Atlanta Printing Specialties

ATLANTA PRINTING SPECIALTIES Atlanta Printing Specialties and Paper Products Union Local 527, AFL-CIO (The Mead Corpora- tion) and Jerry Fred Fennel. Cases 10-CB-2312 and 10-CB-2323 December 4, 1974 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND PENELLO On June 21, 1974, Administrative Law Judge Ben- jamin K. Blackburn issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep- tions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclu- sions of the Administrative Law Judge, as expanded herein, and to adopt his recommended Order. The pertinent facts, as established by the stipulation of the parties and the findings of the Administrative Law Judge, are as follows: The parties' collective-bar- gaining agreement, which was scheduled to expire on November 1, 1973, allowed each employee to execute a form authorizing payroll checkoff of his union mem- bership dues. Each form essentially embodied the re- quirements of Section 302(c)(4) that the authorization not be irrevocable for a period of more than 1 year, or beyond the termination date of the "applicable collec- tive-bargaining agreement," whichever occurred sooner; and each form guaranteed a 15-day escape period immediately preceding the anniversary date of the authorization's execution, and a 15-day escape period immediately preceding the termination date of the "applicable collective-bargaining agreement." On October 13, 1973, a new collective-bargaining agree- ment was consummated, effective from October 15, 1973, to February 15, 1975. Between October 17 and November 1, 1973, a number of employees gave notice of revocation of their checkoff authorizations. Re- spondent caused the Employer to dishonor many of these notices as untimely.' It contended, as it now contends in this proceeding, that the "applicable collec- tive-bargaining agreement" was the new one rather than the old one, and the 15-day escape period immedi- ately preceding the termination date of the applicable I The Respondent caused the Employer to honor other notices which were timely filed within the 15-day escape period immediately preceding the anniversary dates of certain employees' execution of their checkoff authorizations 237 collective-bargaining agreement was therefore from January 31 , 1975, to February 15, 1975, rather than from October 17, 1973, to November 1, 1973. It argues that hence its actions were proper under the statute, and excepts to the Administrative Law Judge's finding that it violated Section 8 (b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act. We disagree with the Respondent 's contention, and affirm the finding of the Administrative Law Judge. As we read the Act, Section 302(c)(4) guarantees an em- ployee two distinct rights when he executes a checkoff authorization under a collective-bargaining agreement: (1) a chance at least once a year to revoke his authoriza- tion, and (2) a chance upon the termination of the collective-bargaining agreement to revoke his authori- zation. The Respondent's interpretation of the statu- tory phrase "applicable collective-bargaining agree- ment," however, would enable it to negate the second right forever by the simple strategy of always negotiat- ing a new agreement prior to the contractually created escape period, which here began 15 days before the termination date. In our view, the most reasonable identification of the "applicable" contract is the one that had not yet expired when the new agreement was executed and prematurely put into effect. We do not believe that Congress, in enacting Section 302(c)(4), intended that the second of the two district employee rights guaranteed thereby could be negated by the device of such a premature contract renewal. If we were to sanction the effectiveness of such a prema- ture contract renewal, we would permit the parties to entirely eliminate the statutorily guaranteed escape period.2 It is true, as the Respondent contends, that the par- ties are free to change the termination date or other pertinent provisions of their agreement. But this does 2 The present case is distinguishable from American Smelting and Refin- ing Company (Mission Unit), 200 NLRB 1004 (1972), precisely because of this The checkoff authorization forms involved in American Smelting stated, "This authorization shall be effective and cannot be cancelled for a period of one (1) year from the date appearing above or until the termination date of the current collective -bargaining agreement which- ever occurs sooner," and added, "I hereby voluntarily authorize you to continue the above authorization in effect after the expiration of the shorter of the periods above specified, for further successive periods of one (1) year from such date " In that case, after the old agreement expired and a new one was executed, a number of employees fil'd revocation notices within an annual 15-day escape period immediately following the anniver- sary dates of their authorizations' executions The union, however, caused the employer to dishonor such notices as untimely, contending that accord- ing to the above-quoted language in the authorization forms, the annual escape period had shifted to the 15 days immediately following the anniver- sary date of the old agreement's termination The Board found no violation, concluding first that the union's action was taken in good faith and involved a reasonable interpretation of the relevant language in the collective-bar- gaining agreement and the authorization forms The Board then concluded that, as so interpreted, the provisions of the agreement did not infringe upon the exercise of employees' Sec 7 rights Unlike in the instant case, in American Smelting, the union preserved both the right at least once a year to revoke a checkoff authorization (even though it shifted the annual date on which revocation could be made) and the right upon the termination of the old agreement to revoke an authorization-whereas in the present case, the Union negated the latter statutory right entirely 215 NLRB No. 15 238 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD not mean that they are at liberty thereby to extinguish statutory rights or to escape the legislative mandate of Section 302(c)(4) of the Act. In changing termination dates, therefore, parties must preserve the statutory right of the employees to revoke their checkoff authorizations during the previ- ously established escape period occurring before the originally intended expiration date of the old contract. For the above reasons and those advanced by the Ad- ministrative Law Judge, we conclude that the Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by causing the Employer to dishonor the employees' revocation no- tices here in question, thus restraining and coercing the employees in the exercise of their statutory right to revoke their checkoff authorizations.' We further con- clude that the Union violated Section 8(b)(2) of the Act by causing the Employer to discriminate against the employees who gave notice of revocation of their checkoff authorizations, thus encouraging membership in the Union.4 ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re- lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the Respondent, Atlanta Printing Specialties and Paper Products Union Local 527, AFL-CIO, Atlanta, Georgia, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Or- der. 3 See John I Paulding, Inc, 130 NLRB 1035, 1043 (1961) 4 It is well settled that where an employee has validly revoked his checkoff authorization, a union's causing an employer to continue deducting dues violates Sec 8(b)(2) Industrial Towel and Uniform Services, a Division of Cavalier Industries, Inc, 195 NLRB 1121 (1972), enforcement denied on other grounds 473 F 2d 1258 (C A 6, 1973) The discrimination in the instant case lay in the fact that the Employer deducted unauthorized sums from the paychecks of employees who had properly given notice of revoca- tion of their checkoff authorizations. The encouragement of union member- ship lay in the fact that employees, seeing the futility of trying to revoke their checkoff authorizations, henceforth would be discouraged from trying to revoke their union membership absent a valid union-security clause We note that Georgia, where Respondent's plant is located, has a right-to-work law DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE BENJAMIN K. BLACKBURN, Administrative Law Judge: The charge in Case 10-CB-2312 was filed on November 9, 1973. The charge in Case 10-CB-2323 was filed on January 9, 1974, and amended on February 7, February 21, and April 4, 1974. An Order Consolidating Cases and Consolidated Complaint were issued on February 21, 1974. An Amend- ment to Complaint was issued on April 24, 1974. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on March 5, 1974. Administrative Law Judge Arthur Leff denied Respondent's motion on April 8, 1974. On April 22, April 24, and May 2, 1974, respectively, Fennell, counsel for Respondent, and counsel for the General Counsel executed a stipulation that: The charge in Case No. 10-CB-2312, the charge and the first, second, third and fourth' amended charges, in Case No. 10-CB-2323, the Consolidated Complaint and Notice of Hearing, Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the Consolidated Complaint, General Counsel's Response to the Motion to Dismiss, the Order dated April 8, 1974, by Administrative Law Judge Arthur Leff on said Mo- tion, Respondent's Answer to the Consolidated Com- plaint, the Amendment to the Consolidated Complaint issued on April 24, 1974, and this Stipulation and its attached exhibits constitute the entire record in this case, and the introduction of any further or other evidence before an Administrative Law Judge is expressly waived The stipulation also provides that: All parties waive hearing and agree that this matter shall be submitted to the Chief Administrative Law Judge of the Board, upon a motion by Counsel for the General Counsel, for a decision by a duly designated Administrative Law Judge, upon the record described herein, provided that the parties shall have 21 days from the date of the order granting such motion, or such further period as may be allowed for good cause shown to file briefs and proposed findings of fact and conclu- sions of law with said Administrative Law Judge. Counsel for the General Counsel so moved on May 3, 1974. I was designated by the Chief Administrative Law Judge on May 8, 1974. Upon the record formulated in this manner and after due consideration of briefs, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I JURISDICTION The Mead Corporation, herein called the Employer, is, and has been at all times material herein, an Ohio corporation, with an office and place of business located at Atlanta, Georgia, where it is engaged in the manufacture and sale of boxes and cartons. The Employer, during the past calendar year, which period is representative of all times material herein, sold and shipped finished products valued in excess of $50,000 directly to customers located outside the State of Georgia. II THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Facts Respondent and the Employer were parties to a collective- bargaining agreement, effective July 20, 1970, to expire November 1, 1973, which provided in article II, inter alia, for the payroll deduction and remittance to Respondent of Re- spondent's membership dues upon the execution of an au- thorization therefor to the Employer by an employee. (The 1 There is no fourth amended charge in the documents before me ATLANTA PRINTING SPECIALTIES language of said article has remained substantially unchanged throughout successive agreements between Respondent and the Employer since 1963.) The authorization for dues deduc- tion involved herein provides- This authorization shall be irrevocable for a period of one year from the date of its execution or for the dura- tion of the applicable collective bargaining agreement, whichever occurs sooner. The authorization provides for an annual escape period dur- ing the 15 days preceding the anniversary date of the authon- zation, and for an escape period during the last 15 days of the applicable collective-bargaining agreement, during which no- tice of revocation can be given. In July of 1973, Respondent and the Employer began negotiations which, on October 13, 1973, resulted in agree- ment upon a new collective-bargaining agreement, which was ratified on October 14, 1973, and by its terms became effec- tive upon October 15, 1973, to expire February 15, 1975. The 1967-70 agreement between Respondent and The Mead Corporation, by its terms, was effective from Novem- ber 1, 1967, to expire November 1, 1970. The following employees, prior to October 15, 1973, au- thorized the Employer to deduct Respondent's membership dues from their wages each month, and to remit said amounts so deducted to Respondent: Virgill C. Allen John F. Anderson Noel T. Bryant Charles E. Campbell Lewis Carr Ken Coryell Donald E. Crow Patsey Devorce Barney Dowdell James E. Durmire Nina Everett Jerry Fred Fennell Wilburn Garrett Wilma Garrett W. C. Gaylor W. A. Gnffey Gordon E. Gurley Lawrence Williams James F. Hogan Claudia Houston Calvin Hughes Julius Jackson Gary Jones James N. Kendrick Donald A. King Dale Marlow Gwendolyn Nunnally Alonzo Paulhill Thomas L. Puzder Andrew J. Sellers Howard Slatan Lucille Smith Douglas F. Spinks James Spivey Ella M. Thomas Between October 17, 1973, and November 1, 1973, a num- ber of employees gave notice to the Respondent and to the Employer, in proper form, to revoke their dues deduction authorizations. Some of such revocation notices were given within the annual escape period of the individual authorization and were therefore timely on that basis. Respondent caused the em- ployer to honor these revocation notices. Others of such revocation notices, including those given by the employees listed above, were not given within the annual escape period of the individual authorization, but were given within the 15 days preceding the expiration date specified in the old agreement. Respondent caused the Employer not to honor these revocation notices given by the employees listed above, so that these employees continued on dues checkoff notwithstanding their attempted revocation. 239 The stipulation contains the following paragraph relating to Respondent 's contentions: Respondent contends that the new agreement . . . is the "applicable collective bargaining agreement," that the revocation notices of the employees listed [above] were not given during the fifteen day annual escape period nor during the fifteen days previous to the expira- tion of the "applicable collective bargaining agreement" and that such notices were not timely under the dues deduction agreement (authorization) in effect between each member and Respondent. The stipulation contains the following further agreement between the parties with respect to those paragraphs of the complaint which allege that Respondent 's purpose in causing the Employer to refuse to honor the revocations of the em- ployees named above was "to encourage membership in Re- spondent" and that Respondent's acts constitute unfair labor practices affecting commerce within.the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended: With reference to paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Con- solidated Complaint and Respondent's Answer thereto, it is agreed that the violation alleged therein is predicted upon the contention that the said revocations by the employees were timely, and that the violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act as encompassed therein arose solely as a consequence of Respondent's causing The Mead Cor- poration to refuse to honor said revocations. B. Analysis and Conclusions In his Response to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss and in his brief to me counsel for the General Counsel relied on Felterv. Southern Pacific Company, 359 U.S. 326, and Inter- national Union, United Automobile, Aircraft, Agricultural Implement Workers of America, AFL-CIO, et al. (John L Paulding, Inc.), 130 NLRB 1035 (1961 ). In denying Respon- dent's motion, Administrative Law Judge Leff said: Assuming as I must for purposes of this motion the truth of the allegations of the consolidated complaint, and in light of the decisions cited by the General Counsel in his Response, I find no merit in Respondent's motion. The only significant difference between Paulding, supra, and this case is that there the employees involved had taken action after the expiration of one contract and before execu- tion of another, while here they took action during the escape period provided at the end of one contract at a time when another had superseded it. The Board had occasion to charac- terize its holding in the case relied on by the General Counsel in the third of a series of Paulding cases, 142 NLRB 296 at 299-300: In the first of these cases, International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft, Agricultural Implement Workers of America, AFL-CIO (John I. Paulding, Inc.), 130 NLRB 1035, Respondents attempted to cause the dis- charge of some 33 employees who had submitted resig- nations from Respondents on or after the expiration of the first contract and prior to the execution of the second contract on January 11, 1960. The Board found that, under the Act, these employees had a right to withdraw their membership from Re- 240 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD spondents after the first contract expired and at any time there was no contract in existence. The Board concluded that these employees had, for purposes of the Act, effec- tively terminated their membership prior to the date of the second contract, and were not, therefore, on that date members who were subject to the maintenance-of- membership clause in the second contract, and accord- ingly, Respondents' attempts to cause their discharge for nonpayment of dues under that clause were unlawful. Thus, the precise question posed in this case is whether Re- spondent can abrogate employees' statutory right to cancel their checkoff authorizations during an escape period pro- vided at the end of the term of a collective-bargaining agreement by eiiecuting a second collective-bargaining agreement which takes effect earlier than the first day of the escape period. In the first Paulding ease the Board adopted the Intermedi- ate Report of Trial Examiner Vicent M. Rotolo (except for one aspect of his recommended Order and notice not relevant here), including the statement that: No restrictions or limitations imposed by either the Company or the Union unilaterally or by agreement with each other will be permitted to prevent the free exercise of the employee's statutory right to revoke his dues checkoff authorization at the termination of the contract. Respondent contends the principle enunciated in the Paulding case is not controlling because of what it character- izes as the Board's "continuity of union security" doctrine. It cites as dispositive American Smelting & Refining Com- pany (Mission Unit), 200 NLRB 1004. That case involved the interpretation of a checkoff authorization form which read in part: This assignment and authorization shall be effective and cannot be cancelled for a period of one (1) year from the date appearing above or until the termination date of the current collective bargaining agreement between the Company and the Union, whichever occurs sooner. In sustaining Administrative Law Judge Jerrold H. Shapi- ro's conclusion that the Act had not been violated by the interpretation agreed on by company and union, the Board said: Our dismissal of the complaint herein does not rest solely on the finding that "Respondents acted reasona- bly and in good faith in construing the authorizations and the collective bargaining agreement ...." but also on our conclusion that, as so interpreted, the provisions of Respondents' agreement respecting the checkoff of union dues did not infringe upon employees' exercise of Section 7 rights. Respondent contends American Smelting stands for these three propositions: (1) [T]hat the parties to a collective bargaining agree- ment may provide for reasonable fifteen-day escape pen- ods which are enforceable as limitations upon the right to revoke a check-off authorization, (2) that the check- off authorization is an agreement by the employee which may limit his right to revoke a check-off authorization, and (3) that a construction of dues check-off authonza- tion which deprives an employee of a supposed oppor- tunity to revoke does not necessarily violate his Section 7 rights. - Assuming, without finding, that the Board intended its decision in American Smelting to have this sweeping effect, it does not follow that it is controlling here. The question posed in this case, i.e., what does the word "applicable" mean in the statutory guarantee that a checkoff authorization "shall not be irrevocable. .. beyond the termination date of the applicable collective agreement," was not considered in American Smelting. While neither Paulding nor American Smelting is on all fours with this case, American Smelting is not, as Respondent contends, "more nearly like the present case than any other " Paulding is. The third Paulding case, 142 NLRB 296 (1963), Hershey Chocolate Corporation, 140 NLRB 249, and National Lead Company, Titanium Division, 106 NLRB 434 (1953), cited by Respondent for its doctrine of "continuity of union security," are even less apposite than American Smelting. As Respondent points out, "they dealt with union shop and maintenance of membership clauses, rather than check-off clauses." Finally, the portions of the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act which Respondent relies on do not require a different conclusion. They provide no insight into what Congress meant by the use of the word "applicable" in the situation presented here. The employees listed above had a statutory right to revoke their checkoff authorizations between October 16 and November 1, 1973, because, by its terms, a collective-bargain- ing agreement was due to expire on the latter date. The Board, in Paulding, has held that nothing will be permitted to prevent the free exercise of that right. The fact that Re- spondent caused the Employer to dishonor the revocations executed by the employees listed above is sufficient to bring this case within the ambit of Section 8(a)(3) even though Respondent has made no request and conditions of employ- ment which would be discriminatory within the meaning of that section of the Act. I find, therefore, that Respondent has violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act by causing the Employer not to honor revocations of dues checkoff authori- zations furnished to it by its employees during the period from October 16 to November 1, 1973 Upon the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in this proceeding, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Employer is, and has been at all times material herein, engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Respondent is, and has been at all times material herein, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By causing the Employer not to honor revocations of dues checkoff authorizations furnished to it by its employees during the period from October 16 to November 1, 1973, Respondent has violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, conclu- sions of law, and the entire record in this proceeding, and ATLANTA PRINTING SPECIALTIES pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the fol- lowing recommended: ORDER2 Atlanta Printing Specialties and Paper Products Union Local 527, AFL-CIO, its officers, agents, and representa- tives, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Causing The Mead Corporation not to honor revoca- tions of dues checkoff authorizations furnished to it by the employees listed in Appendix A during the period from Octo- ber 16 to November 1, 1973. (b) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec- tuate the policies of the Act: (a) Notify The Mead Corporation, in writing, that it with- draws its request that said corporation not honor the revo- cations of dues checkoff authorizations furnished to it by the employees listed in Appendix A during the period from October 16 to November 1, 1973, and send a copy of said letter to each of the employees listed in said Appendix. (b) Reimburse each of the employees listed in Appendix A for the dues withheld from his wages by The Mead Corpora- tion since November 1, 1973, plus interest, computing the sum due each employee in the manner prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and Isis Plumb- ing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962). (c) Post at its offices and meeting halls copies of the at- tached notice marked "Appendix B."3 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 10, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not al- tered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Mail signed copies of the attached notice marked "Ap- pendix B" to the Regional Director for Region 10 for posting at facilities of The Mead Corporation, provided said corpora- tion chooses to post said notice. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 10, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith 2 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes 3 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " APPENDIX A Virgill C. Allen John F. Anderson Noel T. Bryant Charles F. Campbell Lewis Carr Ken Coryell Donald E. Crow Patsey Devorce Barney Dowdell James E . Durmire Nina Everett Jerry Fred Fennell Wilburn Garrett Wilma Garrett W. C. Gaylor W. A. Griffey Gordon E. Gurley Lawrence Williams James F. Hogan Claudia Houston Calvin Hughes Julius Jackson Gary Jones James N. Kendrick Donald A. King Dale Marlow Gwendolyn Nunnally Alonzo Paulhill Thomas L. Puzder Andrew J. Sellers Howard Slatan Lucille Smith Douglas F. Spinks James Spivey Ella M. Thomas APPENDIX B NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government 241 The National Labor Relations Board having found, after a trial, that we violated Federal law by causing The Mead Corporation not to honor revocations of dues checkoff au- thorizations furnished to it by some of its employees dur- ing the period from October 16 to November 1, 1973, we hereby notify you that: The National Labor Relations Act gives all employees these rights: To engage in self-organization To form, join, or help unions To bargain collectively through a representative of their own choosing To act together for collective bargaining or other aid or protection To refrain from any or all of these things. WE WILL NOT cause The Mead Corporation not to honor revocations of dues checkoff authorizations fur- nished to it by its employees during periods when its employees have a legal right to revoke their authoriza- tions. WE WILL NOT, in any like or related manner, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the above rights. WE WILL notify The Mead Corporation, in writing, that we withdraw our request it not honor the revoca- tions of dues checkoff authorizations furnished to it by: Virgill C. Allen James F. Hogan John F. Anderson Claudia Houston Noel T. Bryant Calvin Hughes 242 Charles E. Campbell Lewis Carr Ken Coryell Donald E. Crow Pat^ey Devorce Barney Dowdell James E. Durmire Nina Everett Jerry Fred Fennell Wilburn Garrett Wilma Garrett W. C. Gaylor DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Julius Jackson Gary Jones James N. Kendrick Donald A. King Dale Marlow Gwendolyn Nunnally Alonzo Paulhill Thomas L. Puzder Andrew J. Sellers Howard Slatan Lucille Smith Douglas F. Spinks W. A. Griffey James Spivey Gordon E. Gurley Ella M. Thomas Lawrence Williams during the period from October 16 to November 1, 1973, and send a copy of said letter to each of these employees. WE WILL reimburse each of these employees for the dues withheld from his wages by The Mead Corporation since November 1, 1973, plus interest. ATLANTA PRINTING SPECIALTIES AND PAPER PRODUCTS UNION LOCAL 527, AFL-CIO