Sumter Plywood Corp.

SUMTER PLYWOOD CORP. 227 Sumter Plywood Corporation andSouthern Council of Industrial Workers, United Brotherhood of Carpen- ters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO. Case 10-CA-10246 December 3, 1974 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND JENKINS On July 25, 1974, Administrative Law Judge Jennie M. Sarrica issued the attached Decision in this proceed- ing. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a sup- porting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclu- sions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt her recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re- lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that Respondent, Sumter Plywood Corporation, Living- ston, Alabama, its officers, agents, successors, and as- signs, shall take the action set forth in the said recom- mended Order. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1973, issued its Order transferring the case to the Board and a notice to show cause on or before November 7, 1973, why summary judgment should not issue. In its response of November 5, 1973, Respondent moved for dismissal of the complaint or a hearing on objections to the election con- ducted in Case 10-RC-9346. The Board having considered the matter, on May 10, 1974, issued its Order denying motion for summary judgment, granting in part the motion for hear- ing, denying the motion to dismiss the complaint, and direct- ing a hearing before a duly designated Administrative Law Judge, and further ordering that the Judge render a decision containing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recom- mendations based upon the evidence received. Representa- tives of all parties were present and participated in the hear- ing. Based on the entire record, including my observation of witnesses, and after due consideration of the arguments pre- sented in the brief filed by the Respondent, I make the follow- ing: FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW I JURISDICTION The Respondent, an Alabama corporation, with an office and place of business located at Livingston , Alabama, is en- gaged in the manufacture and sale of plywood and lumber products. During the preceding 12 months , a representative period, Respondent sold and shipped finished goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly to customers located outside the State of Alabama. Respondent admits, and I find, that it is an employer en- gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 11 THE UNION Respondent admits, and I find, that Southern Council of Industrial Workers, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the Union, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. JENNIE M. SARRICA, Administrative Law Judge: Upon due notice, this proceeding under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (29 U.S.C. §151,• et seq.), hereinafter referred to as the Act, was tried before me at Livingston, Alabama, on June 11, 1974, pursuant to a complaint issued July 10, 1973, based on charges filed June 25, 1973, and amended July 2, 1973, by Southern Council of Industrial Workers, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the Union, presenting allegations that Sumter Plywood Corpora- tion, hereinafter referred to as Respondent, committed unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(1) and (5) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act. On July 18, 1973, Respondent filed a timely answer denying that it committed the violation of the Act alleged . Thereafter, on October 15, 1973, the Gen- eral Counsel filed with the National Labor Relations Board, hereinafter referred to as the Board, a motion for summary judgment on the pleadings and the Board, on October 25, III THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Posture of the Case Respondent admits, and I find, that the following unit of employees is appropriate for collective bargaining purposes within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act: All full-time and regular part-time production and maintenance employees including yard employees, qual- ity control employees, maintenance, yard and green end leadmen, the head electrician, foresters and forester helpers, loader and dozier operators, truckdrivers, pro- curement and stockroom clerks, employed by Respond- ent at its Livingston, Alabama facility, but excluding all office clerical employees, professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. 215 NLRB No. 56 228 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Respondent also admits that on November 16, 1972, an election by secret ballot was conducted under the supervision of the Board, that a majority of the employees in the unit described designated and selected the Union as their rep- resentative for purposes of collective bargaining with Re- spondent with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of em- ployment , and other terms and conditions of employment, and that on May 16, 1973, the Board certified the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of all em- ployees in said unit . It is further admitted that on June 2, 1973, and thereafter, the Union requested Respondent to bargain with respect to rates of pay , wages, hours of employ- ment, and other terms and conditions of employment for the employees in the unit descri bed above, and that on or about June 21 , and thereafter Respondent refused and has con- tinued to refuse to recognize and bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of said employees. Respondent denies that at all times since May 16 , 1973, the Union has been and is the representative of a majority of the employees in the described unit and denies that by its conduct it has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act on the ground, as pertinent here, that the certification of representa- tives issued by the Board on May 16, 1973, is void because of conduct which affected the results of the election and which was the subject of timely objections. B. The Objection The objection on which the Board deemed a hearing to be necessary is Respondent's Objection 3, which is as follows: The Petitioner, through its officers, agents, and re- presentatives, at a time which precluded an effective reply by the employer, made substantial misrepresenta- tions concerning the cost of membership in the union by telling employees that they did not have to pay anything to join the union although the union constitution specifi- cally provides otherwise.' C. The Evidence During the election campaign herein a leaflet was dis- tributed among the employees containing the following state- ment "YOU DON'T PAY ANYTHING TO JOIN, THERE ARE NO INITIA- TION FEES' THERE ARE NO ASSESSMENTS' THERE ARE NO LABELED FINES" With respect to the time factor in the Respondent 's Objec- tion 3, Sam Massingill , personnel manager of Sumter Ply- wood, testified that he was given the leaflet quoted above 1 or 2 days prior to the election conducted on November 16, 1972, by an employee who told him it was received in the mail and postmarked Atlanta, Georgia. This employee did not state how long he had had the folder or what the postmark date was. Sylvester Hicks, an employee of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the International , who was assigned to assist in the conduct of the Sumter Plywood organizing campaign, prepared the literature that was disseminated by the Union I The Petitioner and certified representative in Case 10-RC-9346 is the Charging Party, Union herein during the campaign . Hicks testified that all organizing campaign literature was passed out at the road entrance to the plant, and none of the literature distributed among employees at Sumter Plywood was mailed . He prepared the leaflet referred to above and testified that it was dis- tributed at the road entrance on November 7, 1972, under his direction. Respondent conducted its election campaign through the mail In evidence is a letter dated November 6, 1972, on the letterhead of Sumter Plywood Corporation, by which em- ployees were informed, inter aha, that the carpenters (1) charge $6 per month every month for dues, (2) charge at least $25 for an initiation fee, and (3) fine members amounts up to $50 every time they break a union rule. The constitution of the Union approved February 15, 1973, and received in evidence as unchanged in pertinent part from the preceding constitution except as specifically indicated with respect to the minimum monthly dues, provides:2 Initiation Fees Section 23. The Initiation Fees in this District shall not be more than twenty-five dollars ($25.00) nor less than fifteen dollars ($15.00). Arrangements may be made for payment of Initiation Fees by installments . The Initia- tion Fee for Apprentices shall be in accordance with the Constitution and Laws of the United Brotherhood. Where an ex-member has violated any of the Rules and Laws of this Council and has been tried and found guilty of the same and where a fine has been imposed , such fine must be paid before initiation. Working Cards Section 26. Any member who represents himself as a Business Representative or any member acting as such and not having received credentials from the Council or a Business Representative whose credentials have been cancelled and who represents himself as a Business Re- presentative of this Council or Local Union shall for the first offense, after having been tried and if found guilty, be fined a sum of Fifty Dollars ($50.00) and for the second offense if found guilty shall be expelled from the United Brotherhood. Section 28. A. The monthly dues in this Council shall not be less than Five Dollars ($5.00) which must be an adequate sum to enable the Local Unions in this Council to oper- ate in an efficient , proper and solvent manner in the service and best interest of its membership. Miscellaneous Section 45. The Council shall have the power to levy and collect fines for violation of the laws, trade and other rules of the Council. such fines to become part of the revenue of the Council. 2 Credited testimony of Floyd Doolittle , executive secretary-treasurer of the Union since July 1967 , establishes that at the time of the Sumter Ply wood organizing campaign in 1972, the constitution provided for a $5 minimum but the dues structure in effect was $6 and this change was made in the constitution later SUMTER PLYWOOD CORP 229 Section 47 . Affiliated Local Unions may petition the General President to grant special dispensation on initia- tion fee through the Council for organizing purposes, if same is approved by the Executive Committee of the Council. The testimony establishes that union meetings held prior to the election began at 4 p.m., lasted until around 6 p .m., and were held on Sunday afternoons in an abandoned restaurant in Bellamy, Alabama, which was being used as the union hall. The last such meeting was held on November 12 At that meeting 90 persons were present in a hall that measured approximately 12 feet by 16 feet and the people were crowded in, standing along the walls and in front of the windows. During union meetings, including that last one, employees present asked questions relating to information contained in Respondent's campaign literature. Such questions included the subjects of union dues , initiation fees, and fines. Employee Archie Hall testified that he attended only the last union meeting before the election ; that he arrived late and could not get into the hall but stood outside the building and leaned into the window . In this position he was approxi- mately 12 feet away from speaker Hicks . Hall recalled that someone in the audience said they heard union dues would be $6 or $7 a month and Hicks replied they would not be that much but would be $1 or $2.' Testimony of other employees who attended union meetings , and of Hicks who was one of the spokesmen for the Union at those meetings , establishes that employees were repeatedly told dues were $6 a month, and were distributed $ 1.15 to the International and $2 to the Southern Council . Employees asked, and were told, what the International and the Council used those payments for. Fines were discussed in at least one of the meetings and the subject arose because of information in a leaflet distributed by the Respondent. Some employees present at the meeting asked what the fines were for and were told there were no "labeled" fines.' Hicks testified that it was at the Union meeting the last Sunday of October that he discussed initiation fees. The dis- cussion arose because the employees had received a handbill from the Respondent and were raising questions about what the Company was stating in those handbills about initiation fees. In response , Hicks told the employees there were no initiation fees for the first 90 days of a newly organized local; that the Southern Council advocated that there be none; and 3 Hall asserted that he remembered this statement because it was his , understanding that the dues would be $6 or $7 On cross-examination when asked, "isn't it a fact that you were aware all the time that these union dues would be $6 or $7 per month7" Hall answered "No sir I did not know what they would be myself " This self-contradiction , together with the fact that Hall remembered nothing else that was said at that meeting and his tes- timony that he left before it was over at which time it was dark but the lights were on inside the building, raises serious doubts as to the reliability of his testimony Further, despite Respondent 's acknowledged mail campaign, Hall denied that he received a letter from the Respondent stating that dues were $6 or that he saw any such letter on the bulletin board . He also stated that he did not receive circulars or handbills in the mail from the Respond- ent or the Union ' Hicks explained that "labeled" fines referred to a set fine for a set offense and that this was what was meant in the statement "there are no labeled fines " Hicks explained that he used the term "labeled" because it seemed like a good word to describe what he was referring to He further stated he had never known of a fine , "labeled" or otherwise , being levied on a member of an industrial local that on application the local could obtain a continuing waiver of any requirement for initiation fees. Hicks indicated that there were only 67 employees , out of an employee comple- ment of between 250 and 300, present at this meeting, and it was his effort to obtain a wider distribution of this informa- tion and to reach the rest of the employees in answer to the Respondent's campaign literature that precipitated the distri- bution of the November 7 leaflet. In applying the constitutional provisions governing initia- tion fees, Union Officials Hicks and Doolittle testified that any waiver of initiation fees applies to the entire local regard- less of race, creed, color, or whether the membership appli- cant voted for or against the Union and whether or not the applicant signed an authorization card. The waiver of initia- tion fees is referred to as "dispensation." For newly organized groups, an application for a charter is made after the initial contract is negotiated.' When the charter is requested the Union automatically institutes the procedure to obtain a 90- day "dispensation" or waiver of initiation fees. It takes be- tween 3 weeks and a month to receive a charter . After the charter is received and installed the 90-day period begins to run. During ,the 90 days the local may request the Union to grant a continuing dispensation from the constitutional provision for initiation fees. Such dispensation is automati- cally granted. As a result 95 percent of the locals in right-to- work states charge no initiation fee.' However, the determi- nation is up to the local union. D. The Respondent 's Contentions Relying on Hollywood Ceramics Company, Inc., 140 NLRB 221 (1962), Respondent asserts that in its election campaign the Union engaged in a material misrepresentation involving a substantial departure from the truth at a time when the Respondent was prevented from making an effec- tive reply; therefore, the misrepresentation, whether deliber- ate or not, may reasonably be expected to have had a signifi- cant impact on the election . Respondent points out that the personnel manager received the offending union handbill on November 14 or 15, which would have been 1 or 2 days prior to the election . As the polls opened at 6:30 a.m. on November 16, under Peerless Plywood Company, 107 NLRB 427 ( 1953), the Respondent was prevented from making a captive audi- ence speech to the employees on the subject of union initia- tion fees after 6:30 a.m . on November 15. Respondent also notes that as Archie Hall did not inform it of what he had heard in the union meeting , Respondent was without knowl- edge of the misrepresentation concerning union dues until after the election. Respondent claims that although it had issued a letter on the subject of union policy and procedures, 5 Hicks testified that if there is no contract signed, no initiation fee is ever charged because initiation fees are charged by a local union and "If you don't have a contract you don't have a union " 6 Reference is to industrial type locals under the Southern Council, in contrast with "beneficial" local unions of the International wherein the local union functions as a hiring hall for construction jobs Those locals charge initiation fees Doolittle testified that to his knowledge no local has ever been refused a continuing dispensation, and Hicks asserted that in his 17 years with the International he had never known of any industrial local member being required to pay an initiation fee in a right -to-work state, and in such states , of which Alabama is one, the union advocates that the locals choose never to charge initiation fees 230 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD which included statements regarding the cost of initiation fees, dues, and fines, the subjec. matter represented was one on which the employees could expect the Union to be more knowledgeable than their Employer; therefore, the only effec- tive reply, if in fact an effective reply by the Respondent could have been made, would have been to furnish employees a copy of the Union's constitution and conduct a captive audi- ence speech in which the pertinent provisions were read so as to insure that they were communicated in an authoritative manner to the employees. Respondent argues that, even though the Union regularly grants dispensation of the initia- tion fee for the first 90 days of the initial contract and thereafter extends such dispensation on application of the local union, it is not true that there is no initiation fee since the constitutions of both the Southern Council and the In- ternational provide for initiation fees, and any waiver is subject to approval by those organizations. In these cir- cumstances, Respondent asserts the mere statement that there are no initiation fees is erroneous and misleading to employees who are unsophisticated in union matters. Therefore, Respondent contends the discussions at union meetings were insufficient to dispell the misrepresentation involved. In conclusion, Respondent argues that the record shows employees had a misunderstanding con- cerning the matter of initiation fees and union dues on November 16, 1974, as a result of the communications to them by the petitioning Union; that the Respondent be- came aware of such misrepresentations at a time which precluded an effective reply; and that the misrepresen- tations made were substantial and of a type that could affect the outcome of an election, thus bringing into question the validity of the Union's certification as the statutory represen- tative of its employees. E. Analysis and Conclusions Considered only in light of the Union's constitutional provisions, two of the quoted statements contained in the Union's leaflet of November 7, 1972, are not entirely accu- rate. Thus, section 23 of the constitution provides for initia- tion fees, while section 47 provides a procedure through which special dispensation on initiation fees for organizing purposes may be requested, and section 26 sets forth a specific fine for a stated offense, albeit of a nature that in all probabil- ity would be of little interest to employees in deciding how to vote in a representation election. Further, sections 23 and 45 indicate that the Union has the power to fine members for violations of "the Rules and Laws" of the Union. However, the inconsistencies between the constitutional prrvisions and the flat statements made in the handbill distributed to em- ployees on November 7, must be considered in the context of the entire campaign, for such statements do not stand alone. Clearly, as demonstrated by the literature circulated by both the Union and the Respondent, and by testimony con- cerning employees' questions during the various union meet- ings, the matter of union initiation fees, dues, and fines were a subject of inquiry and a prominent issue in the campaign.' ' Copies of Respondent's campaign material other than the November 6 letter were not presented There is, however, no denial of the Union's testimony that it was in response to assertions in company literature that I do not accept Hall's testimony as an accurate reflection of what was said at the last meeting. As previously indicated, his own explanation of the reason he remembers this and his contradiction of that explanation on cross-examination is suf- ficient to reveal his testimony as unreliable. In addition, al- though other employee witnesses were not too cognizant of the distinction between dues and initiation fees, their tes- timony and that of the official union spokesman indicates that what Hall understood as the amount of dues that would be charged was, in reality, the Union's explanation of the distribution of the dues made between the local, the Interna- tional, and the Southern Council. Therefore, I find no misre- presentation with respect to dues, and need not consider Re- spondent's further arguments related thereto. With respect to initiation fees, the Union's statement in the bulletin of November 7 is not a complete and full explanation but, in the context of the Union's established practice and the information previously supplied employees at meetings, it is not a misrepresentation. Nor is the dispensation practice util- ized herein the type of vote buying involved in N.L.R.B. v. Savair Manufacturing Co., 414 U.S. 270 (1973). The waiver of initiation fees applied to all employees joining a newly established local during the 90 days after the Union entered into its first contract and then established such a local. It applied to every employee during the stated period, and for a continuing indefinite period upon the local's application after the expiration of the 90-day period. There remains the statement concerning fines. As previ- ously noted, the bulletin is inaccurate in this respect. For, accepting the definition of "labeled" fines given by its origina- tor "as a set fine for a set offense" section 26 of the Union's constitution establishes a "labeled" fine. It is immaterial that the error may well have been unintentional.' The one "la- beled fine" in the constitution related to falsely claiming au- thority as a business agent of the Union. Clearly this was not an issue of vital concern to employees in deciding how to vote in the election. I conclude that the subject of fines levied against imposters was not material to the campaign issues. Insofar as employees were concerned with what specific fines for what conduct they would generally subject themselves to by becoming members, Hicks' reply may have been evasive but it was not a misrepresentation. Moreover, Respondent had already addressed its campaign literature to all of these subjects, including the subject of fines, before the Union's November 7, bulletin. Finally, this was not a new campaign subject and there is no requirements that either party be given the last word or that each must be able to convince employees of the truth of that party's particular statements. On the basis of the foregoing and the entire record in this brought about discussions of initiation fees, dues, and fines at the various meetings In addition, as Respondent's own campaign literature is presuma- bly available to it, and it is the burden of the party challenging the election to support its objections, I find that company literature on these subjects was distributed among employees in October as well as on November 6, 1972 Although there are differing recollections as to precisely which of these subjects were discussed at particular meetings, it is clear that each was the subject of questions and explanations at one time or another, well before the election 8 It would seem safe to assume that both the employees who raised the questions about what fines were for at the union meeting and Hicks in answering them, when he first stated that there were no labeled fines, had in mind fines for violations of union rules and laws SUMTER PLYWOOD CORP. 231 case, I conclude that the statements in the Union's November 7 bulletin did not constitute a substantial misrepresentation of a material fact in issue in the campaign which would reasonably be expected to have a significant impact on the election and that Objection 3 is without merit. Accordingly, I find that since May 16, 1973, the Union has been and is the duly certified majority representative of the employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit and that Respondent has failed since June 2, 1973, and has refused since June 21, 1973, to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive represen- tative of the employees in the appropriate unit. By such fail- ure and refusal Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Sumter Plywood Corporation is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Southern Council of Industrial Workers, United Broth- erhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. All full-time and regular part-time production and maintenance employees, including yard employees, quality control employees, maintenance, yard and green and lead- men, the head electrician, foresters and forester helpers, loader and dozier operators, truckdrivers, procurement and stock room clerks, employed by Respondent at its Livingston, Alabama, facility, but excluding all office clerical employees, professional employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for purposes of collec- tive bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 4. Since May 16, 1973, the Union has been and is, by virtue of Section 9(a) of the Act, the exclusive representative of all the employees in the unit described above for purposes of collective bargaining. 5. On or about June 2, 1973, and thereafter, the Union requested Respondent to bargain . By failing on June 2, 1973, and by refusing on June 21, 1973, and thereafter, to bargain collectively with the above-named labor organization as the exclusive bargaining representative of all the employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sec- tion 8(a)(5) of the Act. 6. By the aforesaid refusal to bargain Respondent has inter- fered with , restrained, and coerced, and is interfering with, restraining, and coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to them in Section 7 of the Act, and thereby has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. ordered to cease and desist therefrom and upon request bar- gain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representa- tive of all employees in the appropriate unit and if an under- standing is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. In order to insure that the employees in the appropriate unit will be accorded the services of their selected bargaining agent for the period provided by law it shall be recommended that the initial period of certification be construed as begin- ning on the date Respondent commehces to bargain in good faith with the Union as the recognized bargaining representa- tive in the appropriate unit . (See Mar-Jac Poultry Company, Inc., 136 NLRB 785 (1962); Commerce Company d/b/a La- mar Hotel, 140 NLRB 226, 229 ( 1962), enfd . 328 F.2d 600 (C.A. 5), cert. denied 379 U.S. 817 ( 1964); Burnett Construc- tion Company, 149 NLRB 1419, 1421 ( 1964), enfd . 350 F.2d 57 (C.A. 10, 1965). Upon the basis of the entire record I make the following recommended: ORDER' Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that Respondent, Sumter Plywood Corporation, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to bargain collectively concerning rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment with Southern Council of Industrial Workers, United Broth- erhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees in the following appropriate unit: All full-time and regular part-time production and maintenance employees including yard employees, qual- ity control employees; maintenance, yard and green end leadmen, the head electrician, foresters and forester helpers, loader and dozier operators, truckdrivers, pro- curement and stock room clerks, employed by Respond- ent at its Livingston, Alabama facility, but excluding all office clerical employees, professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain- ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights gua- ranteed them in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, bargain with the above-named labor or- ganization as the exclusive representative of all employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment and, if an understanding is reached, embody such under- standing in a signed agreement. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in and is en- gaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, I shall recommend that it be 9 In the event no exceptions are filed to this recommended Order as provided by Section 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Section 10(c) of the Act and in Section 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes 232 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (b) Post at its Livingston, Alabama, plant, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."" Copies of said no- tice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 10, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea- sonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 10 in writing within 20 days of the date of this Order what steps have been taken to comply herewith. 10 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively concerning rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and condi- tions of employment with Southern Council of Indus- trial Workers, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive re- presentative of our employees in the bargaining unit de- scribed below. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL, upon request, bargain with the above- named Union, as the exclusive representative of all em- ployees in the bargaining unit described below, with re- spect to rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agree- ment. The bargaining unit is: All full-time and regular part-time production and maintenance employees including yard employees, quality control employees; maintenance, yard and green end leadmen, the head electrician, foresters and forester helpers, loader and dozier operators, truck- drivers, procurement and stock room clerks, at the Livingston, Alabama plant, but excluding all office clerical employees, professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. SUMTER PLYWOOD CORPORATION