231 NLRB 13
Morse Shoe, Inc.
MORSE SHOE, INC.
Morse Shoe, Inc. and Retail Clerks Union Local 324,
Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-
CIO. Case 21-CA-13855
July 28, 1977
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND
ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, MURPHY, AND
WALTHER
On December
17,
1976, the National Labor
Relations Board issued a Decision and Order' in the
above-entitled proceeding wherein it found that
Respondent Morse Shoe, Inc., had violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to bargain
collectively with the Union as the exclusive represen-
tative of all employees in the appropriate unit; by
making a unilateral modification of the collective-
bargaining agreement
with the Union and by
refusing to make payments to the Union's welfare
and pension trust funds; and by withdrawing
recognition from the Union and repudiating the
contract. The Board further ordered that Respondent
cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirma-
tive action to remedy the unfair labor practices.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board, sua sponte, has decided to reconsider its
original Decision and Order herein to the extent set
forth below. 2 In our original Decision, we rejected
Respondent's defense that it should not be required
to bargain with the Union since: (1) it did not
independently establish majority status at the time of
initial recognition, and (2) the contractual unit
limited to employees in its leased shoe department at
the Two Guys Huntington Beach, California, store is
inappropriate. We there stated:
With respect to the other contentions made by
Respondent, the Board has held, in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Bryan Manufacturing
Co., 5 that an employer may not defend against a
refusal-to-bargain allegation on the basis that the
original recognition,
occurring more than 6
months before charges had been filed in the
proceeding raising the issue, was unlawful.6 Any
such defense is barred by Section 10(b) of the Act,
which, as the Court explained in Bryan, was
specifically intended by Congress to stabilize
bargaining relationships. For similar reasons we
must reject Respondent's argument that the
I 227 NLRB 391.
2 All parties were informed of this decision to reconsider the original
Decision and Order.
231 NLRB No. 6
previously agreed-upon unit was inappropriate.
The record herein shows that Respondent signed
the assent agreement almost 10 months before it
withdrew recognition from the Union and over a
year prior to the time the Union filed the instant
charge. Hence, it cannot now attack the Union's
majority status among its employees or the
appropriateness of the unit.
I Local Lodge No. 1424, International Association of Machinists,
AFL-CIO [Bryan Manufacturing Co.] v. N.LR B., 362 U.S. 411 (1960).
6 North Bros. Ford Inc., 220 NLRB 1021 (1975), and cases cited
therein.
In its brief to the Board, Respondent argues that
the Union is entitled to no presumption of continu-
ing majority status because "the Union initially
obtained
its representative status without ever
demonstrating majority status." It is clear, however,
that this defense constitutes an attack on the
lawfulness of the initial recognition of the Union.
Accordingly, we hereby reaffirm our previous finding
that Respondent's defense based on the alleged lack
of majority status by the Union is barred by Section
10(b) of the Act.
We further indicated in our original Decision that
Respondent's defense with respect to the inappropri-
ateness of the contractual unit, based on its conten-
tion that only a storewide unit consisting of all
employees, including those employed in leased
departments, at the Two Guys Huntington Beach,
California, store is appropriate herein, was also
barred by Section 10(b) of the Act. Without regard to
the applicability of Section 10(b), however, we find
on the basis of the record before us that a separate
unit of Respondent's leased shoe department em-
ployees is appropriate. Thus, while there are circum-
stances indicating that all employees working at the
store share a common community of interest in
certain respects, there are other significant factors
which establish that the employees of Respondent's
leased shoe department also have a community of
interest separate and distinct from that of the other
employees. In this regard, the stipulation of facts of
the parties establishes that all employees in the shoe
department work under the direct supervision of
Respondent's shoe department manager. Respon-
dent, through its department manager, is responsible
for the hiring and firing of its own employees, and
the department manager is solely responsible for
issuing work instructions to the shoe department
employees. Although Respondent's employees are
regularly informed that they are expected to follow
the work rules promulgated by Two Guys for its own
employees, it is the shoe department manager who is
13
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
responsible for any disciplining of Respondent's
employees. Furthermore, according to the stipulated
record, Respondent's shoe department has its own
cash register and its employees do not use Two Guys'
timeclocks. The evidence herein also reveals that
Respondent does not submit to Two Guys any
written information as to the identity of its employ-
ees or their terms and conditions of employment.
Finally, we note that Respondent recognized a
separate unit of shoe department employees when it
executed the assent agreement, thereby reaffirming
the contract originally entered into by Karl's Shoe
Stores, Ltd., the former operator of the leased shoe
department, and the Union, which contract provided
for a separate unit of employees in the leased shoe
department.
In light of all the foregoing indicia of separateness,
we find that a unit comprised solely of Respondent's
shoe department employees constitutes an appropri-
ate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining
" Esgro Valle,, Inc., 169 NLRB 76 (1968); Bargain Town U.S.A. of Puerto
Rico, Inc., 162 NLRB 1145 (1967).
within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.3 We
therefore find that Respondent's defense based on
the inappropriateness of the contractual unit is
without merit. In all other respects, we hereby
reaffirm our original Decision and Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby reaffirms its Order as
contained in its original Decision and Order, issued
December 17, 1976, in this proceeding.
MEMBER JENKINS, dissenting:
In my view, no useful purpose is served by the sua
sponle reconsideration of our original Decision and
Order herein. That Decision adequately disposes of
the issues presented in this case. That Order is extant
and requires no reaffirmation.
14