Meat Processors of Green Bay

984 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Farah Supermarkets, Inc., d/b/a Meat Processors of Green Bay and Local 248 Meat & Allied Food Workers, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, AFLr-CIO. Case 30- CA-3671 March 22, 1977 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS FANNING, PENELLO, AND WALTHER On November 2, 1976, Administrative Law Judge Eugene George Goslee issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed an answering brief and a brief in support of the Administrative Law Judge's Decision. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions 1 of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order, except as modified herein. The Administrative Law Judge found, and we agree, that the Respondent's numerous and blatant unfair labor practices fully warranted, as a part of the remedy, the issuance of a bargaining order under N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc.2 We also agree with the Administrative Law Judge's finding that the Respondent should be required to bargain as of the June 15, 1976, demand date even though many of the violations were committed prior to that date, but only because those violations are otherwise remedied by our adoption of the Administrative Law Judge's recommended Order. Trading Port, Inc., 219 NLRB 298 (1975) (Member Fanning concurring).3 See also Drug Package Company, Inc., 228 NLRB 136 (1977) (Member Walther concurring and Member Fanning concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Administrative Law Judge also found, in light of the Board's Decisions in Steel-Fab, Inc., 212 NLRB 363 (1974), and Trading Port, Inc., supra, that it was unnecessary to reach the issue of whether or not the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. We disagree. The complaint alleged a violation of Section 8(a)(5) and, under the circumstances of I Inasmuch as we fully agree with the Administrative Law Judge that the Union demanded recognition on June 15 , 1976, and that the Respondent could not avoid the consequences of that demand by refusing all communi- cation with the Union, see, e.g., Century Projector Corporation, 49 NLRB 636 (1943), enfd. 141 Fd.2 488 (C.A. 2, 1944), we need not decide whether the 228 NLRB No. 111 this case, it is appropriate to make an 8(a)(5) finding. The record establishes that (1) on June 15, 1976, the Union represented a majority in an appropriate unit and sought recognition, and (2) the Respondent refused to recognize and bargain with the Union while engaging in and having engaged in numerous and substantial unfair labor practices. Accordingly, as all the elements of an 8(a)(5) violation are present, we find that on and after June 15, 1976, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW In accord with our above finding, we adopt the Administrative Law Judge's Conclusions of Law with the following modification: Substitute the following for Conclusion of Law 9: "9. By refusing, since June 15, 1976, and at all times thereafter, to recognize and bargain with the Union as the exclusive representative of its employees in the appropriate unit set out above, the Respondent has engaged and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act." ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modified below, and hereby orders that the Respon- dent, Farah Supermarkets, Inc., d/b/a Meat Proces- sors of Green Bay, Green Bay, Wisconsin, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order, as so modified: 1. Insert the following as paragraph 1(k) and reletter the subsequent paragraph accordingly: "(k) Refusing to bargain with Local 248 Meat & Allied Food Workers, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of the employees in the following unit: All employees of Farah Supermarkets, Inc., d/b/a Meat Processors of Green Bay at its facility located at 2210 Don Hutson Road, Green Bay, Wisconsin, excluding office clerical employees and supervisors as defined in the Act. 2. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(c): "(c) Upon request, recognize and bargain with Local 248 Meat & Allied Food Workers, Amalga- Union's filing of an RC petition on June 18 , 1976, "perfected" an otherwise imperfect demand. 2 395 U.S. 575 ( 1969). 3 Member Fanning agrees with the Administrative Law Judge that the bargaining obligation should date from the demand. MEAT PROCESSORS OF GREEN BAY 985 mated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO, with respect to wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment for employees in the appropriate unit set out above. 3. Substitute the attached notice for that of the Administrative Law Judge. APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government of North America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bargaining representative of employees in the appropriate unit described below. WE WILL offer the employees named below immediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs, or, if those positions are no longer available, we will offer the employees substantially equiva- lent positions, together with all seniority and other rights and privileges they previously enjoyed, discharging if necessary any employees hired on or after June 14, 1976, and WE WILL make the said employees whole for any loss of earnings they sustained by reason of our discrimination against them: WE WILL NOT discharge, lay off, or otherwise terminate the employment of our employees Max Behrendt Jo-Ann Koehler because of their union sympathies, interests, or Wayne Hultman William Vallier activities. Jeffrey LeAnna John Hoenig WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees con- Rhonda Watruba cerning their union sympathies, interests, or activities. WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees con- cerning the union sympathies, interests, or activi- ties of their fellow employees. WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with layoff, discharge, or other discrimination affecting the tenure of their employment because of their union sympathies, interests, or activities. WE WILL NOT create the impression in our employees that their union activities are under surveillance. WE WILL NOT inform our employees that they and their fellow employees have been discharged because of their union sympathies, interests, and activities. WE WILL NOT solicit our employees to persuade their fellow employees to abandon their allegiance to the Union. WE WILL NOT condition the future employment of our employees on their willingness to persuade their fellow employees to abandon their allegiance to the Union. WE WILL NOT threaten our employees that other employees who may be reinstated to their former jobs will again be discharged because of their union sympathies, interests, and activities. WE WILL NOT threaten to discharge all of our employees rather than submit to a union represen- tation election. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with Local 248 Meat & Allied Food Workers, Amalga- mated Meat Cutters & Butcher Butcher Workmen WE WILL, upon request, recognize and bargain collectively with Local 248 Meat & Allied Food Workers, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO, with respect to wages, rates of pay, hours of employ- ment, and other terms and conditions of employ- ment. The appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining is: All employees of Farah Supermarkets, Inc., d/b/a Meat Processors of Green Bay at its facility located at 2210 Don Hutson Road, Green Bay, Wisconsin, excluding office clerical employees and supervisors as defined in the Act. FARAH SUPERMARKETS, INC., D/B/A MEAT PROCESSORS OF GREEN BAY DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE EUGENE GEORGE GOSLEE, Administrative Law Judge: This case came on to be heard before me at Green Bay, Wisconsin, on August 2 and 3, 1976, upon a complaint issued by the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board and an answer filed by Farah Supermark- ets, Inc. d/b/a Meat Processors of Green Bay, hereinafter sometimes called the Respondent . The issues raised by the pleadings relate to whether or not the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, by engaging in acts and conduct hereinafter specified. Briefs have been received from the General Counsel and the Respondent, and the briefs have been duly considered. 986 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Upon the entire record in this proceeding, and having observed the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses, I hereby make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I fmd that the Respondent is (1) engaged in the processing and retail and wholesale sale and distribution of food and meat products at its facility at Green Bay, Wisconsin; (2) that the Respondent's gross volume of business exceeds $500,000 annually; (3) that the Respondent annually purchases goods in interstate commerce in an amount valued in excess of $50,000; and (4) that the Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act, and is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE STATUS OF THE CHARGING UNION The complaint also alleges, the answer admits, and I fmd that Local 248 Meat & Allied Food Workers, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO, hereinafter sometimes called the Union, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT The parties have stipulated and I find that the following described bargaining unit is a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act: All employees of Farah Supermarkets, Inc. d/b/a Meat Processors of Green Bay at its facility at 2210 Don Hutson Road, Green Bay, Wisconsin, excluding office clerical employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. IV. THE UNION'S MAJORITY STATUS The parties have further stipulated that on June 14, 1976,1 prior to any terminations, there were 10 employees in the bargaining unit, exclusive of 5 individuals whom the parties have stipulated to be supervisors within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act. The record contains nine authori- zation cards executed by the employees on June 9 and 10, by which they designated the Union to represent them for purposes of collective bargaining. There is no contention and no evidence that the authorization cards are other than voluntary designation by the employees of an agent for the purposes of collective bargaining. I fmd, accordingly, that at all times since June 9, 1976, the Union has been the duly designated collective-bargaining representative of the Re- spondent's employees in the appropriate unit for the purposes of bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, ' All dates hereinafter are in 1976, unless specified to the contrary. 2 The mailgram was sent to the attention of Don Farah at the Respon- dent's business address The record reflects that Daniel Farah is also known hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment. V. THE UNION'S DEMAND FOR RECOGNITION AND BARGAINING The pertinent events in this case transpired in a relatively restricted timespan extending from approximately June 1 to June 15, and the Respondent's response to the collective- bargaining aspirations of its employees portrays a classic pattern of interference, restraint, and coercion. The Re- spondent's employees became interested in union represen- tation on or shortly before June 1. On June 5 employee Max Behrendt contacted Victor Bobrowicz, the business agent for Local 248, explained the employees' interest in union representation, and obtained some literature appropriate to an organizing campaign. Between the date of his contact with Bobrowicz and June 9, Behrendt passed out the literature to his fellow employees and solicited their attendance at a union meeting scheduled for the latter date. At the meeting on June 9, Bobrowicz explained the benefits of union representation, informed the employees of the various means to obtain recognition from the Respondent, and passed out authorization cards for the employees' signatures. Seven of the employees who attended the meeting signed valid authorization cards, and two addition- al cards were executed on the following day. Between the approximate hours of 4:30 p.m. on June 14 and 11:30 a.m. on June 15, the Respondent, in clear possession of knowledge of the protected activities of its employees, discharged seven of the nine employees who had authorized the Union to represent them. After his discharge on the evening of June 14 by the Respondent President Daniel Farah, Max Behrendt report- ed the contents of the discharge interview to Business Agent Bobrowicz. At approximately 9:30 p.m. that evening Bobrowicz sent a mailgram to the Respondent, advising of the Union's majority status, and offering to prove the claim through recourse to a card check.2 Bobrowicz also request- ed the Respondent to recognize the Union and offered to meet on a mutually agreeable date for the purpose of collective bargaining. On the morning of June 15 Bobrowicz received a telephone call from Western Union, in which it was reported that no person at the Respondent's place of business would accept the mailgram. In a second call received by Bobrowicz shortly thereafter, Western Union reported that a second attempt to deliver the mailgram had also proved futile. Bobrowicz directed that the mailgram be sent to the Respondent by registered mail. On June 18 Bobrowicz received a copy of the mailgram sent on June 14, and on June 21 Bobrowicz was advised by Western Union that the Respondent's personnel had also refused to accept a copy of the registered letter. In the interim, on June 18, the Union filed a petition in Case 30-RC-2879 requesting that the Board conduct a representation election in a unit essentially identical to the bargaining unit which the Respondent concedes here is appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining. A as Don Farah, and was referred to by this nickname by some of his employees. MEAT PROCESSORS OF GREEN BAY 987 copy of the petition with accompanying documents was mailed to the Respondent by registered mail on the same date as filed. The return registry receipt reveals that the petition was received at the Respondent's address on June 21, and was signed for by Carl Farah, whom the record reveals to be a brother of Daniel Farah. It is the Respondent's contention that no refusal to bargain has been proved in this case because the Union failed to make a valid request for recognition and collective bargaining. In support of this contention Daniel Farah testified that he was unaware of the Union's June 14 mailgram until the following Thursday, when he was told by General Manager Robert Warner that a telegram for Farah had arrived on June 15, but Warner had refused to accept it. Warner testified in this proceeding, but afforded no explanation of his refusal to accept the telegram. Farah additionally testified, however, that on Thursday, June 18, he received a registered letter, which he sunilarly refused to accept, and returned the letter to the sender. In explanation of this unusual conduct, Farah asserted that he does not normally receive telegrams, and although he had no particular reason to refuse the telegram, he did so because he does not like telegrams. As concerns the representation petition, Farah similarly denied receipt, and testified that he was unaware of the petition until the date the hearing in this proceeding opened. Farah acknowledged that the signature on the return registry receipt is that of his brother Carl, but asserted that Carl Farah is neither employed by nor has any official position with the Respondent, but only drifts in and out of the office. Counsel for the Respondent stipulated that the petition was received in the Respondent's office on June 21 and, without conceding that the petition came to the attention of Daniel Farah, counsel further stipulated that on June 29, after he was retained to represent the Respondent, he was furnished a copy of the RC petition by a representative of the Regional Office. To the extent Daniel Farah testified to the alleged reasons the Respondent refused to accept the Union's mailgram and registered letter, I reject his testimony as inherently incredible and in direct contrast with all the circumstances attending the Respondent's gross violations of the Act. Similarly, I reject Farah's averments that, notwithstanding his brother's receipt and signed acknowl- edgment of the RC petition, the document did not come to his attention until the date the hearing in this matter was opened. On the whole of the record I find that the Union took all reasonable and necessary steps to perfect its demand for recognition and bargaining by its mailgram of June 14, followed by a registered letter on the following day. The Respondent offered no credible evidence to explain why the Union's correspondence was refused, and in the light of all the circumstances the inference is clearly warranted that the Respondent's conduct in this respect was in direct furtherance of its goal of frustrating the collective-bargaining aspirations of its employees. When the Respondent refused receipt of the Union's demand its agents, including Farah, had clear and unequivocal knowl- edge of the employees' union activities. Prior to the time the Union's mailgram of June 14 was delivered to the Respon- dent's premises, Daniel Farah had discharged several of the employees in the unit, and by the time the Union's registered letter was received Farah had discharged seven of the nine employees who had signed authorization cards. In the light of the Respondent's knowledge of its employ- ees' union activities and considering its subsequent course of gross discriminatory conduct, I reject the contention that the Union's demand for recognition was defective and legally insufficient to support a bargaining order. Even if on the contrary, however, the record supported a fmding that the Union's demands for recognition of June 14 and 15 were deficient, I would find that the demand was perfected with the filing of the RC petition on June 18. It was stipulated that a copy of the RC petition was received in the Respondent's office on June 21, and I have discredited Daniel Farah's testimony that the petition was not brought to his attention until August 2. Even if I were to credit Farah, the undisputed evidence is that a copy of the petition was furnished to the Respondent's attorney on June 29, at a time when he was concededly the Respon- dent's agent for the purposes of this proceeding. The Respondent argues, nevertheless, that no bargaining order is warranted here because, even if the Union's demand was perfected, all the unfair labor practices were committed before either the demand was made or the RC petition was filed. I find no merit in the Respondent's argument. It is not correct, as the Respondent asserts, that all of the unfair labor practices here were committed prior to the Union's demand for recognition and bargaining. Even if the Respondent's assertion was supported by the record, however, it would not foreclose a bargaining order where there is proof of majority status and the Respondent has engaged in extensive and pervasive unfair labor practices. An employer has the legal right to insist on an election to determine a union's claim of majority status; but as we are taught by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Gissel,3 an employer foregoes that legal right when, in the face of a proven majority claim, it engages in independent unfair labor practices which make the holding of a fair election unlikely. It is not material to the appropriateness of a bargaining order that the unfair labor practices postdate the union's demand for recognition or the filing of a petition. The essential rationale of the Gissel rule is that a bargaining order is required where the Board's traditional remedies are insufficient to remedy the employer's unfair labor practices. The test is the extent and seriousness of the unfair labor practices, and not the timing in relation to the union's demand or the filing of a petition for election. This, moreover, is the test applied by the Board in Trading Port,4 where the Board ordered a bargaining remedy retroactive in application, even though the employer's unfair labor practices were initiated prior to the union demand for recognition or the filing of a representation petition. I find accordingly, that the Union made a valid demand for recognition, and in the light of the Respondent's unfair labor practices found below, a bargaining order is required. 3 N LR B v. Gissel Packing Co, Inc, 395 U.S 575 (1969). 4 Trading Port, Inc., 219 NLRB 298, 301(1975) 988 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD VI. THE DISCHARGES AND ATTENDANT 8(A)(1) CONDUCT Max Behrendt was employed by the Respondent in March 1976 and worked as a meatcutter until the date of his discharge on June 14. Behrendt was a participant in some of the conversation among employees concerning union representation, and he made the initial contact with Business Agent Bobrowicz. Behrendt obtained some pam- phlets from Bobrowicz, which he passed out to his fellow employees during the next few days, generally using break periods for this purpose. Toward the end of the day on June 9, Behrendt met and talked with Brad Mueller, the Respondent's foreman in its retail outlet. Behrendt told Mueller that the employees were going to hold a meeting after work and invited Mueller to attend . Mueller testified in this proceeding and acknowledged that , on June 7 or 9, he was asked by Behrendt to attend a union meeting, or some kind of a meeting at the office of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters. On the evening of June 14, Behrendt was informed by his mother that he had been called by Daniel Farah. Behrendt returned the call and was asked by Farah, "What's this about a union?" Farah added that he had heard that Behrendt was passing out literature , and instructed Beh- rendt to meet him at the plant at 7 p.m. Behrendt proceeded to the plant, but found a note that Farah would be back at 7:30 . Behrendt left to get a sandwich, met Wayne Hultman, and the two returned to the plant to meet with Farah. Present at the meeting were Farah, Warner, Mueller, and Richard Janus, all of whom are acknowledged supervisors and agents of the Respon- dent. When Behrendt and Hultman entered the meeting Farah stated that he assumed they knew why they were present, and Behrendt replied that he had a pretty good idea. Farah then embarked on a long tirade, telling the employees that the Union was the kind of a thing that would break a new business, and accusing the employees of taking food out of his mouth and other people at the plant . Farah said he had no choice, and that he couldn't afford to pay $6 or $7 an hour. Behrendt explained that the employees weren't looking for an arm and a leg, but that their take-home pay was not adequate to support married couples. Farah asked why the employees hadn't contacted him if they had problems, but Behrendt made no reply. Speaking directly to Behrendt, Farah told him that he of all the employees had the most to gain , that the smokehouse was intended as Behrendt's department, and that the Company had been pleased with Behrendt's production. Behrendt stated that Farah could still beat the union matter, and in response to Farah's inquiry explained that, if Farah would get together with the employees and make them an offer, the employees would probably vote against the Union in an election. There is no indication in the record that Farah replied, but Warner interjected that the Company could not let the matter come to an election, "We'll fire all of you first" Warner added that, once the Union got its foot in the door it was already too late, and spoke of some other employer who had suffered a nervous breakdown because of a union. At this juncture Warner asked if Behrendt had signed a card, and also asked who else had signed cards. Behrendt replied that he wasn't sure, but thought that all of the employees had done so. Warner countered that he knew that it was 100 percent, knew that Behrendt had passed out the literature, and there was nothing more to be said. Warner told the employees that they were no longer in the employment of Meat Processors. Hultman asked the reason for his discharge, indicating that he believed it was for union activities . Warner retorted that Hultman should not put words in his mouth, and stated that Hultman was discharged for lack of production. Hultman suggested that since the employees were dis- charged they might as well leave, and he proceeded out the door. Farah called Behrendt back and stated that he would guarantee the employees' reinstatement to their jobs if they would get the employees to tear up their union cards, or somehow get out of the Union . Behrendt called Hultman back in to hear Farah's offer and Farah repeated, "You have my word that I'll reinstate both of you if you can get these people out of the Union, change their minds." Behrendt replied to Farah's offer with the statement that he was in the minority, that he would have to talk to the other employees, and that it would be up to them. Behrendt also asked what guarantee there was that they would be hired back; Farah replied that the employees had his word, but refused Behrendt's suggestion to put the offer in writing. Behrendt also asked about the other employees; Farah equivocated, but finally stated that he had made an offer to Behrendt and Hultman, "And, that's it " The employees were provided with a list of the names and telephone numbers of the other employees and left the Respondent's premises. Later in the evening Behrendt and Hultman called the other employees and related Farah's offer, including his statement that there was no guarantee that the other employees would be reinstated to their jobs. The employees had a meeting on the following morning, and apparently decided not to revoke their union authorizations. On June 16 the charge in this matter was filed. Wayne Hultman was employed by the Respondent from February to June 14. Hultman's primary duties entailed the operation of the meat grinder, but he also performed cutting duties and worked in the retail outlet. Hultman participated in some of the early discussions with Behrendt and other employees about union representation, he attended the union meeting on June 9, and he executed an authorization card while at the meeting. Hultman testified that, prior to the meeting with Farah on the evening of June 14, he had received a call from another employee with the message that Farah and Warner knew about the Union. On the whole, Hultman's testimony concerning the events of the meeting with Farah and other agents of the Respondent accords in most essential details with the testimony adduced through Behrendt. Hultman did add that Division Manager Richard Janus asked the employees why they wanted a union, and there was some conversation about the Armour plant. According to Hult- man, Farah wrote his name and that of Max Behrendt on a piece of paper and informed the employees that as of 5 minutes of 8 the two were no longer employed by Meat Processors of Green Bay. Hultman confirmed that he asked for the reason for his discharge, suggesting that both MEAT PROCESSORS OF GREEN BAY 989 employees were discharged for union activities, and that it was Farah who replied, "Don't put words in my mouth, I'm firing you for lack of production. According to Hultman's testimony it was Robert Warner who produced the list of names and telephone numbers, after Farah had offered to reinstate Behrendt and Hultman if they succeeded in obtaining the other employees ' assent to abandon the Union. Hultman called some of the other employees and related the contents of the meeting with Farah and his offer concerning revocation of the authoriza- tion cards. The Respondent's avowed reason for the discharge of Behrendt and Hultman, like its explanations for the discharges of five other employees , is a mixture of fact and phantasy, with strong emphasis on the latter . Farah testified that Behrendt was discharged for poor workmanship, but immediately substituted the explanation that Behrendt had been hired to operate the smokehouse, but since plans for the smokehouse had not materialized , Behrendt was terminated. Next, Farah testified that Behrendt operated the Cry-O-Vac machine, and that some of the meat had soured. When the General Counsel sought clarification as to those aspects of poor workmanship which prompted Behrendt's termination, Farah slipped back to his plea that Behrendt had been hired for the smokehouse , which never became operational. In addition, according to Farah, Behrendt did a bad job of cutting up chickens , and spoiled a batch of prime ribs by failing to properly operate the Cry- O-Vac machine. The latter incident, as Farah testified, occurred sometime during the first week in June, but his testimony as to whether he discussed the problem with Behrendt can only be described as evasive and equivocal. Warner also testified concerning the reasons prompting Behrendt's discharge, and acknowledged that Behrendt did operate the Cry-O-Vac machine. Warner had received complaints from customers , but when questioned specifi- cally, Warner was unable to state whether it was the operator or the machine which caused the problems. Behrendt also acknowledged that he operated the Cry-O- Vac machine, admitted there were problems with the machine, but denied that he was the recipient of any complaint from the Respondent about any batch of spoiled prime ribs. According to Behrendt, the only reason he was given for his discharge was Farah's explanation of lack of production. As a witness called by the General Counsel, Farah testified that Hultman was discharged for poor workman- ship. With more detail, Farah explained that Hultman had improperly cut some pork steak for a hospital customer, and the hospital complained. Questioned about when the incident happened, Farah stated that it happened on the Tuesday prior to Hultman's discharge . Immediately after, Farah testified that the incident occurred 1 to 2 weeks prior to the discharge, during the first part of June. According to Farah he talked to Hultman about the mistake on Tuesday, but also talked to him concerning the same matter on one or two other occasions. Farah was questioned about other problems with Hultman 's work and replied, variously, that he didn't know; that Hultman didn't have his mind on his work ; that he could not recall any other problems; and that on one occasion Hultman had caused the spoilage of some meat by failing to rotate the stock . According to Farah, he discovered the latter example on the afternoon of June 14. Warner's testimony concerning the reasons for Hult- man's discharge is no more enlightening than that proffered by Farah. It is Warner's version that on June 14 or 15 he discovered four boxes of meat which had been removed from the freezer 4 days before, 70 percent of which was spoiled. Warner was asked if he had investigated the matter, and without any explanation answered that Hult- man had pulled the meat out of the freezer . Oddly enough, Warner conducted his investigation into June 15, after he allegedly determined that Hultman was responsible and Hultman had been discharged. Warner was not questioned about the reason given Hultman at the discharge interview, and Farah's testimony is similarly silent on the issue. Accordingly, I credit Hultman's testimony that the reason given by Farah and Warner was poor production, and I similarly credit his denial that he was not responsible for the spoilage ofany meat removed from the cooler. In assessing the diverse reasons asserted by Farah and Warner for the discharges of Behrendt and Hultman, I am least impressed with the multiplicity and variety of the misconduct relied on, and the extent of time which elapsed between the alleged misconduct and, the termination. Similarly lacking is credible evidence that the employees' derelictions were considered of sufficient importance to prompt warnings or instructions to the employees and the evidence that both were told that they were terminated for lack of production. Farah and Warner were not convincing witnesses, and Farah in particular was evasive, equivocal, and unbelievable. The assessment of the discharges of Behrendt and Hultman, like the discharges of five other employees, must also be made in the context of the Respondent's knowledge of their union activities, the timing of the discharges in relation to the Respondent's discovery of their activities, and the contents of the discharge interviews. Upon the whole of the record I find that the Respondent 's agents had knowledge of the employees' union activities no later than June 9, when Behrendt solicited Mueller to attend a union meeting. Farah testified, however, that he was unaware of any union activities until about 4:30 p.m. on June 14, less than 4 hours before Behrendt and Hultman were dis- charged. For the purposes of this Decision I accept Farah's testimony in this respect as it exemplifies that fmding that the discharges were peremptory retaliations against the Union's organizing campaign which the Respondent sought to mask with hasty and ill-contrived assertions of termina- tions for cause. Farah testified that he returned to the plant about 4:30 p.m. on June 14, and shortly thereafter Mueller informed him that he was having problems with employee Jo-Ann Koehler in the retail outlet. Farah told Mueller that he was responsible for the retail outlet, and told Mueller to fire Koehler, or lay her off. In Farah's presence Mueller made the call. At this juncture, according to Farah, Mueller informed him about the employees' union activities. Al- though Farah testified that all of the discharges had been previously planned, he called Max Behrendt at his home, concededly for the purpose of finding out what the union matter was all about. On the basis of testimony reviewed 990 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD below, I find that, immediately following Mueller's call to Koehler, Farah laid his plans to discharge all of the employees who were identified as participants in the organizing effort. Jerome Hujet testified that on June 10 he was approached by employee Jo-Ann Koehler and asked if he wanted to sign a union card. Hujet did sign the card. At a later time that day, and/or the next day, Brad Mueller asked Hujet how he felt about the Union, and if he had signed a card. Hujet replied in the affirmative. At a subsequent conversa- tion during the period from June 10 to June 12, Mueller again approached Hulet on the subject of the Union, and informed Hujet that he was against the Union, and that he had previously lost a job because of a union. In his testimony in this proceeding Mueller was not questioned and did not deny Hujet's version of the conversations concerning the Union. Mueller's questioning of Hujet about his feeling on the Union and whether he had signed a union card is a clear and explicit interrogation prohibited by Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The second conversation, however, was not alleged as a violation of the Act, and no finding is required. Late in the afternoon of June 14, Mueller approached Hujet for the third time about the Union to inform him that Farah was aware the Union was trying to get in. This conversation took place in the breakroom, and shortly after Mueller had talked to him Hujet overheard a conversation between Warner, Janus, and Mueller. While the three supervisors were talking about the Union trying to get in, Farah entered the room and told the supervisors that he thought he had a plan to beat the Union. Hujet had a day off on July 15, but in the evening he received a call that he had been fired. Hujet attended the plant on the following morning and asked Mueller if he was still employed. Mueller explained that, after Behrendt and Hultman left the plant on the evening of June 14, Farah changed his mind and agreed to retain Hujet. Hujet was not alleged as a discriminatee, and I make no finding with respect to his discharge. Jo-Ann Koehler was employed by the Respondent on March 4 and continued to work until her discharge on June 14. Koehler was employed in the retail outlet, but occasion- ally worked in the wholesale portion of the plant. Prior to June 9 Koehler engaged in some conversations with Max Behrendt about organizing a union , she attended the union meeting on June 9 and signed an authorization card. Koehler also obtained two extra cards, and on June 10 she solicited the signatures of Rhonda Watruba and Jerome Hujet. About lunch time on June 10, in the presence of Hujet and Watruba, Koehler inquired of Mueller if Max Behrendt had asked him to sign a union card. Mueller replied that Behrendt had made the request and added, "Do you know they can just lay you off and that's what they'll probably do." About 8:30 p.m. of June 14 Koehler received a call from Mueller, who informed her that there had been a meeting at the plant, that the discussion had included reference to dissatisfaction with Koehler's work, and that Mueller was going to lay her off. Koehler testified, and I credit her testimony that she had not previously been criticized or warned about her work, but on the contrary had been complimented by Farah on her maturity and the good job she was doing. Farah testified that Koehler was discharged on June 14 by Brad Mueller because of the latter's complaint that Koehler had left work early. Farah was unable to state whether Koehler had ever been warned about her work performance. Mueller was not questioned on the issue of whether Koehler had been the recipient of prior warnings or threats of discipline or discharge, but he recited a plethora of complaints about Koehler's work, her attitude, and the neglect of her assigned duties. Koehler was employed by the Respondent from March to mid-June, and her alleged incompetence, neglect, and poor attitude were of no concern to Mueller or Farah until it was ascertained that she favored union representation. While Farah con- tends he knew nothing about the Union until after Mueller had fired Koehler, there is little if any reason to credit his testimony in this respect. Even if credited, however, Farah's lack of knowledge would not foreclose a finding that Koehler's discharge was motivated by discriminatory reasons. Mueller was fully aware of Koehler's union sympathies and activities, and on June 10 he had threat- ened Koehler and two other employees that they would be laid off if they signed union cards. Mueller's discharge of Koehler on the evening of June 14 was only the final consummation of his previously expressed threat, and the finding is the more supported by the evidence that the other two recipients of Mueller's threat, Watruba and Hujet, were also terminated. The Respondent's animus toward Koehler is further exemplified by the testimony of employee James Greene. Greene attended the union meeting on June 9, but was on vacation from June 14 to June 20. On June 28 Greene encountered Brad Mueller in the breakroom , and in the presence of several other employees Mueller told Greene that, if the Union ever succeeded in putting Koehler back to work, she would not last a week. I find, upon all of the relevant evidence in the record, that Jo-Ann Koehler was terminated from her employment in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. As to the threat to Koehler and other employees on June 10, Mueller acknowl- edged that he talked to Koehler about the Union on that date, but he made no pretense to refute Koehler's version that he threatened that employees who signed union cards would be laid off. Neither did Mueller's testimony contain any refutation of Mueller's statement to Greene of the prospects if Koehler managed to obtain reinstatement. I find that both of Mueller's threats violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Rhonda Watruba, like Jo-Ann Koehler, was employed in the Respondent's retail outlet and worked from May to June 15. Watruba did not attend the union meeting on June 9, but on June 10 she signed an authorization card at the suggestion of Jo-Ann Koehler. On the afternoon of June 14 Watruba approached Warner to find out where to locate an item desired by a customer. Warner answered Watruba's inquiry, and then asked her, "What's this about a union?" Watruba replied that she didn't know, and told Warner that she had to return to the customer. Between 4:30 and 4:45 p.m. on June 14, Watruba was questioned by Farah about the Union. In the presence of MEAT PROCESSORS OF GREEN BAY his supervisors, Farah asked Watruba if she knew anything about a union. Watruba refused to say anything. On the following morning at 7:45 Mueller informed Watruba that there had been a meeting the night before between Farah and some of his supervisors and they had decided to let some people go. Watruba asked what Mueller meant and he replied that he had to fire some people, including Koehler and Watruba, and that Watruba was laid off indefinitely. In response to Watruba's inquiry, Mueller stated that they were dissatisfied with her work, but refused to provide any details. Watruba's termination was explained to her as a layoff, and there is other evidence in the record bearing on this subject. As a witness for the General Counsel Farah explained that he instructed Mueller on the morning of June 15 to inform Watruba that she was laid off. Farah explained that he had made the decision on the previous day because he had too many employees. Farah also admitted, however, that within a week after Watruba's discharge he hired two new employees for the retail shop, and also put his wife to work. Robert Warner's testimony concerning the reasons for Watruba's termination do not equate with those proffered by Farah. According to Warner, Watruba was a good worker, but young and inexperienced and unable to handle customers. Warner was sufficiently inexplicit concerning Watruba's shortcomings as an employee, and there is no more reason to credit his assertions of termination for cause, than there is to credit Farah's version that Watruba was laid off because of a surplus of help. Watruba signed a union card on June 10, and on June 14 she was the object of two interrogations about the Union, and in both instances she refused to provide any information. Although there is no direct evidence of the Respondent's knowledge of Watruba's activities, the interrogations suggest that she was a prime suspect as a union sympathizer. Moreover, at the meeting on the evening of July 14, Warner told Behrendt and Hultman that he knew the Union had signed up 100 percent of the employees, and there is nothing in the record to refute his claim. With knowledge established, and considering the timing of Watruba's discharge and the shifting, conflicting, and pretextual reasons advanced by the Respondent as a defense, it is clear and I find that the discharge was discriminatorily motivated and violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. I similarly find that the interrogations of Watruba violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Jeffrey LeAnna was first employed by the Respondent in February as a meatcutter, and worked until his discharge on June 14. LeAnna engaged in some of the initial conversations with Max Behrendt about a union, attended the union meeting on June 9, and signed an authorization card. At or about 9 p.m. on June 15 LeAnna received a call from Farah. LeAnna had already received a call from Wayne Hultman, and informed Farah that his call had been expected. Farah asked LeAnna why he had signed a union card and told the employee that he could not afford a union, because the Union would break his neck. Farah counseled that he knew that 100 percent of the employees had signed union cards, and that he would have to get a whole new crew. Farah completed the conversation with 991 notice to LeAnna, "Of course, you realize I had to hire your replacement tonight and your job is terminated." As a witness for the General Counsel Farah admitted that he discharged LeAnna on June 14, for the asserted reason that LeAnna had obtained his real estate broker' s license and intended to leave the Respondent's employ. According to Farah he made up his mind to fire LeAnna at 7 p.m. on June 14, and called LeAnna at his home. However, neither as a witness for the General Counsel nor as a witness on his own behalf did Farah attempt to rebut, refute, or explain LeAnna's version of what Farah said in the telephone conversation on the evening of June 14. Farah had already informed Behrendt and Hultman that the whole crew was fired because of the Union, and I credit LeAnna's testimo- ny that Farah explained his termination in the same terms. LeAnna's discharge violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, and his interrogation by Farah of the reasons why he had signed a union card violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. In addition, I fmd that Farah's notice to LeAnna that he knew the Union had signed up 100 percent of the employees created the impression that the employees' union activities were under surveillance, and constituted a further violation of Section 8(axl). Further, Farah engendered an additional violation of Section 8(axl) by telling LeAnna that he had replaced his whole crew of employees because of their support of the Union. William Vallier was employed by the Respondent as a driver over the period from March to June 14. Vallier was informed of the union meeting by Max Behrendt, he was present during the latter part of the meeting, and did sign a union authorization card. Shortly after 5 p.m. on June 14, Vallier was approached by Farah, who asked if he knew anything about a union. Vallier replied that he had heard about the Union, but didn't know much about it. Farah then asked if Vallier had signed a union card, and Vallier replied in the affirmative. Farah continued the conversation by stating that if the employees brought a union in it would break his back and they would be taking food from the tables of employees, and his table. Farah counseled, "It would be a smart idea for you to get in contact with Max- your buddies, Max and Wayne, and tell them to forget about the whole thing." Farah closed the conversation with the statement, "If you do happen to get a union in here, I'll probably have to lay some of you off, because I won't be able to pay the wages that the Union will be asking from me." Shortly before noon on June 15, while at the union hall, Vallier called Richard Janus at the plant and asked what was going on. Janus asked what was meant and Vallier asked if he still had a job. After a short hesitation Janus replied, "No." It is the Respondent's defense that Vallier was discharged for losing some sausage off a delivery truck, and subse- quently refusing to pay for the loss. Farah testified that he had made the decision to terminate Vallier 2 weeks before the actual date of discharge, after he talked to Vallier and Vallier refused to make good the loss of the sausage. Farah further testified that he told Warner of his decision. There is no mention in Warner's testimony of instructions to discharge Vallier and, although Janus informed Vallier of the termination, Janus did not testify. 992 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Vallier admitted that he did lose a package of sausage off the truck, and testified that the accident occurred a month or more before his discharge. In the absence of any specificity from Farah, I accept Vallier's testimony as the most reliable evidence of when the sausage was lost. Vallier also conceded that Farah had complained to him about the loss of the sausage on three occasions, and demanded that he pay for the loss. The last of these conversations took place 2 or 3 weeks before Janus informed Vallier that he was no longer employed. It is axiomatic that in the absence of a discriminatory motive an employer may discharge an employee for good cause, bad cause, or no cause at all. The discharge of Vallier for an accidental loss which Farah estimated at $12 to $16, and Vallier estimated at $13.60, equates with a termination for no cause at all, and must be viewed in the totality of the circumstances in which it occurred. Vallier credibly testi- fied to his interrogation by Farah on the evening of June 14, and his admission that he had signed a union card. In the same conversation Farah threatened that he would proba- bly have to lay off some of the employees if they persisted in their drive for union representation. Farah was not ques- tioned at all about the June 14 conversation with Vallier, and Vallier's testimony is unrebutted. Considered in conjunction with the timing of the discharge , the mass nature of the terminations, the pretextual nature of the reason asserted, and the complete lack ofnotice and reason to Vallier, I reject the Respondent's defense of a termina- tion for cause as a subterfuge. Vallier was threatened with termination because of his union activities and, as in the case of several other of Respondent's employees, the actual discharge was an immediate confirmation of the threat. By discharging Vallier, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. By interrogating Vallier as to whether he had signed a union card, and by threatening the termination of employees, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. In addition I find that Farah's order to Vallier to convince Behrendt and Hultman to desist from their union activities, when coupled with his simultaneous threat of layoffs, also violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The record reflects that employee John Hoenig attended the June 9 union meeting and signed an authorization card. Hoenig did not testify in this proceeding, but the record reflects that he was employed as a delivery man. According to Farah, Hoenig had an accident and the insurance company revoked his driver's license. Farah did not explain how an insurance company accomplished this objective, but conceded that he discharged Hoenig between June 14 and 16. According to Farah, he made the decision to terminate Hoenig a week to 10 days before the actual termination, and told Janus to release him. As to the alleged accident and Hoenig's loss of his driver's license, Farah was unable to recall when the incidents occurred. A finding of discrimination necessitates proof that the employer knew of the employee's union activities. Hoenig attended the June 9 union meeting and signed an authoriza- tion card. On the unrebutted evidence that both Farah and Warner claimed knowledge that 100 percent of the employ- ees had signed union cards, there is proof that the Respondent knew of Hoenig's union activities. The proof of knowledge is further substantiated by the evidence that Hoenig's name is contained on the list given to Behrendt and Hultman on the evening of June 14, with instructions from Farah that Hoenig and all the others be persuaded to give up their union activities. A finding of discrimination also necessitates proof of animus, and there is a plentitude in this case . Farah, assisted by his minions, interrogated employees and threat- ened them with discharge or layoff. In addition to these expressions of animus expressed to employees in individual confrontations, there is the evidence that Farah told Behrendt and Hultman on the evening of June 14 that all of his employees were discharged because of their union activities. Furthermore, as to the asserted discharge of Hoenig for cause, the record contains small support of the Respondent's contention. According to Farah, he deter- mined to discharge Hoenig a week or 10 days prior to the actual termination. There is no evidence of when Hoenig suffered the alleged loss of his driver's license, but obvious- ly it occurred prior to the date Farah made the decision to terminate him. If Hoenig could not perform his duties for lack of a driver's license, it is incredible that Farah would have maintained Hoenig on the payroll for a week or more. The assertion is the more incredible in the light of the evidence that other employees were notified of their terminations immediately after Farah had made his deci- sion, even to the extent they were notified after regular working hours. Upon all of the relevant evidence, I find that Hoenig's discharge is indistinguishable from the other cases of discrimination found above. The General Counsel has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Hoenig's discharge was motivated and consummated for reasons prohibited by the Act, and the lack of Hoenig's testimony in his own support does not detract from the measure of adequate proof.5 There remains for consideration in this Decision certain additional allegations arising from the meeting between the Respondent's agents and employees Behrendt and Hult- man on the evening of June 14. It is clear from Farah's testimony that he called Behrendt's home and summoned him to the meeting because of his awareness of the union activities and his desire to find out what was going on. According to the testimony of Behrendt, Farah asked him during the telephone conversation, "What's this about a union," and informed Behrendt that Farah knew he was passing out literature. Farah testified to his telephone conversation with Behrendt, but he neither directly or tacitly denied Behrendt's version of the conversation. I find that the interrogation violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. In the context of the unlawful interrogation, Farah's acknowl- edgment that he knew Behrendt was passing out union literature had the tendency to leave Behrendt with the impression of surveillance, which I find to constitute an additional violation of Section 8(a)(1). I have carefully reviewed the testimony of Farah and Mueller as it pertains to the meeting on the evening of June 146 and, where their testimony conflicts in any respect from 5 Riley Stoker Corporation, 223 NLRB 1146, 1147 (1976) 6 Robert Warner did not testify with respect to the meeting. MEAT PROCESSORS OF GREEN BAY 993 the testimony of Behrendt and Hultman, I credit the employees . I particularly reject Farah's testimony that he had previously planned to discharge or lay off all of the seven employees who were terminated. I also reject Farah's testimony that after his telephone conversation with Max Behrendt he considered canceling the terminations, but was dissuaded by Warner's advice. In addition, I discredit the testimony of Farah, as well as that of Mueller, that it was Behrendt's suggestion that the employees be contacted individually to persuade them to abandon the Union. Even if, arguendo, it was Behrendt's idea, the conduct would be no less a violation of the Act, particularly when the quid pro quo was reinstatement of Behrendt and Hultman, an offer which Farah conceded he made. The assertion that the idea of contacting the employees was initiated by Behrendt is the more doubtful in the face of other relevant evidence . There is uncontroverted evidence that, a short time before the meeting with Behrendt and Hultman, Farah announced to his supervisory staff that he thought he had a plan by which he would beat the Union. There is the additional evidence pertaining to the list of names and addresses of employees given to Behrendt and Hultman. Farah's testimony is that he didn't give the list to the employees and was not sure how they obtained it. Farah also testified, however, that he saw the list on Warner's desk, and Warner brought the list into the meeting. It is clear from the record that Farah and Warner met separate- ly after Behrendt and Hultman arrived for the meeting, and on the clear preponderance of the credited evidence I fmd that Warner prepared the list to permit Behrendt and Hultman to persuade the other employees to abandon the Union, with a promise of reinstatement if they were successful. In summary of the meeting on the evening of June 14, I find that Warner's threat to fire all of the employees before the Respondent would submit to a union election violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Warner asked Behrendt if he had signed a union card, and also asked who else had signed cards. Both interrogations violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Warner's comment that he knew 100 percent of the employees had signed union cards, coupled with his acknowledgment that he knew Behrendt had passed out union literature, was a clear message that the employees' union activities had been kept under surveillance, and the conduct violated Section 8(a)(1). The notice to Behrendt and Hultman that they were discharged violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act and, in the context of which the announcement was made, the Respondent engaged in a further independent violation of Section 8(a)(1). Finally, by predicating the future employment of Behrendt and Hult- man on their agreement to persuade other employees to abandon their support of the Union, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom, and take certain affirmative actions to effectuate the purposes of the Act. Having found that the Respondent discharged seven of its employees in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, I shall order that the Respondent offer immediate and full reinstatement to Max Behrendt, Wayne Hultman, Jeffrey LeAnna, Rhonda Watruba, Jo-Ann Koehler, William Vallier, and John Hoenig, together with all seniority, rights, and privileges they previously enjoyed, discharging, if necessary, any employees hired on or after June 14, 1976, and if the former jobs of said employees are no longer available, the Respondent shall offer them immediate and full reinstatement to substantially equivalent positions. I shall also recommend that the Respondent be ordered to make whole each of the employees named above by payment to each of them of the amount of money he or she would have earned from the date of the discharge to the date of the Respondent's valid offer of reinstatement. Said backpay shall be computed in the manner proscribed by the Board in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and shall bear interest according to the manner prescribed in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962). The General Counsel contends that it is appropriate in this case to order the Respondent to bargain with the Union as the duly designated collective-bargaining agent of the employees in the unit found appropriate. In the light of the findings that the Respondent has engaged in extensive and pervasive unfair labor practices , including the discriminato- ry discharges of 7 of 10 employees in the bargaining unit, I fmd that the requested remedy is in all respects appropriate. It is clear that the Respondent's multiple unfair labor practices cannot be remedied by the Board's traditional cease-and-desist order, the Union represented the employ- ees in the bargaining unit at all times material , and all of the elements required under the Gissel doctrine, supra, are fully satisfied. Such bargaining remedy shall be fashioned in accordance with the Board's decision in Steel-Fab, Inc., 212 NLRB 363 (1974), and shall have retroactive application to the date of the Union's demand for recognition, which I find to be June 15, 1976, in accordance with the dictates of the Board expressed in Trading Port, Inc., 219 NLRB 298 (1975). Further, in the light of the Respondent's extensive and aggravated unfair labor practices, and particularly in the light of the findings of mass discharges in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, I shall recommend that the Respondent cease and desist in any other manner from interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Respondent, Farah Supermarkets, d/b/a Meat Processors of Green Bay, is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act, and is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union, Local 248 Meat & Allied Food Workers, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. At all times material to this case the following described unit has been a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining with respect to wages, rates of pay, 994 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment: All employees of the Respondent at its facility at 2210 Don Hutson Road, Green Bay, Wisconsin, excluding office clerical employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. 4. Since June 9, 1976, the Union has been, and continues to be, the sole and exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the employees in the bargaining unit described in paragraph 3 above, for the purposes of collective bargaining with the Respondent with respect to wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment. 5. Beginning on June 15, 1976, and continuing thereaf- ter, the Union has demanded that the Respondent bargain collectively with it as the sole and exclusive collective- bargaining agent for the employees in the unit described in paragraph 3 above. 6. At all times since June 15, 1976, the Respondent has refused, and continues to refuse, to bargain with the Union, and has engaged in a course of unlawful conduct designed to undermine the Union's majority status and prevent the conduct of a fair representation election. 7. By the following acts and conduct the Respondent has engaged in violations of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act: (a) Interrogating its employees concerning their union sympathies, interests, and activities. (b) Interrogating its employees concerning the union sympathies, interests, and activities of their fellow employ- ees. (c) Threatening its employees with layoff, discharge, or other discrimination affecting the tenure of their employ- ment because of their union sympathies, interests, or activities. (d) Creating in its employees the impression that their union activities are under surveillance by the Respondent. (e) Informing its employees that they and their fellow employees have been discharged because of their union sympathies, interests, or activities. (f) Soliciting employees to persuade their fellow employ- ees to abandon their allegiance to the Union. (g) Conditioning the future employment of its employees on their willingness to persuade their fellow employees to abandon their allegiance to the Union. (h) Threatening its employees that other employees who might be reinstated would again be discharged because of their union sympathies, interests, and activities. (i) Threatening its employees that it would discharge all of its employees rather than submit to a representation election. 8. By discharging Max Behrendt, Wayne Hultman, Jeffrey LeAnna, Rhonda Watruba, Jo-Ann Koehler, Wil- liam Vallier, and John Hoenig because of their union sympathies, activities, and interests, the Respondent violat- ed Section 8(aX3) and (1) of the Act. 9. In the light of the Board's decisions in Steel-Fab, Inc., supra, and Trading Port, Inc., supra I find it unnecessary to r In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 decide whether the Respondent violated Section 8(aX5) of the Act by refusing to recognize and bargain with the Union on and after June 15, 1976. 10. The unfair labor practices found in paragraphs 7 and 8 above are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact , conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in this proceeding, and pursuant to the provisions of Section 10(c) of the Act , I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER? The Respondent, Farah Supermarkets, d/b/a Meat Processors of Green Bay, Green Bay, Wisconsin, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discharging, laying off, or otherwise terminating the employment of its employees because of their union sympathies, interests, and activities. (b) Interrogating its employees concerning their union sympathies, interests, and activities. (c) Interrogating its employees concerning the union sympathies, interests, and activities of their fellow employ- ees. (d) Threatening its employees with layoff ', discharge, or other discrimination affecting the tenure of their employ- ment because of their union sympathies, interests, and activities. (e) Creating the impression that the union activities of its employees are under surveillance. (f) Informing its employees that they and their fellow employees have been discharged because of their union sympathies, interests, and activities. (g) Soliciting its employees to persuade their fellow employees to abandon their allegiance to the Union. (h) Conditioning the future employment of its employees on their willingness to persuade their fellow employees to abandon their allegiance to the Union. (i) Threatening its employees that other employees who might be reinstated would again be discharged because of their union sympathies, interests, and activities. (j) Threatening its employees that it will discharge all of its employees rather than submit to a representation election. (k) In any other manner, interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaran- teed them by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. 2. Take the following affirmative actions to remedy the unfair labor practices and to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer to the employees named below immediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those jobs are no longer available, offer them reinstatement in substantial- ly equivalent positions, together with all seniority and other rights and privileges previously enjoyed, discharging if necessary any employees hired on or after June 14, 1976, and make said employees whole for any loss of earnings of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. MEAT PROCESSORS OF GREEN BAY 995 they may have sustained by reason of the discrimination against them, said backpay to be computed and to bear interest as prescribed in the Remedy section hereof: Max Behrendt Jo-Ann Koehler Wayne Hultman William Vallier Jeffrey LeAnna John Hoenig Rhonda Watruba (b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records and reports necessary to analyze and compute the amounts of backpay due under the terms of this recommended Order. (c) Upon request, recognize and bargain with Local 248 Meat & Allied Food Workers, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO, with respect to wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment. The unit appropriate for bargaining is: All employees of Farah Supermarkets, Inc. d/b/a Meat Processors of Green Bay at its facility located at 2210 Don Hutson Road, Green Bay, Wisconsin, excluding office clerical employees and supervisors as defined in the Act. (d) Post at its facility at Green Bay, Wisconsin, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."s Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 30, after being duly signed by the Respondent's representative, shall as posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted, and shall be maintained by the Respondent for 60 consecutive days thereafter. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 30, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps have been taken to comply herewith. 8 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board."