain- ing representative of any of its employees. (e) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representa- tives of their own choosing, or to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection as guaranteed in Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, or to refrain from any or all such activities. - 2. Take the following affirmative action which, it is found, will effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended: (a) Post at'its premises in Anniston, Alabama, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 20. Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 10, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ- ing all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall-be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 10, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps have been taken to comply herewith. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that paragraphs 8, 12, 14, 15, and the related portions of paragraph 16 of the complaint be, and they hereby are, dismissed. Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shalLread "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge, at which all parties had the opportunity to present evidence and arguments, it has been decided that we have violated the National Labor Relations Act. We have, therefore, been ordered to post this notice and carry out its terms. WE WILL NOT question our employees concerning their union membership, activities, and desires. WE WILL NOT threaten to close our plant or to go out of business because United Rubber Workers, or -any other union, is or becomes your bargaining representa- tive. WE WILL NOT reduce working time, or put into effect more difficult or harder working conditions, or do anything else to your disadvantage, or threaten to do any of these things, because you join, support, or help United Rubber Workers, or any other union, or because you have already done so. WE WILL NOT in any similar way interfere with any right given to employees by the National Labor Relations Act. All our employees are free, without any objection from us, to become or remain members of United Rubber Workers, or any other union, or not to become or remain members of any union. In this connection, WE WILL respect your right to form any union to support any union, to help any union, and to deal with us through any union, and WE WILL also respect your right not to do any of these things. 20 In the event, that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by CLASSE RIBBON COMPANY, INC. -