Mini-Circuits Laboratory

MINI-CIRCUITS LABORATORY Scientific Components Corporation d/b/a Mini-Cir- cuits Laboratory and Local 463, International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO. Cases 29-CA-5078 and 29-RC-3361 March 11, 1977 DECISION, ORDER, AND DIRECTION OF SECOND ELECTION BY MEMBERS JENKINS, PENELLO, AND WALTHER On December 30, 1976, Administrative Law Judge Nancy M. Sherman issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the Petitioner- Charging Party filed an answering brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find- ings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt her recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the Respondent, Scientific Com- ponents Corporation d/b/a Mini-Circuits Laborato- ry, Brooklyn, New York, its officers, agents, succes- sors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the election conducted herein in Case 29-RC-3361 on June 11, 1976, be, and it hereby is, set aside. [Direction of Second Election and Excelsior foot- note omitted from publication.] i The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule an Administrative Law Judge' s resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing her findings. 228 NLRB No. 64 DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE 601 NANCY M. SHERMAN, Administrative Law Judge: The instant unfair labor practice case (Case 29-CA-5078) was initiated by a charge filed on June 23, 1976,1 against Scientific Components Corporation d/b/a Mini-Circuits Laboratory (herein the Company) by Local 463, Interna- tional Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO (herein the Union). On the basis of that charge, a complaint issued on July 28, alleging that the Company violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (herein the Act) in May and June by threatening its employees with layoff and other reprisals for union activity. Pursuant to a petition filed by the Union on March 31 and a Decision and Direction of Election issued on May 10 by the Regional Director for Region 29 in Case 29-RC- 3361, an election was held on June 11 among the Company's employees to determine whether or not they wanted the Union to represent them. The tally of ballots showed 10 votes for the Union and 11 votes against it .2 On June 16, the Union filed timely objections to conduct affecting the results of the election, including an allegation that on the day of the election the Company "threatened and coerced the employees by stating that if [the Union] became the majority representative of the employees, the [Company] would discharge union adherents in reprisal." By order dated August 4, the Regional Director consolidat- ed this representation case with the unfair labor practice case, on the ground that the investigation of this objection disclosed substantial and material factual issues, including credibility issues, which could best be resolved by hearing and were substantially identical to issues involved in the unfair labor practice case.3 The hearing in these consolidated cases was held before me on October 26, 1976. At the conclusion of the hearing, all parties waived briefs but presented oral argument. Upon the entire record in the case, including such argument and my observation of the witnesses, I hereby make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTION The Company is a New York corporation with its principal office and place of business in Brooklyn, New York, where it manufactures, sells, and distributes electron- ic components and related products. During the year preceding the issuance of the complaint, a representative period, the Company shipped products valued in excess of $50,000 directly to States other than New York. I find that, as the Company admits, it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act, and that assertion of jurisdiction over its operations will effectuate the policies of the Act. All dates hereafter are 1976 unless otherwise stated. z Six ballots were challenged . During the Region's postheanng investiga- tion, five or six such challenges were sustained in accordance with the agreement of the parties 3 The Regional Director overruled a second objection filed by the Union, which has not requested the Board to review such action. 602 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES AND THE ALLEGED OBJECTIONABLE CONDUCT A. Testimony Regarding Kaylie's Conversations with Patrick The Company's employees are ordinarily paid on an hourly basis. However, from time to time employees are able to obtain on request what the Company refers to as a "deal." A "deal" constitutes an agreement to pay the individual employee a bonus if he produces a particular number of units, ordinarily a number greater than the usual number, during a particular week. Employee Barbara Jean Patrick testified that about a month before the election, when she asked the Company president, Harvey Kaylie, for a raise, he told her to quit if she did not like what was going on, and she said she was not going to quit and he would have to fire her. Still according to Patrick, the following ensued: [H]e said . . . well, this Union, and I said I ain't got anything to do with that and he said well, if the Union gets in, he said there will be no more deals because I don't think they will allow it and he said I am not going to tell you how to vote and I said well, I didn't come to talk about a Union and so he said well, if the Union gets in, like the work will slow up and people will have to be laid off . . . he never answered whether I would get a raise or not at that time. Still according to Patrick, about 2 weeks before the election, she again brought up the question of a raise, and he replied, "the Union is coming in . . . I am not going to tell you how to vote . . . you make that choice yourself." Kaylie testified that "deals" were to the employees' advantage, and that he had never discussed the Union's pay demands with Union Representative Fred Simeone. Kaylie denied telling Patrick that if the Union came in, there would be no more deals. He testified that he "probably" told Patrick that she should do whatever she wanted to do about the Union or the election. Kaylie testified that he had never threatened any of the employees with reprisals if they voted for the Union; "I feel, and I feel now just as I felt then, that everyone has a right to decide to do what they want, but they should have that right. It shouldn't be that some people have it and others don't, and that was the only reason for my saying anything at all to them so they could do it on a fair basis." B. Testimony Regarding Kaylie's Conversations with Smith and Wilson 1. Background On or about April 1976, when Union Representative Simeone came to the office of Company President Kaylie, Kaylie asked the Union's position regarding seniority and layoffs. Simeone replied that the selection of employees must be based on seniority. During the period relevant here, Respondent had a total of about 35 employees, about 10 of whom were assemblers. Anita Smith and Erlene Wilson were seventh and eighth in seniority among the assemblers,4 although more than two employees in the plant as a whole were junior to them. 2. Kaylie's testimony regarding his conversations with Smith and Wilson Company President Kaylie testified that 2 or 3 weeks before the election he had one discussion with Smith, and shortly thereafter one conversation with Wilson, about layoffs. He testified that his conversation with Smith took place at the door of his office, when she came to him to ask him something about the job she was working on. According to Kaylie, he told her that he thought she should look at all the facts before making a decision about whether to vote for the Union, that a union representative had told him the Union had "a seniority type situation," and that the best thing she could do was to ask the Union about the matter. Still according to Kaylie, he asked whether she understood what seniority meant, she replied no, and he said that he understood it as meaning that in the event of a layoff the last one hired would be the first to go. Kaylie testified that he also told her that the Company had no seniority policy and that its layoff policy was to retain the best workers. Also, Kaylie testified that on four or five occasions he had told Smith that her work performance was "very good," he was "very pleased" with her, and he thought she was going to do "quite well with the Company because her progress had been very good." Kaylie testified that he did not recall whether he made such a remark to Smith during this particular conversation. Also, according to Kaylie, he told her that the Union might have other disadvantages, and she should check with the Union about them. Kaylie further testified that when he spoke to Smith, she did not seem upset. Kaylie testified that he said the "same thing" or the "same kind of thing" to Wilson. More specifically, he testified that he told Wilson at her workbench that she had a right to vote the way she wanted to; she should look at all the facts and make a decision; the Union had a seniority policy which he described to her as "In the event of a layoff, then the last one hired would be the first one to be let go"; and the Union had some advantages and, he was sure, some disadvantages. He further testified that when he spoke to Wilson she did not seem upset but, on the contrary, she laughed. Kaylie testified that throughout the preelection cam- paign, he tried to talk as little as possible about the Union because he did not know what he was allowed to say or not allowed to say. Aside from Smith and Wilson, he was able to give the names of only four employees whom he spoke to about the Union-"possibly" a part-time employee named Fred, and "probably" employees Rocky and Belle (the assemblers junior to Smith and Wilson) and Barbara Jean Patrick (see supra). On direct examination, he testified that , The record fails to show which of the two was senior. The matter is immaterial here MINI-CIRCUITS LABORATORY 603 so far as he could recall Smith and Wilson were the only employees he talked to about seniority, and that he spoke about this to Smith and Wilson as opposed to anybody else because they were "newer type employees" and the seniority matter "may be more important to them than someone who is the first out there." On cross-examination, he testified that he "probably" told "Rocky" and "Belle" that an election would take place, and "may have" explained seniority to these junior employees, but that he did not "recall" discussing the seniority matter with the other, senior employees. Still on cross-examination, he testified that he decided to talk to Smith and Wilson about the Union "Because they are nice girls. I think they are good workers, and . . . the other possible reason is that I possibly thought they might have been intimidated by some other employees and that they should be able to decide for themselves." 5 3. Employee testimony relating to Smith's conversations with Kaylie At the time of the hearing, Smith was still in the Company's employ. She testified that Kaylie never told her that if the Union won the election there would be layoffs and the last to be hired would be the first to be fired. She also denied telling any of her coworkers that Kaylie said there would be a layoff if the Union won. Smith testified that as she was punching in one preelection Saturday, whose date she could not recall except that she did not usually work on Saturdays, Kaylie told her that "the last to be hired is the first to go," without saying that this is what the Union or he believed. She testified that he told her nothing else and that she asked no questions. When asked whether she believed that this would happen if the Union came in, she testified "No. I really didn't think of it." She further testified that Kaylie's remark "shocked" her; and that she went to employee Wilson right afterwards, said that Smith was shocked, and told Wilson about Smith's discussion with Kaylie. Wilson testified that on Saturday, May 5, Smith appeared to be "sort of upset"; that Wilson asked her what happened; that Smith said that Kaylie had told her "the last to come would be the first to go," and she was afraid of being fired; and that Wilson replied Smith "shouldn't have any fear about it because they have to have a very good reason to fire her." Wilson's testimony in this respect was not received to show the truth of what Kaylie said to Smith. Smith denied that Kaylie told her that he wanted her to know the Union's advantages or told her that she had better ask the Union about the matter. Smith further testified that after this incident, but before the election, she went to Kaylie to ask him about some units. According to her, Kaylie was standing at the door of his office, and brought up the fact that "the last to be hired is the first to go," without saying anything else. According to Smith, he did not say anything about "if the Union comes in." Smith further testified that she told her coworkers about this discussion, and that she had no other discussions with him. Later, she testified that during the 5 Smith testified that she was having some difficulties with her coworkers, because "they said that I was the one who signed out the Union" and had sold out on them, and that in consequence she had asked Kaylie to week of the June 11 election, and following her questions to him about some units, he called her into his office and talked about some units. Then, according to her, Kaylie told her that he had had a meeting earlier that day with Joanne Simmons, an employee of 5 years' standing, and he told Smith that Simmons had received a piece of paper describing certain benefits. According to Smith, Kaylie did not talk about the Union at all. Smith further testified that she then returned to work, reported to the other employees (including Barbara, whose last name Smith did not know) what Kaylie had said about Simmons and that Smith and Kaylie had been talking about units, and stated that she had a feeling she was going to lose her job.6 Still according to Smith, most of the others then said that they would all stick together. Employee Patrick testified that during the week of, but before, the election, on the day when Joanne came in with a "pension" certificate, Patrick saw Smith talking with Kaylie "like beside the office." Barbara Patrick went on to testify that she saw Smith leave Kaylie and go into the plant; that Smith "kept saying I know I am going to lose my job," and had a "really nervous" facial expression; that Patrick asked her what happened; and that Smith replied that Kaylie "said the last one to come in would be the first to go if the Union gets in." Still according to Patrick, she told Smith that she was not the last to come in; Smith said, "I know, but that is what he said"; and Patrick said that if anything happened, "we stood up for Esme, we will stick by you"-referring, inferentially, to a recent incident where the Company had recalled employee Esme Trotman, who had organized the Union in the plant after a strike to protest her discharge. Patrick's testimony was not received to show what Kaylie said to Smith. I discuss infra its probative value vel non about the effect of Kaylie's remarks on Smith. Employee Angelita Clarke testified that about a month before the election Kaylie told her that if the Union came in there would be changes, and she replied that she did not want to discuss the matter. Clarke further testified without objection that about a week before the election employee Smith said that Kaylie had told her that if the Union came in the last people hired would be the first to go. According to Clarke, Smith further said that she was afraid, and she did not want to lose her job. Employee Trotman testified that before the election Smith told her that Kaylie had said that, whether or not the Union won, the last to come would be the first to go. According to Trotman, Smith also said that she was very upset because she did not know why Kaylie had said those things to her. Trotman's testimony was not received to show what Kaylie said to Smith. 4. Employee testimony about what Kaylie said to Wilson Wilson and Patrick gave mutually corroborative testimo- ny to the following effect: On Saturday, May 22, Kaylie came up to Wilson at her worktable, gave her some work, and told her that "if the Union do come in there is liable to move her out of the room However, it appears that such difficulties began after the election. 6 She testified that she told them this because "everybody was saying it " 604 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD be a layoff and the last to come in would be the first to go." Wilson asked why he was telling her this, and he said that he just wanted her to know. Wilson laughed, Kaylie asked why, and she said that the "whole thing sounds crazy," and that two others had been hired after her. Kaylie said that he knew, but "the last person hired would be the first to go, then the one before that, and the one before that and right up the line." Wilson testified at the hearing that the "main reason" she laughed was that Smith had told her the same thing. Smith testified that Wilson told her there would be layoffs if the Union came in. Wilson further testified that on the morning of the election Kaylie told her to do what was right for herself. C. Analysis and Conclusions 1. Credibility determinations I credit Patrick's testimony that about a month before the election Kaylie told her that if the Union came in (1) there would be no more deals "because I don't think they will allow it," and (2) "like the work will slow up and people will have to be laid off." Further, I credit Patrick's and Wilson's testimony that a few days before the election Kaylie told Wilson that if the Union came in there was liable to be a layoff and "the last person hired would be the first to go, then the one before that, and the one before that and right up the line." I credit the foregoing employee testimony, and discredit Kaylie's denials, for demeanor reasons and in view of the following additional considera- tions: Kaylie corroborated the employees' testimony that he told Wilson that the Union had a seniority policy which he described to her as, "In the event of a layoff, the last one hired would be the first one to go." Moreover, his testimony as a whole constitutes an admission that, in talking to employees about the Union, he drew their attention to the disadvantages of this policy, but not to its advantages. Thus, he testified, in effect, that he told Wilson and Smith about this union policy because it particularly disadvantaged them as "newer type employees" who would nonetheless be retained, under existing company layoff policy, owing to the superior abilities which he had mentioned to Smith, at least. However, he further testified that he did not relate this union policy to the senior employees who (as he must have known) stood to gain by it. Also, although he testified that he told Smith and Wilson that they should look at all the facts before making a decision about whether to vote for the Union, and should ask the Union about its advantages and disadvantages, Smith credibly denied this testimony in terms , and Wilson credibly denied it in effect. Furthermore, Patrick's credited testimony about her conversation with Kaylie gains some indirect corroboration from her and Wilson's mutually 7 As to the admissibility of the testimony summarized in this sentence, see Rule 803(3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. For demeanor reasons, I credit Clarke's testimony that Smith said Kaylie had told her that if the Union came in the last people hired would be the first to go; and discredit Smith's denial that she told any of her coworkers that Kaylie said there would be a layoff if the Union won. This testimony by Clarke is plainly probative as to the fact that Smith made such a report . I find it unnecessary to determine whether Company counsel's failure to object to Clarke's testimony, which in consequence was received without limitation, rendered corroborative testimony about his subsequent conversation with Wilson. Finally, I conclude that on Saturday, May 5, and again during the week of, but before, the election, Kaylie told employee Smith that if the Union came in there would likely be a layoff and, in that event, junior employees like Smith would be the first to be laid off. I base this inference on Kaylie's testimony that he told Smith the same thing, or the same kind of thing, he told Wilson ; the testimony by both Kaylie and Smith that he told her the last to be hired is the first to go; his testimony that he told her that this was union policy; her testimony that she was shocked by what Kaylie said to her during the Saturday interview and "right afterwards" told Wilson that she was shocked; Wilson's testimony that on Saturday, May 5, Smith appeared "sort of upset" when describing an interview with Kaylie; and Smith's testimony that on a second occasion before the election, when Kaylie was standing at the door to his office, he "repeated the same thing" he had said during the Saturday interview-namely, that "the last to be hired is the first to go"-and that she told her coworkers about this discussion. In addition, I rely on Patrick's testimony that after a conversation with Kaylie near the office door Smith had a "really nervous" facial expression and said she was afraid she would lose her job; and Clarke's testimony that, after describing a conversation with Kaylie, Smith said that she was afraid, she did not want to lose her job.7 I do not credit, except to the extent already indicated, Kaylie's testimony about what he said to Smith, nor do I credit his denial that he ever threatened employees with reprisals if they voted for the Union. Also, I discredit Smith's denial that Kaylie told her that if the Union won the election there would be layoffs and the last to be hired would be the first to be fired. In reaching this conclusion about Smith's credibility, I note her unpersuasive demeanor, the fact that she clearly failed to give a complete account of her conversations with Kaylie, and the fact that the portion she did give failed to account for her admitted shock at what he told her, and her admitted report to other employees that she had a feeling she was going to lose her job. 2. Whether Kaylie's statements were unlawful and invalidated the election I agree with counsel for the General Counsel that the Company violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when Company President Kaylie told employee Patrick that, if the Union came in, there would be no more deals and there would be a layoff. His remarks about "deals" were not rendered lawful by his further statement that he did not think the Union would "allow" them, because the record is barren of any basis for this views and, in any event, the Company's duty to bargain with a victorious Union would such testimony probative as to the content of the Kaylie-Smith conversa- tions. See Federal Rules of Evidence , Rule 103(a)(1); American Rubber Products Corporation v. NLR.B., 214 F.2d 47, 52 (CA. 7, 1954), decided before the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 8 N.LR.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., et al., 395 U.S. 575,617-620 (1969), see infra fn. 11; Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, et al., 221 NLRB 831 (1975). Indeed, Kaylie denied having discussed with the Union its demands with respect to pay. MINI-CIRCUITS LABORATORY 605 not carry with it any obligation to agree with any union proposal abolishing "deals."9 Further, I fmd that the Company violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when Kaylie told Patrick that if the Union came in, "like the work will slow up and people will have to be laid off." Kaylie's statement was not rendered lawful by his reference to lack of work, since there is no evidence that the Company anticipated any lack of work or had any objective basis for believing that lack of work would flow from the Union's selection as bargaining representative.10 Finally, I find that the Company violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when Kaylie told relatively junior employees Smith and Wilson that if the Union came in there would likely be a layoff and junior employees would be the first to go. After Wilson had credibly testified to this statement by Kaylie, the Company's counsel asked her if Kaylie had ever threatened her with reprisals or job loss if she voted for the Union. She replied, "All he said to me is the last to be employed was the first to go. I do not know if that was a threat, but I know that is what he said." Further, she gave a negative reply when asked whether Kaylie had ever threatened her with loss of her job because of the Union or for any reason, and whether Kaylie had said that the layoff which was "liable" to occur "if the Union do come in" would be a result of the Union's coming in. While Wilson was an honest witness, she was in Respondent's employ at the time of the hearing and, moreover, tended to answer questions according to their narrow and literal meaning rather than by what others might consider the questions' fair implication. Accordingly, unlike the Company's counsel at oral argument, I do not take Wilson's testimony as averring "that there were no threats made, that she was not coerced and had freedom of choice to do what she pleased." Further, for demeanor reasons and in view of the credible testimony that Smith repeatedly expressed fear for her job, I do not credit her denial that she believed that if the Union came in the last to be hired would be the first to be fired. In any event, so far as the unfair labor practice aspect of this case is concerned, "the measurement of coerciveness of [Section] 8(a)(1) misconduct is . . . whether such conduct reasonably `tends to interfere with the free exercise of employee rights' rather than whether it succeeded or failed in intimidating individual employees . N.LR.B. v. Illinois Tool Works, 153 F.2d 811, 814 (C.A. 7, 1946) . . . ." Burns International Security Services, Inc., 225 NLRB 271, 275 (1976).11 Moreover, the Board makes its determination whether to set aside an election on an objective basis-i.e., on whether the alleged misconduct would reasonably tend to prevent the holding of a fair and free election-rather than on the subjective statements of the employees as to whether they were "coerced" or "misled" into voting as they did. Pinkerton's National Detective Agency, Inc., 124 NLRB 1076, 1077, fn. 3 (1959); G.H.R. Foundry Division, 123 NLRB 1707, 1709 (1959), and cases there cited at fn. 3; Orleans Manufacturing Company, 120 NLRB 630, 631, fn. 4 (1958). This approach was approved in Harlan #4 Coal Company v. N.LRB., 490 F.2d 117, 122-123 (C.A. 6, 1974), cert. denied 416 U.S. 986, which pointed out, inter alia, the peculiar pressures which postelection proceedings impose on employees' testimony regarding why they voted as they did. Indeed, even assuming that the employees are trying to tell the truth and are unaffected by the fact that they may be, in effect, revealing the contents of their secret ballot to representatives of their employer and of the Union which may become their exclusive bargaining representative, the recognition of constraint remains a subtle thing which may call for a high degree of introspective perception . Cf. The Radio Officers' Union of the Commercial Telegraphers Union, AFL [A. H. Bull Steamship Company] v. N.LRB., 347 U.S. 17, 51 ( 1954); Darlington Mfg. Co. v. N.LRB., 397 F.2d 760, 772-773 (C.A. 4, 1968), cert. denied 393 U.S. 1023 (1969). For these reasons, at the hearing I sustained the General Counsel's objection to company counsel's inquiry, on cross-examination, of employee Patrick, "So it is fair to assume that [Kaylie] never influenced your voting at all?" I conclude that Company President Kaylie's threats of reprisals in the event of a union victory reasonably tended to prevent the holding of a fair and free election . "Conduct violative of Section 8(axl) is, a fortiori, conduct which interferes with the exercise of a free and untrammeled choice in an election." Dal-Tex Optical Company, Inc., 137 NLRB 1782, 1786 (1962). Moreover, the outcome of the election would have been affected by a change in one or two votes, and the credible testimony of Patrick, Wilson, and Clarke shows that Smith relayed Kaylie's threats to her fellow workers. For demeanor reasons, I do not credit either Smith's denials that she relayed such threats or Trotman's version of Smith's report-namely, that Kaylie had said that whether or not the Union won the last to come would be the first to go. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Company is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. The Company has interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 4. Such unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 5. By engaging in the aforesaid unlawful conduct, the Company interfered with the free choice of employees in the election. 9 Parts, Jobbers, Warehouse, Inc., 216 NLRB 1093, 1096 (1975); Gibson Discount Center, 191 NLRB 622, 628 (1971 ), enfd. in relevant part 481 F.2d 1156, 1162 (C.A. 5, 1973). 10 Where an employer makes "a prediction as to the precise effect he believes unionization will have on his company ... the prediction must be carefully phrased on the basis of objective fact to convey an employer's belief as to demonstrably probable consequences beyond his control." Gissel, supra at 618. See also Del E. Webb Corporation, et al., 204 NLRB 1111, 1118, 1122-23 (1973). rr Accord: N LAB. v. Wilbur H. For4 170 F.2d 735, 738 (C.A. 6, 1948), N.L.RB. v. Brown-Dunkin Company, Inc., 287 F.2d 17, 18 (C.A. 10, 1961); Local 542, International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO [Giles & Ransoms; Inc.] v. N.L.R.B, 328 F.2d 850, 852-853 (C.A. 3, 1964), cert. denied 379 U.S 826. 606 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD THE REMEDY Having found that the Company engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it be required to cease and desist therefrom, and from like or related conduct, and to post appropriate notices. It will be further recommended that the election held on June 11 , 1976, be set aside and that Case 29-RC-3361 be remanded to the Regional Director for Region 29 for the purpose of conducting a new election at such time as he deems that circumstances permit a free choice of bargain- ing representative. Upon the foregoing fmdings of fact and conclusions of law and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act and the Regional Director's August 4, 1976, "Supplemental Decision, Order Consolidating Cases, and Notice of Hearing," in Case 29-RC-3361, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER 12 The Respondent, Scientific Components Corporation d/b/a Mini-Circuits Laboratory, Brooklyn, New York, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Threatening to lay off employees, or to withdraw from them the opportunity to obtain production bonuses, if they choose representation by Local 463, International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL- CIO, or any other labor organization. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Post at its Brooklyn, New York, facility copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 13 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 29, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 29, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. IT Is FURTHER ORDERED that the election in Case 29-RC- 3361 be set aside, and that such case be remanded to the Regional Director for Region 29 for the purpose of conducting a new election at such time as he deems appropriate. 12 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Secs. 102.46 and 102.69(e) of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions , and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 13 In the event the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a hearing at which all parties had the opportunity to present their evidence, it has been decided that we violated the law. We have been ordered to post this notice and we intend to carry out the Order of the Board and abide by the following: WE WILL NOT threaten to lay off employees, or to withdraw from them the opportunity to obtain produc- tion bonuses, if they choose representation by Local 463, International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, or any other union. WE WELL NOT, in any like or related manner, interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of these rights. The National Labor Relations Act gives employees the following rights: To engage in self-organization To form,join, or assist any union To bargain collectively through representa- tives of their own choosing To engage in activities together for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection To refrain from any such activities. Our employees are free to exercise any or all of these rights, including the right to join or assist Local 463 or any other union. Our employees are also free to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent that union membership may be required by a collective-bargaining agreement as a condition of continued employment as permitted by the proviso to Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. SCIENTIFIC COMPONENTS CORPORATION D/B/A MINI- CIRCUITS LABORATORY