255 NLRB 165
Best Distributing Co., Inc.
165
BEST DISTRIBUTING CO., INC.
Best Distributing Co., Inc. and Edward M. LaFave.
Case 3-CA-9494
March 20, 1981
DECISION AND ORDER
On November 10, 1980, Administrative Law
Judge Robert Cohn issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed ex-
ceptions, and counsel for the General Counsel filed
a reply brief.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and
to adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative
Law Judge and
hereby orders that the Respondent, Best Distribut-
ing Co., Inc., Watertown, New York, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in the said recommended Order, except
that the attached notice is substituted for that of
the Administrative Law Judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all sides had an opportu-
nity to present evidence and state their positions,
the National Labor Relations Board found that we
have violated the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, and has ordered us to post this notice.
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in
Beer Drivers, Brewery, Soft Drink, and Main-
tenance Workers, Local Union No. 263, affili-
ated with International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers
of America, by terminating or otherwise dis-
criminating against our employees because of
their union membership or activities.
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in the
above-named Union by failing and refusing to
apply the terms and conditions of employment
set forth in the collective-bargaining agree-
ment between us and the above-named Union
to all our employees encompassed by the unit
of the collective-bargaining agreement.
255 NLRB No. 24
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with re-
prisals, including layoff, because they joined or
attempted to join the above-named Union.
WE WILL NOT tell our employees that they
are required to notify us before they join a
labor organization.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employ-
ees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL offer Edward M. LaFave his
former job, or, if such job no longer exists, to
a substantially equivalent postition, and will re-
store his seniority and other rights and privi-
leges.
WE WILL pay Edward M. LaFave any
backpay which he may have lost as a result of
our discrimination against him, as well as any
benefits which might be due him as a conse-
quence of our failure to apply to him the terms
and conditions of our collective-bargaining
agreement with the above-named Union, since
on or about October 11, 1979, with interest.
BEST DISTRIBUTING CO., INC.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ROBERT COHN, Administrative Law Judge: This case
came on for hearing before me in Watertown, New
York, on April 16, 1980, pursuant to an amended com-
plaint issued by the Acting Regional Director for Region
3 of the National Labor Relations Board, on March 27,
1980, which is based upon a charge and an amended
charge filed by Edward M. LaFave on December 19,
1979, and February 13, 1980, respectively. The amended
complaint alleges, in essence, that Best Distributing Co.,
Inc. (herein the Company or Respondent) engaged in
certain acts and conduct in violation of Section 8(aX1)
and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended
(herein the Act), as hereinafter detailed. The duly filed
answer of the Respondent to the amended complaint
admits the jurisdictional allegations but generally denied
the commission of any unfair labor practices.
The parties were afforded full opportunity to be heard,
to call, examine, and cross-examine witnesses, and to in-
troduce relevant evidence. Posthearing briefs have been
received from counsel for the Respondent and counsel
for the General Counsel, which have been duly consid-
ered.
Upon the entire record, including my observation of
the demeanor of the witnesses, I make the following:
166
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
FINDINGS OF FACT'
I. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Facts
The Respondent is engaged in the sale and distribution
of beer and related products in Watertown, New York,
and surrounding areas. It is a relatively small operation-
at the time of the events here at issue, it employed three
truckdrivers, three helpers, and one warehouseman. 2 The
overall supervision of the operation is lodged in Charles
Lamon, the general manager. In the office with Lamon
are two office employees who perform bookkeeping and
secretarial services.
For many years prior to the events herein, the Re-
spondent has been in a collective-bargaining relationship
with the Union covering the drivers, helpers, and ware-
housemen. The last collective-bargaining agreement was
entered into on April 27, 1978, to run to April 26, 1981.
B. The Termination of the Charging Party
Edward M. LaFave was initially employed by the Re-
spondent in May 1979,3 as a truckdriver's helper. It was
understood that LaFave's employment would last only
during the summer months because he was a student, and
planned to enroll in college in the fall. Accordingly,
LaFave left the Respondent on or about August 24, to
resume his education. However, in October, LaFave
dropped out of college and sought to return to employ-
ment with the Respondent.
He was reemployed by
Lamon on or about October 11II, again as a helper. At
that time, as previously indicated, Respondent employed
two other helpers-Kingsbury and Brady.4
On the evening of Friday, November 9, LaFave at-
tended a union meeting which was held at the Eagles
Club in Watertown. While there, he filled out documents
to join the Union, which was observed by the ware-
houseman, Doolittle (who was a member of the Union).
LaFave overheard Doolittle remark to another union
member, truckdriver Frank Peccori: "You just signed a
death warrant. You should have told Charle [Lamon]
There is no issue as to the jurisdiction of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board, nor of the status of the Union (Beer Drivers, Brewery, Soft
Drink, and Maintenance Workers, Local Union No. 263, affiliated with
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America) as a labor organization within the meaning of
the Act. The complaint alleges sufficient facts concerning the business
operations of the Respondent, which are admitted by answer, upon
which I may, and do hereby, find that at all times material the Respond-
ent has been an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Sec. 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that at all times
material the Union has been a labor organization within the meaning of
Sec. 2(5) of the Act.
2 The warehouseman, Lloyd (Pickles) Doolittle, is alleged in the com-
plaint to be a supervisor. This is disputed by the Respondent as discussed,
infra.
3 All dates hereinafter refer to the calendar year 1979, unless otherwise
indicated.
I As the classification of helper implies, the duties of a truckdriver's
helper at the Respondent's establishment included the loading and un-
loading of the beer trucks, and otherwise assisting the driver in the per-
formance of his duties, such as stacking the cases of beer at a customer's
establishment.
before you joined the Union. The chances are you won't
have a job come Monday." 5
Later that evening, Doolittle telephoned Lamon at the
latter's home and told him that LaFave had joined the
Union. According to Doolittle's testimony, Lamon hung
up on him.
The following Monday morning, LaFave reported for
work and observed Lamon and Doolittle talking on the
loading dock. When Lamon saw LaFave, he turned to
him and said, "Go home today. We don't need you. You
are laid off as of Friday at 5:30." About that time,
Lamon also told Colin Brady, another truckdriver's
helper, to go home. Lamon then directed LaFave to go
into the warehouse office and "talk about it." According-
ly, LaFave, Lamon, and Thomas Peccori, the union ste-
ward (who accompanied LaFave at the latter's request)
went into the office. There, Lamon told LaFave that the
latter was being laid off for lack of work due to poor
business conditions, and that Lamon could not afford to
pay LaFave the contract wage if he was a union
member. LaFave responded that it sounded to him
(LaFave) that he was being laid off for joining the
Union. Lamon responded, "Take it anyway you like it."
Lamon also advised that, "if necessary, he would lay off
the whole crew every 28 days and start with a new
one."6
During the conversation,
Lamon
also
told
LaFave that it was the policy of the Company that em-
ployees inform management before they joined the
Union. 7
The following Wednesday, LaFave went to the Com-
pany for the purpose of filing a grievance. When he gave
it to Lamon, the latter advised that if LaFave secured a
class 3 driver's license (which was apparently required
for anyone who drove one of the Respondent's trucks),
LaFave could take over Peccori's position as a truck-
driver when the latter left for Florida. LaFave respond-
ed that he had enrolled in the Union as a helper, and did
I Credited testimony of LaFave, who impressed me as an honest and
forthright witness. Doolittle did not deny the statements attributed to
him. He admitted having "quite a few drinks" that evening, and recalled
some discussion about a union membership; however, he could not re-
member exactly what was said. He also admitted that he knew that
Lamon was sensitive about employees joining the Union and not letting
him (Lamon) know about it.
6 Credited testimony of LaFave. Lamon did not specifically deny the
statements attributed to him, although he did refute the allegation that
LaFave was terminated because he joined the Union. Peccori was not
called as a witness at the hearing; the record shows that he left the em-
ployment of the Respondent in December to go to Florida, and has not
apparently returned.
Regarding the threat to lay off the whole crew every 28 days, it
should be noted that the collective-bargaining agreement between the Re-
spondent and the Union has a union-security clause which, as is normally
the case, gives new employees 30 days after their employment to join the
Union as a condition of employment.
I Lamon admitted that he became disturbed any time an employee
joined the Union without first telling the Company. His explanation for
this position was that "a lot of paperwork" takes place when this occurs,
such as notifying the insurance company, pension institutions, and the
payroll clerk so that union dues are properly deducted: "It's just a
common policy and courtesy that we always be notified before anybody
went into the union, and it's been that way in Watertown for 20 years."
BEST DISTRIBUTING CO., INC.
167
not believe it was necessary to get a class 3 license to
protect his job.8
II. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUDING FINDINGS
A. Supervisory Status of Doolittle
The complaint alleges that Lloyd (Pickles) Doolittle is
a Section 2(11) supervisor; the Respondent denies this al-
legation.
As previously noted, the Company classifies Doolittle
as a warehouseman. The evidence shows that he has
been employed by the Respondent for 21 years, which is
longer than any of the other employees. His principal
function is performing warehouseman functions, and he
has an office there. However, he also drives a truck on
occasions. Unlike the other employees who work on an
hourly basis, Doolittle is paid a salary and does not
punch the timeclock. He also receives a Christmas bonus
which is larger than the other employees receive. He is
the only person at the Respondent's facility (other than
Lamon) who has a key to the premises.
The evidence shows that the only acknowledged su-
pervisor of Respondent is the general manager, Lamon.
He admitted spending approximately 50 percent of his
time away from the facility primarily soliciting business.
During his absence, Doolittle is in charge of the facility
and gives directions to the other employees with respect
to their duties. Doolittle testified that such directions to
employees are based upon notes received from Lamon;
however, no such notes were proffered into evidence in
the case. Moreover, some of the evidence indicates that
the type of directions given by Doolittle are not subject
to such prior instruction. Thus, for example, LaFave tes-
tified without contradiction that when he was first hired
in the summer, Lamon told him to do whatever Doolittle
said. Another example, also testified to by LaFave with-
out contradiction, is that on one occasion driver Gary
Premo came into work apparently still under the influ-
ence of liquor, and Doolittle told him to get to work.
Under all circumstances, and particularly considering
that if Doolittle were not considered to be a supervisor,
the facility would remain unsupervised approximately
one-half of the time, I am of the view, and therefore
find, that at all times material, Doolittle possessed and
exercised sufficient independent judgment in connection
with his direction of other employees to constitute him a
supervisor within the meaning of the Act.
B. Alleged Interference, Restraint, and Coercion
The complaint alleges that on or about November 9, at
the Eagle Club in Watertown, Doolittle threatened an
employee with an unspecified reprisal, because he joined
the Union. The evidence shows, as herein above set
forth, that when LaFave was filling out his initiation
papers at the union hall on that occasion, Doolittle ad-
vised that LaFave had just signed his death warrant-
that the chances were that he would not have a job the
s Several weeks later, LaFave telephoned Lamon and informed him
that LaFave had secured his class 3 permit and needed practice driving a
truck so that he could take his road test. Lamon responded that he would
check with his insurance company and get back to LaFave, but never
did.
following Monday. While acknowledging that there was
some discussion about union membership on this occa-
sion, Doolittle did not recall exactly what was said. I
find the statement attributed to him by LaFave to be
substantially as the latter testified, and that such state-
ment constituted interference, restraint, and coercion of
employees' Section 7 rights, in violation of Section
8(a)(l) of the Act.
The complaint alleges that on or about November 12,
Charles Lamon threatened to lay off employees if they
attempted to join the Union. The evidence shows, as pre-
viously noted, that following LaFave's dismissal by
Lamon on November 12, LaFave stated that it sounded
to him as if he were being laid off for joining the Union.
Lamon responded that LaFave could take it any way he
liked it and, if it were necessary, Lamon would lay off
the whole crew every 28 days and start with a new one.
I find this statement to constitute a threat of reprisal for
employees' attempts to join the Union, and therefore
constitute interference, restraint, and coercion of their
Section 7 rights in violation of Section 8(a)() of the Act.
The complaint alleges that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by Lamon's telling employees,
on or about November 12, that they were required to
notify the Respondent before they joined the Union. As
previously set forth, LaFave testified that Lamon told
him on November 12, that it was the company policy
that employees inform management before they joined
the Union. In his testimony, Lamon affirmed this posi-
tion, basing it upon the paperwork that was required to
be performed upon such an occasion. I am unable to
accept this reason as providing a legitimate basis for Re-
spondent's defense. That is to say, ordinarily, the issue of
an employee's joining or not joining a labor organization
is a matter between him and the Union, without interfer-
ence or concern of the employer. When an employee de-
termines to join a union, it is the clear responsibility of
the latter to notify the employer to make dues deduc-
tions (assuming they are required under the collective-
bargaining agreement) or other payments such as to the
Union's health and welfare fund, before the employer be-
comes responsible for such payments. Accordingly, I
find that the Respondent had no legitimate right to re-
quire employees to so notify the Respondent of the em-
ployees joining the Union and, therefore, by advising the
employees of such position it was interfering with, re-
straining, and coercing them in the exercise of their Sec-
tion 7 rights, in violation of Section 8(aXl) of the Act.
C. The Alleged Discrimination Respecting Edward M.
LaFave
The complaint alleges that the Respondent violated
Section 8(aX)()
and (3) of the Act by laying off its em-
ployee, Edward M. LaFave on November 12, and by
failing and refusing to apply the terms of its collective-
bargaining agreement to LaFave with respect to wages,
benefits, and terms and conditions of employment be-
cause he was not a member of the Union from October
11 to November 12. Respondent defends the layoff on
the grounds that, as Lamon testified: "I terminated Mr.
LaFave for unsatisfactory work." When asked to explain
BEST
DISTRIBUTING
CO.,
INC~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.16
168
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
how LaFave's work was unsatisfactory, Lamon listed
three incidents involving LaFave which had occurred
since he had been rehired in October as follows: (1) a de-
livery to Dad's Tavern in Alsburg, New York; (2) a de-
livery to Fay's drug store in Watertown, New York; and
(3) a delivery to Turin, New York. Lamon explained that
with respect to the Dad's Tavern incident, the delivery
took 4-1/2 hours where it should have taken only 35 to
40 minutes. However, it should be recalled that LaFave
was only a helper on the delivery truck and therefore
the driver was the person primarily responsible for the
time consumed in delivery. Moreover, the incident oc-
curred 2 or 3 weeks before November 12 and Lamon
only told LaFave that he would not afford "that type of
situation." The incident at Fay's store, which occurred a
week or two prior to November 12, involved improper
stacking of the beer bottles which resulted in some
breakage. Here again, the person primarily responsible
was the truckdriver-in this case, Peccori. However,
Peccori was not disciplined as a result of the incident,
Lamon lamely explaining that he did not discipline Pec-
cori because he knew Peccori was leaving his employ-
ment for Florida.
The Turin incident involved a delivery to a tavern in
that area in which Premo was the driver and LaFave ac-
companied him as a helper. It appears that Premo
became intoxicated to the extent that he could not make
the delivery nor drive the truck back home, and that
LaFave had to telephone his fiancee to come and get
him. Here, again, the primary responsibility was that of
the driver and the only disciplinary action which Lamon
took against Premo was to "make sure nobody loaned
him any more money in our office."
It would appear, based upon the foregoing discussion,
that the issuance of the most extreme form of disciplin-
ary action within the power of the Respondent to a
helper on a delivery truck, without prior warning of
such action, reflected a reason other than those incidents
as the "real reason" for the termination. Moreover, as
the record shows, a few days later, Lamon offered
LaFave employment as a truckdriver if he would secure
the necessary class 3 license. One might ponder the
reason for this offer if LaFave was as unsatisfactory an
employee as Lamon portrayed him. Lamon attempted to
explain his conduct by stating that he knew that two of
his drivers were leaving his employment in December,
and therefore he would need a driver. However, that
does not, of course, explain the willingness to hire an as-
serted unsatisfactory employee. The answer lies, in my
judgment, in the manner in which the collective-bargain-
ing agreement was administered between the Respondent
and the Union.
That is to say, the record shows that although truck-
drivers' helpers were encompassed in the unit covered
by the collective-bargaining agreement, the Union sought
to enforce the agreement only as to the truckdrivers, en-
abling the Respondent (as well as, apparently, other beer
distributing companies in the area) to pay the helpers a
mere minimum wage.9 Under these circumstances, it is
9 Moreover, even as to the truckdrivers, the Union did not rigidly en-
force the union-security clause of the contract. Accordingly, it appears
more readily understandable why Lamon became upset
when he learned that one of the truckdriver's helpers
joined the Union. This would not only require making
the benefits of the collective-bargaining agreement appli-
cable to LaFave, but would eventually, of course, make
such benefits applicable to all the helpers since they
would clearly learn of the benefits which they had not
received but were entitled to. This explains, in my view,
Lamon's abrupt decision to terminate LaFave the first
thing Monday morning without previous warning, based
upon conflicting reasons which, as indicated, do not
withstand scrutiny. o
In view of all of the foregoing, including the state-
ments made to LaFave by Lamon at the exit interview, I
conclude, and therefore find, that the Respondent's as-
serted reasons for terminating LaFave on November 12,
were pretextual, and that the real reason was because he
joined the Union. His termination, therefore, was dis-
crimination to discourage union membership in violation
of Section 8(aX3) of the Act.
Violation of Section 8(a)(3) is also found with respect
to the failure to apply the terms of the collective-bar-
gaining agreement to the Charging Party with respect to
wages, benefits, and terms and conditions of employ-
ment. The evidence shows, as previously stated, that the
Respondent did not apply the terms of the collective
agreement to helpers since they were not union mem-
bers, and the Union did not seek to enforce the agree-
ment as to them. Nevertheless, the helpers were entitled
to the benefits of the agreement and did not receive them
solely because they were not members of the Union. Ac-
cordingly, Respondent's conduct in this regard was dis-
crimination to discourage membership in a labor organi-
zation, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. '
III. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent, set forth in section
II, above, occurring in connection with the interstate op-
erations of the Respondent, have a close, intimate, and
substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce
among the several States and tend to lead to labor dis-
putes, burdening and obstructing commerce and the free
flow thereof.
that the Company paid the contract rate only to those truckdrivers who
were members of the Union.
'o In an affidavit given to the Board's field examiner during the inves-
tigatory stage of this proceeding, Lamon attempted to base his reason for
LaFave's termination on economic reasons; i.e., a decline in business.
However, that reason, too, does not withstand scrutiny. In the first place,
an employer under such circumstances normally gives an employee some
notice of declining business conditions. Secondly, LaFave had seniority
over the other two helpers whom Lamon apparently also laid off but
quickly recalled the same week. In any event, at the hearing, Lamon
relied primarily upon LaFave's alleged unsatisfactory performance as the
reason for termination.
'' The record shows that subsequent to the events in this case, but
prior to the hearing, the Union commenced to enforce the union-security
provision of the contract more stringently.
BEST DISTRIBUTING CO., INC.
169
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By discriminating against Edward M. LaFave in the
manner aforesaid, because he engaged in activities on
behalf of the Union, as described above, and by thereaf-
ter failing and refusing to reinstate him, Respondent has
violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
4. By threatening employees with reprisals if they
joined the Union, and by telling employees that they
were required to notify the Respondent before they
joined the Union, the Respondent has interfered with, re-
strained, and coerced employees within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in
unfair labor practices violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (3)
of the Act, I shall recommend that it cease and desist
therefrom, and take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
It having been found that the Respondent unlawfully
terminated the employment of the Charging Party in the
manner aforesaid, it is recommended that the Respondent
offer the Charging Party immediate and full reinstate-
ment to his former position, or, if such position no longer
exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prej-
udice to his seniority or other rights and privileges and
make him whole for any loss of earnings he may have
suffered as a result of the discrimination against him.
Any backpay found to be due shall be computed in ac-
cordance with the formula set forth in F. W. Woolworth
Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), plus interest as set forth
in Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977).12
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER 13
The Respondent, Best Distributing Co., Inc., Water-
town, New York, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall:
I. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in Beer Drivers, Brew-
ery, Soft Drink, and Maintenance Workers, Local Union
No. 263, affiliated with International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, or any other labor organization, by terminating
12 See, generally, Isis Plumbing A Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962).
J In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided
in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto
shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
or otherwise discriminating against employees because of
their union membership or activities.
(b) Discouraging membership in the above-named
labor organization by failing or refusing to apply the
terms and conditions of its collective-bargaining agree-
ment with said labor organization to employees encom-
passed by the appropriate unit of its collective-bargaining
agreement.
(c) Threatening employees with reprisals, including
layoff, if they joined or attempted to join the above-
named Union.
(d) Telling its employees that they were required to
notify the Respondent before they joined the above-
named Union.
(e) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effecuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Edward M. LaFave immediate and full rein-
statement to his former position or, if that position no
longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, with-
out prejudice to his seniority or other rights or privileges
previously enjoyed, and make him whole for any loss of
earnings he may have suffered by reason of the discrimi-
nation against him in the manner set forth in the section
of this Decision entitled, "The Remedy."
(b) Make Edward M. LaFave whole for any loss of
wages or benefits he may have suffered since on or about
October 11, 1979, as a consequence of the Respondent's
refusal to apply the terms of the collective-bargaining
agreement with the Union to the said Edward M.
LaFave.
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, time-
cards, personnel records and reports, and all other re-
cords necessary and relevant to analyze the amount of
backpay or other benefits due under the terms of this
Order.
(d) Post at its Watertown, New York, facility copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix."14 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 3, after being duly signed by the Respondent's
authorized representative, shall be posted by the Re-
spondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be main-
tained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in con-
spicuous places, including all places where notices to em-
ployees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(e) Notify the said Regional Director for Region 3, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
14 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
B E S D S T I B U I N.
.
1 69.