Waples-Platter Companies

WAPLES-PLATTER COMPANIES 483 Waples-Platter Companies ' and Chauffeurs, Team- sters and Helpers Local Union No . 47, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America. Case 16-CA-5494 witnesses, and after due consideration of the briefs filed on behalf of all parties, I make the following: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 1. RESPONDENT'S BUSINESS December 11, 1974 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS JENKINS, KENNEDY, AND PENELLO On July 31, 1974, Administrative Law Judge Irving M. Herman issued the attached Decision in this pro- ceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the Charging Party filed a brief in support of the Decision. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re- lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders the Respondent, Waples-Platter Companies, Fort Worth, Texas, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Or- der. I The name of Respondent appears as amended at the hearing DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE IRVING M. HERMAN, Administrative Law Judge: This case was tried before me on June 4 and 5, 1974, at Fort Worth, Texas. The charge was filed by Chauffeurs, Teamsters, and Helpers, Local Union No. 47, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, herein called the Union, on March 14, and served on Respondent, Waples-Platter Companies,' by registered mail the same day. Complaint issued April 30. The primary issues is whether Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (29 U.S.C., Sec. 151 et seq.), herein called the Act, by failing to bargain in good faith with the Union. Upon the entire record, including my observation of the Respondent's name was amended at the hearing by changing "Com- pany" to "Companies " The complaint (as amended at the hearing) alleges, the answer (as amended at the hearing) admits, and I find that Respondent is a Texas corporation engaged in the wholesale distribution and sale of groceries, with its principal office and place of business at Fort Worth; that during the year immedi- ately preceding the complaint, Respondent received at said facility products valued in excess of $50,000 from outside of Texas, and sold and distributed groceries valued at over $1 million; and that Respondent is an employer engaged in com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE A. The Fact' 1. The bargaining prior to March 6, 1974 Following a stipulated consent election held March 21, 1973, the Union was certified on March 29, 1973, as the exclusive bargaining representative of Respondent's em- ployees. The Union submitted its proposals on April 26 and a series of 10 bargaining meetings commenced May 18, 1973. A number of the Union's proposals were tentatively agreed on at the first meeting. Respondent sent the Union certain counterproposals on June 18, but failed to furnish its eco- nomic proposals at the June 21 meeting, as promised, because of its claimed inability to do so in view of the price freeze. The employees struck on July 29. The parties did not meet again until September 21, and, since the Respondent still had no economic proposals ready, the Union's chief negotiator at that time, Allgood, said there was no point in prolonging the meeting and the Union would be available to meet when Respondent was prepared to present its economic proposal. Sometime between then and November 15, Respondent proposed the maintenance of existing economic conditions which Union Attorney Hicks accepted in a telephone call to Respondent's attorney and chief negotiator, Sears, on November 15. Hicks confirmed this by letter to Sears the following day, adding his "certain[ty]" that such acceptance would remove "the last stumbling block to securing a final contract" and urging that the parties meet the following week "to finalize this matter." Further meetings were held on November 28 and December 3. Meanwhile, tentative agree- ments were reached on additional noneconomic provisions. 2 There is no testimonial conflict between the opposing witnesses, con- cerning the period prior to March 6, 1974 215 NLRB No. 80 484 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Hicks, who by that time had started to attend the negotia- tions and had become cospokesman with Allgood, began the December 17 meeting by stating that the parties were reason- ably close to an agreement and proposed that they run through the various items. This proved burdensome, and it was decided that the Union would send to Sears a draft of the noneconomic items tentatively agreed to thus far. Hicks farmed the job out to Allgood but Allgood understood that he had been assigned only so much of this task as related to matters covered in the Union's original proposal. There was substantial discussion of some, if not all, of the five items still open. Allgood thought these were settled "in principle," and that, in view of the other agreements reached, the parties virtually had a contract. Hicks testified that while he would not describe the situation in respect to the open items as "agreement in principle," he felt that at least "we were down to the final cut before we had an agreement . . we were darned close." Hicks sent the following wire to Sears on December 17, after the conclusion of the meeting, listing the items still open, and notifying him of the unconditional offer of the strikers to return to work: THIS MESSAGE WILL CONFIRM THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE REFERENCED MATTER ALL CONTRACT LANGUAGE HAS BEEN AGREED UPON EXCEPT THE FOLLOWING THE WAIVER CLAUSE AS SET OUT IN YOUR WRITTEN PROPOSAL WAS NOT AGREED UPON YOU WERE TO DETERMINE WHETHER, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE LANGUAGE WOULD REQUIRE BARGAINING ABOUT SUBSEQUENT UNFORESEEN MATTERS HOWEVER, WE HAVE RECIEVED NOTH- ING TO DATE THE PICKET LINE CLAUSE (SECTION 2-6 OF THE COMPANIES NO STRIKE-NO PICKETING-NO LOCK-OUT CLAUSE) HAS NOT BEEN AGREED UPON ALTHOUGH SO PROPOSED BY THE COMPANY NO AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED REGARDING THE TERM OF THE CONTRACT THE UNION HEREBY PROPOSES THAT THE CON- TRACT BE EFFECTED FOR ONE YEAR PLFASE BE PREPARED TO AGREE OUR COUNTER PROPOSE AT OUR NEXT MEETING THE PARTIES HAVE AGREED THAT EXISTING ECONOMIC BENEFITS WILL CONTINUE IN EFFECT, HOWEVER, DESPITE AGREEMENT TO DO SO, YOU HAD NOT REDUCED THESE TO WRITING FOR OUR MEETING OF DECEMBER 17, 1973 YOU AGREED TO HAVE SUCH PREPARED FOR OUR NEXT MEETING A PREGNANCY LEAVE CLAUSE HAS NOT RECEIVED AGREEMENT PLEASE BE PREPARED TO COUNTER PROPOSE OR AGREE TO OUR NEXT MEETING DUR- ING THE WEEK OF DECEMBER 10, 1973 YOU INFORMED ME FOR THE FIRST TIME THAT THE COMPANY WISHED TO HAVE LAN- GUAGE IN THE CONTRACT TO PROTECT AGAINST POST STRIKE DISRUPTION BY FORMER STRIKERS YOU LEFT THE MEETING OF DECEMBER 17, 1973 TO PREPARE THE COMPANIES PROPOSAL IN LATER CONVERSATION YOU IN- FORMED ME THAT SUCH A PROPOSAL WOULD BE READY BY OUR NEXT MEETING REGARDING ALL THE ABOVE, WE AGREED THAT YOU WOULD CALL ME ON DECEMBER 19 1973 TO SET UP A SESSION FOR LATER THAT WEEK IN ADDITION, ACCEPT THIS MESSAGE AS THE UN- ION'S UNCONDITIONAL OFFER TO RETURN TO WORK ALL STRIK- ERS PLEASE ADVISE ME IMMEDIATELY HOW SUCH CAN MOST EX- PEDITIOUSLY BE COMPLETED Sears replied by wire on the 18th as follows: YOUR TELEGRAM OF DECEMBER 17 1973 RECEIVED BY ME DECEM- BER 18 1973 I DO NOT AGREE THAT ALL CONTRACT LANGUAGE HAS BEEN AGREED UPON EXCEPT THE DETAILS SET OUT IN YOUR TELEGRAM ALL PROPOSALS HERETOFORE MADE BY BOTH OF US IN THE HOPE THAT THE STRIKE COULD BE AVOIDED OR SHORT- ENED WERE CONTINGENT UPON ARRIVING AT A COMPLETE CON- TRACT, WHICH WE HAVE NOT ACCOMPLISHED AS OF THIS TIME I BELIEVE THAT THE BEST WAY TO PROCEED IS FOR YOU TO PRE- PARE AND MAIL TO ME A COMPLETE CONTRACT AS YOU UNDER- STAND THE PRESENT SITUATION THIS WOULD BE IN LINE WITH YOUR PREVIOUS STATEMENT THAT SUCH A PROPOSAL WOULD BE READY FOR OUR LAST MEETING WE WILL THEN REVIEW TO DE- TERMINE WHETHER DISCUSSION IS NECESSARY AND MEET YOU AS SOON AS POSSIBLE STRIKERS WHO WISH TO RETURN TO WORK MAY REPORT IN PERSON TO THE EMPLOYMENT OFFICE AT THE WAREHOUSE BETWEEN THE HOURS OF 8AM AND 5PM ON WEEKDAYS On the 19th, Allgood, under the mistaken impression, as indicated above, that he was not to cover any items, even those agreed upon, which had been proposed by Respondent, sent Sears a draft of the items in the Union's proposal on which tentative agreement had been reached . On January 3, 1974, Hicks sent Sears a draft of proposals concerning the open items listed in his wire of December 17. On January 31, apparently in response to the request in Hicks' telegram of December 17, Sears sent him materials embracing the eco- nomic benefits that the Union had agreed to accept. There were delays, apparently on both sides, in scheduling the next meeting, and in the interim , on February 18, Respondent wrote Hicks of its unilateral revision of its pay scale upwards on the basis of the completion of construction of a warehouse addition enabling it to consolidate its operations into a single facility making for greater efficiency and productivity. Its announcement stated the action was "without prejudice to collective bargaining" and offered to "negotiate any details which you want to discuss " Neither the delay nor the wage raise was regarded by the Union as other than bona fide.' A meeting was finally arranged for March 6 2. The March 6 meeting Allgood had been transferred to Washington in February, so Hicks was the chief spokesman for the Union at the March 6 meeting. Respondent was again represented , as at all the sessions, by Sears, Dexter (its vice president and secretary), and Nickell (personnel director). However, Dexter opened the meeting by announcing that he had succeeded Sears as chief negotiator and immediately went on to say that all tentative agreements were set aside, and that while Respond- ent might not want to change all of them it was going to reexamine them.' Hicks asked why, and Dexter said that 3 Hicks felt "at that point that we had relinquished control over wages during whatever term the contract would be " Although Dexter testified that he had mentioned only those agreements covered in Allgood's communication of December 19, he admitted on cross- examination to having "announced that all tentative agreements were off " I have found Hicks a more credible witness in any event, and he emphati- WAPLES-PLATTER COMPANIES 485 circumstances had changed. Pressed for specifics, he and Sears mentioned economic controls, the energy crisis, a sig- nificant increase in business, enlargement of the warehouse, more employees, more customers, and the passage of time; plus the fact that concessions had been made to avert a strike and then to settle it, and now the strike was no longer hanging over their heads. Hicks said this sounded like "utter bad faith" and that since they had been so close to a contract Respondent owed an explanation in greater particularity as to how each tentative agreement had been affected by these various factors. Respondent refused so to particularize. Hicks testified that he then asked what proposals Respondent had to make, and Respondent offered a grievance procedure that would have sharply reduced coverage from any complaint alleging failure to comply with the contract to discharges for reasons other than destruction of company property or sabot- age The Union rejected this proposal out-of-hand, and Hicks asked what other proposals Respondent had after repudiating almost a year of bargaining achievements. Respondent re- plied, according to Hicks, that it did not have any other proposals ready but would have a full written proposal at the next meeting.5 Dexter's testimony was that he was ready to discuss other proposals but that he wished to discuss the changes, while "Mr. Hicks refused to go through and discuss the changes that we wanted to make. He only wanted to discuss the reasons for the changes." Dexter first testified that Respondent's decision to reexam- ine the tentative agreements was made in January or Febru- ary. He testified later, however, that the decision, made by President Sweeney, was communicated to him at the time when they discussed the wording of the telegram Sears sent to Hicks on December 18. Dexter also testified that prior to March 6 Respondent had not considered each agreement "individually" in light of the changed circumstances it men- tioned to the Union, but his later testimony was that he "knew which ones [he] wanted to change" by that date. 3. Subsequent events The Union filed the instant charge on March 14. Although a meeting had been set for the 19th, Hicks did not attend because he felt that further negotiations should await the outcome of the charge. The Union's new business agent, Birks, who had also attended the prior bargaining sessions, spoke for the Union on March 19 He requested the proposal that had been promised on March 6, but Dexter who had started to prepare the proposal, had dropped it upon the filing of the charge because he and Sears agreed that the charge indicated the Union would not rehash the previously tenta- tively agreed items without a detailed explanation by Re- spondent which the latter did not intend to provide. Birks did refuse to renegotiate any of those items, saying he did not see "any reason" to do so in the absence of further explanation by Respondent, and the Union did not want to appear to be mooting its charge. cally testified that Dexter's announcement referred to "all" the tentative agreements 5 Dexter said that supplying written proposals in advance of discussion was not the way the parties had been operating This position did not comport with the submission of the initial proposals of the parties. Respondent offered to extend recognition for 60 days beyond March 29, the anniversary of the certification, and Birks said that Hicks, who had previously expressed concern over the approaching end of the certification year, would communicate with Sears concerning his proposal. Hicks tele- phoned Sears on April 8 to inquire about a resumption of negotiations with the understanding that the parties would not "rehash" the tentative agreements pending the investiga- tion of the charge. Sears, after talking to Dexter and Sweeney, rejected this condition by letter of April 10 in which he "restate[d] . . . that many of the concessions made in the initial negotiations were done so for the purpose of avoiding and averting a strike," which, "coupled with other reasons," required "re-examination of those articles which were tena- tively agreed to between the parties." B. Analysis The Act "impose[s] a mutual duty upon the parties to confer in good faith with a desire to reach agreement." N.L.R.B. v. Insurance Agents' International Union [Prudential Ins. Co.] 361 U.S. 477, 488 (1960). "While Con- gress did not compel agreement . . . it did require [good-faith] collective bargaining in the hope that agreements would result." N.L.R.B. v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152 (1956). It is therefore of particular importance, when the parties have made substantial progress toward agreement, that that momentum not be dissipated lightly. To this end, the Board views with concern a party's withdrawal of conces- sions made in the negotiations, albeit tentatively , and regards as evidence of bad faith the failure to reasonable explain such withdrawal. San Antonio Machine & Supply Corp., 147 NLRB 1112, 1116-17 (1964), enfd 363 F.2d 633, 635-637 (C.A.5, 1966); Nassau Glass Corporation, 199 NLRB 476 (1972); McCann Steel Company, 190 NLRB 12, 17 (1971); Orion Tool, Die and Machine Co., 195 NLRB 1080, 1087-88 (1972); Inter-Polymer Industries, Inc., 196 NLRB 729, 761(1972); Shovel Supply Company, 162 NLRB 460, 473 (1966). Recognizing the force of the foregoing, Respondent relies on the explanation it advanced at the meeting of March 6. Its statement of this issue, however, both at the hearing and in its bnef,6 shows that its position falls short of the Act's re- quirements. It is not enough to claim a change in conditions, just as it was not enough for the employer in Truitt, supra, to claim an inability to pay higher wages. "Good-faith bar- gaining necessarily requires that claims made by either bar- gainer should be honest claims . . . . If [the claim] is impor- tant enough to present in the give and take of bargaining, it is important enough to require some sort of proof of its ac- curacy." Truitt, supra at 152-153. It was precisely that ab- sence of such proof here that prevented the testing of Respon- dent's claim and hence precluded meaningful bargaining. By failing to particularize the effects of the "change in condi- tions" Respondent did not even reach the stage to which the employer in Truitt had advanced The latter at least had relied on a claim which could be proved or disproved by the financial records sought by the Union. The Union here, 6 "is a company permitted to re-examine those articles tentatively agreed to when there is a material change in conditions9" 486 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD however, was not even in a position to request proofs because Respondent had not yet indicated-indeed it refused to indicate-why, in its own view, any of the alleged changes in conditions (other than the termination of the strike) war- ranted review of the various provisions tentatively agreed on. I find incredible Dexter's testimony that Hicks was unwill- ing to discuss the changes desired by Respondent and insisted on confining the discussion to the reasons for the changes. In the first place, I am unable to comprehend how the reasons could be discussed in a vacuum free from consideration of the changes themselves. Secondly, Dexter's repeated testimony of his readiness and willingness to discuss the changes (but not the reasons) on March 6 is impossible to reconcile with his admission that he had not yet considered each particular agreement in light of the changed circumstances, because in the absence of such consideration he could not have decided by that time of the withdrawn agreements he wanted to change. He contradicted himself later in his testimony, more- over, by asserting that as of March 6 he "knew which ones [he] wanted to change." And if he did know that, his tes- timony offers no explanation for his withdrawal of those provisions which he did not intend to change, including some indeed, like the Union's recognition, whose substantive effect could not lawfully be changed. Nor does it explain why the Union was not afforded some notice of so serious a development in advance of a meeting which, as it turned out, was almost 3 months in coming and only 3 weeks before the expiration date of the certification year when it did come. Respondent's position that the Union was put on notice by Sears' telegram of December 18 is hardly tenable in view of the invitation in the telegram of "a com- plete contract as you understand the present situation. This would be in line with' your previous statement that such a proposal would be ready for our last meeting. We will then review to determine whether discussion is necessary." Not only was such an invitation inconsistent with any notion that Respondent might be withdrawing from previous agree- ments, but the last sentence quoted even suggests that the draft to be submitted might well disclose the absence of any differences so as to obviate further discussion.' As indicated in footnote 4, supra I found Hicks a more reliable witness, and credit his testimony that Dexter's with- drawal on March 6 was from allthe tentative agreements, not just those covered by Allgood's communication of December 19.8 This of course included even matters which had been the subject of company demands. ". . . [I]f the Board is not to be blinded by empty talk and by the mere surface motions of collective bargaining, it must take some cognizance of the reasonableness of the positions taken by an employer in the course of bargaining negotiations." N.L.R.B. v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134 (C.A. 1), cert. denied 346 U.S. 887. While tentative agreements, by definition, are not final, an employer may not use his right to change position ' Even if Sears' wire could somehow be deemed to imply an intent to withdraw, surely something more explicit was required by good faith in the face of such further communications as Allgood's letter of December 19, 1973, Hicks' letter of January 3, 1974, Hicks' subsequent phone call to Sears, and Sears' letter of January 31 in response to that call 8 Additional support for this finding appears in Sears' "restate[ment]," in his April 10 letter, of Dexter's position-without limitation-for "re-exami- nation of those articles which were tentatively agreed to between the par- ties " "as a cloak" because, as the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently said in Sweeney & Co. v. N.L.R.B.., 437 F.2d 1127, 1134 (1971), in reaffirming language it had used in N.L.R.B. v. Herman Sausage Co., 275 F.2d 229, 232 (1960): ... bad faith is prohibited though done with sophi stica- tion and finesse. Consequently, to sit at a bargaining table, or to sit almost forever, or to make concessions here and there, could be the very means by which to conceal a purposeful strategy to make bargaining futile or fail. Hence, we have said in more colorful language it takes more than mere "surface bargaining," or "shadow boxing to a draw," or "giving the Union a runaround while purporting to be meeting with the Un- ion for purpose of collective bargaining" [footnotes omitted]. As has been noted above, the only reason given by Re- spondent for its change in position that required no further explanation was that flowing from the termination of the strike. However, I find this reason also to have been advanced in bad faith since whatever validity it might have had in respect to concessions, it could have had no possible applica- tion to those matters on which tentative agreement had been reached at the insistence of Respondent. I have grave dif- ficulty, moreover, with Respondent's position that to the ex- tent that a strike forces concessions from an employer, the Union can call off the strike short of the actual conclusion of an agreement only at the risk of the employer's repudiation of those very concessions which induced the return to work. If at that point the employees retain sufficient stamina to endure and subject their families to further privation by renewing the strike, the employer is free, contends Respond- ent, to start again from scratch. Should the employees lack that fortitude, as is likely after a long strike, what has been a successful strike is lost. It may be that with this heads-tails combination Respondent has discovered an elixir destined to earn the everlasting and universal gratitude of the employing fraternity. However, I cannot help but doubt that this quite squares with the purposes of the Act. Cf. Caroline Farms Division of Textron, Inc., 163 NLRB 854 (1967), where an employer's insistence on renegotiating all subjects not specifically covered by a strike settlement agreement was held, together with other conduct indicative of bad faith, to violate the Act even though such repudiation was sought to be justified by the earlier rejection of the tentative agreement by the membership and the ensuing strike. I find that Respondent's conduct, viewed in its entirety, shows a determination to give the appearance of good-faith bargaining accompanied by an equal determination not to reach agreement. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by refusing to bargain with the Union in good faith. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practice affects commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. WAPLES- PLATTER COMPANIES 487 REMEDY In order to remedy the unfair labor practice found herein my recommended Order will require Respondent to cease and desist therefrom and from any like or related conduct. Moreover, in order to effectuate the policies of the Act the recommended Order will require that Respondent bargain in good faith with the Union and, if an understanding is reached, embody it in a signed contract; in this connection, and since Respondent has given no indication of how far back it intends to go in the negotiations, I shall recommend that the Union's certification extend 1 year from the commence- ment of negotiations hereunder. I shall not recommend the additional remedies sought by the Union9 because the Board's decisions indicate that the instant circumstances do not warrant a departure from its conventional remedial provi- sions. Cf. Shovel Supply Co., 162 NLRB 460, 461, 474- 475 (1966); Orion Tool, Die and Machine Co., 195 NLRB 1080, 1089, 1091 (1972); Rauland Div. of Zenith, 187 NLRB 785 (1971); Longhorn Machine Works, Inc., 205 NLRB 685, fn 2 (1973). Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the entire record herein, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby recommend the following: ORDER10 Respondent, Waples- Platter Companies, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local Union No. 47, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware- housemen and Helpers of America (herein called the Union), as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the following approriate unit: All order pullers, forklift operators, shipping and re- ceiving clerks, frozen food packers, maintenance and mechanics, loaders and local and over- the- road truck- drivers at the employer's place of business located at 7301 Waples Road, Fort Worth, Texas, excluding office clerical, professional employees, supervisors, guards and 9 Requiring Respondent "not to withdraw from tentative agreements except where superseded by subsequent mutual agreements," to pay the Union's costs, to give the Union the use of Respondent's bulletin boards, and to permit Board personnel to read the order to the employees 10 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, recommendations, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections therto shall be deemed waived for all purposes watchmen as defined in the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain- ing, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec- tuate the policies of the Act- (a) Upon request, bargain collectively and in good faith with the Union for the unit described herein with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of work, and other conditions of employment, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. The certification year shall extend 1 year from the date such new bargaining negotiations begin (b) Post at its place of business in Fort Worth, Texas, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."" Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 16, after being duly signed by an authorized represen- tative of Respondent, shall be posted by Respondent immedi- ately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to ensure that such notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 16, in writing, within 20 days from the date of the Order, what steps Re- spondent has taken to comply herewith. 11 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the Notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu- ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL bargain collectively and in good faith with Local 47 of the Teamsters in the unit certified by the National Labor Relations Board on March 29 , 1973, and the Union's certification shall extend 1 year from the date new bargaining negotiations begin. WE WILL NOT refuse so to bargain in good faith, nor will we interfere in any similar way with the rights gua- ranteed to our employees by the National Labor Rela- tions Act. WAPLES- PLATTER COMPANIES