Generac Corp.

GENERAC CORPORATION 351 Generac Corporation and District No. 10, Interna- tional Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO. Case 30-CA-2667 December 6, 1974 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND KENNEDY On August 30, 1974, Administrative Law Judge Morton D. Friedman issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed ex- ceptions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclu- sions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re- lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that Respondent, Generac Corporation, Genesee Depot, Wisconsin, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. admitting that it has refused to furnish the said requested information, nevertheless defends upon the basis that the information requested is not necessary for the administration of the collective-bargaining agreement between the parties as contended by the Charging Party and the General Counsel. Pursuant to notice, this matter came on to be heard before me at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, on June 20, 1974. All parties were represented and were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to introduce relevant evidence, to present oral argu- ment and to file briefs. Oral argument was waived by all parties. Briefs were filed by counsel for the General Counsel and the Respondent. Upon consideration of the entire record herein and upon my observation of each witness appearing before me, and upon due consideration given to the conten- tions of the parties, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT Respondent, a Wisconsin corporation, with its principal offices and plant in Genesee Depot, Wisconsin, is engaged in the manufacture of generators and alternators. During the calendar year immediately preceding the issuance of the com- plaint herein, a representative period, the Respondent manu- factured, sold, and shipped products of a value in excess of $50,000 directly from its plant to points located outside the State of Wisconsin. It is admitted, and I find, that the Respondent is an em- ployer engaged in commerce as defined in Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. II THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED It is admitted, and I find, that the Union is a labor organi- zation within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE MORTON D. FRIEDMAN, Administrative Law Judge: Upon a charge filed on March 28, 1974, by District No. 10, Interna- tional Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, the Regional Director for Region 30 of the National Labor Relations Board, herein called the Board, issued a complaint on May 10, 1974, on behalf of the General Counsel of the Board, against Generac Corporation, herein called the Respondent or the Company, alleging that the Respondent had violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, herein called the Act. In its duly filed answer, the Respondent, while admitting certain allegations of the complaint, denied the commission of any unfair labor practices. The complaint alleges, in substance, that the Respondent has refused and is refusing to bargain in good faith in viola- tion of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to furnish to the Union, at the Union's request, the names and addresses of employees in the unit for which the Union is the certified bargaining representative. The Respondent, while A. The Facts Since approximately June 14 , 1963, the Respondent has bargained with the Union as the certified bargaining re- presentative of Respondent's employees in a unit concededly appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining consist- ing of all production and maintenance employees , excluding office clerical employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act, at Respondent's plant at Genesee Depot , Wiscon- sin. Since that time, the Respondent and the Union have entered into a series of collective-bargaining agreements cov- ering the terms and conditions of employment of the em- ployees in the aforesaid unit. The current collective-bargain- ing agreement is effective from October 19, 1972, with expiration date of October 12, 1974. However, none of these collective-bargaining agreements, including the current agreement, contain any union-security provisions. As a result thereof, and as a result of other factors, not made part of the record herein, out of a complement of approximately 290 employees , the Union now retains a mem- bership among employees in the said unit of approximately 20. Of course, the terms and conditions of the bargaining agreement between the Respondent and the Union apply to 215 NLRB No. 41 352 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD and govern the hours, wages, and other working conditions of all the employees in the unit whether or not members of the Union. Under the laws -of the State of Wisconsin, the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, herein called the Com- mission, regulates the authority of unions and employers to include in collective-bargaining agreements provisions for un- ion shops. Upon petition filed with it, the Commission con- ducts union-shop referendums. On or about January 21, 1974, the Union herein petitioned the Commission to conduct such a referendum among the employees of the Respondent in the above unit. At a meeting held before a representative of the Commission, for the purpose of determining the appro- priate unit and the cut-off date for the employees eligibility to vote, the Union requested that the Respondent supply to the Union the full names and addresses of all the employees in the unit. The Respondent refused to give the names and addresses voluntarily and the matter was referred by the representative of the Commission to the whole Commission. On February 12, 1974, in directing a referendum for an "all- union agreement" between the Employer and the Union, the Commission denied the Union's request that the eligibility list contain the addresses of the unit employees. The Commission gave no reason except that it has never required any employer to provide the addresses of employees involved in a referen- dum conducted by the Commission. It should be noted, in connection with this request for the addresses of the employees in the unit, that although the Union has been the certified bargaining representative of the said employees since 1963, this was the first time that it had made a demand on the Respondent for the addresses of the employees. However, pursuant to the terms of the collective- bargaining agreements, including the current agreement, the Respondent for the purposes of seniority, supplies to the Union at regular monthly intervals, a list of all of the em- ployees in the unit employed during the previous months. However, these lists contain only the initial and last name of the employees without any addresses. Following the Commission's decision to hold a referendum among the Respondent's employees fo- an "all-union agree- ment," the Respondent distributed by mail to the unit em- ployees three separate letters containing propaganda and ar- gument with regard to why the employees should vote against a union shop. The first of these letters was mailed to the employees in the unit on February 18, and the last on Febru- ary 20. Perhaps as a result of these mailings and as a result of the Union's failure to obtain the addresses of the em- ployees, the Union withdrew its petition for a referendum.' On March 6, 1974, the Union's business representative, Joseph Spehert, sent a letter to Werner Scheerenberger, direc- tor of manufacturing of the Respondent, requesting that the Respondent supply to the Union a list of all of the unit employees giving their full names and post office addresses. In the letter, Spehert stated that under the existing labor laws a certified union must represent all of the employees in the unit for which it is certified whether such employees are ' The mailings noted above sent by the Respondent to the unit employees are not alleged to have been violative of Sec 8(a)(1) of the Act and no claim to that effect is made by either the General Counsel or the Union members of the union or not. In reply to this request, Respon- dent's counsel answered that the Union is supplied the names of the employees in the seniority list, above mentioned, and also stated that because the Union had set forth no specific necessity for the addresses of the employees, the request of the Union was therefore refused. Following this reply, on March 14, 1974, Spehert addresses a second letter to Respondent's counsel acknowledging receipt of Respondent's counsel's let- ter of March 13. In this letter to Respondent's counsel, Spe- hert stated that because the agreement does not include union-security provisions , and, therefore, the employees are not required to join the Union as a condition of em- ployment, the Union does not have access to the names and addresses and the employees that it is required to rep- resent under the Act. Spehert went on to explain that the Union's legal obligation under the Act was to represent all of the employees in the unit and that therefore it was necessary to have their names and addresses. In answer to this letter, Respondent's counsel replied by letter dated March 21, in which he stated that he still did not find any basis for the request made for the employees' addresses and that the Union's request was, therefore, denied. Thereafter, the charge in this case was filed alleging, as in the complaint, that the Respondent had violated its duty to bargain with the Union under the Act by refusing to supply the full names and addresses of the employees in the unit. With regard to the accessibility of the employees in the unit to the representatives of the Union and for the distribution of matters concerning wages, hours and working conditions, and the administration of the collective-bargaining agree- ment, it becomes necessary to review the physical location of the plant, the dispersion of the employees residences in rela- tion to their distance from the plant, the accessibility of the means of distributing union information by the Union within the plant and immediately surrounding the plant, the availa- bility of union members and union-appointed committeemen to make contact with union and nonunion members of the unit and, finally, the rules established by the Respondent both in the collective-bargaining agreement and otherwise with regard to the dissemination of information issued, by the Union within the Respondent's premises. As a joint exhibit, there was submitted at the hearing a list of the addresses, without names, of the employees of the Respondent as of the week of June 19, 1974. As noted above, the Respondent's plant is located at Genesee Depot, a small village approximately 6 miles from Waukesha, Wisconsin. Waukesha is located approximately 25 miles west of Mil- waukee and Genesee Depot is approximately the same dis- tance from Milwaukee in a slightly different direction. A study of the map of Wisconsin, as compared with the entire list submitted as a joint exhibit, as above, shows that the employees live in a six-county area in southeastern Wisconsin dispersed throughout the area, for the most part in small, rural communities or small cities. Although 118 of the com- plement of employees as of June 19, 1974, live in Waukesha, the balance of the employees were spread out among the aforesaid counties anywhere from 8 to 20 or 30 miles from Genesee Depot. One employee, as a matter of fact, lives in Madison, Wisconsin, a distance of 60 miles. Twelve em- ployees live 14 miles from the plant, 16 live 16 miles from the plant, 22 others live 16 miles from the plant in another direc- GENERAC CORPORATION 353 tion, 28 live 10 miles from the plant in still another direction and the dispersion follows somewhat the same pattern with regard to all of the other employees. With regard to the ability of the Union to dispense printed information to the employees as they leave or enter the plant, the plant is located off a main road on a little traveled road so that, according to the testimony of Scheerenberger, there would be no physical danger with regard to union representa- tives passing out union literature at the entrance to the Re- spondent's premises. In addition, the Respondent provides a bulletin board at each of the two timeclocks in the Respon- dent's plant, which bulletin boards are used for the posting of various notices by the Union , including notices of union meetings . Moreover, within the last few months before the hearing herein , a third bulletin board was established some- where in the center of the Respondent's plant Additionally, although the employee manual distributed to all employees upon hiring contains a no-solicitation provision which could, standing alone, be considered too restrictive, and therefore possibly violative of the Act, the Respondent has since posted on its bulletin boards a modification of this restrictive no- solicitation rule which now permits distribution of union matters in nonworking areas on nonworking time provided, however, that such distribution does not create a littering problem. George Urban, a union business representative , testified, without contradiction, which testimony is credited, that there are only four persons on the shop committee representing the Union and that these individuals are not sufficient in number nor do they work in areas or on shifts which would permit them to sufficiently cover the entire workforce in all sections of the plant to disseminate union information with regard to the administration of the collective-bargaining agreement or other matters of interest to employees represented by the Union . There are many departments with no shop commit- teemen. He further testified credibly, that although the bulle- tin boards had been used to publicize union meetings, only 10 or 15 nonunion members usually attend . He ascribed this to the fact that employees do not have time to read the matters on the bulletin board because they are either checking in or checking out of the Employer's plant when they are reading the bulletin board and are, therefore , in too much of a hurry to either go to their work stations or to leave the plant to go home in order to fully comprehend what has been posted. Furthermore , although four union representatives , not em- ployees of Respondent, handbilled outside the plant in con- nection with the scheduled March 1974 union-shop referen- dum, which was later withdrawn by the Union , there was not sufficient distribution of matter through this means to over- come the anti union-shop propaganda which the Respondent mailed to employees and to which reference has hereinbefore been made. Thus, Urban testified, that although admittedly no request had been made by the Union at any time prior to the referen- dum hearing conducted by the Commission for a list of the names and addresses of all employees in the unit, one of the reasons for this failure to make such a request was that, formerly, the Union had been locally represented by another branch of the Machinists International which had not re- quired such a list, but that at the present, and dust before the events herein, another district of the International took over the administration of the area and its officials required and requested such list Furthermore , according to Urban, the necessity for the names and addresses of the employees, al- though admittedly for the purpose of contacting such em- ployees for organizational reasons, also is necessary for the purpose of sending Machinists newspapers to all persons in the unit, whether or not union members, for the dissemina- tion of legislative action that might be taken up or passed for the benefit of organized labor or even for the particular shop involved Also, there are a multitude of other areas which might give rise to the necessity to apprise the members of the unit in order to properly represent them whether or not they are members of the Union. In addition to the foregoing , Scheerenberger, the Respon- dent's director of manufacturing, testified that the Respon- dent, within the last year has made about seven mass mail- ings to its employees , among them the letters to the employ- ees sent pending the scheduled referendum , mentioned above, in which the Respondent informed the employees of the pitfalls of compulsory unionism . These matters were mailed to all of the Respondent's employees and signed by Scheerenberger . Scheerenberger, however, also testified, without contradiction , that union representa- tives distributed literature at the parking lot gate two or three times during the prereferendum period. B. Discussion, Analysis, and Conclusions Counsel for the General Counsel contends that the names and addresses of the employees of the Respondent are neces- sary for the Union to have in order for the Union to properly administer the collective-bargaining agreement and to inform the employees in the unit of matters which are necessary for the Union to properly represent all of the employees in the unit, whether members or not, because such is the Union's duty under the Act Furthermore, counsel for the General Counsel argues that the dispersion of the employees with regard to their residences and the conditions within the plant and around the plant are such that personal contact with the employees to disseminate such information is literally im- possible absent the ability to mail such matters to the em- ployees' homes. On the other hand, Respondent's counsel argues that in the first instance, the claim that the Union requires the addresses of the unit employees for the purpose of carrying out the Union's statutory duty to represent all of the employees in the unit is spurious, and that the real and only reason for the request for the addresses of the employees is for the purpose of organizing the unorganized . Furthermore, Respondent's counsel argues, that the residences of the employees in the unit are not so dispersed and so far apart that it becomes a virtual impossibility or an extreme difficulty for the Union to make personal contact by house-to -house canvassing. More- over, Respondent's counsel further argues that the modified no-solicitation rule together with the bulletin boards estab- lished for the Union's use, plus the capability of union re- presentatives to disseminate union literature at the parking lot gate of the Respondent's plant eliminates the necessity for the Union to have the addresses of the employees in the unit in order to inform such employees of any matters of which the Union desires to inform them, or needs to inform them, 354 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD as their statutory representative and pursuant to the Union's obligations under Board law. As counsel for the General Counsel points out, it is a fundemental principle of the law under Board decisions, and pursuant to the Act, that the exclusive bargaining representa- tive of unit employees has a duty to fairly represent all unit employees and not just members of the Union.' Accord- ingly, although the Union for a number of years dunng its bargaining relationship with the Respondent did not request the addresses of the employees in order to properly represent all of the employees in the unit, whether or not such em- ployees were union members, nevertheless, the late start for such a request does not minimize nor eliminate the necessity for equal representation of all employees in the unit by the Union, the certified representative of the unit. And this is true even if the original impetus for the request for the addresses came only after the Union petitioned the Wisconsin Employ- ment Relations Commission for a union-shop referendum. This being so, the necessity and legal obligation imposed on the Union to represent all of the employees in the unit having been established, I find and conclude the Respondent's con- tention that the Union desires the addresses of employees solely for organizational purposes to be without merit. What is left for decision, and what represents the real issue here, is whether the Union can fully represent the employees in the unit without obtaining the addresses of the employees from the Respondent. Moreover, it can be concluded that this works no hardship upon the Respondent because it was testi- fied, without contradiction, by the Respondent's office em- ployee at the hearing herein, that the compillation, through the use of computer, of the joint exhibit listing the addresses of the employees in the unit, without giving the names or collating the names to the addresses, took but a very short time . Accordingly, any defense that the preparation of such a list of names and addresses would work a hardship upon the Respondent is also without merit. We come then to whether the Union is without any truly effective means of communicating with unit employees unless the Respondent supplies the names and addresses of the em- ployees. The Board decisions' that determine whether an em- ployer must supply the list of names and addresses of unit employees, once it is determined that such names are neces- sary for the proper administration of the contract and for the purpose of serving the employees in the unit whether mem- bers of the Union or not, are based on considerations of such factors as the size of the unit; the rate of turnover; the nature of the contractual union-security clause, if any; the Union's ability to reach member and nonmember employees, both at the plant and at their homes, including the effectiveness of any steward system, and the use of bulletin boards; and the availability of the information to the Employer.' ' Steelev Louisville & Nashville RR., 323 US 192, Ford Motor Co, v Huffman, 345 U.S 330, Miranda Fuel Company, Inc, 140 NLRB 181 (1962), and Bekins Moving & Storage Co, 211 NLRB 138 (1974) 3 Standard Oil Company of California, Western Operations, Inc., 166 NLRB 343, 344-345 (1967), enfd 399 F 2d 639 (C A 9, 1968), Prudential Insurance Company ofAmerica, 173 NLRB 792, 793 (1968), enfd. 412 F 2d 77 (C.A 2, 1969), UnitedAircraft Corporation, 181 NLRB 892, 903 (1969), enfd. 434 F 2d 1198 (C A. 2, 1970), Shell Oil Company, 190 NLRB 101, Food Employer Council, Inc., 197 NLRB 651 (1972) 4 Magma Copper Company, San Manuel Division, 208 NLRB 329 (1974) The elements, set forth above in the cited cases, are present here in varying degree. In the Standard Oil Company case, supra, the Board ordered the employer to furnish the names and addresses of the employees where there was approxi- mately a 50-percent union membership in the unit which the union in the case represented. In the case,at bar, the percent- age is less than 10 percent. Additionally, in the case at bar, as in the cases cited, there is a rather extensive dispersion of the employees in the unit with regard to their places of resi- dences. Although perhaps not as great as in the Standard Oil Company or Prudential Insurance Company ofAmerica cases, supra, it does nevertheless extend over a number of counties with an average of approximately 20 miles distant in all direc- tions from the Respondent's plant. Moreover, for a unit of approximately 290 employees, there are only four union com- mitteemen in the plant, certainly not a sufficient number to make personal contact with all of the employees during the times when the employees may be free from work on com- pany premises, at which time contact could be made between the representatives of the Union and the other employees. With regard to the bulletin board situation, it should be noted, as stated above, that the bulletin boards, with the exception of the newest one, are posted near the timeclocks where the employees remain but for a few moments in enter- ing or leaving the plant. With regard to the effectiveness of bulletin board posting, the Board has stated' as follows: Even if the Respondent had not placed restrictions upon the Lodges use of bulletin board, bulletin Board by their very nature do not provide an effective means of communicating with employees about important mat- ters. In connection with the foregoing, upon examination by counsel for the General Counsel, Respondent's director of manufacturing, Scheerenberger, stated, with regard to the propaganda mailed to the employees before the March sche- duled referendum, that the reason that these matters were mailed to employees, rather than merely posted on the bulle- tin boards, was that "I felt it was an important enough subject to mail it directly to them rather than just posting it on a bulletin board; I wanted to make sure every individual re- ceived it." Thus, the Respondent would seem to be admitting in the testimony of its own, most important official, that the bulletin boards are insufficient for the dissemination of information to the employees. Thus, the Respondent cannot argue under such a situation that the Union's notices to employees should be limited to the bulletin board and that by the bulletin board the Union can make contact with the employees sufficiently to properly represent them in the manner required of the Union as the certified bargaining representative. With regard to the accessibility of employees entering and leaving the Respondent's premises for the purposes of hand- billing the employees or making contact with them by union representatives, there would seem to be some conflict. The representatives of the Union attempted to reach the em- ployees at the entrance to the Respondent's premises during the prereferendum period. But, they gave up after a few days because the attempts to reach a substantial number of the employees seemed futile. The Respondent, on the other ' United Aircraft Corporation, 181 NLRB 892 (1970) GENERAC CORPORATION 355 hand, elicited an admission that a number of the employees refused to accept the handbilling and, moreover, argues that the Union's attempt was but a feeble one and did not establish that the Union was unable to reach the employees by hand- billing at the entrance to the Respondent's premises. Regardless of the merits of this argument, however, it would seem that this 'is but a minor factor when regarded in the context of the situation as a whole. Accordingly, on the basis of all of the foregoing, I find and conclude that the Union, in order to properly service the employees in the unit for which it is certified as the bargaining representative and to represent all of the employees in the unit regardless of union affiliation should be supplied by the Respondent with the names and addresses of all of the employees in the said unit. The Respondent also contends, as a final argument, that the Union here is seeking to take a "second bite at the apple" having been refused the names and addresses of the em- ployees by the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commis- sion at the time that the Union desired such names and addresses for the purposes of contacting employees to induce them to vote for a union shop. The Respondent argues that the intention is the same here and that therefore the decision of the Wisconsin Commission should prevail. I find no merit in this contention. While it is true that the original impetus for the request for the names and addresses of the employees in the unit came at a time when the Union deemed it necessary to have the addresses in order to promote its campaign for a union shop, and while it is quite obvious that this was the Union's original purpose because the Union withdrew its petition for a union shop election when the Commission denied it the right to the addresses of the employees, I find for several reasons that the Wisconsin Commission's decision in the referendum matter is not binding on the Board in the instant proceeding. Al- though the Supreme Court has held6 that the Wisconsin Commission has authority, under the Act, to decide whether employees may have a union shop and that the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction within the State of Wisconsin for this purpose, nevertheless, there is nothing in the Supreme Court's decision to indicate that the decision of the said Com- mission in a peripheral matter such as determining the right of the Union to the names and addresses of employees in the unit, is binding on the Board, especially where the decision of the Wisconsin Commission gave no reason for the denial and, moreover, the denial would seem to be in conflict with Board decisions as sustained by the Courts, as recited above. In such instance, the Board has preemptive authority over the authority of the Wisconsin Commission. Secondly, although one of the purposes for the request for the names and ad- dresses of the unit employees by the Union is admittedly for the purpose of organizational activity and to induce nonunion members to accept union membership, it has been held that . . there is no clear distinction between informing non- members agents [employees] about the benefits it has ob- tained and hopes in the future to secure for them and its solicitation of their support."' Moreover, in the Standard 6 Algoma P l y w o o d v N.LR.B, 336 U S 301 7 Prudential Insurance Company of America v N.LR.B., 412 F 2d 77, 84-85 (1969). Oil of California case, supra, the Board held, in part, "The Union's effectiveness as an employee representative was necessarily dependent on'its bargaining strength, and this in turn was dependent on continued employee adherence and support." Accordingly, it would seem that union organizational ac- tivities of a certified union are considered part and parcel of its duty to adequately represent all of the employees in the unit. Inasmuch as I have heretofore determined that the names and addresses of employees are necessary with regard to other matters, there is no reason to hold that because the supplying of such information may also assist in organiza- tional activities, the Union's request for this information should be denied. Accordingly, by reason of all of the foregoing, I find and conclude that the Respondent's refusal to furnish the Union with the full names and addresses of all of the employees in the unit, for which the Union is the certified representative, constitutes a refusal to bargain in good faith within the mean- ing of the Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. IV THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activity of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with its operations described in section I, above, has a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the se- veral States and tends to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the poli- cies of the Act. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in this proceeding, I make the following conclusions of law: 1. Generac Corporation is an employer engaged in com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. All production and maintenance employees, excluding office clerical employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act, employed by the Respondent at its Genesee De- pot, Wisconsin plant, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining. 4. Since on or about June 14, 1963, the Union has been the certified and recognized bargaining representative of the Re- spondent's employees in the above appropriate unit. 5. Since on or about January 21, 1974, the Respondent has wrongfully refused to supply the Union the names and ad- dresses of the employees in the aforesaid unit thereby refusing to bargain in good faith in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 356 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) and Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Act, I hereby issue the following: ORDER' Respondent, Generac Corporation, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to bargain collectively concerning rates to pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ- ment with District No. 10, International Association of Ma- chinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, by refusing to furnish to the said union, upon request, a list of unit em- ployees full names and home addresses. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain- ing, or coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaran- teed to them by Section 7 of the Act 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec- tuate the policies of the Act: (a) Bargain collectively with the above-named labor organ- ization by furnishing it, upon request , a list of the full names and home addresses of employees in the appropriate unit. (b) Post at its plant premises in Genesee Depot, Wisconsin, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."9 Copies 8 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 9 In the event the Board's Order is enforced by Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Realtions Board " of said notice, of forms to be provided by the Regional Direc- tor for Region 30, after being duly signed by Respondent's representatives, shall be posted by the Respondent immedi- ately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 30, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government We hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL bargain collectively with District No. 10, In- ternational Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, by furnishing it, upon request, a list of the full names and home addresses of unit em- ployees. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercises of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. The appropriate unit is: All production and maintenance employees, exclud- ing office clerical employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act employed at our Genesee Depot, Wisconsin, plant. GENERAC CORPORATION