255 NLRB 323
Friday Canning Corporation
323
FRIDAY CANNING CORPORATION
Friday Canning Corporation and General Drivers
and Helpers Local Union No. 662, affiliated
with International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen
and Helpers
of
America. Case 18-CA-6343
March 26, 1981
DECISION AND ORDER
On August 20, 1980, Administrative Law Judge
James L. Rose issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep-
tions and a supporting brief, the General Counsel
filed an answering brief, cross-exceptions, and a
supporting brief, and Respondent filed an answer-
ing brief.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions'
and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find-
ings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge, as modified below, and to adopt his recom-
mended Order,2 as so modified.
We find in agreement with the Administrative
Law Judge that Respondent threatened employees
with termination should they continue to engage in
a concerted work stoppage and did terminate them
in violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. We dis-
agree, however, with the Administrative
Law
Judge's finding that Respondent did not engage in
unlawful surveillance of the employees' activities in
violation of Section 8(a)(1).
The relevant facts are as follows:
The Union sought to organize the migrant em-
ployees, and in late July 1979 Armando Hernandez,
a union organizer, was granted permission by Re-
spondent to talk to the migrants at their camp bar-
racks located on Respondent's property. Roberto
Gonzales, an agent of Respondent, 3 came into the
barracks on both occasions when the union orga-
nizer attempted to speak to the migrants.
The Administrative Law Judge did not find that
Gonzales was engaged in surveillance within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(1). He found that, at all
crucial times, Gonzales was where he had the right
I Respondent has requested oral argument. This request is hereby
denied as the record, the exceptions, and the briefs adequately present the
issues and the positions of the parties.
2 Respondent contends that it suffered economic loss by operating the
migrant labor camp and there is substantial justification for not reopening
the camp on the same terms and conditions that it operated in 1979. It
contends that the cookhouse and trailer have been torn down and the fix-
tures and furniture from the barracks have been sold. Respondent's con-
tentions may be raised as an affirmative defense in the compliance pro-
ceeding.
3 Gonzales recruited the migrants in Texas and had final authority
over who was hired. He cosigned with Respondent's vice president the
employment contract executed with each individual migrant employee.
Gonzales served as "crew leader" for the migrants at the cannery, taking
care of both the barracks and commissary of the migrant camp. His wife
was the cook. Gonzales also acted as the migrants' interpreter and gener-
ally helped them with their personal and work-related problems.
255 NLRB No. 52
to be and where he was on other days. The Ad-
ministrative Law Judge stated that, if the Union
chose to engage in union activities at the Employ-
er's premises, the Union should have no cause to
complain that management observed them.
We disagree. The facts reveal that Respondent
permitted the union organizer to speak to the mi-
grants in the barracks and then purposely had its
agent, Gonzales, present during the conversations.
Respondent provided no explanation for Gonzales'
presence in the barracks on those two particular
occasions when the union organizer spoke to the
migrants.
Indeed, Respondent's
vice president,
Winston Bash, admitted that he told Gonzales to
keep management informed as to the organizing ac-
tivities in the barracks.
Accordingly, we conclude that the migrant em-
ployees were unable to exercise fully and freely
their Section 7 rights of self-organization while Re-
spondent's agent was present during the meetings
with the union organizer. The Union had no alter-
native access to the migrant employees for the pur-
pose of meeting with them concerning their organi-
zational rights except in their living quarters on
Respondent's premises with Respondent's permis-
sion. Gonzales' presence had a twofold purpose of
surveying the union activities of the employees and
conveying to the employees the impression that
they were being watched.4
On the basis of the
foregoing, we find that Respondent engaged in un-
lawful surveillance in violation of Section 8(a)(1).
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modi-
fied below, and hereby orders that the Respondent,
Friday Canning Corporation, New Richmond, Wis-
consin, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall take the action set forth in the said recom-
mended Order, as so modified:5
I. Insert the following as paragraph l(d):
"(d) Engaging in unlawful surveillance of em-
ployees' union activities."
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
4 In fact, Gonzales' presence had its intended inhibiting effect.
5 In accordance with his dissent in Olympic Medical Corporation, 250
NLRB 146 (1980), Member Jenkins would award interest on the backpay
due based on the formula set forth therein.
324
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all sides had an opportu-
nity to present evidence and state their positions,
the National Labor Relations Board found that we
have violated the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, and has ordered us to post this notice.
WE WILL NOT discharge, threaten with dis-
charge, or otherwise discriminate against our
employees because they engage in concerted
activity protected by the National Labor Rela-
tions Act.
WE WILL NOT engage in unlawful surveil-
lance of our employees' union activities.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employ-
ees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL offer immediate reinstatement to
all
the
migrant
employees
discharged
on
August 6, 1979, and make them whole for any
losses they suffered with interest, and WE
WILL reopen and make available to them the
migrant labor camp.
All of our employees are free to join or assist
any labor organization of their own choosing or re-
frain from any such activity.
FRIDAY CANNING CORPORATION
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JAMES
L. ROSE, Administrative
Law Judge: This
matter was heard before me on April 3, 1980, at Minne-
apolis, Minnesota, upon the General Counsel's complaint
which alleged principally that on August 6, 1979,1 the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §151, et seq.,
by discharging certain unnamed employees who were
engaged in a work stoppage protected by Section 7 of
the Act. It is also alleged that the Respondent engaged
in surveillance of employees' union activities and threat-
ened employees with discharge, both in violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(l).
The Respondent denied the substantive allegations of
the complaint and affirmatively contends that the em-
ployees in question were not discharged but voluntarily
quit their employment on August 6.
1 All dates are in 1979 unless otherwise indicated.
Upon the record as a whole, including my observation
of the witnesses, briefs and arguments of counsel, I
hereby make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. JURISDICTION
The Respondent is a Wisconsin corporation engaged in
the processing and canning of fresh vegetables at 12
facilities including the one involved in this matter at
New Richmond, Wisconsin. In the course of its oper-
ations at the New Richmond facility, the Respondent an-
nually ships goods, products, and materials valued in
excess of $50,000 directly to points outside the State of
Wisconsin. The Respondent admits, and I find, that at all
times material it has been an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Charging Party, General Drivers and Helpers
Local Union 662, affiliated with International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen,
and
Helpers of America (herein called the Union), is ad-
mitted to be, and I find is, a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
ll. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background Facts
The Respondent cans peas, corn, green beans, carrots,
and potatoes which are grown in the area around the
New Richmond plant. It has about 75 full-time employ-
ees, of whom about 30 are clericals. In mid-June each
year, with the pea crop, the Respondent begins hiring
seasonal employees. As the canning season progresses,
the complement of seasonal employees reaches about 200
to 225. In October it begins to level off and then drops.
The seasonal employees include both migrants, who
are hired from Texas and Mexico, and people who live
in the immediate locality. The corps of migrant employ-
ees in 1979 was 47, about 85 to 90 percent of whom
return year after year. They are, however, hired on a
yearly contract supervised through the Wisconsin De-
partment
of Industry,
Labor and Human
Relations
(DILHR).
For several years, the Respondent's principal contact
in hiring migrant employees has been Roberto Gonzalez,
though the Texas Migrant Council Recruiting Service is
also a source of employees. In the spring each year, the
Respondent advises Gonzalez how many migrants will
be needed, and in some cases he is told not to rehire a
particular individual deemed not satisfactory. Otherwise,
Gonzalez is given a free hand in contacting potential em-
ployees and offering them a written employment con-
tract. The contracts, signed by each of the migrants as
well as the Respondent, set a minimum hourly wage to
be paid (in 1979 from $2.90 per hour to $3.10 per hour
depending on the job). The contracts provide for compa-
ny-furnished housing at no charge;
and commissary
meals to be furnished 7 days a week at a cost to the em-
FRIDAY CANNING CORPORATION
325
ployee of S4 per day deducted from earnings. Finally,
upon successful completion of the season, the employee
is to receive the cost of a one-way bus ticket from
McAllen, Texas, to New Richmond. Winston Bash, the
Respondent's vice president and production manager,
testified that in practice the migrant employees are fur-
nished transportation or given the equivalent of the one-
way bus fare at the beginning of the season which is de-
ducted from their pay and then, upon completion of the
season, that amount is reimbursed to them.
Gonzalez not only recruits the migrants, he serves as
their "crew leader." He also comes to New Richmond
for the canning season, however, not to work in the can-
nery, but to take care of the migrant camp-the barrack
and commissary. His wife is the cook.
The barrack is World War II vintage about 40 by 200
feet located on the Respondent's premises. Adjoining the
barrack is a trailer and a kitchen building.
Gonzalez also acts as an interpreter for the migrants,
most of whom speak only limited English, and he gener-
ally helps them with their personal and work-related
problems. But he has no authority over any of the em-
ployees in connection with their production work nor
does he himself engage in any production activity.
In late July, Armando Hernandez, a bilingual organiz-
er of the Union, began an effort to organize the migrant
employees of the Respondent. In connection with this it
is alleged that the Respondent, through Gonzalez, en-
gaged in surveillance of employees' union activity. There
is, however, no evidence in the record that the events of
August 6 were in any way connected with the Union's
attempt to organize the migrant employees.
While there are some minor differences in the precise
words used, the parties are in general agreement con-
cerning the events of August 6 and their timing.2
While a few of the migrants worked just the evening,
or cleanup, shift, most worked the dayshift and took
their lunch period between noon and 12:30 p.m. Thus on
August 6 at the luncqibreak word was spread among the
migrants that they were going to demand a wage in-
crease to $4 per hour-up from an average of about
$3.29.3 Bash met with Gonzalez and one migrant about
this then had a discussion at the barrack with all, or
most, of them. Gonzalez was the interpreter, although
present were two investigators of the Wisconsin DILHR
who apparently spoke from time to time.4
The essence of the first discussion was that Bash could
not agree to give them a wage increase and stated that
he would take the matter up with Mr. Friday. He then
left and returned in about 10 minutes and said the Com-
pany would give them a 30-cent-per-hour bonus (10
cents per hour for each season segment an employee suc-
cessfully completed). This apparently was interpreted by
Gonzalez to be an agreement that the Company would
give an across-the-board 30-cent-per-hour raise; thus they
All of the employee witnesses testified through an interpreter which
may explain the slight variances.
3 The average nonmigrant seasonal wage was $3.13 per hour.
4 Hernandez was on the grounds but not invited to any of the meet-
ings, and it was he, apparently, who arranged for the investigators to be
there. There is no indication, however, that these three played any more
than an observer role, except for occasional interpretation.
all returned to work. It was then pointed out that Gon-
zalez had misinterpreted what Bash had said and that the
Company agreed only to a 30-cent-per-hour bonus. Ap-
parently fearful that they would not actually get the
bonus, all the migrants left work and returned to the bar-
rack.
There ensued a second meeting. Bash was eager for
the employees to return to work because, as he credibly
and undeniably testified, peas were ripe and they must be
picked and canned within 24 hours lest their quality de-
teriorate substantially.5 The employees stated their un-
willingness to work for less than an additional 30 cents
per hour.
Thus, according to Bash, at or about I or 1:15 he said,
"It's time to get back to work. Let's get back to work."
But they would not do so, and then Bash told them, "If
they were not going to work, then we would close the
camp. We would not provide camp services."
Later in the afternoon, according to the General
Counsel's witness Jose Guadelupe Reyes:
Mr. Winston [Bash] came back and Wayne was
with him they both asked us if we wanted to come
back to work. And then we replied that if we got
the 30 cents-an hour increase, we would. Howev-
er, we would not go along with the bonus. Robert
Gonzalez walked by and not he but the others that
were there said, "Look we want our checks," all at
once, "right now."
They told the company officials they would not return
to work because they were not going to get the 30-cent-
per-hour increase.
Finally Bash told them it would take a while to pro-
cess the checks and they would probably not be ready
until 5 or 6 p.m. Then according to Reyes, "And we said
as soon as we got our checks, we would leave. Then Mr.
Winston was there and he said the checks will be ready
around 5 or 6 o'clock, 'at which time you should leave
because we're going to close the camp."' Bash's version
of this meeting, recorded by him at or about the time, is
substantially in accord:
After a considerable amount of time, approximately
2 p.m., Wayne Sias [the plant superintendent] and I
again went down to camp and through the interpre-
tation of Reyes told the fellows again that we
wanted to, if they wanted to work, they should im-
mediately go to work. If not, they should leave the
premises and we would not keep the camp available
for those that are not working. Reyes indicated that
they were all going to stick together after discuss-
ing it a bit and that none of them were going to
work and that they were all going to leave. At that
time I indicated the camp would be closed at about
6 o'clock, and that they should all be gone.
The Respondent argues that the employees asked for
their checks prior to Bash telling them that, if they did
Bash testified that the Company in fact lost 131 acres of peas repre-
senting about $83,390.
326
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
not return to work, he would close the camp. Hence,
argues the Respondent, the employees quit. I find, how-
ever, that this was Bash's third meeting with the employ-
ees. At the second as well, an hour or so before, he told
them that the camp would be closed if they did not
return to work.
The employees did in fact receive their checks about 5
or 6 p.m. and did leave. Gonzalez cleaned up, gave the
keys to Bash about 7 p.m., and he too left. The camp
was closed.
The following day a half dozen or so migrants re-
turned to the Company and asked for their jobs. Though
they were reemployed, they were advised that the camp
would not be reopened and they would have to provide
their own board and room. New contracts of employ-
ment were written along those lines.
Another group of migrants, including Reyes, returned
2 days later, but were told by Bash that they had been
replaced (although the Respondent continued to run ads
on the local radio for seasonal employees) and they were
not rehired. There is no evidence that any of the remain-
ing migrant employees sought to return to work during
the 1979 canning season.
B. Analysis and Concluding Findings
1. The August 6 terminations
The General Counsel contends that when Bash told
the migrants that unless they returned to work he would
close the camp such was a threat to discharge them for
engaging in activity protected by Section 7 of the Act;
and, when the Respondent in fact closed the camp on
the evening of August 6, such was tantamount to dis-
charging employees because they engaged in activity
protected by Section 7.
The Respondent contends that on August 6 the mi-
grants quit their employment because the Respondent
would not accede to their demand for a 30-cent-per-hour
across-the-board increase; and, even if they were consid-
ered economic strikers, the Respondent was privileged to
tell them to leave the Company's premises. Further, if it
were a strike, the Respondent was not required to subsi-
dize it by continuing operation of the camp, particularly
where the Respondent was operating the camp at a loss.
Similarly, the Respondent contends that, when the six
employees were rehired on August 7, it was not eco-
nomically feasible to reopen the camp for such a small
number of employees. Thus it was justified in rehiring
these employees without that benefit.
Though the tendency in these matters is to give excess
weight to which words were used when analyzing the
nature of an event, the acts of the parties are a more pre-
cise indicator of what actually transpired. This is particu-
larly true where the testimony is in a language other
than English and the English version is a literal transla-
tion. Thus here, the word "strike" was never used, yet
that is precisely what occurred when the employees left
work on August 6. They had earlier said they would not
work unless they received a wage increase. They were
told, so they thought, that the Company would give
them the increase and they returned to work. But they
discovered that what the Company had offered and what
they had demanded were two different things. They then
left their jobs and returned to the barrack. At this time, I
conclude, the employees were engaged in a strike.
The Respondent argues that by saying they would not
work because the wage increase was refused the employ-
ees in effect stated they quit. Clearly such cannot be a
proper interpretation lest the concept of a strike be abro-
gated. Every time employees engage in an economic
strike they are telling their employer that they will not
work. Indeed they do not work unless and until some
event occurs. Nevertheless, they retain their status as em-
ployees.
While striking employees may be permanently re-
placed, even those involved in a spontaneous work stop-
page such as this, they may not be discharged or led to
believe they were. Ridgeway Trucking Company, 243
NLRB 1048 (1979).
When Bash told employees during his second meeting
with them that, unless they returned to work, the camp
would be closed was a clear threat of discharge under
these circumstances. He did not simply tell strikers they
must leave the premises, which is generally an employ-
er's right. Here the barrack was the employees' home
and to exclude them from it was tantamount to excluding
them from the New Richmond area. After all, these
were primarily non-English speaking migrant employees
who had at best a limited capacity to arrange for rooms
apart from the barrack. Bash gave them two choices: (1)
return to work for the wages offered by the Respondent;
or (2) return to Texas or Mexico. Work or be terminat-
ed. The middle ground of a strike was not an option.
No doubt that during a strike a company need not pay
wages or provide other fringe benefits to the nonwork-
ing employees. E.g., Kansas City Power & Light Compa-
ny, 244 NLRB 620 (1979). But here to exclude employ-
ees from the camp effectively severed the indicia of con-
tinued employment to which strikers are entitled.
While the Respondent did offer some evidence sug-
gesting that the cost of running the camp exceeded the
revenues received from employees by nearly $20,000 a
year, there is no showing that had the Respondent al-
lowed the employees at least to stay in the barrack it
would have incurred any expense at all. The primary
cost of camp, other than the food, were the salaries of
Gonzalez and his wife. And in any event, furnishing of
food at a cost of $4 per day could easily have been sepa-
rated from allowing the employees to continue to stay at
the camp. The Respondent did not have to close both
the commissary and the barrack.
To live in the barrack for free was part of each em-
ployees' contract and amounted to a substantial fringe
benefit. However, there does not appear to have been an
equivalent cost to the Respondent. In short, the Re-
spondent did not establish an economic justification for
closing the camp which would weigh against the em-
ployees' right to strike-and stay in the New Richmond
area. Lest the right to strike in a situation such as this be
diminished to the point of nonexistence, the employees'
right to discontinue working while retaining the indicia
of employment must balance against Respondent's right
to have nonworking employees off of its premises. It
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FRIDAY CANNING CORPORATION
327
should be noted that the barrack was away from the pro-
duction area and, in allowing the employees to stay in
the barrack, the Respondent would not have been sub-
jected to their interfering with the production process.
Nor would the Respondent need have allowed any of
them in the production area during the course of the
strike.
If, as they did later in the afternoon of August 6, the
employees had said initially they wanted their checks
and were going to leave, then such might be construed
as a voluntary quit as opposed to engaging in an eco-
nomic strike. However, they did not ask for the checks
until substantially after Bash told them that unless they
returned to work he would close the camp. Thus the mi-
grants never had the opportunity to choose between
striking for higher wages and quitting. They were told in
advance either they would return to work for the wages
the Company offered, or they would, in effect, be termi-
nated.
This conclusion is substantially corroborated in Bash's
investigatory affidavit, undenied and unexplained, where-
in he stated: "I did not use the word 'fired' or 'dis-
charged' in my discussion with the workers but it is fair
to say that by closing the camp, this was our intent to
dismiss the workers, that they were not going to work at
the wage we had offered."
In addition, when employees engage in protected, con-
certed activity, the burden of any ambiguity concerning
their continued status as employees is on the employer.
Thus, here, the Respondent had the affirmative duty to
tell the employees that they were not being discharged
and would continue to be treated as employees until per-
manently replaced. Ridgeway Trucking Company, supra.
To demonstrate further that the Respondent intended
to discharge the migrant employees unless they returned
to work on precisely the Respondent's terms is the fact
that on August 9 several migrants asked for their jobs
back but were denied reinstatement on grounds that they
had been permanently replaced. While it may be, as Bash
testified, the bodies had been replaced, given the nature
of the Respondent's business, there is a large turnover of
employees. The Respondent is more or less continuously
hiring people to do the type of work the migrants had
been doing. Thus on August 10 and 17 the Respondent
ran radio ads which offered immediate employment for
seasonal jobs.?
It is noted that, when six employees did return to
work on August 7, they were denied the opportunity to
stay in the barrack. Such a change in compensation was
inherently discriminatory and put on the Respondent the
burden of justification. N.L.R.B. v. Great Dane Trailers,
Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967). While it may be the Respondent
did show a business justification for not opening the
commissary for only six employees, the Respondent did
not in any way establish a reason for denying them a
place to stay. Absent some proof in this respect, I con-
" There is also undenied testimony that Friday, apparently the presi-
dent or chief operating officer of the Respondent, suggested that he did
not want to hire any more "Mexicans." The implications of this, howev-
er, need not be considered inasmuch as I have concluded that, at the be-
ginning, the Respondent unlawfully discharged the migrant employees
for having engaged in activity protected by the Act.
clude that, by denying the employees an integral part of
their original employment contract, the Respondent dis-
criminated against them because they engaged in activity
protected by the Act. Rather than being inconsistent
with a conclusion that the migrants were discharged, as
argued by the Respondent, such discrimination tends to
prove they were.
Accordingly, I conclude that on August 6 Bash threat-
ened employees with termination should they continue to
engage in a concerted work stoppage and ultimately did
terminate them in violation of Section 8(aXl) of the Act.
2. The alleged surveillance
Occurring at or about the same time, but as far as this
record indicates, unrelated to the events of August 6, the
Union
sought to organize
the migrant
employees.
Though there is some question as to the precise date, in
late July Hernandez came to the plant and was granted
permission to talk to the migrants at the camp. The first
time he went to the kitchen trailer and told Gonzalez
who he was. Gonzalez acknowledged Hernandez' pres-
ence by shaking his head. Hernandez then proceeded to
pass out authorization cards to employees. The next day
he returned about noon. As he was discussing the Union
with employees, Gonzalez came into the barrack, sat
down, and began watching TV. The following Sunday
Hernandez returned to the barrack, again talked to em-
ployees about the Union, and again Gonzalez came in
and, according to Hernandez, "as soon as Robert Gonza-
lez walked in, nothing else was said."
Though Bash testified he did not ask Gonzalez to
survey the employees' union activity, he did ask Gonza-
lez to keep him posted on what was going on.
The General Counsel contends that when Gonzalez
came into the barrack area on July 19 and July 22, inas-
much as he was an agent of the Respondent, the Re-
spondent thereby engaged in surveillance of employees'
union activity.
The record is clear that Gonzalez was in fact an agent
of the Respondent. On behalf of the Respondent he hired
all of the migrant employees and was himself employed
by the Respondent to look after the camp. However, I
do not believe he was engaged in surveillance within the
meaning of Section 8(aXI) of the Act. At all times on
July 19 and 22 he was where he had the right to be and
where he was on other days-in the barrack from time-
to-time watching television.
The Board has long held, "Union representatives and
employees who choose to engage in their union activities
at the employer's premises should have no cause to com-
plain that management observes them." Milco, Inc.. et aL,
159 NLRB 812, 814 (1966); Chemironics Inc., 236 NLRB
178 (1978).
If Hernandez, as the union organizer, had not wanted
the Respondent's agent to observe his organizing efforts
among the migrant employees, he certainly could have
asked those employees to accompany him to some place
away from the barrack. He did not. Nor is there any in-
dication that Hernandez ever asked Gonzalez to leave
the barrack.
328
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
On these facts I cannot conclude Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and I will recommend the
complaint in this respect be dismissed.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The unfair labor practices found above, occurring in
connection with the Respondent's operation of its New
Richmond, Wisconsin, facility, have a close, intimate,
and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and com-
merce among the several States, and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in cer-
tain unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it
cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Though mindful that the migrants had 1-year contracts
of employment, they nevertheless were seasonal employ-
ees who had a reasonable expectation of rehire in 1980
and following seasons. According to Bash, 85 to 90 per-
cent of them returned each year. Accordingly, they are
entitled to reinstatement. Solboro Knitting Mills, Inc., 227
NLRB 738 (1977).
Thus, I recommend that the Respondent be ordered to
offer reinstatement to all the migrant employees who
were discharged on August 6 to their former jobs, or, if
those jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent po-
sitions of employment under the terms and conditions of
their employment contract of 1979; and make them
whole for all wages and other losses they may have suf-
fered as a result of the discrimination against them
through the end of the 1979 canning season, and each
succeeding season until they are offered reinstatement,
Abilities and Goodwill, Inc., 241 NLRB 27 (1979), pursu-
ant to the formula set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company,
90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest as provided for in
Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977). 7 In ad-
dition, as to those employees who were reinstated on
August 7, but who were not allowed to live in the bar-
rack, I shall recommend that the Respondent be ordered
to make them whole for whatever expenses they in-
curred as a result of having to provide their own lodging
away from the Respondent's premises.
The Respondent contends that it suffered economic
loss by operating the migrant labor camp and has now
concluded not to reopen the camp because it can make
do with local employees. Cost is not a sufficient reason
to deny a full remedy. Here an offer to reinstate the mi-
grants without also providing the camp would be illu-
sory. Further, employer-furnished housing is a working
condition and a mandatory subject of bargaining, Granite
Ball Groves, a Joint Venture, et al., 240 NLRB 1173
(1979). Thus returning to the status quo ante the unfair
labor practices require the Respondent to reopen the
labor camp on the same terms and conditions that it op-
erated in 1979. I note that the Respondent had no inten-
7 See, generally, Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962).
tion of closing the camp following the 1979 season and
did not determine to do so until following its unlawful
discharge of employees on August 6. Finally, whatever
losses may be incurred as a result of Respondent's having
to reopen and rehire the migrant employees was occa-
sioned by the Respondent's unfair labor practices.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of
law, the entire record in this matter, and pursuant to pro-
visions of Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby make the
following recommended:
ORDER8
The Respondent, Friday Canning Corporation, New
Richmond, Wisconsin, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Threatening employees with discharge should they
engage in a concerted work stoppage protected by Sec-
tion 7 of the Act.
(b) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against
employees because they engage in concerted activity
protected by Section 7 of the Act.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.9
2. Take the following affirmative action deemed neces-
sary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer immediate reinstatement or a contract for em-
ployment for the next canning season, whichever is ap-
propriate, to each of the migrant employees discharged
on August 6, 1979, to his former position of employment
or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equiva-
lent position of employment under the same terms and
conditions as the employment contract of 1979 with ap-
plicable wage increases, if any.
(b) Make whole all employees discharged on August 6
for any loss of wages or other benefits that may have oc-
curred as a result of the discrimination against them in a
manner set forth in the section of this Decision entitled
"The Remedy."
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, time-
cards, personnel records and reports, and all records nec-
essary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the
terms of this Order.
(d) Post at its premises in New Richmond, Wisconsin,
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 10
8 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the find-
ings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in
Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto
shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
9 Though the discharges here were numerous, there is no real indica-
tion of a proclivity on the Respondent's part to violate the Act or other-
wise engage in widespread misconduct. Accordingly, the narrow injunc-
tive language is appropriate. Hickmolt Foods, Inc., 242 NLRB 1357
(1979).
10 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
Continued
----
FRIDAY CANNING CORPORATION
329
Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
Director for Region 18, after being duly signed by the
be taken by the Respondent to insure that the notices are
Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof,
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 18, in
and be maintained for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the allegations in
ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
the complaint not specifically found herein are dismissed.
Order of the National Labor Relations Board."