Local Lodge No. 1994, International Association of Machinists

LOCAL LODGE NO 1994, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS 651 Local Lodge No. 1994, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO (O.K. Tool Company, Inc.) and Ralph W. Stinson and George Staiti. Case 1-CB-2319 The Board has considered the stipulation, including exhibits, brief, and the entire record in this proceeding, de novo, and hereby makes the following: FINDINGS OF FACT December 16, 1974 DECISION AND ORDER Upon charges duly filed, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, by the Regional Di- rector for Region 1, issued a complaint and notice of hearing July 18, 1973, against Local Lodge No. 1994, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO. The complaint alleged that the Respondent had engaged in, and was engaging in, cer- tain unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. Copies of the charge and of the complaint and notice of hearing were duly served on the parties. On July 30, 1973, the Respondent filed its answer to the complaint denying the commission of unfair labor practices and requesting that the complaint be dismissed. Thereafter, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts and jointly moved to transfer this proceeding di- rectly to the Board for findings of facts, conclusions of law, and order. The parties waived a hearing before, and the making of findings of fact and conclusions of law by, an Administrative Law Judge, and stipulated that no oral testimony is necessary or desired by any of the parties.' The parties also agreed that the charge, complaint and notice of hearing, the answer, and the stipulation of facts, including exhibits, constitute the entire record in this proceeding. On December 21, 1973, the Board issued its order granting motion, approving stipulation, transferring the proceeding to the Board, and setting January 4, 1974, as the date for filing briefs. None of the parties having filed a brief, the Board issued its Decision on April 3, 1974. After the Decision issued, Respondent's counsel advised the Board that he had not been served with a copy of the order transferring the proceeding to the Board and was not aware that a date for filing briefs had been set. On April 16, 1974, the Board, by Execu- tive Secretary's Order, rescinded its earlier Decision and set a new date for filing briefs. The Respondent filed a brief in support of its position on May 10, 1974. The parties stipulated that the stipulation of facts was made without prejudice to any objections any party might have to the relevance , material- ity, or competence of any facts , and reserved any such objections In the motion to transfer, counsel for the General Counsel contends that whether or not a grand lodge representative of the IAMAW read and explained art L, sec III, of the IAMAW constitution at regular membership meetings of Local Lodge No 1994 is irrelevant No other objection on any basis having been urged to the Board, we conclude that the parties have no other objec- tions or, alternatively , that they have now been waived I THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER O.K. Tool Company, Inc., maintains its principal office and place of business in Milford, New Hamp- shire, where it manufactures, sells, and distributes cut- ting tools and related products. In the course and con- duct of its business, the Company annually receives from points outside the State of New Hampshire goods valued in excess of $50,000. The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and we find, that O.K. Tool Company is, and has been, en- gaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act, and we find that the Company is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. We find that it will effectuate the purposes of the Act to assert jurisdiction herein. II THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and we find, that the Respondent is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE Local Lodge No. 1994, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, and O.K. Tool Company were parties to a collective-bar- gaining agreement effective from April 1, 1971, to April 1, 1973. The Company and the Lodge began negotiations for a new collective-bargaining agreement on February 15, 1973, and continued negotiations until April 6, 1973, following an agreement to extend the contract to April 7. On April 7, 1973, the Lodge's members rejected the Company's proposal and voted to strike. The parties have stipulated that it was a lawful strike over employment terms. On May 9, 1973, George Staiti and Ralph W. Stinson submitted their resignations to the Lodge by mail. Rep- resentatives of the Lodge visited Stinson at his home May 11-the day the resignations were received. They gave him a copy of the IAM constitution, and called his attention to article L, section III, concerning resigna- tion during the course of a strike. The lodge representa- tives also attempted, but failed, to see Staiti on the same day. On May 12, Staiti and Stinson returned to work. The Lodge sent letters to Staiti and Stinson on May 16 with copies of the constitution, referring them to the provision concerning resignations during a strike and also stating that they were subject to charges for their 215 NLRB No. 110 652 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD violation of the constitution. On May 17 a letter was sent to all lodge members, including Staiti and Stinson, advising that charges would be brought against mem- bers who crossed the picket line, that such members would be subject to fines, and that, under the IAM constitution, members could not withdraw during a strike. Stinson and Staiti continued working and, in June and July respectively, were advised that they had been charged with violations of article L, section III, of the IAM constitution, conduct unbecoming a member, for accepting employment while a sanctioned strike was in progress. Neither appeared at his trial and both were found guilty. Stinson was fined $200 for each week he crossed the picket line, Staiti $150. They were notified of the results by letter and that they were "obligated for payment." Both have continued to work, and neither has appealed through intraunion procedures. Staiti and Stinson were advised before charges were filed that members who crossed the picket line would be charged. The Respondent concedes in its brief that the fines are court-collectible. The complaint alleges that Stinson and Staiti duly resigned from the Lodge and that the Lodge violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by threatening a fine or other disci- plinary action if they did not support the Lodge's posi- tion and return to work during the strike. The fines were not alleged as violations of the Act. But, because that issue lies well within the ambit of the complaint, and has been briefed extensively by the Lodge's coun- sel, and as the necessary facts for its resolution have been stipulated, we conclude that the parties have con- sented to trial of that issue. The Respondent now concedes that Stinson and Staiti had duly resigned from the Lodge before return- ing to work. It contends, however, that they were law- fully fined under article L, section III, of the IAM constitution, "Improper Conduct of a Member." Sec- tion III provides in pertinent part that a member may be penalized for: Accepting employment in any capacity in an establishment where a strike or lockout exists as recognized under this Constitution, without per- mission. Resignation shall not relieve a member of his obligation to refrain from accepting employ- ment at the establishment for the duration of the strike or lockout if the resignation occurs during the period of the strike or lockout or within 14 days preceding its commencement. Where observ- ance of a primary picket line is required, resigna- tion shall not relieve a member of his obligation to observe the primary picket line for its duration if the resignation occurs during the period that the picket line is maintained or within 14 days preced- ing its establishment. The issue thus presented is whether or not a labor organization may lawfully threaten to impose, and im- pose, a court-collectible fine on a former member, who has tendered a valid resignation, for conduct following his resignation which is prohibited by the union's con- stitution but protected by Section 7 of the Act. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that it may not and that the Lodge has violated the Act. The Supreme Court in two recent decisions has con- sidered the application of Section 8(b)(1)(A) to union fines of former members for crossing picket lines and working during a strike following lawful resignations. N.L.R.B. v. Granite State Joint Board, 409 U.S. 213 (1972); Booster Lodge No. 405, IAM [Boeing Co.] v. N.L.R.B., 412 U.S. 84 (1973). In Granite State the union members voted to strike shortly before the con- tract expired. The membership also adopted a rule that any "member" guilty of "aiding or abetting" the em- ployer would be subject to a $2,000 fine. Over a period of some 1 to 12 months, 31 members resigned from the union and returned to work. They were tried and fined by the union which then instituted court suits for col- lection of the fines. The Board found that the union had violated Section 8(b)(1)(A), 187 NLRB 636 (1970); the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied enforce- ment, 446 F.2d 369 (1971); and the Supreme Court reversed, 409 U.S. 213 (1972). The court of appeals held that a strike vote implies a mutual reliance by the participants on an undertaking by all to abide the duration of the strike. It reconciled enforcement of that undertaking in the face of the Sec- tion 7 guarantee of the right to refrain from concerted activity by finding that the right had been waived by the agreement to strike. But the Supreme Court con- cluded that a union's power over its members is no greater than the union-member contract, and ends when a member lawfully resigns. The Court observed, in response to the weight that the court of appeals had attached to participation in the strike vote, that events occurring after a strike vote may have an unsettling effect, leading members to change their minds. It held that the "vitality of section 7 requires that the member be free to refrain in November from the actions he endorsed in May," at least when there are no restric- tions on resignation. Following his resignation, a union has "no more control over the former member than it has over the man in the street." 409 U.S. 213 at 217. In Boeing, supra, the union sought to distinguish Granite State and contended that its constitutional prohibition against strikebreaking, though applicable to "members," extended by implication to former members. The Court rejected the distinction and stated that it was no more disposed to find an implied post- resignation commitment from the prohibition against strikebreaking than it had been from participation in LOCAL LODGE NO. 1994, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS 653 the strike vote and ratification of the rule in Granite State. 412 U.S. 84 at 89. We note that the Supreme Court's rejection of an implied commitment from participation in the strike vote in Granite State had not been based on a narrow construction of "member" as used in the rule,' but on the conclusion that events during a strike may lead a member to change his mind. The Court stated, in the passage previously cited, that, where there is no restric- tion on resignation, "the vitality of section 7 requires that the member be free to refrain in November from the actions he endorsed in May and that his section 7 rights are not lost by a union's plea for solidarity or by its pressures for conformity to its regime." 409 U.S. 213 at 217-18. The Lodge argues that, because its constitution specifically prohibits former members from returning to work following resignation during a strike, Granite State and Boeing are not applicable, and that the right of a labor organization to maintain solidarity during a strike and to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition and retention of membership must take precedence over whatever Section 7 rights its former members may have to abandon a lawful strike and return to work. In support, it cites the Supreme Court's Decision in Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 388 U.S. 175 (1967). In Allis-Chalmers, the Court held that a union does not violate the Act by fining members who return to work during a strike and instituting state court suits for collection of the fines, concluding that Congress had not intended to regulate a union's internal affairs in those circumstances. But those fined enjoyed full union membership, as the Court pointed out in Granite State, 409 U.S. 213 at 215, in distinguishing Allis-Chalmers, on that basis. Not only do full members reap the bene- fits of their continuing union membership, but they also have a continuing voice in the union's course of action, a factor the Court relied on in Allis-Chalmers, supra, 191. No such justifications can support the imposition of court-collectible fines on former members. They no longer receive the benefits of union membership and have no right to participate following resignation in deciding their former union's course of action. It can- not be argued in reason that continuing membership to the extent, but only to the extent, that the "member" remains subject to union discipline is the equivalent of the "full union membership" that the Court relied on in Allis-Chalmers, and relied on again in distinguishing that decision in Granite State. 2 In fact, the Court was not concerned with any commitment based on the rule, but the commitment which the court of appeals had found implicit in participation in the strike vote Moreover, in Granite State the Court reiterated its view, expressed first in Scofield v. N. L. R. B., 394 U.S. 423 at 430 (1969), that: 8(b)(1) leaves a union free to enforce a prop- erly adopted rule which reflects a legitimate union interest, impairs no policy Congress has imbedded in the labor laws, and is reasonably enforced against union members who are free to leave the union and escape the rule. [409 U.S. 213 at 216.] Not only does the Lodge's proscription of postresigna- tion strikebreaking impair a former member's Section 7 right to refrain from concerted activity, but it also is plainly contrary to Scofield's requirement that union members be free to leave the union to escape member- ship conditions that they consider onerous. Balancing an individual's right under Section 7 to refrain from concerted activity following resignation from a union against that of a union to maintain solidarity during a strike, we conclude that the latter must give way. Conformity may be none too high a price for the benefits of union membership. But the choice, at least in the absence of reasonable restrictions on resignation, is the individual's to make, not the union's. Should he choose to resign and to forgo the benefits of union membership, the union may not nonetheless seek to exact conformity without regard to the individual's Section 7 rights. Whether the Lodge might lawfully have placed rea- sonable restrictions on the circumstances in which a member could resign, and have enforced those restric- tions and strikebreaking sanctions against full members who returned to work during a strike, is a question which is not raised by the facts of this proceeding. We hold only that a union may not levy, or threaten to levy, court-collectible fines against a former member for ex- ercising his Section 7 rights following lawful resigna- tion from the union. IV THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The conduct of the Respondent set forth above, oc- curring in connection with the operations of the Em- ployer as set forth in section 1, has a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tends to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging in, certain unfair labor practices, we shall order it to cease and desist therefrom. In order to effectuate the purposes of the Act, we shall also order 654 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the Respondent to rescind the unlawful fines, to refund any money paid to it as a result of the fines, with interest computed at 6 percent per annum, and to post the notice attached as an appendix to this Decision and Order. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Respondent is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By threatening to discipline, and by imposing court-collectible fines on, former members, who had duly resigned from the Union, for their postresignation crossing of a sanctioned picket line and working during the strike at O.K. Tool Company, Inc., Respondent restrained and coerced employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act, and thereby engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) of the Act. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re- lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Local Lodge 1994, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Restraining or coercing employees who have re- signed from, and are no longer members of, Respond- ent, in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act, by threatening disciplinary action against, and by imposing court-collectible fines on, such employees because of their postresignation con- duct in working at O.K. Tool Company, Inc., during the strike which began in April 1973. (b) In any like or related manner restraining or co- ercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaran- teed in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the purposes of the Act: (a) Rescind the fines levied against Stinson and Staiti because of their postresignation work for O.K. Tool Company, Inc., during the strike which began in April 1973 and refund to them any money they may have paid as a result of such fines, plus interest computed at the rate of 6 percent per annum. (b) Post at its business office and meeting hall copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix. ,3 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Direc- tor for Region 1, after being duly signed by an author- ized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Mail to the Regional Director for Region 1 signed copies of said notice for posting by O.K. Tool Com- pany, Inc., if the Company be willing, in places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 1, after being duly signed by the Respon- dent's authorized representative, shall be returned forthwith to the Regional Director. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 1, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply here- with. MEMBERS FANNING and JENKINS, concurring in the result: In agreement with our colleagues, we conclude that the Lodge violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by threatening to impose, and imposing, court-collectible fines on George Staiti and Ralph W. Stinson for return- ing to work during a strike after they had duly resigned from the Lodge. Our view of the facts, however, makes it unnecessary for us to consider the broader legal issue which our colleagues here determine adversely to the Lodge: whether or not a union may, on proper notice and in the absence of any other legal impediment, en- force an otherwise valid constitutional provision forbid- ding former members from returning to work during a strike following lawful resignation from the union. We do not believe that issue is present and we reserve our judgment on it until it is presented in a more appro- priate factual setting. Our concurrence is not intended to reflect, and should not be read as reflecting, either favorably or unfavorably on our colleagues' view of the law in that respect. Local Lodge No. 1994, IAM, and O.K. Tool Com- pany were parties to a collective-bargaining agreement effective from April 1, 1971, to April 1, 1973. Negotia- tions for a new agreement began February 15, 1973, and continued to April 6 after an agreement to extend negotiations to April 7. On April 7, the Lodge's mem- bers rejected O.K.'s proposal and voted to strike. It is stipulated that it was a lawful economic strike. 3 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " LOCAL LODGE NO. 1994, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS 655 On May 9, 1973, George Staiti and Ralph Stinson, the Charging Parties, submitted their resignations to the Lodge by mail. Representatives of the Lodge visited Stinson at his home on May 11-when the resignations were received-gave him a copy of the IAM constitu- tion, and "called his attention" to the constitutional provision regarding resignation during a strike. The Respondent's representatives also attempted, but failed, to see Staiti on the same day. On May 12 both returned to work. The Lodge sent letters to Staiti and Stinson on May 16 with copies of the constitution, refering them to the provision, article L, section III, concerning resigna- tions during a strike. The letter did not advise Staiti and Stinson that they could not resign and return to work during the strike as the constitution provides. Rather, it interpreted the constitution (wrongfully, as the Lodge now concedes) as prohibiting resignations: Enclosed you will find the most recent copy of the I.A.M. Constitution. On page 123, lines 30 thru 41, you will find language clarifying how you re- sign from this organization. Since your resignation has not been properly pre- sented by the rules of our Constitution, we find we must notify you that your resignation request is denied. The letters also advised them that they were subject to charges for violating the constitution. On May 17 a letter was sent to all the Lodge's mem- bers stating in part that: Questions have been asked as to what can be done with members that cross our picket lines. Some of the answers are as follows: 1. Charges can, and will, be brought against any member of Local Lodge 1994 that crosses our picket line. 2. If charges are upheld by a trial committee . any violators will be subject to fines that will be voted by our membership at a regular meeting. 3. Can members be fined? Yes. What about the New Hampshire court ruling against the Textile Union? This law is not applicable. When you re- ceived your checks this week you also received an I.A.M. Constitution. On page 125, lines 30 thru 41 will explain that you can not withdraw from this Union during a strike. Stinson and Staiti continued working and, in June and July respectively, were advised that they had been charged under article L, section III, of the IAM consti- tution, concerning conduct unbecoming a member, for accepting employment during a sanctioned strike. Nei- ther appeared for trial and both were found guilty. Stinson was fined $200 for each week he crossed the picket line, Staiti $150. Among the exhibits presented at the trial were "#I Letter of resignation" and "#2 Letter of denial & Constitution." They were noti- fied of the results by letter and that they were "obli- gated for payment. 14 Both have continued to work and neither has ap- pealed through intraunion procedures. They were ad- vised before charges were filed that members who crossed the picket line could be charged. Except for the references to the IAM constitution, there is no evidence that they were told that former members who resigned before crossing a picket line could also be charged. Although the parties stipulated that the constitutional provision in issue here was read and explained to mem- bers before the strike, there is no evidence of how it was explained. It was also stipulated that lodge representa- tives, as noted above, visited Stinson, but not Staiti, "and called his attention to the provision on page 125 [of the constitution] pertaining to resignation in the course of a strike." It is only reasonable to infer that the explanations were consistent with the Lodge's later, and oft repeated, explanation that the constitution pro- hibited resignations during a strike. The complaint alleged in paragraph 8 that "Stinson and Staiti duly resigned from membership in Respond- ent." The Lodge answered that it: denies the allegation of paragraph 8 of the Com- plaint. The Respondent denies Paragraph 8 of the Complaint and further answering states that Arti- cle L, Section III, of the Constitution . . . prohib- its such resignations. Paragraph 12 of the complaint, alleging that the Lodge had violated Section 8(b)(1)(A), was denied in its an- swer on the ground that: The resignations referred to in Paragraph 8 of the Complaint could not be honored, therefore these people were still members and subject to the obligations set forth in the Constitution. The Lodge argues that it fined its resigned members pursuant to the provisions of the IAM constitution which forbids a member, who resigns during a strike or within 14 days before it begins, to work at the struck establishment. To reach this argument, it contends that whether or not its members were ever advised that they could be tried and fined for returning to work during a strike after valid resignations, or whether it is es- topped from relying on its constitutional prohibition against postresignation strikebreaking, are not raised 4 The Lodge concedes in its brief that the fines are court-collectible 656 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD by the parties and, in any event, that its members were on notice. But the issue is presented to the Board , not only by the facts, to which the Lodge stipulated, but also by the Lodge's answer to the complaint. The answer not only denies that the Charging Parties had resigned from the Lodge, but also affirmatively defends that the resigna- tions could not be honored, and for that reason they were still members and subject to constitutional obliga- tions. The Lodge's brief buttresses its claim that its mem- bers were apprised of the postresignation restriction by arguing that the reference to the "New Hampshire court ruling against the Textile Union ," in its May 17 letter to its members, supra, is "obviously to the Su- preme Court's decision in N.L.R.B. v. Granite State Joint Board, 409 U.S. 213." In the context of "this exact citation" (which is exact in the Lodge's brief), the further statement that the constitutional provision -will explain that you cannot withdraw from this union during a strike' plainly means , and cannot rea- sonably be prejudicially misunderstood, that a mid- strike resignation does not free the resigner to engage in post-resignation strikebreaking." But Staiti and Stinson did not have the benefit of the Lodge's brief. The point, after all, is not what the Lodge might have thought it was telling its members, nor how what it did tell them might be interpreted under the most favorable analysis to comport with its present defense, but what information the Lodge actually con- veyed to its members. The Lodge asserts that it is clearly unlawful to fine former members for conduct occurring after they have submitted valid and effective resignations , in the ab- sence of any postresignation restrictions . With that in mind, the IAM had amended its constitution to provide what it considers to be lawful restrictions in article L, section III. The Lodge argues that in view of the clear state of the law, and the fact that its constitution had been amended to prevent lawfully the very conduct the Charging Parties engaged in, the Lodge would not have ignored the amendment and have proceeded in a man- ner which is clearly unlawful. The argument, however, is not sufficient to prevent the conclusion that that is precisely what the Lodge did do. It would be strange indeed if the Lodge, by now conceding for the first time that it could not lawfully restrict the resignations of Stinson and Staiti and con- tinue to treat them as members for the purposes of union discipline, could thereby compel the conclusion that it had neither restricted their resignations nor dis- ciplined them as members . We doubt that Congress labored under the belief its enactment of the law was sufficient unto itself or that the Supreme Court thought its view of the reach of Section 8(b)(1)(A) would have the effect of a law of nature. The Lodge's position comes down to the argument that its representatives simply did not know what they were talking about . But to sustain the Lodge's factual argument, we must also conclude that, although its representatives did not understand the meaning of their own words, its members were able to see through what was actually said to what was supposedly intended. In the Lodge's view, its members, not the Respondent, must bear the burden of any misunderstanding or am- biguity. The interpretation of the IAM constitution which the Lodge now advances to the Board, although con- sistent with its plain meaning, is not consistent with the interpretation advanced to the Lodge's members, with its refusal to accept the resignations of Staiti and Stin- son, nor with its answer to the complaint: that it had not violated the Act because the resignations of Staiti and Stinson could not be honored and they were still members. Having undertaken to interpret its constitu- tion to Staiti and Stinson, the Lodge may not belatedly justify encroachment on their Section 7 rights on the basis of a contrary interpretation. But, assuming that we did not find that the Lodge is estopped from raising that defense , we could not con- clude that Staiti and Stinson were on notice that the Lodge claimed a right to discipline them as resigned members for postresignation activities. The record before us demonstrates that they were told that article L, section III, prohibited resignations . That was the Lodge's only interpretation. Its members were entitled to rely upon it, and entitled to conclude that was the sole import of article L, section III, and the sole consti- tutional impediment to working during the strike. There was no burden on Staiti and Stinson to go behind the representations made by the Lodge's representa- tives. The burden was upon the Lodge to assert any claim to a continuing power over former members not- withstanding resignation before, and not after, exercis- ing that power. It is clear that, even if a labor organization may lawfully impose postresignation restrictions on former members, it may do so only upon proper notice. Justice Blackmun, the lone dissenter in Granite State, supra, observed in his concurring opinion in Boeings that even a constitutional provision clearly prohibiting post- resignation strikebreaking is no substitute for proper notice. Not only were Stinson and Staiti not on notice of the interpretation of the Lodge's constitution which it now urges, but they were advanced a completely different interpretation. Indeed, the Lodge's case for 5 Booster Lodge No. 405, IAM [Boeing Co.] v. N.L.R.B., 412 U.S. 84 (1973). LOCAL LODGE NO. 1994, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS 657 notice would have been better had it never mentioned its constitutional provision to them at all. Because Staiti and Stinson had duly resigned from Local Lodge No. 1994 before crossing the picket line and were not on notice that the lodge asserted any right to restrict the postresignation conduct of former mem- bers, and because the Lodge is estopped from asserting that its constitution prohibits postresignation strike- breaking, we concur in the finding that the Lodge vi- olated Section 8(b)(1)(A). We find it unnecessary to consider whether a union which is not estopped may, on proper notice, lawfully restrict the postresignation conduct of former members on the basis of a clear and otherwise binding constitutional proscription. In our judgment that issue is not presented by the facts of this proceeding. exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, work after their resignation at O.K. Tool Company, Inc., during the strike which began in April 1973, by threaten- ing to discipline them or by imposing court-col- lectible fines. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner re- strain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Na- tional Labor Relations Act. WE WILL rescind the fines levied against George Staiti and Ralph W . Stinson because they worked at O.K. Tool Company, Inc., after their resigna- tion from the Union during the strike which began in April 1973, and refund any money they may have paid as a result of such fines, plus interest. APPENDIX NOTICE TO MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government LOCAL LODGE No. 1994, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS, AFL-CIO WE WILL NOT restrain or coerce employees who have resigned from the Union and who, in the