United Electric Company

UNITED ELECTRIC COMPANY United Electric Company and International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO- CLC, Local 1021. Case 16-CA-4562 October 10, 1972 DECISION AND ORDER By MEMBERS JENKINS, KENNEDY, AND PENELLO On June 15, 1972, Administrative Law Judge 1 Herzel H.E. Plaine issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief and the Charging Party filed limited exceptions. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,2 and conclusions 3 of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that Respondent, United Electric Company, Wichita Falls, Texas, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in said recommended Order. 1 The title of "Trial Examiner" was changed to "Administrative Law Judge" effective August 19, 1972. 2 In adopting the Administrative Law Judge's Decision we do not rely on his finding that certain delays in negotiations were due to the Respondent's "foot dragging" in supplying information to the Union. 3 In its exceptions the Respondent compares at length its conduct with that found not to be unlawful in Lloyd McKee Motors, Inc, 170 NLRB 1278. We agree with the Administrative Law Judge that Respondent's reliance on that case is misplaced. In Lloyd McKee there had been an unusual 6-week delay after 8 bargaining sessions in 15 weeks over a single issue. The delay was even more pronounced because a mediator was present who was to resolve the issue after receiving information from the Union. In addition, when the union negotiator was asked if the Union represented a majority he refused to answer. Further, Respondent asked its supervisors to assess the Union's strength and received reports that the Union had lost its majority. These factors in combination with considerable employee turnover and evidence of union disarray were sufficient to establish a good-faith doubt. Here, to the contrary, the delay in bargaining was not at all unusual, and Respondent had no evidence from which it could be inferred that the employees failed to support the Union. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION HERZEL H. E. PLAINE, Trial Examiner: Respondent, a manufacturer of air-conditioning equipment, is charged with having violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) when it broke off negotiations for a renewal contract with the Charging Party (the Union), the certified collective-bargaining representative of Respondent's production and maintenance employees, and refused to bargain further. Respondent admits the refusal to bargain, but seeks to justify it on the ground that it had good reason to doubt that the Union continued to represent a majority of the employees. The case was tried in Wichita Falls, Texas, on April 27, 1972, on a complaint filed March 9, 1972 (resting on a charge filed by the Union on November 22, 1971), and Respondent's answer denying any wrongdoing. General Counsel and Respondent have filed briefs. Upon the entire record of the case, including my observation of the witnesses and consideration of the briefs, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I JURISDICTION Respondent is a Texas corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of air-conditioning equipment in Wichita Falls, Texas. In the year prior to issuance of the complaint, Respondent received at its plant from points outside Texas, goods valued in excess of $50,000, and sold and shipped to points outside Texas products valued in excess of $50,000. Respondent is engaged, as it admitted, in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. The Union is, as Respondent also admitted, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Facts Preceding Cessation of Bargaining Following a Board-conducted election in 1968, the Union was certified as the bargaining representative of Respondent's production and maintenance employees. A first contract was negotiated and signed in June 1969. The terms of the contract was 18 months, to expire on November 30, 1970. Prior to expiration, in September 1970, a decertification petition was filed with the Board and an election held on October 16, 1970. The Union won and was certified again as bargaining representative of the employees on October 26, 1970. Thereafter, and before expiration of the first contract on November 30, 1970, the parties began negotiations on November 9, 1970, for a new contract. The negotiations spanned more than a year, covering nine negotiating meetings from November 9, 1970, through September 15, 1971,¹ and two telephone conferences on October 12 and November 18, 1971. Each side had a negotiating committee that attended the meetings. The principal negotiating was done by the Union's business agent, Edward Gaskill, who headed The nine meetings were held on November 9, 10, and 23 and December 1, 1970, and March 30, June 29, July 8 and 22, and September 15, 1971. 199 NLRB No. 170 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the employees' committee, and Respondent's lawyer, Joseph Parker, who headed the Employer's committee. Gaskill operated out of Norman, Oklahoma, and Parker had his office in Forth Worth, Texas. The telephone conferences of October 12 and November 18, 1971, were between Gaskill and Parker. In the negotiations that began November 9, 1970, Respondent offered a written proposal, which largely tracked the first contract with a few additions that Respondent wanted. As negotiations progressed Respondent succeeded in establishing its proposal as the contract that appeared to be emerging, and by the ninth meeting, September 15, 1971, there appeared to be substantial agreement except in possibly three areas-wage increase, checkoff, and duration of the contract. The Union seemed prepared to go along with Respondent's 10-cent-per-hour wage raise, but Respondent rejected the checkoff and 1-year term for the contract that the Union appeared to be holding out for. Gaskill suggested that Respondent provide a fresh final draft, and on October 6, 1971, Respondent mailed to Union Agent Gaskill a new draft of the proposed contract that covered the provisions agreed to between the parties and some that had not been agreed to. The redraft did not include a checkoff provision and included a provision calling for a 3-year duration of the contract (G.C. Exh. 7b). The covering letter (G.C. Exh. 7a) suggested that Gaskill discuss any problems he had with Lawyer Parker. The new draft was received by Union agent Gaskill on October 8, 1971. On October 12, Gaskill discussed the new draft in a fairly long telephone conversation with Lawyer Parker. Gaskill called attention to some mistakes and omissions, which Parker agreed to correct. While Gaskill apparently had little hope of getting the desired checkoff and did not press that issue, he was greatly disturbed by the 3-year term proposed, and said it was going to raise a real problem with his people. Parker replied the 3-year term was his client's idea to avoid repetition of long bargaining periods for renewals, but if Gaskill were to come back with a 2-year proposal he, Parker, would recommend it although he did not know what kind of reception the proposal would get. Gaskill said he needed time to check the new draft and the proposed 3-year term with the people of the union local and with the regional people, District 10 of the International Union in Dallas. They agreed that Gaskill would check the matter out. Union Agent Gaskill testified that he met with his committee and then consulted with District 10. He tried to reach Lawyer Parker by phone several times (November 8 and 12) and finally succeeded on November 18, 1971. (Parker admitted that he told Gaskill on November 18 that he had been "out of pocket"-meaning out of town-on at least one of these earlier occasions, but denied knowing that Gaskill had called.) Gaskill told Parker if the Respondent would reduce the 3-year term to a shorter term, they had a contract. Parker cut him-short by saying Respondent questioned the Union's majority status and had mailed him a letter saying so the previous day (November 17), and was filing an RM petition with the Board that day (November 18) petitioning for investigation and certification of the representative. Parker added that if Gaskill represented a majority of the employees he ought to prove it, and Respondent would resume the negotiations from the point they had reached. Union Agent Gaskill expressed surprise and indignation at this action taken while he had been checking with his people, by agreement with Lawyer Parker, to report back their response to Respondent's offer of a contract. He said he would file an unfair labor practice charge, and did on November 22, 1971. Some time later, the Regional Director dismissed Respondent's RM petition (Case 16-RM-444, filed November 18, 1971) because of the pendency of the present complaint based on the charge of November 22 (Resp. Exh. 3). 1. Respondent's defense Lawyer Parker testified that the delay in the union response, between the two telephone conferences of October 12 and November 18, 1971, with Union Agent Gaskill, was a consideration in his questioning the Union's majority status. He said he couldn't understand the delay when the contract was close to agreement except for the few items noted. Parker conceded there had been longer stretches in the negotiations without communication, see footnote 1, supra, and that this lapse of time was not unusual. He also admitted that he made no effort to get in touch with Gaskill following the October 12 conference. However, said Lawyer Parker, he put the lapse of time together with a conversation reported to him, in the week prior to November 18, between Plant Superintendent Riley Cook and the Union's local president, Tony Castillo, which indicated to Parker (he said) that Castillo hadn't heard from Union Agent Gaskill and that Castillo was saying the employees did not want the Union. When this conversation was reported to him, said Parker, he decided to question the Union's majority status. Lawyer Parker put his reasons in writing to Union Agent Gaskill in a letter he sent dated November 17, 1971, received by Gaskill after November 18 (G.C. Exh. 8), in the following three sentences: During the past week we have been informed that the employees no longer desire you to be their bargaining representative. This confirms statements you made at various times during our bargaining sessions about the lack of support you had among our employees. Based upon the above factors, we doubt that you represent a majority of our employees. The letter concluded with a withdrawal of the contract proposal and notice of filing the RM petition to determine majority status. It is not without significance, in gauging Parker's accuracy and appraisal of the facts he allegedly had, that his letter to Gaskill opened with the statement that on October 6 the Company sent its contract proposal and "To date we have received no response from you." This completely ignored the long telephone conference Parker and Gaskill had had covering the proposal on October 12, and their agreement then that Gaskill needed time to check with both the local and International representatives. Parker admitted, both to Gaskill and in the courtroom, that his letter was UNITED ELECTRIC COMPANY incorrect in this opening assertion.² The evidence that Lawyer Parker had received, in the week prior to his letter of November 17, was a report from Plant Superintendent Cook of a brief passing conversation he had with Union Local President Castillo in the plant restroom on November 9, 1971. Both Cook and Castillo served on the negotiating committees, and Cook, according to his testimony, asked Castillo if he had heard from Ed Gaskill. Castillo replied, that Ed was pretty busy and he hadn't heard from him.³ Castillo then volunteered, according to Cook, that at one time he thought the employees wanted a union but that he had decided now that they didn't, that they would not support him, that they wanted a free ride on the gravy train, and he was going to resign. In response to Cook's question as to what he meant by resign, Castillo added that he was not going to resign then but would stick with the negotiating committee through the negotiations. The evidence that Lawyer Parker had of statements by Union Agent Gaskill that he lacked support of the employees, was Parker's claim, that on one occasion in the negotiations Gaskill complained of not having strength to get Parker to change his position when he could not get Parker to budge on giving a checkoff provision; and a second occasion at the last bargaining meeting in September 1971 when, according to Parker, Gaskill said he didn't have the strength among the employees to negotiate and some day the two of them would sit down and negotiate a contract. Parker replied, according to his testimony, that Gaskill had done well for one with no strength. Union Agent Gaskill denied saying in the negotiations (or elsewhere) that he had no strength among the employees and that it placed him at a disadvantage. He did say, according to his testimony, after he had been met with Parker's refusal of certain changes, that he'd like to have a 95-97 percent strike vote in his pocket. Parker admitted that Gaskill had said this. Plant Superintendent Cook, who attended all of the negotiating meetings and who was called on to corroborate Parker's claim about the talk of strength, admitted that Gaskill did not clarify what he meant by strength, and admitted that Gaskill never said he did not represent a majority of the employees and that Gaskill was never asked to say if he did or didn't represent a majority. In view of Parker's demonstrated inaccuracy, supra, and the total testimony on this point, I am inclined to believe Union Agent Gaskill that he bemoaned only the lack of overwhelming support for a strike vote to compel certain concessions.4 2 The letter was also misaddressed and missent to Union Agent Gaskill at an incorrect address (compare it and the mailing envelope, G.C. Exh 8, with G.C. Exh. 7c) Gaskill did not receive the letter until after his conversation with Parker on November 18. 3 Laywer Parker (in his brief) construed this ambiguous statement to mean that Gaskill had not met and consulted at all with the negotiating representatives of the local It IS equally, if not more likely, susceptible of the meaning that, on November 9, Castillo had not heard further from Gaskill since his meetings first with the representatives of the local and then with regional union representatives. 4 Even accepting as true the whole of Parker's and Cook's testimony, it depicts only professional hand-wringing by Gaskill over inability to get terms that he wanted, and not an admission or suggestion to the conferees that the Union no longer represented a majority of the employees. Respondent argues that added to the two basic reasons, given at the time of questioning the Union's majority status, are supporting factors derived from the manner in which the Union and its officers conducted business with the employer and from the turnover of employees in the unit. 2. The governing law Under the Celanese doctrine, Celanese Corp. of America, 95 NLRB 664 (1951), recognized by the Supreme Court in Brooks V. N.L.R.B., 348 U.S. 96 (1954), the union certified by the Board as bargaining representative of the unit of employees enjoys the irrebutable presumption of majority status for 1 year after certification. Thereafter the presumption is rebutable, and an employer, who has a reasonable basis in fact to doubt the majority status of the incumbent union, and who asserts the doubt in good faith, may refuse to recognize and bargain with the union, Bally, Case and Cooler V. N.L.R.B., 416 F.2d 902, 904-905 (C.A. 6, 1969). The standard is serious doubt of the union's continued majority status, and the two components to be established by the employer are a reasonable basis in fact for the serious doubt, and the employer's good faith in asserting the doubt, Lodges 1746 and 743, Machinists V. N.L.R.B., 416 F.2d 809, 811-812 (C.A.D.C., 1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 1058. Since the doubt as to the continuing majority status must rest upon a reasonable basis in fact, it may not depend upon unfounded speculation or upon a subjective state of mind; and the basis for the doubt may not be controlled or even guided by later ascertained facts of union adherence or nonadherence, but must be the basis at the time of the refusal to bargain, N.L.R.B. V. Gulfmont Hotel Co., 362 F.2d 588, 589 (C.A. 5, 1966). Because the presumption of majority status flowing from certification is a continuing one, the burden of proof is on the employer to produce evidence of the good-faith doubt that the union no longer represents the majority of the unit of employees, N.L.R.B. V. Gulfmont Hotel Co., supra, 592; N.L.R.B. V. Rish Equipment Co., 407 F.2d 1098, 1099-1102 (C.A. 4, 1969). And, in this connection, there is no threshold burden on the General Counsel to prove the union's majority status, Lodges 1746 and 743, Machinists V. N.L.R.B., supra, 812, fn. 3. B. The Section 8(a)(5) and (1) Findings Tested by these standards, Respondent has failed in its burden to establish a reasonable basis in fact for serious doubt of the Union's majority status on November 18, 1971, and has failed to establish that it asserted its alleged doubt in good faith. The claim made by Respondent that the employees no longer wanted the Union for their bargaining representative rests upon the solitary report by a supervisor of a passing conversation with the president of the local to the effect that the members were not giving the support he formerly thought he had and that he was contemplating resigning his position as president after the contract negotiations were completed. This may have been a sign of disaffection among the employees, or it may have been the expression of unhappiness and frustration by one among them trying to get something done for all, but it is hardly indicative of a grass DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD roots movement or desire by the employees to terminate their union representation (as, for example, in N.L.R.B. V. Gallaro, 419 F.2d 97, 101 (C.A. 2, 1969)). Moreover, as the Board pointed out in Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 184 NLRB No. 69 (1970), supervisory reports of employee discontent are not of significance; to be significant the evidence of dissatisfaction with the union must come from the employees themselves, not from the employer on their behalf. The claim by Respondent that the Union's principal negotiator himself admitted lack of support among the employees turned out to be evidence of mere shop talk between the two principal negotiators about who was getting the better bargain, with the union negotiator suggesting he could have done much better if he had a close-to-unanimous backing for a strike in his pocket. This was far from indicating lack of support for the Union by the employees, and was clearly not an admission that the Union no longer represented a majority of the unit of employees. Respondent's claim that the lapse of time between the telephone conferences of October 12 and November 18, 1971, confirmed Respondent's reasons for believing that the Union no longer represented the employees and was no longer interested in seeking a contract for them, and therefore justified the action of breaking off the negotiations and questioning the Union's majority status, was, in my opinion, an unconscionable claim and action in the context of the contract negotiations in this case. These were protracted negotiations, well over a year, involving nine meetings of the negotiating committees and two telephone conferences of the principal negotiators. The background evidence indicated that a large measure of the slowness was attributable to foot-dragging by Respondent in supplying information, and the necessity in some instances for filing charges with the Board in order to get the information; large scale layoffs of employees, including at one time two of the three members of the Union's negotiating committee; and a large number of terminations of employment, some of which the Union challenged by charges to the Board and ultimately settled out with the Respondent. The lapses of times between meetings and in communications regarding proposals and counterproposals exceeded, in a number of instances, the approximate 5 weeks between October 12 and November 18, 1971, and it was conceded that the latter was not an unusual lapse of time. On October 12, 1971, it appeared that the negotiators were not far from agreement, pretty much on Respondent's proposals for a contract. However, the union negotiator still had to sell, to both the local and International union representatives, acceptance of a long-term contract without a union dues checkoff and with only a 10-cent wage raise. He needed time, and Respondent's negotiator understood and acceded. Respondent's sudden attack on the Union's status, and concomittant withdrawal of the contract proposal, ignoring its arrangement with the Union's principal negotiator, and without notice to or inquiry of him, was based upon mere conjecture that something might be wrong in the relationship between the Union and its members. It was a shot in the dark in the hope that, if it struck, it might collapse the relationship and end the need for any contract, or at least soften up union resistance to Respondent's proposals. The attack came close upon the expiration (on October 26, 1971) of the Union's certification year. In the circumstances of this case, it was a bad-faith use of Board procedures, of a kind (though not identical) with that condemned in Bally, Case and Cooler V. N.L.R.B., supra, 905, as designed to cast the Union in a bad light or extract concessions from it. Respondent asserts other considerations to support the basis for its doubt of the Union's majority, such as the closeness of the election vote that resulted in certification, and the turnover in employment by terminations and replacements since certification. There was no independent evidence from which it could be found or inferred that the new employees did not support the Union. Indeed, Respondent conceded that it did not know who of its employees were union members. Hence these assertions by Respondent do not support the showing of a reasonable basis for serious doubt which Respondent is required to make, N.L. R.B. V. Little Rock Downtowner, Inc., 414 F.2d 1084 (C.A. 8, 1969); Massey-Ferguson, Inc., supra. Respondent also complained of failures in notification of changes in union officers and stewards; but there was contrary evidence of Respondent having overlooked some of the notifications, and clear evidence that mutual business between the employer and employees involving the processing of grievances and conduct of negotiations has been carried on by stewards, officers, or trustees of the Union for the employees, with representatives of the Employer, since the advent of the Union in the shop. Respondent sought to attack the claim of incumbency of some of the officers or trustees of the local based on evidence obtained on the day of trial, April 27, 1972. Assuming such evidence was relevant to a showing of a reasonable basis for serious doubt, it cannot have a bearing here, since facts respecting union adherence or nonadherence ascertained after the refusal to bargain are not controlling or even guiding in determining that the employer had a reasonable basis for serious doubt at the time it refused to bargain, N.L.R.B. V. Gulfmont Hotel Co., supra, 589. Lastly, the Respondent would take credit for reasonableness and good-faith of its position from an absence of commission of unfair labor practices, independent of the present charge. But, as stated by the Board in Laystrom Mfg. Co., 151 NLRB 1482, 1485 (1965), enforcement denied on other grounds 359 F.2d 799 (C.A. 7, 1966), the absence of independent unfair labor practices, though consistent with good faith, does not establish reasonable grounds for believing that the Union has lost its majority. Moreover, in the matter of good faith, I found it missing, supra, in Respondent's repudiation of its negotiating arrangements and the bad-faith use of Board procedures.⁵ Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to bargain further with the Union on November 18, 1971, and by its continued refusal to bargain since. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Respondent refused on November 18, 1971, and thereafter, to bargain with the Union as the collective-bargaining representative of the unit of Respondent's production and 5 Respondent's reliance on comparability of its conduct with that found not to be unlawful in Lloyd McKee Motors, 170 NLRB 1278 (1968), is misplaced. UNITED ELECTRIC COMPANY maintenance employees, certified by the Board October 26, 1970. The refusal to bargain was based on a claim of doubt of the Union's continued majority status, but the doubt was asserted by Respondent without a reasonable basis in fact and not in good faith. Consequently, Respondent's refusal to bargain with the Union is an unfair labor practice in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, and affects commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY It will be recommended that Respondent: (1) Cease and desist from its refusal to bargain with the Union; (2) upon request, resume bargaining with the Union; and (3) post the notice provided for herein. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, there is hereby issued the following recommended: ORDER 6 Respondent, United Electric Company, Wichita Falls, Texas, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from refusing to bargain with the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the appropriate unit of Respondent's production and maintenance employees. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, resume bargaining in good faith with the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the appropriate unit of Respondent's production and maintenance employees and, if an understanding is reached, embody it in a written agreement. The appropriate unit is: All production and maintenance employees of United Electric Company at its plant, 501 Kell Boulevard, Wichita Falls, Texas, including truckdrivers, inspectors, leadmen, working foremen, plant clericals, regular part-time employees, coffee shop attendant, maintenance men, shipping, receiving, and stock room employees in the plant area of Magic Aire Division, but excluding office clerical employees, guards, watchmen, foremen and supervisors as defined in the Act. (b) Post in its plant at Wichita Falls, Texas, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."7 Immediately upon receipt of copies of said notice, on forms to be provided by the Regional Director for Region 16 (Fort Worth, Texas), the Respondent shall cause the copies to be signed by one of its authorized representatives and posted, the posted copies to be maintained for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director of Region 16, in writing, within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this Decision, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply therewith.⁸ 6 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, recommendations, and Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 7 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." 8 In the event that the recommended Order IS adopted by the Board after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify the Regional Director of Region 16, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply therewith." APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board having found, after a trial, that we violated the National Labor Relations Act: WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain with International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC, Local 1021 (the Union), as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the appropriate unit of our production and maintenance employees. WE WILL, upon request, resume bargaining in good faith with the Union and, if an understanding is reached, embody it in a written agreement. The appropriate unit is: All production and maintenance employees of United Electric Company at its plant, 501 Kell Boulevard, Wichita Falls, Texas, including truckdrivers, inspectors, leadmen, working foremen, plant clericals, regular part-time employees, coffee shop attendant, maintenance men, shipping, receiving, and stock room employees in the plant area of Magic Aire Division, but excluding office clerical employees, guards, watchmen, foremen and supervisors as defined in the Act. UNITED ELECTRIC COMPANY (Employer) (Representative) Dated By This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days (Title) DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, Federal Office Building, Room 8-A-24, 819 Taylor Street, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, Telephone 817-334-2921.