Pre-Engineered Building Products, Inc.

PRE-ENGINEERED BUILDING PRODUCTS, INC. 841 Pre-Engineered Building Products , Inc. and Shop- men's Local Union No. 620, International Associa- tion of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL-CIO. Case 16-CA-6426 March 17, 1977 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS FANNING AND MURPHY On October 15, 1976, Administrative Law Judge Alvin Lieberman issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief 1 and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the Respondent, Pre-Engineered Building Products, Inc., Tulsa, Oklahoma, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order, except that the attached notice is substituted for that of the Administrative Law Judge. I On November 12, 1976, Respondent filed a motion to reopen the record for the purpose of adducing newly discovered evidence. The General Counsel has filed a response in opposition to Respondent's motion. In support of its motion, Respondent submitted the affidavit of its president, Bob Brase, wherein he asserts that beginning in May 1976, after the close of the hearing, Respondent's workload increased , requiring the Respondent to hire additional unit employees; as a result, Respondent's work force has fluctuated between 15 and 22 employees from June 1976 to November 1976, no more than 4 of whom at any given time were previously employed by the predecessor employer. Further, Brase asserts that immediately after the issuance of the Administrative Law Judge's Decision two unit employees voluntarily stated that they did not favor the Union as their bargaining representative. We have considered the motion and find it to be without merit. As to Respondent's first contention, the evidence of the subsequent increase in Respondent's work force is immaterial, as it is well established that the critical date for determining the union's majority status is the date on which the request for bargaining is received by the employer. The Daneker Clock Company, Inc., 211 NLRB 719,721 (1974), enfd. 516 F.2d 315 (C.A. 4,1975); C. G. Conn Ltd., 197 NLRB 442 (1972). Therefore, Respondent's bargaining obligation as the successor employer vested on or about December 17, 1975, the date on which the Union first requested recognition and bargaining. At that time, the Respondent's full employee complement consisted of persons who previously had been employed by Flint and represented by the Union. Respondent therefore has unlawfully refused to recognize and bargain with the Union since December 17, 1975. The possible later loss of the Union's 228 NLRB No. 70 majority status is of no consequence in view of Respondent's continuing unlawful refusal to bargain. C. G Conn supra As to the second point, Respondent's proffer of evidence that two unit employees indicated that they do not favor representation by the Union is patently inadequate to warrant granting the motion . Such evidence has no bearing on the question of the Union's majority status at the time Respondent's bargaining obligation vested. Accordingly, Respondent's motion is hereby denied. APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge, at which all parties had the opportunity to present evidence and arguments, it has been decided that we, Pre-Engineered Building Products, Inc., have violat- ed the National Labor Relations Act. We have, therefore, been ordered to post this notice and carry out its terms. WE WILL NOT threaten to discharge any employ- ee, and WE WILL NOT discharge any employee, for joining, supporting, or assisting Shopmen's Local Union No. 620, International Association of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL-CIO. WE WILL NOT refuse to recognize or bargain with Shopman's Local Union No. 620, Interna- tional Association of Bridge, Structural & Orna- mental Iron Workers, AFL-CIO as your union about your rates of pay, wages, working hours, and other matters connected with your work. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, or to engage in other concerted activi- ties for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection as guaranteed in Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, or to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring member- ship in a labor organization as a condition of employment in conformity with Section 8(a)(3) of said Act. WE WILL, if we are asked to do so by Shopmen's Local Union No. 620, International Association of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL-CIO, recognize and bargain with it as your union about your rates of pay, wages, working hours, and other matters connected with your work. If we come to an agreement about any of these things with Shopmen's Local Union No. 620, International Association of Bridge, Structur- 842 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD at & Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL-CIO, WE WILL put that agreement in writing and sign it. PRE-ENGINEERED BUILDING PRODUCTS, INC. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE ALVIN LIEBERMAN, Administrative Law Judge: The hearing in this proceeding, with all parties except the Charging Party represented, was held before me in Tulsa, Oklahoma, on May 4, 1976, upon the General Counsel's complaint ' dated March 16, 1976,2 and Respondent's answer.3 In general, the issue litigated was whether Respondent violated Section 8(aX5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, (hereinafter the Act). 4 More particularly, the questions for decision are as follows: located within the State of Oklahoma over which the National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter the Board) would assert jurisdiction, and contracted to sell products valued at $36,000 to a customer whose place of business is in Ft. Smith, Arkansas. In addition, during the same period Respondent purchased from vendors located outside the State of Oklahoma supplies valued at $19,776.9 According- ly, I fmd that Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act, and that the assertion of jurisdic- tion over this matter by the Board is warranted. Intergraph- ic Corporation of American [In regard to Polygon Displays, Inc.], 160 NLRB 1284, 1291-92 (1966); Siemons Mailing Service, 122 NLRB 81, 85 (1958). II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. III. INTRODUCTION 1. Is Respondent a successors to Flint Construction Company of South America (hereinafter Flint)? 2. Assuming an affirmative answer to the foregoing question, is Respondent obligated to recognize and bargain with Shopmen's Local No. 620 (hereinafter the Union)?6 Upon the entire record, upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, and having taken into account the arguments made and the briefs submitted,? I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTION Respondent, an Oklahoma corporation, is engaged at Tulsa, Oklahoma, in the manufacture and sale of pre- stressed concrete products. Between December 15, 1975,8 the date on which Respondent commenced operations, and May 4, 1976, the date of the hearing in this proceeding, Respondent sold good valued at $14,067 to customers ' At the hearing 4(b) of the complaint was amended by elinunatmg all references to the Roy J. Hannaford Construction Co. 2 The complaint was issued pursuant to a charge filed on January 30, 1976. 3 At the hearing Respondent's answer was amended to admit the allegations of par. 13 of the complaint which asserts that Respondent violated Sec. 8(axl) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, "by threatening its employees that it could terminate the employment of employees who attempted to keep the Union in." 4 Set forth below are the relevant provisions of the Act to which reference has been made in the text: Sec 8. (a) It shall bean unfair labor practice for an employer- (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7; (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees ... Briefly, this case is concerned with Respondent's refusal to recognize and bargain with the Union, which had represented Flint's production and maintenance employees and with which Flint had maintained a long contractual collective-bargaining relationship. The General Counsel contends that Respondent is Flint's successor; that as such it is obligated to recognize and bargain with the Union; and that its refusal to do so is violative of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. Respondent argues that it is not Flint's successor and, therefore, is under no obligation to bargain with the Union. On the assumption that it is Flint's successor and pointing to the fact that the Union was never certified by the Board as the collective-bargaining representative of Flint's pro- duction and maintenance employees, nor of its own employees in the same category, Respondent further argues on brief that "absent a fresh showing of majority support," as is the situation, it "is not required to recognize and bargain with the Union." Insofar as pertinent, Sec. 7 is as follows: Sec. 7. Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, Join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives or their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities ... . 5 When used in this Decision "successor" and related words will be deemed to have the special technical meanings attributed to them in the field of labor management relations law . See, in this regard, MGR B. v. Burns International Security Services, Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972); Daneker Clock Company, Inc., 211 NLRB 719 (1974), enfd. 516 F.2d 315 (C.A. 4,1975); and Downtown Bakery Corp., successor to Smayda's Home Bakery, Inc., 139 NLRB 1352(1962). 6 The Union's full designation appears in the caption. 7 Although all the arguments of the parties and the authorities cited by them, whether appearing in their briefs or made orally at the hearing, may not be discussed in this Decision, each has been carefully weighed and considered. 6 All dates hereinafter mentioned without stating a year fall within 1975. 9 A projection of this figure on a 12-month basis shows that Respondent's annual out-of-State purchases would amount to more than $50,000. PRE-ENGINEERED BUILDING PRODUCTS, INC. 843 IV. PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 10 A. Flint's Business For several years, ending on about November 30, 1975, Flint, doing business under the trade name of Oklahoma Concrete Products Company, maintained a plant in Tulsa, Oklahoma, for the manufacture of prestressed concrete products. Flint owned the buildings in which it carried on its operations, but the land on which they stood was leased by Flint from the city of Tulsa. Although in the past Flint employed a greater number of employees, at the time it went out of business it had a work force of four production employees and one supervisor. For about 2 weeks before November 30, on which date Flint went out of business, Daniel Simpson, Respondent's president," was present in Flint's plant "as an observer." 12 B. The Union's Representation of Flint's Employees Flint acquired its business from Oklee Engineering Company (hereinafter Oklee). In 1960, following a private election at which a majority of its production and mainte- nance employees chose the Union as their collective- bargaining representative, Oklee recognized the Union and entered into a series of collective agreements with it. The bargaining relationship thus established between Oklee and the Union was continued by Flint which, like Oklee, also recognized the Union and also entered into collective agreements with the Union covering its produc- tion and maintenance employees.13 The last written con- tract between Flint and the Union expired on October 1, 1975. Before the expiration of this contract Flint and the Union agreed upon a new contract to become effective on October 1 and to remain in force for 60 days. The reason for this short term, as Raymond Basore, the Union's business agent, testified, was that Flint "was going to cease opera- tions and refused to negotiate a longer agreement." The 60-day contract between Flint and the Union was reduced to writing and sent to the International, of which the Union is a constituent member, for approval as to form following which it was to have been signed. However, Flint went out of business before the agreement was returned and, therefore, it was never signed. Notwithstanding this, all its terms and conditions were complied with by Flint and the Union. C. Respondent's Business Respondent was incorporated on November 17, 1975. Following its incorporation Respondent bought from Flint its buildings, inventory, machinery, equipment, tools, office furniture, stationery, and supplies. Flint also assigned its land lease to Respondent. 10 The purpose of these findings and conclusions is to furnish a frame of reference within which to consider the facts relating to Respondent 's alleged unfair labor practices and to the conclusions to which they may give rise. To the extent that the contentions of the parties relate to the findings and conclusions made here they will be treated here , although they, as well as the findings and conclusions , may again be considered in other contexts. 11 As will appear below, Flint sold its plant and other property to Respondent. 12 The quotation appearing in the text is taken from Simpson 's testimony. On December 15, Respondent took possession of the buildings and other property it had purchased from Flint and soon began to manufacture prestressed concrete products just as Flint had done. Since starting to do so Respondent has used the machinery and equipment it had acquired from Flint and has followed Flint's method of production. Respondent also adopted, and has done business at all times under, the trade name used by Flint, Oklahoma Concrete Products Company. Respondent's employment complement has never ex- ceeded four production employees and one supervisor. All had been in Flint's employ when Flint went out of business. Two production employees were hired by Respondent on December 1, the day after Flint ceased operations, the third was hired on December 2,14 and the fourth at a later time. Those hired on December 1 and 2 were told by Respon- dent's supervisor, who had also been Flint's supervisor, to report for work on December 15, the day, as found above, on which Respondent took possession of the plant and other property it had purchased from Flint. D. The Relationship Between Respondent and Flint As noted, the General Counsel contends that Respondent is Flint's successor and Respondent asserts that it is not. Respondent's principal arguments in support of its position are that there was a 2-week hiatus between Flint's going out of business and the commencement of Respondent's operations; that Respondent did not acquire a going business from Flint, but merely purchased Flint's assets; and that except for a short period preceding its closing Flint employed more than four employees, whereas Respon- dent's employee complement has never exceed four em- ployees. "Whether an employer is another's successor turns upon the continuation of what has come to be known as the `employing industry.' " Danker Clock Company, supra at 720, enfd. 516 F.2d 315 (C.A. 4, 1975). In Spruce Up Corporation, 209 NLRB 194, 196, (1974), enfd. 529 F.2d 516 (C.A. 4, 1975), it was stated that the "continuity of the employing industry ... is the keystone of [the Board's] successorship doctrine." Where an employer purchases the plant and the physical assets of another, as is the case here, the employing industry is continued and the purchaser is deemed to be the seller's successor if the "purchaser continues its predecessor's business from the same location, handling the same products, and employing its predecessor's employees." Downtown Bakery Corp., 139 NLRB 1352, 1354, reversed on other grounds 330 F.2d 921 (C.A. 6, 1964). The third criterion mentioned in Downtown Bakery is satisfied if a majority of the second employer's work force consists of people formerly employed by the first in the unit con- cerned. Danker, supra at 720. 13 The parties stipulated that such a unit, more particularly described in the complaint, was appropriate for collective-bargaining purposes respecting Oklee's, Flint's, and Respondent's employees. The complaint sets forth the composition of this unit as being "all production and maintenance employ- ees .... engaged in the fabrication of iron, steel, metal, pre-stressed [sic ] and pre-cast [sic ] concrete products and other products or maintenance work exclusive of guards, watchmen and supervisors as defined in the Act " 14 In March 1976 this employee was laid off. 844 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Accordingly, as Respondent bought Flint's plant and physical assets and all Respondent's production employees, as well as its supervisor, had earlier been employed by Flint, Respondent's "going business" and "employee comple- ment" arguments are rejected. Also rejected is Respondent's "hiatus" argument. De- pending on other factors, a hiatus between the closing of a plant by a seller and its reopening by a buyer is relevant to the question of whether the buyer is the seller's successor.15 However, in this case I fmd no circumstances giving support to Respondent's contention that the interval between the closing of Flint's plant and its opening by Respondent destroyed the employing industry carried on by Flint. The evidence, in my opinion, points in the other direction. Thus, not only was the elapsed time between the two events short, consisting of only 2 weeks, but within 2 days of Flint's closing Respondent hired three of Flint's former employees and directed them to report for work on December 15, 1975.16 Further, in this regard, during Flint's last 2 weeks of operation, Daniel Simpson, Respondent's president, was in Flint's plant as an observer. It appears, therefore, that even before Flint went out of business Respondent was preparing to take over its plant for the purpose of manufacturing the same products that Flint was making. In view of this, the 2-week period intervening between Flint's closing and Respondent's opening is not the type of hiatus reflecting adversely upon the continua- tion of the employing industry. I have found that Respondent purchased from Flint its buildings, inventory, machinery, equipment, tools, office furniture, stationery, and supplies; that it is the assignee of Flint's land lease; that it manufactures in the buildings it acquired from Flint the same products Flint had manufac- tured, using the machinery and equipment it bought from Flint; that it follows the same production process followed by Flint; that it does business under the same trade name used by Flint; and that all its production employees and its supervisor were formerly employed by Flint. These factors require a judgment that the employing industry maintained by Flint was continued by Respondent. Daneker Clock Company, Inc., 211 NLRB 719, 721 (1974), enfd. 516 F.2d 315 (C.A. 4, 1975); Hecker Machine, Inc., 198 NLRB 1114 (1972). Accordingly, I conclude that Respondent is Flint's successor. V. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Facts Concerning Respondent's Alleged Violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act The facts concerning Respondent's refusal to bargain with the Union are not in dispute. On December 17, 1975, and again on January 20, 1976, the Union requested Respondent to bargain with it as the representative of Respondent's employees. Respondent, however, refused to comply with these requests and has never recognized or bargained with the Union. B. Contentions and Concluding Findings Concerning Respondent's Alleged Violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act To justify its failure to bargain with the Union Respon- dent makes two claims. It first argues that not being Flint's successor it is a stranger to the Union.17 Basing its second contention on the fact that the Union was never certified by the Board as the collective-bargaining representative of Flint's employees, nor of its employees, Respondent argues on brief, on the assumption that it is Flint's successor, that in the absence of "a fresh showing of majority support," which is the case, it "is not required to recognize and bargain with the Union." The obligation of a successor to bargain with the representative of his predecessor's employees is no longer open to question. N.LRB. v. Burns International Security Services, Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 281 (1972). Although in Burns the union involved had been certified by the Board as the bargaining representative of Burns' predecessor, such a certification does not appear to be a prerequisite to bringing a successor's bargaining obligation into play. See, for example, Henry M. Hald High School Association, The Sisters of St. Joseph, 213 NLRB 415 (1974); Hecker Machine, Inc., 198 NLRB 1114 (1972); N.LRB. v. Polytech, Incorporated, and Terence McGorvan d/b/a Polytech, Incor- porated 469 F.2d 1226 (C.A. 8, 1972); NLRB. v. Interstate 65 Corporation d/b/a Continental Inc., 453 F.2d 269 (C.A. 6, 1971); and Tom -A-Hawk Transit, Inc. v. N.LRB., 419 F.2d 1025 (C.A. 7, 1969). In each of the foregoing cases a union had been recognized, but not certified, as the bargaining representative of the predecessor's employees, yet the Board or the court concerned held that the successor's refusal to bargain with that union was violative of Section 8(ax5) of the Act. Nor is it necessary, as Respondent argues, for the Union to make "a fresh showing of majority support" before Respondent becomes obligated to bargain with it. A union's majority is presumed to continue "whether the union has been certified by the Board, or .... recognized as the bargaining representative of the employees .. . without Board certification. In the latter situation, the existence of a prior contract ... raises a dual presumption of majority-a presumption that the union was the majority representative at the time the contract was executed, and a presumption that its majority continued at least through the life of the contract. Following the expiration of the contract ... the presumption continues and, though rebuttable, the burden of rebutting it rests on the party who would do so .... " Bartenders, Hotel, Motel and Restaurant Employers Bargaining Association of Pocatello, Idaho and its Employer- Members, 213 NLRB 651, 652 (1974). As found, for a long period of time Flint had maintained a contractual bargaining relationship with the Union. Flint's last contract with the Union expired on November 30, 1975, the day it went out of business. In accordance with the teaching of Bartenders Bargaining Association, had Flint remained in business beyond November 30, its bargaining agreements with the Union would have given rise to the IS See the discussion on this point in Danekersupra at 721. 17 Respondent having been found to be Flint's successor, this claim is 16 It will be remembered that Flint went out of business on November 30. rejected. PRE-ENGINEERED BUILDING PRODUCTS, INC. 845 presumption that the Union's majority representative status had continued, absent evidence that the presumption had been rebutted. Respondent, as Flint's successor, stands in Flint's shoes insofar as employee representation is concerned . Inasmuch as Respondent has offered no proof to rebut the presump- tion of the continuance of the Union's majority status following the expiration of its last contract with Flint, I find that the Union was the majority representative of Respon- dent's employees when it requested respondent to bargain with it on their behalf. It follows, and I further find, that Respondent was, and is, obligated to bargain with the Union. Accordingly, I conclude that by not bargaining with the Union pursuant to its request Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. C. Facts and Conclusions Concerning Respondent's Independent Violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I find and conclude, that "by threatening its employees that it could terminate the employment of employees who at- tempted to keep the Union in," respondent independently violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. VI. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The unfair labor practices engaged in by Respondent occurring in connection with its operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. VII. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, my Order will require Respondent to cease and desist therefrom and to take such affirmative action as will effectuate the policies of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing, and upon the entire record in this case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act and is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean- ing of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. Respondent is Flint's successor. 4. All production and maintenance employees at Re- spondent's plants in Tulsa, Oklahoma, and vicinity, en- gaged in the fabrication of iron, steel, metal, prestressed and precast concrete products, and other products or maintenance work, exclusive of guards, watchmen, and lE In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropri- ate for collective bargaining. 5. At all material times the Union has represented a majority of the employees in the unit set forth in Conclu- sion of Law 4, above. 6. By failing and refusing to recognize and bargain with the Union as the collective-bargaining representative of the employees in the unit set forth in Conclusion of Law 4, above, Respondent has engaged, and is engaging, in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 7. By threatening to discharge employees for supporting the Union, Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 8. The unfair labor practices engaged in by Respon- dent, as set forth in Conclusions of Law 6 and 7, above, affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER 18 The Respondent, Pre-Engineered Building Products, Inc., Tulsa, Oklahoma, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Failing or refusing to recognize Shopmen's Local Union No. 620, International Association of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL-CIO, as the collective-bargaining representative of its employees in the following appropriate unit: All production and maintenance employees at Respon- dent's plants in Tulsa, Oklahoma, and vicinity, engaged in the fabrication of iron, steel, metal, prestressed and precast concrete products, and other products or maintenance work, exclusive of guards, watchmen, and supervisors as defined in the Act. or failing or refusing to bargain with the said labor organization respecting rates of pay, wages, hours, or other terms or conditions of employment of its employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit. (b) Threatening employees with discharge for joining, supporting, or assisting Shopmen's Local Union No. 620, International Association of Bridge, Structual & Ornamen- tal Iron Workers, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organiza- tion. (c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representa- tives of their own choosing, or to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective-bargaining or other mutual aid or protection as guaranteed in Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, or to refrain and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 846 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL from any or all such activities , except to the extent that such nght may be affected by an agreement requiring member- ship in a labor organization as a condition of employment in conformity with Section 8(aX3) of said Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which, it is found, will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, bargain with Shopmen's Local Union No. 620, International Association of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers , AFL-CIO, as the collective- bargaining representative of the employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit, respecting rates of pay, wages , hours, or other terms or conditions of employment, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. '9 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (b) Post at its premises in Tulsa, Oklahoma, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 19 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 16, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and maintained by it for 60 consecu- tive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 16, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board."