255 NLRB 534
Cutting, Incorporated
534
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Cutting, Incorporated and Local 154, United Paper-
workers International Union, AFL-CIO-CLC
and Pam O'Connell and Frances Griffey. Cases
25-CA-10983, 25-CA-11016, 25-CA-11655-1,
and 25-CA-11655-2
April 2, 1981
DECISION AND ORDER
On October 27, 1980, Administrative Law Judge
Marion C. Ladwig issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent and the
General Counsel filed exceptions and supporting
briefs, and Respondent filed an answering brief to
the General Counsel's exceptions.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs, and has decided to affirm the rulings, find-
ings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge as modified below, and to adopt his recom-
mended Order, as so modified.
The General Counsel excepts, inter alia, to the
Administrative Law Judge's dismissal of the com-
plaint's allegation that Respondent, through Fore-
man Mike Keith, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act on May I and 2, 1979,2 by soliciting employee
complaints and grievances, and by promising its
employees increased benefits and improved terms
and conditions of employment. The Administrative
Law Judge found that, about the first part of May,
Keith approached employee Pam O'Connell and, in
the presence of other employees, asked, "Pam, are
you aware of what you are getting yourself in-
volved in, when you are getting yourself involved
with the Union?" and "What exactly is it that you
are wanting that . . . the Company is not giving
you?" O'Connell mentioned needing floor mats and
complained about glue guns with electrical shorts,
cut wires on the floor, broken toilet seats, and
other matters. Keith did not expressly promise to
remedy any of those complaints, although floor
mats were provided to employees on May 30, and
therefore the Administrative Law Judge found that
the allegation must be dismissed. We do not agree.
I In agreeing with the Administrative Law Judge's finding that the
General Counsel failed to make a prima facie showing that the Union was
a motivating factor in Respondent's decision to discharge employee Rick
Hodge, we note that longstanding Board precedent holds that "if the
record sustains the allegations of unlawful discrimination against dis-
charged employees, their testimony is not a sine qua non for relief under
the Act." Riley Stoker Corporation, 223 NLRB 1146 (1976), and cases
cited therein.
Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credi-
bility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence con-
vinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products,
Inc.. 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have
carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
2 Unless otherwise noted, all dates are 1979.
255 NLRB No. 76
It is well settled that "the solicitation of griev-
ances at preelection meetings carries with it an in-
ference that an employer is implicitly promising to
correct those inequities it discovers as a result of its
inquiries." Merle Lindsey Chevrolet, Inc., 231 NLRB
478 (1977), citing Uarco Incorporated, 216 NLRB 1
(1974). Accord: Hadbar, Division of Pur 0 Sil, Inc.,
211 NLRB 333 (1974); Reliance Electric Company,
Madison Plant Mechanical Drives Division, 191
NLRB 44 (1971). According to current Board pre-
cedent, this inference is rebuttable by the employer.
Merle Lindsey Chevrolet, supra; Uarco Incorporated,
supra.3 However, in the instant case Respondent
failed to carry its burden to rebut the inference
which thus arose. The validity of the inference is
demonstrated here by the remedying of one of the
grievances, relating to the absence of floor mats,
though such demonstration is not necessary for
finding the violation. Although present at the hear-
ing, Keith did not testify concerning this allegation.
Under these circumstances, we find that by solicit-
ing grievances from O'Connell on May I and 2
and, thus implicitly promising to correct those in-
equities, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act. We further find that during the same conver-
sation, Keith interrogated O'Connell about her
own and other employees' union sympathies, also
in violation of Section 8(a)(1).
AMENDED REMEDY
Having found that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(l) of the Act by soliciting grievances and im-
pliedly promising to correct those grievances, and
by interrogating employee O'Connell about her
and other employees' union sympathies, we shall
order that Respondent, in addition to taking those
remedial measures set forth in the Administrative
Law Judge's Decision, also cease and desist from
said violations. In addition, in view of Respond-
ent's multiple and flagrant violations of the Act as
set forth in the Administrative Law Judge's Deci-
sion and the instant Decision, we shall further
modify the Administrative Law Judge's recom-
mended remedy and Order by requiring that Re-
spondent cease and desist from "in any other
manner" interfering with, restraining, or coercing
its employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed them by Section 7 of the Act. Hickmott Foods,
Inc., 242 NLRB 1357 (1979).
s Member Jenkins dissented in Uarco Incorporated, and did not partici-
pate in deciding Merle Lindsey Chevrolet. He adheres to his view, as fully
set forth in his dissent in Uarco Incorporated, that the mere solicitation of
grievances is of itself coercive conduct violative of Sec. 8(aX 1).
CUTTING. INCORPORATED
535
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modi-
fied below, and hereby orders that the Respondent,
Cutting, Incorporated, Hartford City, Indiana, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take
the action set forth in the said recommended
Order, as so modified:
1. Insert the following as paragraph
(h) and re-
letter the subsequent paragraph accordingly:
"(h) Soliciting grievances from employees and
explicitly or implicitly promising to remedy or
adjust them in order to interfere with the right of
employees freely to choose a bargaining repre-
sentative, or to induce employees to reject, or to
refrain from activities in support of, Local 154,
United Paperworkers International Union, AFL-
CIO-CLC, or any other labor organization, or in
connection therewith to coercively interrogate em-
ployees concerning their or other employees' union
sympathies."
2. Substitute the following for new paragraph
I(i):
"(i) In any other manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing its employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the
Act."
3. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all sides had an opportu-
nity to present evidence and state their positions,
the National Labor Relations Board found that we
have violated the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, and has ordered us to post this notice.
The Act gives employees the following rights:
To engage in self-organization
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choice
To engage in activities together for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection
To refrain from the exercise of any or all
such activities.
WE WILL NOT refuse to reinstate any eco-
nomic striker who unconditionally offers to
return to work before being permanently re-
placed.
WE WILL NOT assign any employee more ar-
duous job tasks in retaliation for supporting
Local 154, United Paperworkers International
Union, AFL-CIO-CLC, or any other union.
WE WILL NOT give an unwarranted written
warning to or suspend any employee for sup-
porting the Union.
WE WILL NOT threaten to discharge our em-
ployees or to move our plant if our employees
support the Union.
WE WILL NOT threaten to discharge any
union official because of union activity.
WE WILL NOT coercively question any em-
ployee about union support or union activity.
WE WILL NOT engage in unlawful surveil-
lance of peaceful
picketing or coercively
threaten employees with legal proceedings for
lawfully striking or picketing.
WE WILL NOT solicit grievances from em-
ployees and explicitly or implicitly promise to
remedy them in order to interfere with your
right freely to choose a bargaining representa-
tive, or to induce you to reject or refrain from
activities in support of Local 154, United Pa-
perworkers International Union, AFL-CIO-
CLC, or any other labor organization.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Sec-
tion 7 of the Act.
WE WILL offer Pamela O'Connell immediate
and full reinstatement to her former job or, if
her job no longer exists, to a substantially
equivalent position, without prejudice to her
seniority or other rights and privileges previ-
ously enjoyed, and make her whole for any
loss of pay or other benefits since we refused
to reinstate her, plus interest.
WE WILL make Frances Griffey and other
former strikers who offered to return to work
on October 16, 1979, whole for any lost earn-
ings from that date until their reinstatement on
October 21, 1979, plus interest.
WE WILL make Pamela O'Connell and Fran-
ces Griffey whole for any lost earnings result-
ing from their 3-day suspension, plus interest.
WE WILL remove from the personnel re-
cords any reference to Pamela O'Connell's
written warning and to her and Frances Grif-
fey's suspensions.
CUTTING, INCORPORATED
CUTTING.
INCORPORATED
535
.....
.....
536
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MARION
C. LADWIG,
Administrative Law Judge:
These consolidated cases were heard by me in Hartford
City, Indiana, on May 19-22, 1980. The charges were
filed on May 29, June 8, and December 14, 1979,1 and
consolidated complaints were issued on July 13 and on
January 31, 1980 (each amended at the hearing). These
cases primarily involve contentions that, after the Union
won an election at the Respondent Company's two
plants, the Company discriminated against a union ob-
server and another union supporter, falsely claimed that
these two employees and other strikers were permanent-
ly replaced when they made unconditional offers to
return to work, threatened to discharge the union presi-
dent as soon as it could "sneak it past the NLRB," and
otherwise coerced employees. The specific issues are
whether the Company (a) discriminated against the
Union's observer, Pamela O'Connell, and another union
supporter, (b) unlawfully refused to reinstate O'Connell
and other striking employees, (c) discriminatorily dis-
charged another employee, (d) threatened to discharge
the union president, and (e) otherwise coerced employees
in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National
Labor Relations Act.
Upon the entire record,2 including my observation of
the demeanor of the witnesses, and after due considera-
tion of the briefs filed by the General Counsel and the
Company, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Company, an Indiana corporation, is engaged in
the manufacture of paper products at its plants in Hart-
ford City, Indiana, where it annually ships products
valued in excess of $50,000 directly to customers located
outside the State. The Company admits, and I find, that
it is an employer engaged in commerce within the mean-
ing of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and that the Union
is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Discrimination Against Union Observer O'Connell
I. Against her and Frances Griffey
a. Assignment of more arduous work
Packer Pamela O'Connell actively campaigned for the
Union and acted as a union observer at the May 31 elec-
tion, which the Union won. On the same day, after at-
tending a union meeting the evening before, packer
Frances "Sally" Griffey wore a 4-inch union "VOTE
UPIU" badge to work and had union stickers on her
truck. (She had been an employee representative on the
Company's "Plant Council.") Plant Coordinator Ron
All dates are in 1979 unless otherwise indicated.
2 The General Counsel's unopposed motion to correct the record,
dated July 16. 1980, is granted and received in evidence as G.C. Exh. I1.
Behrman called her into the office that morning and, in
the presence of Supervisor Gary Brackin, explained a
raise she had received. It is undisputed that, in this con-
versation, she told him, "I felt that I had not received all
of the money I should have received from my raise. And
if your people would do this to a Council person you
would do it to anyone and I'm a little bit tired of people
receiving raises and not getting the money they should
receive. That's why I'm wearing this badge." (The al-
leged interrogation in this conversation is discussed
later.)
Immediately after the election, as packers O'Connell
and Griffey credibly testified, Supervisor Brackin in-
creased their janitorial work on a regular basis and as-
signed them more of the difficult and unpleasant work,
such as cleaning the large machines, washing walls, and
other onerous duties. They estimated that they were as-
signed this excessive cleaning and more arduous tasks
perhaps once every week or two. On two occasions in
June, on June 1 and 27, the assignments were considered
so extreme that O'Connell made a note of them in her
pocket calendar. (She was mistaken in recalling that she
also recorded other such incidents in the calendar.)
It is undisputed that on the first of these occasions, on
June I (the day after O'Connell acted as a union observ-
er and Griffey told Plant Coordinator Behrman and Su-
pervisor Brackin why she was "wearing this [union]
badge"), Brackin instructed O'Connell and Griffey to
take a "huge" factory sweeper and sweep the entire floor
of plant 2-including all of the factory floor, the bath-
room, the break area, and the office. Brackin also in-
structed O'Connell to go into the bathroom and wash
down the walls and mop the floor, and "informed me
that he wanted me to get down on my hands and knees
and clean the toilet bowl and stick my hands into the
toilet and clean it. And I asked for a rubber glove and I
was not given a set of rubber gloves" (although rubber
gloves were available).
It is also undisputed that on the other occasion, on
June 27, Plant Coordinator Behrman instructed O'Con-
nell to clean out the second floor storage area, where
President Brian Jennerjahn kept such items as a snowmo-
bile and old car parts and where there were "all kinds of
tools" and some heavy logs which "looked like railroad
ties." Supervisor Brackin asked her to move the logs and
"put them on the side of the wall." When she could not
budge them, she asked him for help "and he goes over
and starts to move it and he can't and he says to me,
well just forget it." Machine operator (later supervisor)
David Whitecotton was there with her, but Brackin per-
mitted him to remain seated and not give her any help.
As instructed, she hauled the trash (including plywood,
paneling, and pieces of counter top) downstairs where
Behrman went through it and instructed her to carry
some of it back upstairs. Meanwhile Brackin assigned
Griffey (a woman 59 years of age) to washing down and
painting the overhead door, requiring her to stand on the
second from the top step of an 8-foot ladder, and to paint
the front and side doors, using a 2-inch paintbrush. She
asked Brackin for a roller to speed up the painting proc-
CUTTING, INCORPORATED
537
ess and he said he would get one, but he did not. She
painted for 8 hours, using the 2-inch brush.
When called as defense witnesses, machine operator
Susan Lents and Whitecotton (now a laid-off supervisor)
claimed that they did not observe any change in the job
responsibilities of O'Connell and Griffey after the elec-
tion; machine operator Ron Warner claimed that O'Con-
nell and Griffey did not have to do more of such duties
after the election than other packers; and packer Katy
Strait (sister of Foreman Michael Keith) claimed that
"more or less everybody wanted to do the bathrooms and
the break rooms . . . it was fun," that O'Connell and
Griffey "always refused" to go in the bathroom to clean
it because they said they were not required to, and that
"[t]hey weren't told to do it." (Emphasis supplied.) These
witnesses appeared eager to give testimony which would
please the Company rather than willing to reveal what
actually happened. I discredit their claims and find, as
contended by the General Counsel, that after the election
the Company assigned O'Connell and Griffey more ardu-
ous job tasks in retaliation against them because of their
union support, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of
the Act.
b. Their suspension
It is undisputed that on Thursday, June 7, 1 week after
the election, Plant Coordinator Behrman summoned
packers O'Connell and Griffey to the office and summa-
rily suspended them for 3 days. In the presence of Super-
visor Brackin (who assigned O'Connell and Griffey more
arduous work after their union support on the day of the
election), Behrman announced to them, "You two got
yourselves a three day layoff." Later in the conversation,
he pointed his finger at O'Connell and said, "You, Pam,
will not come in here and tell me how to run my plant
nor will you bring anyone else in here to run my
plant"-obviously referring to her union activity, al-
though he did not explain. When Griffey asked the
reason for her suspension, he pointed his finger at her
and said, "Sally, you are not coming in here and threat-
ening my employees." She asked whom she was sup-
posed to have threatened, and he responded, "I will not
tell you who, and I don't care to discuss it with you."
Then O'Connell spoke up and asked who Behrman's in-
formant was, and Griffey stated, "Pam, you don't need
to know who his informant is, I know who his informant
is . . she is not only an informant, she is a liar.... It
is Katy Strait." Behrman confirmed this, without making
any inquiry about the truth of what Strait had reported
to him. Griffey denied that she had threatened any em-
ployee. Behrman ordered them out of the plant and
stated "you are not authorized to talk to any employees
and you are not to be allowed back in here until next
Tuesday." (Neither Behrman nor Brackin was called to
testify.)
The defense witness, packer Strait, is 35 years old and
is 5 feet, 8 inches tall, as compared to packer Griffey,
who is 59 years old and a "very small" person. Although
acknowledging that she is "much taller and bigger" than
Griffey, Strait claimed that Griffey had threatened to
"whip my ass" if Griffey found out that she was an in-
formant, and that O'Connell had said, "I'll help her."
Undoubtedly if this were true, and if Strait had informed
Plant Coordinator
Behrman that both Griffey and
O'Connell had threatened her, Behrman would have as-
signed that reason for suspending O'Connell instead of
referring to O'Connell's telling him how to run his plant
or bringing anyone else in to run his plant. Strait, who
gave discredited testimony about cleaning the bathroom
being "fun," impressed me by her demeanor as being a
most untrustworthy witness. I discredit her claim that
Griffey and O'Connell threatened her, and credit O'Con-
nell's testimony that in an earlier conversation, Strait in-
sisted on knowing why "Everybody is treating me so
cruel around here," and O'Connell finally told her,
"Quite frankly, Katy, I do think you are an informant,"
without either O'Connell or Griffey threatening her in
any way.
From all the circumstances, including the summary
suspension of these two employees at a time when the
Company was discriminatorily assigning them more ar-
duous work-just I week from the date of the election
when one of them had been a union observer and the
other had spoken up to Plant Coordinator Behrman in
support of the Union-I find that Behrman seized on the
untrue information from informant Strait that Griffey
had threatened her and decided, without any investiga-
tion to use that as a pretext for suspending Griffey and
also to discriminatorily suspend O'Connell, for the 3
days, June 7, 8, and 11, to discourage their union mem-
bership in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
2. O'Connell's written warning
When O'Connell reported to work at 7 a.m. on
Wednesday, October 3, she asked Supervisor Whitecot-
ton for permission to attend a parent-teacher conference
at her children's school that morning at 11 o'clock. He
granted her permission and she left about 10:45 and was
gone about 45 minutes. Upon her return, as she credibly
testified, Whitecotton told her, "I am writing you up be-
cause you put the Company in a bind for not being
here." She said, "David, I left at quarter till 11:00" ("we
go on break at 11:00-our lunch break was from 11:00
o'clock until twenty after 11:00") "and I was back ap-
proximately at 11:30.... I don't feel I put the Compa-
ny in a bind." Refusing to sign the "green slip," she
asked, "Why are you writing me up when . . . two or
three hours ago you informed me that it was all right to
go?" He responded, "That's the penalty that you have to
pay for having children."
As indicated above, Supervisor Whitecotton gave dis-
credited testimony that he did not observe any changes
in the duties of O'Connell and Griffey after the election.
(Since his promotion to supervisor, he has been laid off,
but he testified that he has talked to Plant Manager
Clyde Griffith and Vice President Gary Sharman and is
hoping to go back to work for them.) When questioned
about the written warning, he admitted that he had given
O'Connell permission to attend the parent-teacher con-
ference, but he denied giving her any kind of warning.
He further denied on cross-examination being aware that
an allegation had been made in the complaint that he had
given O'Connell an unwarranted written warning.
CUTTING,
INCORPORATED
537
538
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Ignoring the fact that O'Connell recorded the incident
in her pocket calendar (writing "D. Whitecotton" under
"PTC" in the square for October 3), the Company
argues in its brief that O'Connell's testimony about the
written warning "appears fictitious" and "another of her
misrepresentations of facts." Although the Company vig-
orously attacks her credibility, O'Connell impressed me
by her demeanor on the stand, particularly during her
extensive cross-examination, as being a most sincere wit-
ness, doing her best to give an accurate account of what
happened. I credit her testimony about the written warn-
ing and find that Whitecotton denied giving her the
warning because it was obviously discriminatorily moti-
vated.
Accordingly, I find that the Company discriminatorily
gave O'Connell an unwarranted written warning on Oc-
tober 3 in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
3. Refusal to reinstate O'Connell and other strikers
a. The October 16 deadline
On Thursday, October 11, after months of unsuccess-
ful negotiations for a first agreement, the Union went on
an economic strike, with only about a fourth of the em-
ployees participating.
On Monday morning, October
15, after 7:30 or 8
o'clock, employee O'Connell observed a reporter from
the Hartford City newspaper, Doug Driscol, go to the
factory door at Plant 2 and saw Plant Manager Griffith
come out to greet him. Later that day, the newspaper
carried front page headlines, "Cutting strikers to be re-
placed." (From the beginning of the strike, the Company
had advertised for the "Immediate Hiring!" of permanent
strike replacements in the classifications of operators,
packers, etc., but the Company had withheld hiring any
replacements.) The first paragraph of the newspaper
story, carrying Driscol's by-line, stated that a spokesman
for the Company said that union members "will be per-
manently replaced if they fail to report to work Tues-
day" (October 16).
When called as a defense witness, Griffith testified on
cross-examination:
Q.... were you ever interviewed by any news-
paper man or woman concerning strikers returning
to work on October 16, 1979?
A. I did talk to a couple, yes.
Q. ...
And presumably you talked to them
somewhere about October 15 or 16, 1979?
A. I would say you are probably right, yes. The
time I talked to them was during the strike.
(I note that the same October 16 deadline was also pub-
lished in the October 15 edition of the Muncie newspa-
per.) Thereafter, Griffith denied that anybody from the
Company gave the newspaper the October 16 deadline
for returning to work..In part of his cross-examination,
though, he made an admission to the contrary. As he
was being questioned about the eighth paragraph of the
Hartford City News-Times article (G.C. Exh. 10), which
purports to quote Griffith himself, he read along with
the attorney for the General Counsel and the paragraph
was read into the record twice. The paragraph stated:
According to Griffith, of the 53 employees at the
plants, only 18 remain off their jobs. Those will be
permanently replaced tomorrow if they don't report
for work, he said. [Emphasis supplied.]
After testifying, "That's probably my statement . . . they
do twist words around, but that's basically what I said in
that statement," he finally gave an unequivocal answer:
Q. It is an accurate account of what you told the
newspaper?
A. Um-hum.
JUDGE LADWIG: What is your answer?
THE WITNESS: Yes, it is accurate.
However, after making this admission, he thereafter re-
turned to the Company's defense and claimed that
"[t]here may be one word in there that is not right . . .
'tomorrow"' and that it was "probably" on Friday, Octo-
ber 12, when he had the conversation with the reporter,
although "[i]t could have been Monday." Finally on re-
direct examination, he positively denied telling any re-
porter or anyone else that the strikers had until October
16 to report back to work before being permanently re-
placed. (He did not impress me as being a candid wit-
ness.) I discredit his denials and credit his admission that
he told the reporter (on October 15) that the strikers
"will be permanently replaced tomorrow if they don't
report for work."
About 7 p.m. that same day, Monday, October 15,
Union President David Lillard telephoned Plant Man-
ager Griffith and told him that the strikers "would be re-
turning to work tomorrow to meet your deadline." Grif-
fith responded that no jobs were available, that they
"had all been permanently replaced." At 7 o'clock the
next morning, Tuesday, October 16, all of the former
strikers (including O'Connell) attempted to return to
work, but the Company advised them at both plants that
they had been permanently replaced.
b. Belated hiring of replacements
About 8 o'clock that same Tuesday morning (although
the date is in dispute), Supervisor Whitecotton began
telephoning applicants to offer them permanent employ-
ment at plant 2. Meanwhile, Production Manager James
Sandoe was calling other applicants for permanent em-
ployment at plant . As directed by Plant Manager Grif-
fith, Personnel Assistant Zella Taylor had pulled applica-
tions from the files and had given them to Whitecotton
and Sandoe, whom Griffith had instructed "to make the
calls and see if these people who were available could
start work immediately." (Emphasis supplied.)
When asked on cross-examination the time of day
when he started hiring employees (interviewing them
over the telephone), Supervisor Whitecotton guessed it
was "Probably around 8 o'clock," give or take 15 min-
utes, and testified that he continued right through the
noon hour (finishing the hirings by 2 p.m.). On redirect
examination he was given the opportunity to change this
starting time (which conflicts with testimony given by
CUTTING, INCORPORATED
539
Griffith and Vice President Gary Sharman, as discussed
later), but he did not change his estimate:
Q. These times when you talk about 8 o'clock in
the morning and things taking 5 minutes and 2
o'clock in the afternoon and so forth. You're ap-
proximating and guessing back to the correct times.
You don't know the-
A. I can tell them that at 1:45 1 had everyone
hired.
Production Manager Sandoe, when asked what he
would tell the applicants, testified:
I asked them to come in the next morning at 8:00
o'clock to see the Personnel Director, that they had
been hired, but they had to come in and fill out
their forms before they could go to work.... I
need you to come in at 8:00 o'clock tomorrow
morning to report to work and you will have to see
the Personnel Director and fill out the forms before
you can proceed. . .. Like I said, the next day they
had to all come in and report at 8:00 o'clock and
then the Personnel Supervisor would take care of
them. I don't actually recall the hour they went to
work . . . I said they had to report in the next day
at 8:00 o'clock and then they would be scheduled
for physicals and report right after their physicals to
go to work. [Emphasis supplied.]
Thus, although both Whitecotton and Sandoe claimed
along with other defense witnesses that the hiring was
done on Monday, October 15 (as discussed below), both
of them gave testimony which revealed that the hiring
was actually done on Tuesday, October 16, after the
Company refused to reinstate the former strikers at 7
o'clock that morning. Whitecotton remembered that he
began hiring replacements within 15 minutes of 8 a.m. (a
time clearly earlier than the decision was made on
Monday to hire replacements), and Sandoe repeatedly
testified that he told the replacements to report at 8
o'clock the very next morning and told them they would
go to work that same day, "right after their physicals"
(thereby requiring them to report to work on Wednes-
day, the next day after Tuesday but the second day after
Monday, October 15).
By quitting time on Tuesday, Sandoe at plant I and
Whitecotton at plant 2 had hired a total of 13 employ-
ees-but only unskilled packers and no operators to re-
place the operators who had been on strike. The first 12
of the new employees went to work on Wednesday, Oc-
tober 17, and the other 1 started the following day. (At
least I of the 12, Chalmer Williamson-who took his
physical examination on October 30, not before going to
work-went to Plant 2 on October 16 after being hired
by Williamson and filled out a W-4 form, but he did not
work that day.)
The evidence therefore reveals that on Tuesday eve-
ning, October 16, the Company was faced with the prob-
lem of a potentially large backpay liability. It had falsely
claimed that morning (as well as the evening before) that
it had already permanently replaced all of the strikers.
When belatedly that Tuesday, it had hired 13 replace-
ments, but only unskilled employees and nobody to re-
place the skilled employees who had gone on strike. The
former economic strikers, after removing the picket lines
on October 15, had made unconditional offers to return
to work at a time when their jobs were still available, yet
the 13 belatedly hired packers had been promised perma-
nent status.
It was under these circumstances that the Company
devised a way to limit its potential backpay liability to
the former strikers whom it had refused reinstatement.
Plant Manager Griffith telephoned Union President Grif-
fith that Tuesday or Wednesday evening and announced
the Company's decision to assign the former strikers to a
new midnight shift at plant I beginning at 11 p.m. on
Sunday, October 21. As it turned out, all of the former
strikers (except O'Connell as discussed later) accepted
the offer to work on the third shift, which lasted only
about I week, after which the Company reassigned the
former strikers to the first and second shifts at plant 1.
Despite the promise of permanent status for the strike re-
placements, the Company recognized the returning strik-
ers' seniority for purposes of layoffs and, in February
1980, laid off all of the replacements then remaining on
the payroll. (One of the replacements had quit, one had
been discharged, and one was rehired on a different job
after being laid off.)
c. The Company's defenses
In its defense, the Company called five witnesses, Vice
President Sharman, Plant Manager Griffith, Production
Manager Sandoe, Supervisor Whitecotton, and Personnel
Assistant Taylor, all of whom claimed that the perma-
nent replacements were hired on Monday, October 15.
To disprove the accuracy of the October 16 deadline
stated in the local newspaper (as well as in the Muncie
newspaper), Griffith repeatedly disclaimed responsibility
for the story, although during part of his cross-examina-
tion (as quoted above) he admitted the accuracy of the
eighth paragraph of the news article in the October 15
local newspaper which stated that "[a]ccording to Grif-
fith," the strikers " will be permanently replaced tomor-
row if they don't report for work."
When called as a defense witness, Plant Manager Grif-
fith first claimed that he did not talk to Vice President
Sharman on October 15 until the replacements had al-
ready been hired (later in the day). He next testified that
he talked to the Company's labor counsel on October 15
and claimed that he then, "sometime in the morning,"
talked to Sharman, telling him "what I was doing,"
before having Personnel Assistant Taylor pull the appli-
cations and give them to Sandoe and Whitecotton to do
the hiring. Sharman, in turn, had a different version. He
testified that he met with Clyde Griffith Monday morn-
ing, "maybe 9:00 or 10:00 o'clock when Clyde and I got
around to it," that they discussed it in detail, that he
himself made the final decision to hire the replacements
that same day, and that "[a]t that time I directed Mr.
Griffith to go ahead and hire people and get them into
work." Of course, if Sharman made the final decision to
hire replacements about 9 or 10 a.m. that Monday, Su-
pervisor Whitecotton would not have started hiring re-
CUTTING,
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540
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
placements that same morning around 8 o'clock. More-
over, as indicated above, Griffith admittedly told Sandoe
and Whitecotton to see if the available applicants could
start to work immediately, and Sandoe admittedly told
those applicants he hired to report at 8 o'clock the next
day-whereas the replacements did not begin working
until 2 days after Monday.
When testifying first as an adverse witness, Personnel
Assistant Taylor was asked to read, from the accounting
records and personnel files before her, the hiring dates of
the strike replacements. She then purportedly read off
the hiring date of October 15 for each of the replace-
ments, but later admitted that there were no documents
in the company files which showed that the replacements
were in fact hired on October 15. Taylor claimed that
she called the company doctor on October 15 to make
appointments for the physicals, but that he did not per-
form "all of them on October the 15th," that "some of
them were on the 16th and that was the reason for the
delay for reporting to work on the 17th." To the con-
trary, it is clear from the testimony of both Sandoe and
Whitecotton that, even if they did the hiring on October
15 (instead of October 16, as found above), none of the
replacements were sent to either plant on October 15 to
obtain the papers for getting a physical examination. Fur-
thermore, Sandoe told the replacements he hired that
they were to go to plant I at 8 a.m. for their physicals
and to "report right after their physicals to go to work."
So even if physicals were given before they started
working, the replacements at Plant I were told to go on
to work that same day. Moreover the evidence is clear-
contrary to Taylor's claim that they had "to have their
physicals before they could report to work"-that that
was not a requirement. The only personnel file examined
in detail at the hearing revealed that the replacement,
Chalmer Williamson, went to work on October 17 and
did not have a physical examination until October 30. (It
is undisputed that similarly, O'Connell did not have her
physical examination until about a month after she was
hired in 1978.) As discussed later, Taylor gave discredit-
ed testimony about a conversation with O'Connell to
support the Company's purported justification for termi-
nating her on October 18. Like the other four defense
witnesses who claimed that the hiring was done on Octo-
ber 15, she did not impress me as being a candid witness.
I discredit their testimony that the hiring was done on
October 15.
d. Concluding findings
As indicated above, I find that Production Manager
Sandoe and Supervisor Whitecotton hired the 13 perma-
nent replacements on Tuesday, October 16, the day
before the first 12 of them reported to work.
Because of the conflicting versions given by Vice
President Sharman and Plant Manager Griffith about the
making of the decision to permanently replace the strik-
ers (Sharman claiming that he made the decision himself
after a detailed discussion with Griffith about 9 or 10
a.m. on Monday, October 15, and Griffith first claiming
that he did not talk to Sharman that day until after the
hiring, and later claiming that he discussed the hiring
with the Company's labor counsel before telling Shar-
man that morning what he had decided to do), I am
unable to determine from the evidence when the decision
was actually made. It appears clear that when Griffith
gave the news story to the Hartford City News-Times
reporter about 8 o'clock on Monday morning that the
strikers would be "permanently replaced tomorrow if
they don't report for work," he had no intentions at the
time of hiring replacements immediately. However, I
have no way of determining if the Company had second
thoughts sometime during the day and made plans to
start hiring replacements the next morning whether or
not the strikers called off the strike, or if Griffith made
the decision on his own to claim that replacements had
already been hired when Union President Lillard called
him that evening and said the strikers would return the
next morning-and then talked to Sharman about hiring
replacements immediately. Neither do I have reason to
doubt that Supervisor Whitecotton was telling the truth
when he recalled that he started hiring replacements
about 8 a.m. (although this necessarily would have been
on Tuesday rather than on Monday, before the decision
was made to hire replacements under either Sharman's
or Griffith's version).
Accordingly I find that the Company had not hired
permanent replacements for O'Connell and the other
former strikers by 7 a.m. on Tuesday, October 16, when
they made unconditional offers to return to work. Jobs
were available both at Plant I where Griffith admitted
that "Up until Christmas we were extremely busy," and
at plant 2 where there had been no stockpiling in prepa-
ration for the strike and where the Company has not es-
tablished that any change in the staffing requirements
had been made since the preceding Thursday when the
strike began.
It is well established that "unless the employer who re-
fuses to reinstate strikers can show that his action was
due to "legitimate and substantial business justifications"
[such as the hiring of permanent replacements during an
economic strike in order to continue operations], he is
guilty of an unfair labor practice.
....
The burden of
proving justification is on the employer." N.L.R.B. v.
Fleetwood Trailer Co., Inc., 389 U.S. 375, 378-379 (1967).
The Company has not met that burden of proof. I there-
fore find that the Company unlawfully refused to rein-
state O'Connell and the other former economic strikers
upon their unconditional offers on Tuesday morning, Oc-
tober 16, to return to work, thereby violating Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. In making this finding, I note
that in neither a charge herein (Case 25-CA-11655-1)
nor the charge in Case 25-CA-11478 which was with-
drawn (Resp. Exhs. 22 and 23) was there a specific alle-
gation that the Company unlawfully violated the Act on
October 16 when it claimed that permanent replacements
had been hired. However the second consolidated com-
plaint specifically alleged that the Company unlawfully
refused to reinstate O'Connell on October 16, and the
parties fully litigated at the hearing the issue of whether
the strikers at both plants had been permanently replaced
before they made their unconditional offers to return on
October 16.
CUMTNG, INCORPORATED
541
4. O'Connell's termination
Although O'Connell's discharge was not specifically
alleged in the second consolidated complaint, a major
part of the Company's brief, pages 33-45, is entitled
"The Termination of Pam O'Connell."
It was developed at the hearing that on October 18, 2
days after she appeared with other former strikers at
plant 2 and unconditionally offered to return to work,
the Company formally terminated her by executing a
"Payroll/Personnel Authorization Record" which stated,
under her name and over the signatures of Zella Taylor
and Clyde Griffith (G.C. Exh. 2):
Termination Date The above employee has been ter-
minated for the reason-Per David Lillard-Clyde
Griffith telephone conversation this date-Pam will
not be returning. She intends to stay home and as of
1 1/18/79 be a housewife.
As found above, Plant Manager Griffith telephoned
Union President Lillard on the evening of October 16 or
17 and offered to assign the former strikers to a new
midnight shift at plant , beginning at 11 p.m., October
21. Thereafter Lillard checked to determine which of the
former strikers would accept this offer to the third shift.
All of them agreed to accept the offer except O'Connell,
who told Lillard, "No, there was no way I could at that
particular time because of my four children," and ex-
plained that her husband was working on a swing shift
on his job, leaving nobody at home to take care of the
children when both parents would be working at mid-
night.
Lillard reported back to Griffith around October 18
that all of the former strikers would be returning to
work the midnight shift except O'Connell. Griffith asked
if Lillard knew why O'Connell was not returning. As
Lillard credibly testified, he replied, "Yes, I think she's
going to stay home and be a housewife." (Emphasis sup-
plied.) Immediately, without waiting until Sunday to see
if O'Connell decided to return and without checking
with her directly, Griffith instructed Personnel Assistant
Taylor to fill out the termination sheet for O'Connell.
Then at the hearing, Taylor and Vice President Shar-
man gave what I find to be fabricated testimony in an
effort to justify O'Connell's termination.
Taylor claimed that on October 11, the first day of the
strike, O'Connell went from plant 2 where she worked
to plant I to pick up her paycheck and, in the presence
of Sharman, told Taylor "That she was going to stay
home and be a housewife and that she wouldn't be work-
ing." Sharman gave a conflicting version. He claimed he
overheard O'Connell say, "I won't be back because I
don't need this job" (emphasis supplied)-despite the fact
that it is undisputed that O'Connell remained on the
picket line until the pickets were pulled on October 15,
and offered to return to work with the others on Octo-
ber 16. In fact, as O'Connell credibly testified, she was
paid at plant 2 on October I1, and she had no conversa-
tion with Taylor about not returning to work when
Taylor handed her her paycheck through the window at
plant 1 a week later on October 18, the third day after
the strike ended.
I also find that Sharman gave fabricated testimony
when he claimed that Union President Lillard informed
Plant Manager Griffith on the telephone Monday eve-
ning, October 15, that the strikers "would be all coming
back to work with the exception of Pam O'Connell who
had informed him that she was staying home to be a
housewife." To the contrary, Griffith admitted that, in
the October 15 telephone conversation, "Mr. Lillard re-
lated that the employees had decided to come back to
work and they were all going to return on the 16th."
(Emphasis supplied.)
The Company contends in its brief that, inasmuch as
O'Connell and the other strikers had been permanently
replaced before 5 p.m. on October 15, its only legal obli-
gation to her was to place her on a preferential hiring
list, to make an offer to her as openings became availa-
ble, that an opening did become available (on the mid-
night shift at the other plant), that the offer was made to
her through the union president, that he reported back
that she did not accept the offer, and that "O'Connell
never contacted the Company in regard to employment
subsequent to the strike and, therefore, she is not entitled
to any backpay." The Company concludes, "Consequent-
ly, the facts compel dismissal of the allegations of the
complaint in regard to O'Connell's discharge." (Emphasis
supplied.)
After considering all of the evidence and circum-
stances, I find to the contrary that O'Connell was not
permanently replaced, that she was never offered proper
reinstatement to her former or substantially equivalent
position after her unconditional offer to return to work
on October 16 was unlawfully rejected, and that the
Company has demonstrated by its conduct (formally ter-
minating her on October 18 and fabricating testimony at
the hearing to justify the termination) that it would have
been futile for her to have applied again for reinstate-
ment. I therefore reject the Company's contention that
she is not entitled to any backpay and agree with the
General Counsel that she is entitled to the customary re-
instatement with backpay. (In view of the fact that the
remedy would be the same, I find it unnecessary to rule
on whether her October 18 termination violated Section
8(a)(3) of the Act.)
B. Threat To Discharge the Union's President
Before the May 31 election, the Union filed one of the
charges herein (Case 25-CA-10983), alleging the dis-
criminatory discharge of five employees during the elec-
tion campaign and the constructive discharge of a sixth.
The first consolidated complaint alleged only one unlaw-
ful discharge (that of Rick Hodge, discussed later).
Meanwhile Union President David Lillard was having
"some severe problems with absenteeism." Plant Man-
ager Griffith's testimony is undisputed that Lillard had
received verbal and written warnings, had been suspend-
ed, and, "[a]t one point, he could have been up for termi-
nation" under the Company's progressive discipline
policy.
It was under these circumstances that Lillard's dis-
charge was discussed sometime in December when two
members of the union contract committee were in Vice
CUTrING,
INCORPORATED
541
542
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
President Sharman's office with Sharman and Griffith.
While awaiting the arrival of the Union's committee
member, Frances Griffey, as credibly testified to by Lil-
lard, Sharman asked Lillard "if my job was so bad and I
didn't like it, why I just didn't quit." Lillard said he liked
his job and Sharman responded, "Well, that doesn't make
any sense Dave, because you've got a lot of problems
and you're always complaining." Lillard said he knew
what Sharman was going to do, that Sharman was
"going to fire me as soon as you get the chance," to
which Sharman responded, "that's right Dave, I'm going
to fire you as soon as I can sneak it past the NLRB." (Em-
phasis
supplied.)
Union Committee
Member
Kathy
Connor (who impressed me as being an honest witness)
recalled that Lillard "said that he knew what Gary Shar-
man wanted to do . . . that he wanted to fire him and
Gary said that's right David, as soon as I can sneak it
past the NLRB, he would."
In the Company's defense, Griffith testified that, after
Lillard remarked, "you would fire me if you could,"
Sharman's answer was "he'd terminate any employee
* . . if they didn't do their job." Sharman, in turn,
claimed that Lillard "brought up . ..
his job security
.
..and I said to him that if he didn't do his job that he
would probably lose his job the same for Clyde and
myself . . . that none of us had any kind of security and
. . myself, probably less than anybody . . . that if none
of [us] performed, that we would all lose our jobs." I dis-
credit their denials and find that Vice President Sharman
unlawfully threatened the union president with discharge
because of his union activity, in violation of Section 8(a)
(1) of the Act.
C. Other Alleged Unlawful Conduct
1. Before the election
The first complaint alleges that in May (before the
election on May 31), the Company discriminatorily dis-
charged employee Rick Hodge, who did not appear at
the hearing to testify. I find it clear that, in the absence
of his testimony, the General Counsel failed to make a
prima facie showing that the Union was a motivating
factor in the Company's decision to discharge him. In
addition, I credit the testimony of Foreman Mike Keith
(who impressed me as being an honest, forthright wit-
ness) that Hodge was a probationary employee who was
not developing into a satisfactory employee, was not put-
ting enough effort into his work, and, because of back
problems, was complaining about having to run his ma-
chine a full 8 hours. I therefore find that this allegation
must be dismissed.
The complaint alleges that in employee Frances Grif-
fey's conversation with Plant Coordinator Behrman in
his office on May 31-when she explained why she was
wearing the 4-inch "VOTE UPIU" badge-Behrman co-
ercively interrogated her. She testified that when she
stated, "That's why I'm wearing this badge," he "said,
are you for the Union and I said you bet and I'm going
to work like a dickens for it." I agree with the Company
that "[i]t is inconceivable that Behrman's mere response
to Griffey's comment about her support for the Union
constituted an unlawful interrogation." I therefore find
that the allegation must be dismissed.
The complaint alleges that Foreman Beth Bennett
threatened employees with discharge and plant closure
on March 20 and coercively interrogated employees on
that date and on March 28. Employee Janet Teegarden
credibly testified that in a conversation lasting about 15
minutes on March 20 in her work area, in the presence
of other employees in the area, Bennett asked her if she
knew anything about a union coming in, what she knew
about it, and if she were going to sign a union card. Ben-
nett then said that, if she signed a union card and the
Union comes in, "we won't have jobs . . . we will just
move the plant .. . [Owner] Stewart Maynard has a
place picked out down South and if the Union tries to
organize, they will just move it and we won't have
jobs." In the second conversation, about a week later,
Bennett talked to her again, for about 10 or 15 minutes,
at her work station without anybody around. Bennett
asked, "if I did sign a card . . . if I had union cards and
if I was giving them out to other people . . . if they
were signing them, who signed the cards." In the Com-
pany's defense, Packing Supervisor Bennett testified that
it was "just general talk" about a union-before she
knew of any specific union organizing and before the su-
pervisors were told "not to talk about it"-and that she
told Teegarden "I hoped that a union didn't come in,
beause I had heard that there was a possibility that they
could move the company to Missouri." Teegarden ap-
peared to have a good recollection of the threat and the
interrogation. I credit her version and find that the threat
of discharging the employees and moving the plant and
the repeated interrogation particularly in the context of
such a threat were coercive and violated Section 8(a)(l)
of the Act as alleged.
The complaint alleges that Foreman Mike Keith on
May 1 and 2 "by soliciting employee complaints and
grievances promised its employees increased benefits and
improved terms and conditions of employment." It is un-
disputed, as packer O'Connell credibly testified, that,
about the first part of May, Keith came to her machine
and, in the presence of other employees, asked, "Pam,
are you aware of what you are getting yourself involved
in, when you are getting yourself involved with the
Union?" and "what exactly is it that you are wanting
that . . . the Company is not giving to you?" She men-
tioned needing floormats and complained about glue
guns with electrical shorts, cut wire on the floor, broken
toilet seats, etc. However, she readily admitted on cross-
examination that Keith did not promise to provide the
floormats or to remedy any of the other problems. (The
Company's furnishing the packers with doormats on May
30 is not alleged to violate the Act.) In the absence of
such an express or implied promise, I find that this alle-
gation must be dismissed.
The complaint also alleges that President Jennerjahn
likewise "by soliciting ...
promised . . . increased bene-
fits" on May 5, 8, and 24. However, I find that the evi-
dence fails to support this allegation as well. The Gener-
al Counsel's witnesses, who had difficulty remembering
the dates and number of times Jennerjahn conducted
CUTT'ING INCORPORATED
543
plant meetings, merely testified that he pointed out the
existing practices for resolving complaints and problems
(through the plant council and going directly to him),
without promising any increased benefits. I therefore find
that this allegation must also be dismissed. (The Compa-
ny did not call Jennerjahn, Behrman, or Brackin to tes-
tify. None of the three is still working for the Company,
and Jennerjahn and Behrman are currently engaged in
litigation with the Company over an alleged patent in-
fringement.)
2. During the strike
On October 12, the second morning of the strike, strik-
ing employees Griffey and O'Connell were on the picket
line at plant 2 with two other pickets. Griffey was stand-
ing with a picket sign behind a fire barrel which she had
obtained the mayor's permission to place on the sidewalk
for warmth. Vice President Sharman arrived with a pho-
tographer (one of the guards hired to protect the Com-
pany's property during the strike), and went with him to
the middle of the street where the photographer pointed
the camera at Griffey. When Griffey pushed the sign in
front of her face, Sharman told her, "Sally put your sign
down I want to see your face." She said she had not au-
thorized any of them to take her photograph and he re-
sponded that "we need your picture for evidence."
O'Connell asked "What for?" and Sharman answered,
"when we take you to Court." O'Connell asked, "Court,
for what?" Sharman turned and walked away without
answering. (I discredit Sharman's denials of this testimo-
ny.) The same photographer was there daily during the
strike, taking pictures from the roof, from the doorway,
while "hanging out the windows, downstairs and on the
second floor," and from the street.
There was never any violence at the plant 2 picket
line, and Sharman gave no reason for threatening to take
the pickets to court or for taking Griffey's picture for
that purpose. I find that Sharman's conduct, in making
the threat and having the photographer take Griffey's
picture on October 12 while the striking employees were
engaged in peaceful picketing, was to intimidate the
pickets and to make them fearful of reprisals for engag-
ing in a lawful strike and picketing. I therefore find that,
on October 12, Vice President Sharman engaged in un-
lawful surveillance of the peaceful picketing and coer-
cively threatened the employees with legal proceedings
for lawfully striking and picketing, in violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act. (The complaint does not allege
that the other photographing of the picketing at the two
plants further violated the Act.)
3. After the strike
On November 14 (about a month before the signing of
the
2-year collective-bargaining
agreement,
effective
from October 11, 1979, until October 11, 1981), Vice
President Sharman went to the machine where the
Union's committee member, Griffey, was working. Shar-
man first asked if Griffey were aware that Union Repre-
sentative Jack Meyers was going to sign the agreement,
and then informed her of the Company's thoughts of
having the employees work four succeeding Saturdays,
closing the plant from December 21 until January 2, and
deferring the Saturday pay until the Christmas holidays,
enabling the employees to be off 11 days and still receive
a full paycheck. Griffey said that sounded like a super
idea. A few minutes later, when Griffey was on break,
Sharman returned and asked her how the new agreement
would affect the Christmas holiday plan, commented that
the people sitting on the negotiating teams did not know
what they were doing, said that this was what the Union
was doing for the employees- "they don't want to pay
you for your holiday," and added that the Company was
going to be "good people" and give the employees the
holiday pay anyway. He also asked her (as a committee
member) if she would sign the agreement. She admitted
on cross-examination that the discussion of holiday pay
and the signing of the agreement were two separate mat-
ters, and that Sharman did not indicate that the holiday
pay was an inducement not to sign the agreement. (I dis-
credit Sharman's denial that holiday pay was even dis-
cussed.) Contrary to the allegations in the second com-
plaint, I find that Sharman's questioning of committee
member Griffey about the signing of the agreement was
not coercive interrogation concerning union membership,
activities, or sympathies, and further find that he did not
promise the employees "increased benefits and improved
terms and conditions of employment, in an effort to
induce employees to abandon their membership in and
support for the Union." I therefore find that these two
allegations must be dismissed.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By refusing to reinstate employees Pamela O'Con-
nell, Frances Griffey, and other former striking employ-
ees on October 16 after their unconditional offers to
return to work, the Company engaged in unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) and (1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. By assigning employees O'Connell and Griffey more
arduous job tasks after the election in retaliation against
them because of their support of the Union, and by dis-
criminatorily suspending them on June 7, 8, and 11 be-
cause of their union support, the Company also violated
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
3. By discriminatorily giving employee O'Connell an
unwarranted written warning on October 3 because of
her union support, the Company further violated Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
4. By threatening to discharge Union President David
Lillard because of his union activity, the Company vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. By threatening to discharge the employees and
move the plant if the employees support the Union and
by engaging in repeated coercive interrogation, the Com-
pany violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
6. By engaging in unlawful surveillance of peaceful
picketing and threatening employees with legal proceed-
ings for lawfully striking and picketing, the Company co-
erced and intimidated employees in violation of Section
8(a)(l) of the Act.
7. The Company did not unlawfully discharge employ-
ee Rick Hodge; did not coercively interrogate employee
CUTliNG,
INCORPORATED
543
544
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Griffey; did not, by soliciting complaints and grievances,
promise increased benefits and improved terms and con-
ditions of employment; and did not make such a promise
to induce employees to abandon their union support.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in cer-
tain unfair labor practices, I find it necessary to order the
Respondent to cease and desist therefrom and to take
certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the poli-
cies of the Act.
The Respondent having unlawfully refused to reinstate
employee Pamela O'Connell on and since October 16,
1979, having unlawfully refused to reinstate employee
Frances Griffey and other former striking employees on
October 16, 1979, and having discriminatorily suspended
O'Connell and Griffey for 3 days; I find it necessary to
order the Respondent to offer O'Connell reinstatement
with compensation for lost pay and other benefits, com-
puted on a quarterly basis from October 16 until date of
proper offer of reinstatement, less net interim earnings, to
compensate Griffey and other striking employees who
made unconditional offers on October 16 to return to
work, for such lost earnings from that date until they
were reinstated on October 21, and to compensate
O'Connell and Griffey for the earnings lost as a result of
their 3-day suspension, in accordance with F W. Wool-
worth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), plus interest as
computed in Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651
(1977). See, generally, Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138
NLRB 716 (1962).
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law, upon the entire record, and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recom-
mended:
ORDER3
The
Respondent,
Cutting,
Incorporated,
Hartford
City, Indiana, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to reinstate any economic striker who un-
conditionally offers to return to work before being per-
manently replaced.
(b) Assigning any employee more arduous job tasks in
retaliation for supporting Local
154, United Paper-
workers International Union, AFL-CIO-CLC, or any
other union.
(c) Giving an unwarranted written warning to or sus-
pending any employee for supporting the Union.
(d) Threatening to discharge the employees or to
move the plant if the employees support the Union.
(e) Threatening to discharge any union official because
of the union activity.
D In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board. the find-
ings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in
Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, he adopted by the Board arid
become its findings, conclusions. and Order. and all objections thereto
shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
(f) Coercively interrogating any employee about union
support or union activity.
(g) Engaging in unlawful surveillance of peaceful pick-
eting or coercively threatening employees with legal
proceedings for lawfully striking and picketing.
(h) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Pamela O'Connell immediate and full rein-
statement to her former job or, if her job no longer
exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prej-
udice to her seniority or any other rights or privileges
previously enjoyed, and make her whole for any loss of
pay or other benefits she may have suffered by reason of
the refusal to reinstate her in the manner set forth in the
Remedy section.
(b) Make Frances Griffey and other former economic
strikers who made unconditional offers to return to work
on October 16, 1979, whole for any lost earnings from
that date until their reinstatement on October 21, 1979, in
the manner set forth in the Remedy section.
(c) Make Pamela O'Connell and Frances Griffey
whole for any lost earnings resulting from their discrimi-
natory 3-day suspension in the manner set forth in the
Remedy section.
(d) Expunge from the personnel records any reference
to the unwarranted
written warning given Pamela
O'Connell and to the discriminatory suspension of her
and Frances Griffey.
(e) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, time-
cards, personnel records and reports, and all other re-
cords necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due
under the terms of this Order.
(f) Post at its plants in Hartford City, Indiana, copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix. " ' Copies of
said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 25, after being duly signed by the Respond-
ent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be
maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by the Respondent to ensure that said notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other materi-
al.
(g) Notify the Regional Director for Region 25, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS AL-SO ORDERED that the complaints be dismissed
insofar as they allege violations of the Act not specifical-
ly found.
4 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals. the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board."