Teamsters Local No. 83

TEAMSTERS LOCAL NO. 83 Construction, Building Materials & Miscellaneous Drivers, Local No. 83, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware- housemen & Helpers of America and Allied Concrete, Inc. Cases 28-CC-591 and 28-CB-1074 August 31, 1977 DECISION AND ORDER On October 19, 1976, Administrative Law Judge Russell L. Stevens issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep- tions and a supporting brief, the General Counsel filed an answering brief, and the Charging Party adopted the General Counsel's brief as its own. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision ih light of the exceptions and briefs' and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge only to the extent consistent herewith. The issue here is whether Respondent violated the secondary boycott provisions of the Act by engaging in ambulatory picketing around an employer's trucks at a construction site. We conclude that it did not. Ashton Company, Inc. (Ashton), is a general contractor engaged in the construction of a highway overpass near Phoenix, Arizona. Allied Concrete, Inc. (Allied), which processes, mixes, and delivers ready-mix concrete, contracted with Ashton to supply concrete for the project. Allied employs 20 to 50 drivers. Its most recent collective-bargaining contract with Respondent ex- pired May 31, 1976,2 and no new contract had been agreed upon as of the date of the hearing. Respon- dent struck Allied on June 25 and the strike was still continuing as of the date of the hearing. The controversy here involves Allied's attempts to deliver concrete to the project on two occasions during the strike. Prior to making any deliveries, Allied posted signs at roads leading to the jobsite, designating one entrance for Allied employees and suppliers, and two entrances for those of Ashton and all other contractors. Allied notified Respondent of the designations. On July 20, a delivery of concrete was attempted. Three vehicles containing picketers accompanied Allied's truck, fore and aft, along the route from its plant to the highway jobsite. Upon arrival, both Allied's truck and the vehicles contain- ing the picketers entered the project area through one of the entrances designated for use of Allied employees and then proceeded to the concrete pour site. The picketers then left their vehicles and picketed Allied's truck with signs reading: "Picketing ' The Respondent has requested oral argument. This request is hereby denied as the record. the exceptions, and the briefs adequately present the issues and the positions of the parties. 231 NLRB No. 181 Teamsters Local 83 on strike against Allied Con- crete." In response thereto, Ashton's employees walked off the job. Later the same day, Respondent's shop steward, Walker, told Ashton's foreman, Parker (who was a teamster and joined the other Ashton employees in walking off the job), that he appreciat- ed the action they had taken. Allied attempted another delivery on July 27. As before, picketers followed the Allied truck to the pour site and picketed around the truck with identical signs, with the result that the Ashton employees walked off the job. Respondent contends that it had not only the right, but also the duty to follow Allied's mixer trucks onto the jobsite and to picket "between the headlights." In applying the secondary boycott provisions of the Act, the Board must balance the interests of unions in picketing at the sites of their disputes against the interests of secondary employers to be free from picketing arising out of controversies in which they are not directly involved. Where both the primary and secondary employers are working at the same jobsite, as in many construction projects. the com- mon job situs affects the rights of both secondary employers and the picketing unions. In Sailors' Union of the Pacific, AFL (Moore Dry Dock Company), 92 NLRB 547, 549 (1950), the Board established four criteria by which to measure the presumptive lawfulness of picketing in common situs situations. Such picketing is presumptively lawful if: "(a) the picketing is strictly limited to times when the situs of dispute is located on the secondary employ- er's premises; (b) at the time of the picketing the primary employer is engaged in its normal business at the situs,' (c) the picketing is limited to places reasonably close to the location of the situs; and (d) the picketing discloses clearly that the dispute is with the primary employer." While picketing in compli- ance with these requirements is not lawful per se, the criteria are, nevertheless, instructive in analyzing whether certain picketing is primary or secondary in nature. International Brotherhood of Electrical Work- ers, Local Union 861, and Arneth Lard, its Agent (Plauche Electric, Inc.), 135 NLRB 250 (1962). There is no dispute that Respondent's picketing here met these criteria. The issue is whether it exceeded the permissible limits of criterion "c" and revealed an intent to appeal to employees of a neutral employer. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Truck Drivers and Chauffeurs, Local Union No. 807 (Schultz Refrigerated Service, Inc.), 87 NLRB 502 (1949), is both factually and legally analogous to the picketing here. Although Schultz had a terminal, it ran its 2 All dates herein are in 1976. unless otherwise indicated. 1097 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD transportation business primarily through a large fleet of commercial trucks. Striking employees followed Schultz' delivery trucks to various locations where pickups and deliveries were made. The employees picketed only around the trucks at the point of pickup and/or delivery. A Board majority found such ambulatory picketing to be lawful primary activity. In their view, Schultz' business was not confined to its terminal because a substantial number of transactions occurred at the locations of its customers where deliveries were made. Thus, the only effective way for the union there to bring direct pressure on Schultz was to picket "between the headlights" of the trucks as they made their deliveries to the customers. It would have been pointless to require the union to limit its picketing to Schultz' warehouse since this would not permit the union to effectively communicate its appeal to the public. As long as the picketing was confined "between the headlights" of Schultz' trucks at the neutral employ- ers' premises, the union was able to communicate its dispute with Schultz to the public while the neutral employers-i.e., Schultz' customers-were free from interference in the conduct of their business. In our judgment, Schultz is dispositive of the instant matter. Like Schultz, Allied's business of delivering readymade concrete is conducted not only at its terminal where the concrete is made, but also at the pour sites where the concrete is delivered to customers like Ashton. Respondent had a right to communicate its dispute with Allied to the public by picketing Allied's trucks wherever they happened to be, not only at the terminal but at the pour sites as well. By picketing only "between the headlights" of Allied's trucks with signs indicating that their dispute was confined to Allied, the picketers avoided all direct interference with neutral employers, including Ashton. Thus, the picketing conformed with the third criterion of Moore Dry Dock, discussed supra, as well with the other criteria, and consequently was presumptively lawful. In determining the validity of Respondent's picket- ing, the facts that Ashton's employees walked off the jobsite and Respondent's shop steward told Ashton's foreman that he appreciated the action Ashton's employees had taken are irrelevant. Respondent's object in picketing, if otherwise lawful, may not be rendered unlawful merely because neutral employees elect to respect the picket line. In the General Electric case,3 the Supreme Court stated that: "picketing which induces secondary employees to respect a picket line is not the equivalent of picketing which has an object of inducing those employees to engage in concerted conduct against their employer in order :' Local 761, International Union of Electrical, Radio d Machine Workers, A FL-CIO [General Electric Company] v. N.L R.B., 366 U.S. 667 (1%961). to force him to refuse to deal with the struck employer." 366 U.S. at 673-674. Accordingly, the fact that Respondent appreciated the support which it received when the Ashton employees walked off the job does not bring its otherwise lawful primary activity within the purview of the secondary boycott provisions of the Act. Our dissenting colleagues have failed to recognize that lawful ambulatory picketing, as the picketing herein clearly was, and the establishment of a reserved gate are not mutually exclusive. In the view of our colleagues, if an employer sets up a reserved gate, then primary picketing anywhere else becomes secondary. Thus our colleagues seem to imply that primary ambulatory picketing on one side of the Allied sign is lawful primary picketing, but that same picketing on the other side of the sign is unlawful secondary picketing. The logic of that conclusion escapes us. Entry onto the premises in order to picket the truck as closely as possible to the primary situs may constitute trespass if the owner of the premises validly limits the right of entry, but the conduct does not thereby become secondary picketing. Here. the Union picketed only where Allied primary employees performed their duties, i.e., near the trucks located at the pour site, and at no time picketed at points reserved only for neutral employ- ees. The fact that neutral employees are nearby and participating in the same work as the primary employees does not convert the primary picketing to secondary activity. Our colleagues seem to think that establishment of a reserved gate somehow limits a union's right to engage in primary picketing elsewhere. But peaceful primary picketing of any type and at any location is explicitly permitted by the statute, regardless of the effect on neutral employers' operations. Primary picketing does not become less than primary or unlawful simply because there are other locations at which it might be carried on out of sight or hearing of, or having other effects on, neutral employees. Nothing in Denver Building Trades4 suggests other- wise. The "accommodation of conflicting rights" by limiting primary picketing, which our colleagues seem to think desirable, is in fact an importation of their own preferences into the Act which specifically provides to the contrary; and they support the importation only by a Supreme Court decision which did not in any way touch the issue. If the picketing is primary, no "accommodation" or limitation is, or can be, proper. Indeed, this Was the reason underly- ing the reserved gate principle to which Denver Building Trades led, to separate the primary picketing from secondary picketing, by separating the primary I N.LR.B. v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council, et al. [Gould & Preisner]. 341 U.S. 675 (1951). 1098 TEAMSTERS LOCAL NO. 83 and neutral operations in order that lawful picketing of mixed operations would not shut down the entire project. Allowing reserved gate picketing rules to define and control lawful primary picketing, as our colleagues would do, makes the bat boy's activity determine the ball game. The "gates" herein were merely signs along what appears to have been a public right of way, and were established by Allied, the primary employer, rather than by the owner of the overpass site or the general contractor-the parties who traditionally establish reserved gates. This allowed Allied-the primary employer-to make all decisions relative to the establishment of the signs, including their wording and placement.5 Allied's initiative in establishing the "reserved gates" is significant, for Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) is intended to protect the rights of neutral employers and was not designed for the aid and convenience of primary employers. In view of the foregoing, we find that Respondent Union engaged in lawful primary picketing and did not violate Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (iiXB) of the Act. Accordingly, we shall dismiss the complaint in its entirety. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the complaint herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. MEMBERS PENELLO AND WALTHER, dissenting: The issue here is whether Respondent could legally ignore the reserved gates, proceed onto the actual worksite, and picket at the concrete pour site. Contrary to the majority, we believe that the Administrative Law Judge correctly found that Respondent's picketing on the actual worksite- rather than at the gate reserved for the primary employer-violated the secondary boycott provisions of the Act. Accordingly, we dissent. The controversy involves attempts by the primary employer, Allied, to deliver concrete to a highway construction project on two occasions, July 20 and 27. There is no dispute between general contractor Ashton and Respondent. Allied, after conferring with Ashton, established clearly marked reserved gates at the jobsite, one for Allied employees and suppliers and two for those of Ashton and all other contractors. The gate reserved for Allied was placed approximately 300 yards away from the center of the project. On July 19, Allied : We note that Allied, taking advantage of its initiative in this regard, placed the reserved gate for its own employees over 300 yards from the pour site. notified Respondent of all details concerning the reserved gates. On July 20, a delivery of concrete was attempted. Three vehicles containing Respondent's picketers accompanied Allied's truck, fore and aft, along its route to the jobsite. Upon arrival, the truck stopped at Allied's reserved gate to learn where the concrete should be delivered. It then entered into the interior of the jobsite and proceeded to the pour site where two of the carloads of picketers awaited. When the third car of picketers arrived shortly thereafter, the picketers left their vehicles and picketed the truck with signs reading: "Picketing Teamsters Local 83 on strike against Allied Concrete." In response, Ash- ton's employees walked off the job. Since there were no longer any employees available to handle the concrete, the fully loaded truck had to return to Allied's plant. Later that day, Respondent's shop steward, Walk- er, told Ashton Foreman Parker (who was a teamster and joined the other Ashton employees in walking off the job) that he appreciated the action they had taken. Parker replied, "It was our duty, it was an authorized [T]eamsters' strike and we weren't al- lowed to work behind picket lines." Allied attempted another delivery on July 27. Again, picketers followed the Allied truck through the reserved gate to the concrete pour site and picketed the truck with identical signs. As before, the Ashton employees walked off the job. By letter dated July 27, Ashton canceled its contract with Allied because of the picketing. Section 8(bX4) and its proviso were enacted by Congress in response to the conflict between the interests of unions in picketing employers with whom they have primary disputes and the interests of neutral employers in being free from becoming enmeshed therein. As the Supreme Court stated in N. L R. B. v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council, et al. [Gould & Preisner], 341 U.S. 675, 692, there exist in this area "the dual congressional objectives of preserving the right of labor organiza- tions to bring pressure to bear on offending employ- ers in primary labor disputes and of shielding unoffending employers and others from pressures in controversies not their own." Resolution of such conflicting interests becomes particularly difficult in cases involving "ambulatory" or "common" situs picketing where both the primary and secondary employers are engaged in operations at the same geographical location. While Moore Dry Dock established guidelines to aid in resolving these conflicting interests, such guidelines are evidentiary in nature and are to be employed only in the absence 1099 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD of more direct evidence as to the intent and purposes of the particular labor organization involved in each case. N.L.R.B. v. International Hod Carriers, Building and Common Laborers' Union of America, Local No. 1140, AFL-CIO [Gilmore Construction Co.], 285 F.2d 397 at 401 (C.A. 8, 1960), cert. denied 366 U.S. 903 (1961). Therefore, compliance with the four Moore Dry Dock requirements does not necessarily make a union's picketing lawful where other evidence reveals an unlawful secondary objective. General Teamster, Warehouse and Dairy Employees Union Local No. 126 affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Team- sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America; Local #139, etc. (Ready Mixed Concrete, Inc.), 200 NLRB 253, 254-255 (1972); New York Mailer's Union No. 6, International Typographical Union, AFL-CIO [N. Y. Herald Tribune, Inc. & Neo- Gravure Printing Co.] v. N.L.R.B., 316 F.2d 371, 372 (C.A.D.C., 1963).6 Additionally, where a primary and neutral employer engage in business at a common situs (including a temporary common situs where, for example, a trucking firm's ambulatory situs interfaces with the permanent situs of another employer), a union's picketing must "be so conduct- ed as to minimize its impact on neutral employees [and employers] insofar as this can be done without substantial impairment of the effectiveness of the picketing in reaching the primary employees [and employer]." Wire Service Guild, Local 222, The Newspaper Guild, AFL-CIO-CLC (The Miami Her- ald Publishing Company), 218 NLRB 1234, 1238 (1975) (dissent of Members Penello and Kennedy). Application of the aforementioned principles dic- tates our adoption of the Administrative Law Judge's finding that Respondent violated Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act. Respondent could have effectively accomplished its legitimate objective of communicating its dispute with Allied to Allied's employees had it limited its picketing to the gate reserved for Allied's employees and suppliers while Allied employees made their deliveries at the pour i As stated bv the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in N.L. R.B. v. Northern California District Council of Hod Carriers and Common Laborers of Anmerica. A FL (10, Construction and General Laborers Union, Local No. 185_. AFL (CO1, 389 F.2d 721. 725 (C.A. 9, 1968): Respondent next argues that the picketing was primary and not secondary in nature in that it complied with the requirements for primary picketing established by the Board in Moore Dry Dock Co., 92 NLRB 547 (1950). It would appear that its reliance on this doctrine is misplaced. Moore Dry Dock does not establish a formula whereby picketing with a secondary object can be done lawfully. Rather, it simply establishes [an ] evidentiary aid for the Board to determine the object of picketing where the other evidence is equivocal. The Board is not bound by the inference of lawfulness from compliance with the VMoore Drv Dock standards. ICitations omitted.] 7 The pour site was only 300 yards from the Allied gate. Record evidence establishes that the pour site was clearly visible from the Allied gate, and, similarly. the Allied gate was clearly visible from the pour site. site and during the time when the Allied trucks made their way from the pour site until they actually exited the reserved gate. 7 At the same time, Respondent's honoring of the reserved gate would have insulated Ashton from any interference arising out of its labor dispute with Allied. Instead, the picketers ignored the reserved gate (which they earlier had been informed about in writing and in detail) and picketed directly at the pour site-and, in direct response thereto, Ashton's employees walked off the job. These actions indicate a complete unwillingness on Respondent's part to minimize its impact on neutral employer Ashton and demonstrates Respondent's intent to enmesh Ashton and its employees in the dispute in which it engaged with Allied. Thus, such conduct constitutes prima facie evidence of Respondent's unlawful object. We are not surprised that the majority is unable to understand the logic of our conclusion since they apparently imply that all ambulatory picketing is primary in nature and therefore per se lawful. An example of their misunderstanding is their statement that "[o]ur colleagues seem to think that the establishment of a reserved gate somehow limits a union's right to engage in primary picketing else- where." (Emphasis supplied.) s Our dissent does not provide that a union is prohibited in all instances from picketing an ambulatory site on the premises inside a gate reserved for the primary employer. Rather, we conclude that such a prohibition exists only when the union could have otherwise effectively accomplished its objective without enmeshing the neutral secondary employer by picketing inside the reserved gate at the actual common situs.9 This result, contrary to the majority's per se approach, comports with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the congressional intent of Section 8(b)(4)-to accommodate the legitimate rights of both labor organizations and neutral employers.10 In each case, the Board should weigh the evidence carefully in 8 This quotation from the majority's opinion demonstrates that they have attempted to "rig" the "ball game" (to borrow their vernacular) by utilizing their familiar device of inserting the word "primary" before the word "picketing." This tool enables even an otherwise questionable assertion to have a particularly persuasive ring. Instead, the majority should fairly analyze the facts in this case in order to determine if the picketing was primary or secondary. (See, e.g., our analysis employed in fn. 9 of our dissent, infra.) 9 For example, if the pour site in this case was not clearly visible from the reserved gate, we would have been more inclined to find the picketing to have been primary in nature. I' See, e.g., Denver Building and Construction Trades Council, supra at 692; International Rice Milling Co., Inc., et al. v. N.L.R.B., 341 U.S. 665, 673, fn. 7 (1951); N.LR.B. v. Local 825, International Union of Operating Engineers IBurns and Roe, Inc.], 400 U.S. 297. 302-303 (1971). The majority's per se approach completely ignores these cases insofar as the Supreme Court interpreted the legislative intent of the secondary activity provisions of the Act. 1100 TEAMSTERS LOCAL NO. 83 order to seek accommodation of the conflicting rights of the parties. We note that the majority has made an unwarrant- ed accusation that we have imported our own preferences into the Act because we seek to "accom- modate conflicting rights." Such a pronouncement, however, not only clearly flies in the face of many Supreme Court decisions,1 but also impeaches the majority's own statement made earlier in their opinion, wherein they said: "In applying the secon- dary boycott provisions of the Act, the Board must balance the interests of unions in picketing at the sites of their disputes against the interests of secondary employers to be free from picketing arising out of controversies in which they are not directly involved." Our colleagues rely on Schultz Refrigerated Service, Inc., supra, for the proposition that it is lawful for a union to picket a primary employer's trucks on the premises of neutral employers if such picketing is conducted only "between the headlights." However, Schultz is inapposite as no reserved gate system (or other alternative picketing location) was established at the premises of any of the neutral employers involved in that proceeding. Here, conversely, properly established reserved gates put Respondent on notice regarding those areas where it could appropriately appeal to Allied's employees. We attach no significance to the fact that the gates here were established by Allied, the primary employ- er. For, such was done only after full consultation and agreement between Allied and neutral employer Ashton. Moreover, while reserved gates are often set up at the initiative of secondary employers, it makes no legal or substantive difference who establishes them. Nor was there any element in the physical location of the gates which negates their lawfulness. The Allied gate was only 300 yards from the concrete pour site and was established at an appropriate, commonly traveled entrance to the jobsite. As stated above, the Allied gate was clearly visible from the pour site. Moreover, the picketers further communi- cated their dispute to Allied employees and the public by picketing Allied's terminal and its trucks en route to the pour site. Therefore, we disagree with the majority's contention that by limiting Respondent's pickets to the area at the reserved gate the picketers were prevented from communicating their dispute with the drivers of Allied's trucks. Finally, we cannot agree with Respondent's con- tention that the picketers had a duty to enter the jobsite and picket Allied's trucks. Local Union #612, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, a/w Interna- tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware- housemen and Helpers of America, Ind (AAA Motor Lines, Inc.), 211 NLRB 608 (1974), cited by Respon- dent in support of this proposition, merely holds that-under circumstances in which no reserved gates are established-the Moore Dry, Dock require- ment that picketing be "reasonably close to the location of the situs" is not met when picketers refrain from requesting permission to picket "be- tween the headlights" and, instead, picket at or near the entrance to a neutral employer's premises. Here, unlike AAA Motor Lines, there was a gate reserved for the primary employer and its employees. And, even if there hadn't been, Respondent's pickets made no request to enter the premises for the purpose of picketing "between the headlights." Moreover, ab- sent evidence to the contrary, we regard the very establishment of a reserved gate for the primary employer as constituting an implicit denial of permission to enter the neutral premises for picketing purposes. Cf. Teamsters "General" Local Union No. 200 (Reilly Cartage, Inc.), 183 NLRB 305 (1970). Accordingly, we would adopt the Administrative Law Judge's finding that the Respondent violated the secondary boycott provisions of the Act. " See cases cited at fn. 10. supra. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE RUSSELL L. STEVENS, Administrative Law Judge: This matter was heard at Phoenix, Arizona, on August 31, 1976.1 The complaint in Case 28-CC-591, issued on August 13, is based upon a charge filed on July 27 by Allied Concrete, Inc., hereinafter referred to as Allied. The complaint alleges that Construction, Building Materials & Miscellaneous Drivers, Local No. 83, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, hereinafter referred to as Respondent or as the Union, violated Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act. The complaint in Case 28-CB-1074, issued on August 18, is based upon a charge filed by Allied on July 16. The complaint alleges that the Union violated Section 8(bX )(1)(A) of the Act. On August 18 the Regional Director for Region 28 of the National Labor Relations Board issued an order consolidating the two above-described cases for hearing. General Counsel moved at the hearing to sever Case 28-CB-1074 on the ground that the parties, with approval of the Acting Regional Director for Region 28, had settled the controversy involved in the case. The motion was granted and Case 28- CC-591 was heard as aforesaid. All parties were given full opportunity to participate, to introduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to argue orally, and to file briefs. Briefs, which I All dates hereinafter are within 1976, unless stated to be otherwise. 1101 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD have been carefully considered, were filed on behalf of the General Counsel, the Union, and the Charging Party. Upon the entire record and from my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY The Ashton Company, Inc. (herein called Ashton), is a corporation organized under, and existing by virtue of, the laws of the State of Arizona and maintains its principal office and place of business in Tucson, Arizona. Ashton is engaged in business as a general contractor in the building and construction industry. During the past calendar year, which period is representative of its annual operations generally, Ashton purchased and caused to be transported in interstate commerce and delivered to its places of business in Arizona goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly from suppliers located in States of the United States other than the State of Arizona. I find that Ashton is, and at all times material herein has been, a person and an employer engaged in commerce and in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 2(1), (2), (6), and (7) and 8(b)(4) of the Act. Allied is a corporation organized under, and existing by virtue of, the laws of the State of Arizona, with its principal office and place of business in Phoenix, Arizona. Allied is engaged in the business of processing, mixing, and delivering ready-mix concrete. During the past calendar year, which period is representative of its annual opera- tions generally, Allied sold goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 to Ashton in connection with the construction of highway overpass structures located on Interstate Highway 10 near Buckeye, Arizona. I find that Allied is, and at all times material herein has been, a person and an employer engaged in commerce and in an industry affecting commerce and within the meaning of Sections 2(1), (2), (6), and (7) and 8(b)(4) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Construction, Building Materials & Miscellaneous Driv- ers, Local No. 83, affiliated with International Brother- hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America is, and at all times material herein has been, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 111. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Background Ashton is the general contractor on a job outside Phoenix involving construction of overpasses on the Ehrenberg-Phoenix Highway, Interstate 10 (I-10). Allied is a subcontractor of Ashton, committed by contract dated November 26, 1975, to supply ready-mix concrete for the 2 This description of direction is for simplicity. True direction is more nearly east northeast-west southwest, as shown on Resp. Exh. I. :' This distance is shown on Resp. Exh. I, which was used at the heanng bys agreement of counsel. The distance differs from Newell's testimony, which fixed the distance as "at least two and maybe three" miles. overpass job described above. John Newell is president of Allied; Red Coleman is Ashton's job superintendent. Allied employs from 20 to 50 drivers for its trucks, those drivers being represented by the Union. The most recent contract between Allied and the Union expired May 31 and since that date the parties have negotiated, but they have been unable to arrive at a settlement of their differences. A new contract has not been signed. Union employees commenced a strike at Allied on June 25, and since that date have picketed Allied premises and contin- ued their strike. Ashton is not involved in any dispute with the Union. 1-10 is under construction at and near the Ashton jobsite. The highway runs in an almost east-west direction 2 at the jobsite. The highway is closed to general traffic for a considerable distance both east and west of the jobsite. Miller Road is to cross 1-10 in a north-south direction by means of an overpass bridge which is one of the structures being built at the jobsite by Ashton. Oglesby Road, approximately 1-1/2 miles 3 west of Miller Road, also is to cross 1-10 in a north-south direction by means of an overpass bridge now under construction by Ashton. The east-west roadbed of 1-10 at and near the jobsite is not completed, and is not paved. The median strip and rights of way are graded, but not completed. The controversy herein arose as a result of Allied's attempts to deliver concrete to the jobsite on two occasions, July 20 and 27. On each occasion the attempt was not successful because of picketing, as discussed below. General Counsel alleges in the complaint that the picketing engaged in by Allied employees and the Union on July 20 and 27 was in defiance of reserved gates established by Allied, was illegal, and resulted in Ashton's employees engaging in work stoppages and refusals to work, thereby causing Ashton to terminate Allied's ready- mix contract described above. B. Establishment of Reserved Gates Newell testified that on July 19, the day prior to attempting to deliver concrete to thejobsite, he printed two signs and installed them at three places. Newell credibly testified that on July 19, before printing and posting the signs, he went to the jobsite and talked with Coleman and with Ashton's vice president about the location for the signs "to interfere the least with their operations and their people." By letter dated July 19 and hand-delivered that day,4 Allied notified Local 83 of the reserved gates to be established. The letter reads as follows: Your Union is presently engaged in a dispute with Allied Concrete, Inc. This is to notify your labor organization of the establishment of separate entrances for various con- tractors on the Ashton 1-10 Highway construction project being built by Ashton Construction, as general Respondent admits receipt of this letter. Newell also testified that Local 428 was notified by letter that the signs would be posted. 1102 TEAMSTERS LOCAL NO. 83 contractor. These separate entrances will be established on or before 6:00 a.m. July 20, 1976, near Buckeye, Arizona. A separate entrance has been established for the exclusive use of Allied Concrete, Inc., its employees and suppliers, approximately 300 yards east of the Miller Road overpass on the west bound lane of 1-10. Two separate entrances have been established for Ashton Construction, and all other contractors, their employees and suppliers at either Miller Road south of 1-10 overpass or at the Oglesby Road and 1-10 overpass. Please confine your picketing to the gate reserved for the exclusive use of Allied. Failure to confine your pickets to the Allied entrance will be considered an attempt to enmesh neutral employers in your dispute with Allied and secondary boycott charges will be brought against your Union under the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. Newell credibly testified that he posted the aforesaid signs on July 19. One was posted on the right-hand shoulder of the Miller Road off the ramp going west, about 300 yards east of the Miller Road overpass. Counsel stipulated that this sign read as follows: THIS ENTRANCE RESERVED FOR THE EXCLUSIVE USE OF ALLIED CONCRETE COMPANY, ITS EMPLOYEES AND SUPPLIERS. ALL OTHER CONTRACTORS, THEIR EMPLOYEES AND SUPPLIERS, MUST USE THE ENTRANCES LOCATED AT EITHER OGLESBY AND 1-10 OR MILLER ROAD SOUTH OF THE I-10 OVERPASS. A second sign was posted directly north of the cattle guard, on the right side going north, of Miller Road south of 1-10. Miller Road there was unpaved and under construction.5 Counsel stipulated that this second Miller Road sign read as follows: 6 THIS ENTRANCE RESERVED FOR EMPLOYEES AND SUPPLIERS OF ALL CONTRACTORS EXCEPT ALLIED CONCRETE, INC. ALLIED CONCRETE, ITS EMPLOYEES AND SUPPLIERS MUST USE ENTRANCE LOCATED AT WEST BOUND OFF-RAMP APPROX. 300 YARDS EAST OF MILLER ROAD OVERPASS. A third sign was posted on Oglesby Road at a point where construction traffic left Oglesby Road to go on to the construction site.7 The sign read the same as the No. II sign at Miller Road, described above. C. The Attempted Delivery of July 20 Newell testified that, on July 20, Allied's driver Warren Elliott obtained a load of concrete mix according to work specifications and, in the customary manner, proceeded to the jobsite. Newell followed Elliott, driving a pickup truck. : Locations of the two Miller Road signs are marked I and II on Resp. Lxsh 1. " Newell testified that, several days after Jul) 27, he found the sign he had placed south of Miller Road broken and thrown into a ditch The words "A public road." or words to that effect, had been added to the sign in As they left the batch plant, a group of striking employees was picketing at the entryway of the plant. En route to the jobsite, with Newell following Elliott, one vehicle followed behind Newell and two vehicles preceded Elliott. Riding in one vehicle was Norman Rudd, business agent for Local 428, Operating Engineers. In the second vehicle were Darrell Walker, Local 83's shop steward at Allied, and Al Zuvers, one of Allied's mixer drivers who was on strike. In the third vehicle were Paul Wilshire and Jim Stark, who were striking driver employees. Prior to arrival at the Miller Road off ramp, Newell passed Elliott, and when Newell arrived at the off ramp he stopped just west of the Allied sign he had posted on July 19. Elliott stopped his truck behind Newell's pickup. They stopped because they did not know where the pour was to be made. John Parker, Ashton's finishing foreman, was standing on the Miller Road overpass bridge, motioning for Elliott to come to where he was. Newell and Elliott then proceeded west on the southern (westbound) lane of the freeway roadbed to the pour site, immediately east of the bridge. When they arrived at the pour site, two of the vehicles seen earlier, carrying Rudd and striking employees, were parked near the pour site. The third vehicle carrying striking employees arrived at the pour site shortly after Newell and Elliott arrived. All four striking employees and Rudd got out of their vehicles and picketed near the truck driven by Elliott, with signs reading "Picket - Teamsters Local 83 on strike against Allied Concrete." Parker and several Ashton employees on the bridge got into a pickup and left, going east. Other Ashton employees who were under the bridge walked away from the site to the south. Newell then talked with Coleman and some state highway employees for 20 or 30 minutes, during which time the picketing continued. Since there were no Ashton employees to handle the concrete, Newell instructed Elliott to take the load back to the yard, which he did. By letter dated July 20, Ashton admonished Allied and stated that continuance of the labor dispute and picketing other than at the proper gate would result in cancellation of the purchase agreement. Newell testified that the rear of the sign at the Miller Road off ramp, posted by Newell, was visible from the bridge. Parker corroborated Newell's testimony. Parker also testified that he talked with Walker on July 20: He drove up there and he told me he appreciated us walking off the job and I told him that it was our duty, it was an authorized [Tleamster's strike and we weren't allowed to work behind picket lines. He asked me when the next big pour was going to be and I told him that I didn't know .... Parker said he knew prior to July 20 about the labor dispute between Local 83 and Allied, and had decided in advance of July 20 that the Ashton employees would honor any picket line since the strike was "authorized." Elliott corroborated Newell's testimony. pencil and in small letters. Newell is credited, but this testimony is given no weight because there is no indication of when the words were added to the signs or b) whom. Newell testified that he did not notice any change in his wording on the signs prior to his finding the sign in the ditch Location of this sign is shown bN an "X" on G.C Exh 4. 1103 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Stark testified and he acknowledged that he and Wilshire followed Elliott on July 20 and picketed at thejobsite. D. The Attempted Delivery of July 27 Newell testified that, on July 27, a load of concrete mix was picked up by Elliott as he had done on July 20, and he and Elliott proceeded to the jobsite in the same manner as before, except they came down the eastbound grade instead of the westbound grade. Again they were followed. Carl Woolsey was following in a pickup truck and a van carried Jack Wausom, Wilshire, and Stark. There was a third vehicle, carrying individuals Newell does not remem- ber. Again Newell and Elliott slowed down or stopped at the Miller Road off ramp sign, with one vehicle still following. The following car also stopped at the sign momentarily while Newell and Elliott discussed the pour site. When Newell and Elliott arrived at the pour site the van and pickup already were there, parked where the off ramp met the overpass. Newell got out of his vehicle to talk with Coleman, and Elliott took the truck to the pour site. Ashton employees who were present near Coleman started walking and Coleman said, "Well, they're all going to leave again." As the pickets were walking with their signs underneath the bridge near the pour site,8 the Ashton employees walked away. The pour was not made and it was returned to the plant. By letter dated July 27, Ashton canceled its purchase agreement with Allied because of the picketing.9 Parker corroborated Newell's testimony. Elliott corroborated Newell's testimony and added thereto. Elliott testified that, as he was backing the truck into the pour site, he was facing the Miller Road off ramp sign and saw Wilshire and Stark picketing at the sign. Woolsey and Wausom drove from the bridge to the sign and talked with Wilshire and Stark. Thereafter, all four men went to the bridge and started picketing. Stark testified and he acknowledged that he and Wilshire followed Elliott to the jobsite July 27. Stark said he and Wilshire stopped their vehicle near the reserved gate sign at the Miller Road off ramp and got out with their picket signs in their hands. They intended to picket there, but decided not to. After being out of the vehicle a "couple of minutes," Stark "decided that we should go down Miller Road because I was told that was a public road, and we could picket down there." Another truck came to the sign area, and Stark and Wilshire returned with them to the pour site and picketed until the mixer truck left. He followed Elliott back to the plant, on both July 20 and 27. Stark said, "I was supposed to be in charge of the pickets." Discussion The labor dispute here involved is between Allied and Local 83. Only Allied is a primary employer; Ashton is a secondary employer not involved in any dispute with the Union. I The signs read: "Teamsters Local 83 on strike against Allied Concrete." Newell credibly testified that the picket signs were visible to Ashton employees on July 20 and 27. ' Allied has two other facilities in the Phoenix area. Neither is involved in this case. The controversy thus involves a situation wherein primary employees work on the same site as secondary employees, i.e., at the Miller Road overpass. Respondent argues partially on the basis of common situs picketing, and partially on the basis of ambulatory picketing. However, that point is not controlling. Both parties herein clearly recognized the problem of enmeshing Ashton, an unoffending employer, in a controversy to which it is not a party.i° That recognition is shown by Allied's establish- ment of reserved gates (discussed below), and by the Union's efforts to show that it adhered to Moore Dry Dock standards in its picketing at the worksite. However, regardless of the methods used by the parties, the ultimate question is whether Respondent picketed in a manner which shows that the intent and purpose of the picketing was to appeal to Ashton's employees in violation of Section 8(b)(4Xi) and (ii)(B) of the Act. Respondent argues that the signs, hence the reserved gates, were defective in that the signs were installed on Allied's own initiative, and that the signs were posted in such manner that they precluded Respondent's communi- cation with Allied's employees. That argument is without merit. The signs were installed with full advance knowledge of the Union and Ashton, they were installed in appropri- ate, commonly traveled places, and they were seen in place by union representatives and picketing employees (more fully discussed below). Further, the picketing of July 20 was discussed by the Union and Allied, and objected to by Allied, prior to the picketing of July 27, and the Union clearly had ready access to Allied management at all times relevant herein. Respondent argues that placement of reserved gates at the 1-10 project did not preclude picketing at the Miller Road bridge, and that Respondent had a duty to comply with Moore Dry Dock standards, which Respondent contends it did. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Truck Drivers and Chauffeurs, Local Union No. 807 (Schultz Refrigerated Service, Inc.), 87 NLRB 502 (1949), and Teamsters Local Union #612, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, a/w International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Ind. (AAA Motor Lines, Inc.), 211 NLRB 608 (1974), were cited as authority. However, Schultz is not applicable since reserved gates were not involved. Only the question of ambulatory picketing was involved, with the company's offices located out of the State and deliveries being made within the State. AAA Motor Lines also is inapplicable, since there a violation of Section 8(b)(4Xi) and (ii) was found; no reserved gate was involved; and Moore Dry Dock standards alone were involved, with no substantial evidence of a secondary object being considered. Respondent was alert to the possibility of work stoppages and undertook to protect itself,- Ashton, and the State of Arizona (owner of the site) against that possibility. Reserved gates were established, with Ashton's knowledge, 10 N. L R. B. v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council [Gould & Preisner], 341 U.S. 375 (1951). ii Sailors' Union of the Pacific, AFL (Moore Dry Dock Company), 92 NLRB 547 (1950). 1104 TEAMSTERS LOCAL NO. 83 cooperation, and assistance. The Union was advised in advance, in specific detail, that the gates would be established on July 20. The signs were installed at the most logical and reasonable places.12 They were large (approxi- mately 4 by 4 feet) and easily readable from the lanes of traffic near which they were installed. It is found that the signs were adequate in every respect, and conformed with notice given to the Union in the letter delivered by Allied to the Union on July 19. It is further found, based upon the evidence, that the Union and the picketers involved in this controversy were aware in advance of the reserved gates, and deliberately refused to confine their picketing to the gates reserved for Allied. Newell and Elliott testified that, in each and every instance wherein they entered and left the worksite area, they used the roadbed lane nearest the sign at the Miller Road off ramp. Stark testified that, on one occasion, the lane going the opposite direction was used. Based upon observation of the witnesses and their demeanor, Newell and Elliott are credited. Further, the evidence shows no instance wherein the reserved gates were used in a manner inconsistent with the posted signs. The question then is presented of whether the Union legally could ignore the reserved gate signs, go onto the worksite, and picket at the pour site. Early Board law was that picketing at gates reserved for secondary employees on secondary premises was unlawful.' 3 Subsequently, the General Electric,14 Carrier Corp.,'5 and M & H16 cases considered the subject of common situs picketing at gates used by neutral employers. In M & H at 323 the Board summarized the law on this subject as follows: In General Electric the Supreme Court ruled that the picketing "at a gate utilized exclusively by employees of independent contractors who work on the struck employer's premises" is lawful primary activity unless the following conditions exist: There must be a separate gate, marked and set apart from other gates; the work done by the men who use the gate must be unrelated to the normal operations of the employer, and the work must be of a kind that would not, if done when the . . . [employer] were engaged in its regular operations necessitate curtailing those operations. Subsequently, in Carrier Corp., the Court approved the Board's application of these standards so as to -' Evidence and testimony show that the signs were erected at places customarilr used b) vehicles involved in construction. : Internaional Association of Machiniitsi Local Lodge 889, AFL-CIO (Freernan Construction Companyt, 120 NLRB 753 (1958). 1 Local 761. International Union of Electrical Radio, & Machine Workers, A FL CIO IGeneral Electric Compan jI v. N. L. R. B., 366 U.S. 667 (1961). I; United Steelworkers of America, AF.4L CIO, et al. Carrier Corp.] v. .i. R. B 376 L.S. 492 (1964). Ili Building and Construction Trades Council of New Orleans, AFL-CIO I(Markwell and Hartz, Inc.), 155 NLRB 319(1965). I' The distinction discussed herein, relative to primary and secondary employers, assumes the existence of a neutral employer. An "ally" therefore is outside this discussion. ' r.L. R B v. Northern California District Council of Hod Carriers and ('o,,,itmon Labhorers of Anerica, AFL CIO, et al [Sunset International Petroleum (Corporation], 389 F.2d 721 (C.A. 9, 1968). NVLR.B. v. Denier Building and Construction Trades Council et al [Climar Maolvbdenumn (',oipatl' 1./ 219 F.2d 870 (C.A. 10. 1955): Readsi Mired Concrete. Inc. 200 NI.RB 253 (1972). permit, as legitimate primary action, picketing of a gate, owned by a railroad but cut through a fence surround- ing the struck employer's premises. This gate was used exclusively by neutral railroad employees entering the struck premises to perform delivery activities related to the normal operations of the struck employer. Without passing upon whether the subcontractor gates involved herein were established and maintained in accordance with the General Electric requirements, we are of the opinion that the principles expressed in that case are inapposite in determining whether a union may lawfully extend its dispute with a general contrac- tor on a construction site by picketing gates reserved for exclusive use of subcontractors also engaged on that project. Rather, we believe that this issue must be resolved in the light of the Moore Dry Dock standards, traditionally applied by the Board in determining whether picketing at a common situs is protected primary activity. The Board then analyzed the facts of M & H, concluded that Moore Dry Dock standards had not been met, and found a violation of Section 8(b)(4)i) and (ii)(B) of the Act.17 The next question then becomes one of the intent of the Union, for intent is the crux of the matter. Respondent's counsel argued in his brief that the criteria set forth in Moore Dry Dock Company are applicable herein and should be applied. It is true, as argued by counsel, that failure to comply with Moore Dry Dock criteria may provide the basis for a finding of illegal picketing.' However, it does not follow that compliance with Moore Dry Dock is assurance that the picketing is legal.' 9 Compliance with Moore Dry Dock standards may be an evidentiary fact, used to determine the object of picketing, but resort to those standards is not necessary if the object otherwise is clear.20 The Union dispatched pickets to the pour site after being told in writing, and in detail, about the reserved gates. The pickets ignored the reserved gate sign, followed the truck, and picketed at the pour site. Such disregard of a reserved gate is primafacie evidence of intent to enmesh neutrals in a dispute with a primary employer.2i On July 27 the pickets initially started their activities at the sign, then decided to move onto the pour site.2 2 It is revealing that Walker, the job steward for Allied, talked with Ashton's concrete foreman, Parker, the afternoon of 19 Ne.w York Mailers' Union No. 6, International Typographical Union. AFL-CIO [N.Y Herald Tribune, Inc. & Veo-Gravure Printing Co.] v. N.L.R.B., 316 F.2d 371 (C.A.D.C., 1963): Seafarers International Union of North America, Atlantic i Gulf District, Harbor and Inland Waterway's Division, AFL CIO [Salt Dome Production ComnpanJ v . N LR. B., 265 F.2d 585 (C.A.D.C., 1959). 20 N. L R.B. v. Hod Carriers, supra. 21 Millwrights Local Union No. 1102, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO (Dobson Heavy Haul, Inc.). 155 NLRB 1305 (1965). and Local Union No 369. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. AFL CIO (Kelle, Electric Co., Inc.), 216 NLRB 141 (1975). enfd. 528 F.2d 317 (C.A. 6. 1976). 22 The jobsite and its approaches were under construction and closed to the public. Clearly, the notice to the Union given in the reserved gate signs constituted an appeal to refrain from enmeshing Ashton employees in the dispute between Allied and the Union. 1105 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD July 20 and said he appreciated the fact that the Ashton employees walked off the job that morning. Walker pressed the issue, and asked when the next big pour was going to be made.23 Finally, the pickets did not stop with their actions of July 20. They returned on July 27 and repeated their actions of July 20, although the Union was fully informed in the interim that Allied considered the picketing of July 20 to be illegal. 24 There is no question, under such circumstances, but that the Union intended to enmesh Ashton in the Union's controversy with Allied, and did so to Allied's substantial detriment. Moore Dry Dock stan- dards are not applicable in such a case. The evidence is not equivocal; common situs picketing never is privileged when it is directed, as here, to neutral employees and their employers.25 Respondent relies upon Teamsters Local Union #612, supra, and Local Freight Drivers Local No. 208 International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America (DeAnza Delivery System Inc.), 224 NLRB 1116 (1976), in arguing that ambulatory pickets, as here, have a duty to follow a struck employer's vehicles to delivery sites. Those cases do not stand for the proposition that there must be picketing "between the headlights" in order to find a violation of Section 8(b)(4), as urged by Respondent. The Administrative Law Judge in DeAnza, supra at 1119 succinctly stated controlling law: To establish a violation of Section 8(b)(4Xi) and (ii)(B) of the Act, essentially two elements must be shown. First, it must be established that there has been conduct sufficient to satisfy the standard of Section 8(b)(4)(i) - i.e., in essence, that which engages in, induces or encourages individuals to engage in, a strike or refusal to perform their own employment duties- and to satisfy the standard of Section 8(b)(4)(ii) of the Act --i.e., that which threatens, coerces, or restrains any person. Second, it must be established that the object of that conduct is to force or require any person to cease dealing with or doing business with any other person. The Administrative Law Judge went on to state that Moore Dry Dock may be of assistance in determining the Union's object, and he found "Respondent did not comply with the second Moore Dry Dock standard, requiring that the 2:' Walker's conversation clearly is within the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion that the Act's words "induce and encourage" are broad enough to include every form of influence or persuasion. International Brotherhood of El/ctricol WorAers, Local 501 [Samuel Langer] v. N.LR.B.. 341 U.S. 694, 701 702(1951). 21 Respondent argues that Scott's testimony relative to union policy concerning picketing, and instructions given to picketers, negates an intenlion to violate the Act. That testimony is given very little weight in view of lhe Union's clear course of conduct to the contrary. 2: Mlillrigh.s' Looal Union No. 1102, supra; General Teamsters Local No. 126 (Reaod Mired Concrete), 200 NLRB 253 (1972); N.LR.B. v. Carpenters District Council of Kansas City and Vicinity, AFL-CIO [Kaaz Woodwork Coipancm,. Inc.]. 383 F.2d 89 (C.A. 8, 1967); N.L.R.B. v. Hod Carriers, supra; Teamstlers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Union, Local 279 (Wilson Teaming ConipanV). 140 NLRB 164 (1962); International Brotherhood of Electrical W14orAcr. ILocadl Union No. 11, AFL-CIO et al. (L.G. Electric Contractors, Inc.J, 154 NLRB 766 (1965); Carpenters District Council of Kansas City and l'icinili, AFL CIO (J. E. Dunn Construction Co.), 158 NLRB 269 (1966); Locol 25, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (Building Trades Emplorers Association). 169 NLRB 856 (1968); United Association of Journemen c nd Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry (A & B primary employer be engaged in normal business at the situs when the picketing is conducted." In the instant case the reserved gates clearly were marked through mutual agreement of Ashton and Allied, the Union was informed in advance of establishment of the gates, the gates were "reasonably close" to the worksite and visible therefrom, and the signs designating the gates were placed on the only commonly traveled entrances to the pour site. Under such circumstances, it cannot reasonably be contended that the Union was required by law ("had a duty") to ignore the reserved gates and, rather than picketing "reasonably close" to the situs, actually to picket on the situs itself.26 Clearly, no permission was given, either by Ashton or Allied, for the Union to picket beyond the reserved gates, much less at the pour site. Respondent also argues that, since Allied's business is only to deliver ready-mix concrete, N. LR.B. v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, supra, is not applicable. That argument ignores Board decisions based upon facts similar to those involved herein, and is not valid.27 Finally, Respondent argues that the Union is not bound by Walker's statements to Parker, because the Union issued picketing instructions that precluded Walker from saying what he did, and from talking with Parker. This argument is without merit, since Walker was the job steward at Allied, was prominent in strike activities, and was active in the picketing with full knowledge of the Union. Having placed Walker in such a position, the Union cannot now deny that it is bound by Walker's actions and words.2 8 Further, as shown above, the picketing of July 20 was discussed by Allied and the Union on July 20, yet the Union's actions of that day were repeated on July 27, clearly showing a plan of action followed by the Union. Walker's statement was consistent with that plan of action. Finally, Parker testified that he has known Walker "a long time," and Parker also testified that he was sympathetic with the picketers. Under such circumstances Walker's inducement and encouragement of a neutral employee is obvious. Walker's inquiry about future pours, and the Union's actions of July 27, clearly constituted a part of the Union's continuing plan of action relative to Ashton's employees. Plumbing, Inc.), 171 NLRB 498 (196 8); Local 134, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (Polly Electric Co), 175 NLRB 507 (1969): Drivers, Warehouse & Dairy Employees, Local No. 75 (Seymour Transfer, Inc.), 176 NLRB 530(1969); Iron Workers Local Union No. 167 (Tayloe Glass Co.), 180 NLRB 201 (1969). 2 Local No. 22Z International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America (American Oil Company), 152 NLRB 853 (1965). 27 Teamsters, Local 126 (Ready Mixed Concrete), supra, and cases cited therein. 28 Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 1620 (David M. Fisher Construction Company), 208 NLRB 94 (1974); Local Union No. 3, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO (New York Telephone Company), 193 NLRB 758 (1971): International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union 640 (Brown Wholesale Electrical Company), 190 NLRB 456 (1971), enfd. 464 F.2d 545 (C.A. 9, 1972); Local 825, International Union of Operating Engineers (Morin Erection Co., Inc.), 168 NLRB I (1967); and Local 456, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America (Sid Harvey Westchester Corp), 142 NLRB 1409(1963). 1106 TEAMSTERS LOCAL NO. 83 For the reasons stated, it is concluded that Respondent Union violated Section 8(bX4Xi) and (iiXB) of the Act by inducing employees of Ashton to engage in work stoppag- es, and by restraining and coercing said Employer, for an object of forcing or requiring Ashton to cease doing business with Allied. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent set forth above, occurring in connection with the operations of Ashton and Allied as set forth in section 1, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, it will be recommended that Respondent be ordered to cease and desist therefrom, and to take certain affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Ashton Company, Inc., is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Allied Concrete, Inc., is a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 3. Respondent is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 4. By inducing individuals employed by Ashton Com- pany, Inc., to engage in a strike or refusal in the course of their employment to perform services, with an object of forcing Ashton to cease doing business with Allied Conicrete, Inc., Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(bX4XiXB) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 5. By threatening, coercing, and restraining Ashton Company, Inc., with an object of forcing said person to cease doing business with Allied Concrete, Inc., Respon- dent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(bX4XiiXB) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. [Recommended Order omitted from publication.] 1107