Richland Co. & Assoc.

RICHLAND CO. &r ASSOC. III Richland Co. & Assoc., Division of McDonald Con- struction, Inc. and United Union of Roofers, Waterproofers and Allied Workers, AFL-CIO, Local Union No. 134. Cases 8-CA-13832 and 8-RC- 12044 May 20, 1981 DECISION AND ORDER On February 11, 1981, Administrative Law Judge Claude R. Wolfe issued the attached Deci- sion in this proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief and the General Counsel and the Charging Party filed briefs in opposition to the Respondent's exceptions. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find- ings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re- lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the Respondent, Richland Co. & Assoc., Division of McDonald Construction, Inc., Defiance, Ohio, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE CLAUDE R. WOLFE, Administrative Law Judge: This consolidated proceeding was heard before me in Defi- ance, Ohio, on December 15, 1980. The petition in Case 8-RC-12044 was filed on January 23' by the Charging Party. Pursuant to a hearing there- on, the Regional Director for Region 8 of the Board issued, on February 15, a Decision and Direction of Election in a unit of "All employees performing compo- sition roofing employed by the Employer out of its Defi- ance, Ohio, facility, excluding all office clerical employ- ees and professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act, and employees working in other crafts," directing an election in that unit to be held on April 11, and naming the eligible voters as Walter S. Hockenberry, Dennis Ripke, Danny Ball, Kenneth ler, Carl Healy, and Kyle Reynolds, with Ronald Bennett permitted to vote subject to challenge. The Union lost the election by a vote of zero to four, with two chal- lenged ballots. Thereafter, on April 18, the Union filed timely objections to conduct affecting the results of the election. The Regional Director, on June 20, directed a hearing thereon. I All dates are in 1980 unless indicated otherwise. 256 NLRB No. 26 Charges were filed in Case 8-CA-13832 on May 12 and June 25, and the complaint issued on June 25. The complaint alleges violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Na- tional Labor Relations Act, as amended, and prays for a remedial bargaining order. Inasmuch as acts alleged in the election objections are also alleged in the complaint as unfair labor practices, the two cases were consolidated for hearing. Upon the entire record, my observations of the wit- nesses' demeanor as they testified before me, and with due regard for the able arguments of the parties, I make the following: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS I. RESPONDENT'S BUSINESS The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I find that Respondent, Richland Co. & Assoc., Division of McDonald Construction, Inc., is now, and has been at all times material herein, an Ohio corporation with its of- fices and place of business located in Defiance, Ohio, where it is engaged in the roofing construction business and sheet metal fabrication for commercial buildings. Annually, in the course and conduct of its business oper- ations, Respondent receives goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points located outside the State of Ohio, and is now, and has been at all times material herein, an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 11. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Facts The parties stipulated and I find that Dan Ball, Ronald Bennett, Carl Healy, Walter Hockenberry, Kenneth Iler, Kyle Reynolds, and Dennis Ripke were members of the bargaining unit at all times referred to in the complaint. It was further stipulated that Hockenberry, Healy, ller, Ripke, and Bennett executed valid authorization cards for the Union on October 8, 1979, and that the Union had a card majority in the unit on that date. The bar- gaining unit remained stable at all times material to this Decision, and I find that this card majority continued. After these employees signed the union authorization cards, the Union, by letter of October 10, 1979, which Respondent received via certified mail,2 notified Re- spondent that it had been authorized by them to secure a collective-bargaining agreement, and requested an early meeting. Kevin McDonald, chief officer and manager of Re- spondent, concedes that he has an intense dislike for unions,3 had long ago decided he would close Richland 2 Respondenl concedes its receipt in October 197, and I conclude that it was received within 2 or 3 days. a He attributes this posture to hatred of unions passed on to him by his uncle, who he believes was killed by union problems RCKLAND CO. & ASSC. III 112 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD if a union got in, and would do anything to keep a union out. After the cards were signed and he became aware of the union activity, McDonald asked Ronald Bennett, in October 1979, why he had called the Union. 4 From a composite of the credible testimony of Ripke, Ball, and Reynolds, I find that McDonald told employees on De- cember 14, 1979, 5 while he and they were sitting in the shop drinking beer in the midst of a 4-hour after-work session, that he could not afford a union and would close the Company if the Union came in. I do not credit McDonald's unconvincing semidenial that although he did not say this he could have "inferred" it, and that if he said anything it was that being a union contractor would force him out of business.6 The employee wit- nesses were more impressive, and their version is consist- ent with McDonald's admission that he had long ago de- cided to close down if a union came in and would do anything to keep one out. That all were drinking beer does not give me any reason to discount the impact of the statement. Ripke, Ball, and Reynolds remembered McDonald's threat, and there is no convincing evidence that any one of those present was intoxicated. Reynolds' testimony that McDonald also said employees would have to pay their own insurance premiums during winter layoffs if a union came in, and that Respondent had always paid such premiums, is uncontroverted and cred- ited. About a week after this meeting, McDonald asked Ripke how the Union got started. In mid-February 1980, McDonald told Reynolds that he (McDonald) could not be a nice guy anymore, the men had started all this trouble for him, and he was going to have to send them bills for insurance premiums while they were laid off. The only trouble that Mc- Donald was having in mid-February, so far as the record shows, was the employees' union activity, the pending petition in Case 8-RC-12044 which had been filed on January 23, and the hearing held thereon on February 6. The employees had never before been billed for insur- ance premiums whether on layoff or working. Within 3 weeks of the Regional Director's decision of February 15, McDonald sent letters to Ripke, Ball, and Bennett on March 6 billing them for insurance premiums during their layoff period.7 Also in March, McDonald asked Reynolds what the employees thought about the bills. Reynolds advised him that they were angry. Bennett and Ripke met with McDonald at his house on March 26, at their request, for the purpose of discuss- ing the insurance bills and their annual spring wage in- creases. Ripke credibly testified that McDonald said not to worry about the insurance bills, that they would not have to pay them if the Union was voted down,8 but 4 So much is conceded by McDonald, but he was evasive on the matter. He first testified that lie did ot ask Bennett who contacted the Union, and then, when faced with his sworn affidavit that he had, came up with his concession, incredibly explaining that ie mrlust have read his affidavit too fast before signing it. ' Reynolds was the more certain on the date, and I credit him. 6 rhis version of McDonald's still amounts to a threat of closure if the Union came ill, and certainly cannot be construed as a reasonable predic- tion based on objective fact. 7 he winter layoff ran from January to March 8 Respondent has made no further attempt to collect these premiums from the men, but has itself continued to pay these premiums. Employees had paid nothing for insurance coverage prior to the date of the hearing that they would probably get another bill if the Union won. McDonald also stated that he would go out of the roofing business if the Union got in, and was holding off bidding on two jobs until after the election. When the men asked about what raises they could expect for the year, McDonald told them to come up with a figure. Ripke and Bennett said that they would get back to Mc- Donald individually on the raise. Ripke did not do so, but McDonald called him the Sunday after the meeting, March 30, and told him that Bennett had reached agree- ment with McDonald. McDonald then offered Ripke a 75-cent wage increase and maternity coverage. Ripke ac- cepted. The parties stipulated that all of its working em- ployees were given a raise and maternity insurance in May 1980. Bennett received a wage increase of 80 cents per hour on May 2. Ripke, Reynolds, and Healy re- ceived 75 cents. Both Reynolds and Bennett credibly tes- tified that McDonald told them before the election9 that they would be getting the raises and maternity benefits after the election. Bennett had asked for maternity insur- ance before the union activity started, and Reynolds had asked for it when he was hired on October 16, 1979. Nei- ther had been promised it before the preelection notifica- tion. McDonald's explanation that he found it necessary to charge laid-off employees for insurance premiums due to increased costs occasioned by the addition of coverage for spouses and children is unconvincing, and I do not credit his testimony that the billing of Ripke for January 1980, a month when Ripke worked the number of hours Respondent claims is necessary to qualify for employer coverage, was a mistake on McDonald's part. The timing of the billing, combined with his February statement to Reynolds and his conditioning of payment on the out- come of the election, makes it rather obvious that his intent was to coerce employees into abandoning the Union. With respect to wage increases, Respondent's records show that Ball, hired on September 20, 1976, received 20-, 25-, and 30-cent raises in April, June, and August 1977, respectively. Bennett, hired on September 28, 1977, received 1977 raises in September, October, and Novem- ber of 50, 50, and 25 cents, respectively. In 1978, Bennett received two 50-cent raises in March and June. Ripke, hired on March 28, 1978, received two 25-cent raises in June, 50 cents in July, and 25 cents in September. Hockenberry, hired on May 30, 1978, re- ceived a 50-cent raise and a 75-cent raise in June and at the end of 1978. Ripke and Hockenberry both were earn- ing $5.75 per hour. Bennett was earning $6.25. In 1979, Ripke received raises of 25 cents in March, 60 cents in June, and 40 cents in August, ending the year at $7. Bennett got 75 cents in March and $1.20 in June, ending at $8.20. Hookenberry got 25 cents in March, 60 cents in June, and 40 cents in August, ending at $7. Iler, hired on May 7, 1979, received 60 cents in June, 40 cents in August, and 50 cents in October, ending at $6.50. Ball, rehired the week ending October 19, 1979, received 50 cents in November and 50 cents in December ending at ' KRecylolds places this irotice in late March or early April. and it is plait from Bennelit testimrnony that he was so told after March 26 RICHLAND CO. & ASSOC. 113 $7. The common dates of raises in 1979 were March 9,' ° when Bennett got 75 cents and Hockenberry 25 cents; and August 10, when Ripke, Iler, and Hockenberry re- ceived 40 cents. In addition to the May 2, 1980, raises related above, Reynolds received three 50-cent raises on February 1, 8, and 22, 1980. An annual summarization shows, without considering seniority factors, that total annual increases per man ranged from 75 cents to $1.25 in 1977, $1 to $1.25 in 1978, $1 to $1.95 in 1979, and 75 cents to $2.25 in 1980. The records show no predictable pattern of regular after-winter-layoff increases for all employees. I am per- suaded that the raises were individually negotiated, and were not regularly scheduled. This conclusion is some- what supported by the experience of Bennett and Ripke on March 26, 1980, which they did not seem to believe was unusual. There does appear to have been some rough equalization of raises to reach approximately simi- lar wages, with the exception of Bennett who always earned more than the others, but absent further explana- tion this can be no more than a speculative conclusion. I am persuaded that the General Counsel has not shown that the promise or grant of wage increases was unusual or that the amounts given were unusual, but has devel- oped sufficient evidence, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to warrant an inference that the delay from the promise in March to the actual grant in May" was deliberately designed to impress upon the voters the source from whence their benefits came. Respondent has not explained this delay, and I adopt the inference as my finding. The maternity benefit is another matter. Both the promise and the actual grant were, in my view, calculat- ed to induce and dissuade employees from union activi- ties. Employees had sought the benefit previously with- out response. Only when the possibility of union repre- sentation loomed before him did McDonald, the self-pro- fessed union hater who would do anything to defeat a union, promise maternity benefits, and he did this at the very same time that he contends the costs of existing in- surance had become so high as to require him to bill em- ployees for the premiums. I find that he promised and granted maternity coverage as a device to entice his em- ployees away from the Union. In April, after the election, McDonald told Ripke that he had received a letter from the Union naming Ripke, Ball, and Iler as employees willing to testify for the Board, and called him a "backstabber" for that reason. The Union's objections to the election, served on Re- spondent on April 16, set forth that Iler, Ripke, and Ball would testify in support thereof, and it logically follows that this is the conduct to which McDonald had refer- ence. Thereafter, McDonald interrogated Reynolds on May 14 when he asked how the Union obtained majority sup- port, and billed Ripke for insurance during a layoff in August. Ripke did not pay. 'o All exact date references are to week ending dates. " Actually the last week in April because May 2 was a payroll ending date. B. Conclusions McDonald's statements to employees on December 14, 1979, that he would close the Company if the Union came in, repeated on March 26, 1980, are clear violations of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act, as is the companion state- ment on March 26 that Respondent was delaying bidding for new work until after the election, a transparent warn- ing that McDonald was already in the process of imple- menting his threat to close if the Union won, as well as an effort to coerce its employees into voting against the Union. Respondent's argument that such statements did not violate the Act because McDonald had made the de- cision to close if a union came in before union organizing commenced and was therefore simply informing employ- ees of a previous management decision is without merit. McDonald did hate unions and had previously resolved to close if a union came in, but all this does is establish unlawful motivation, ab inirio, for his various statements made and acts committed as a result of the employees' venture into union activity, and certainly does not rise to the stature of a defense or excuse, nor does it give him license to utter threats that have consistently been held unlawful by the Board. Similarly, McDonald's telling employees on December 14, 1979, that Respondent would discontinue paying em- ployee insurance premiums if the Union was voted in, and telling them on March 26, 1980, that they would not have to pay the premiums if the Union was voted down but would probably be billed if the Union won, both constitute violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. There is no showing that the Union would require the discon- tinuance of employer-paid premiums, and McDonald's statements were open threats to deprive employees of a benefit previously enjoyed if they defied his wishes and selected a union to represent them. It is further found that McDonald's statement to Reyn- olds in mid-February 1980 with respect to billing laid-off employees for insurance was a threat of loss of benefits because of union activities which could not help but have a coercive and restraining effect on Reynolds' exer- cise of his Section 7 rights, and therefore violated Sec- tion 8(a)(1) of the Act. The actual March 1980 billing of employees, which I have found was designed to coerce employees into abandoning the Union, also violated Sec- tion 8(a)(1) of the Act. McDonald's promise of maternity insurance on or about March 30, and again before the election, to take effect after the election, was, I am persuaded, an attempt to induce employees to refrain from union activity and violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The subsequent grant of this benefit in May 1980 flowing from an unlaw- fully conceived promise amounted to payment for serv- ices rendered, i.e., voting against the Union, and an in- ducement to cease further union activity, and thereby violated Secion 8(a)(l) of the Act. I have found that the delay of the wage increase from the promise in March to the grant in May was an artifice employed to impress upon the employees, on the eve of the upcoming Board-conducted election, the source from which their benefits flowed. Accordingly, I find the de- liberate delay between the promise and the grant part of RICHLAND CO. & ASSOC. 113 . , 114 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the "anything" McDonald would do to defeat a union- violative of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. Although I agree with the Charging Party that McDonald's applying the term "backstabber" to Ripke because he was proffered by the Union as a witness to support its election objection amounts to vilification of Ripke because of his union activity, and would normally be found a violation of the Act,'2 it was neither alleged in the complaint nor sufficiently litigated to warrant such a finding in this case. The General Counsel does not argue it should be found a violation, and, in the circum- stances, I do not find it to be a violation of the Act. I have considered it in assessing the degree and duration of Respondent's hostility to employee union activity. IV. THE OBJECTIONS TO THE ELECTION The objections before me for hearing are summarized in the Regional Director's Supplemental Decision and Order Directing Hearing as follows: Objections Nos. I through 4 In these four numbered objections, the Petitioner alleges that the Employer, during the critical period, threatened plant closure and loss of jobs if the Petitioner were selected as the employees' col- lective bargaining representative; promised, during individual bargaining with employees, wage and benefit increases if they abandoned the Petitioner, and granted said increases; threatened employees that increases in wages and benefits would be effec- tive after the election only if Petitioner were not se- lected as their collective bargaining representative; and [reduced] benefits pending the outcome of the election. Respondent's March 26 threat to close the business, its February threat of loss of benefits made to Reynolds, its promise of maternity benefits on or about March 30 and on another date prior to the election, its March 26 state- ments conditioning employee freedom from insurance premium payments on the Union's losing the April 11 election, and its delay of the wage increase promised in March until after the election have been found herein to be violations of the Act. They are also found to be ob- jectionable conduct'3 of the type alleged by the Union fully warranting setting aside the election, and I shall recommend that the Union's objections be sustained and that the election be set aside. V. THE REMEDY In addition to the usual cease-and-desist order and notice posting, I shall recommend that Respondent be ordered to recognize and bargain with the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining agent of the employees in the unit found appropriate herein. I am persuaded that the violations of Section 8(a)(1) in this case, in a very small bargaining unit, are sufficiently extensive and of sufficient gravity, including threats to close the Company 12 Henriksen. Inc.., d/b/a Gibson Discount Center, 191 NLRB 622 (1971). 13 Dal-Tex Optical Company, Inc., 137 NLRB 1782, 1786 (1962). of a type which the Board has held is proscribed con- duct of the most egregious sort,'4 that the impact of Re- spondent's coercive conduct can reasonably be expected to make a fair election unlikely and, therefore, the em- ployees' signed authorization cards are a more reliable indication of their desire for representation. Inasmuch as the Union's request for bargaining predates the begin- ning of the 6-month period of limitations set forth in Sec- tion 10(b) of the Act, I shall recommend that the begin- ning of Respondent's bargaining obligation be established as November 13, 1979, the date 6 months prior to the service of the charge, noting that the first act in Re- spondent's campaign to unlawfully coerce its employees into abandoning union activities took place in October 1979 with McDonald's questioning of Bennett, which may not now be found to be an unfair labor practice be- cause of the limitation period but may be considered as evidence shedding light on Respondent's conduct within the period. In short, for purposes of this decision, I have viewed Respondent's unlawful campaign as commencing on November 13, 1979. I shall also recommend that a broad cease-and-desist order issue requiring Respondent to cease and desist from violating the Act "in any other manner" in view of the egregious nature of its conduct which demonstrates a deliberate disregard for its employees' fundamental statu- tory rights. 16 Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions based thereon, and upon the entire record in this case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean- ing of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. The following employees constitutes a unit appro- priate for collective bargaining: All employees performing composition roofing em- ployed by Respondent out of its Defiance, Ohio, fa- cility, excluding all office clerical employees and professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act, and employees working in other crafts. 4. At all times since October 8, 1979, and continuing to date, the Union has been the designated representative of all the employees within said appropriate unit for pur- poses of collective bargaining within the meaning of Sec- tion 9(a) of the Act. 5. By threatening its employees with company closure if the Union becomes their collective-bargaining repre- sentative, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. 6. By delaying bidding on new work until after the election in Case 8-RC-12044 in order to coerce its em- ployees into voting against the Union in said election, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. ,4 General Sencils. Inc., 195 NLRB 1109, 1110 (1972). s N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). 16 tlickmotn Foods. Inc., 242 NLRB 1357 (1979). RICHLAND CO. ASSOC, 115 7. By threatening to discontinue paying employee in- surance premiums if the Union came in, and by promis- ing to continue such payment if the Union was voted out, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 8. By threatening employees with billing for insurance premiums while they were in layoff status, and by there- after billing laid-off employees for said premiums, in an effort to coerce employees into abandoning union activi- ties, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 9. By promising and granting employees maternity in- surance in order to induce them to forswear union activi- ties, Respondent violated Secion 8(a)(1) of the Act. 10. By delaying promised wage increases until after the scheduled representation election in Case 8-RC- 12044 as a device to coerce employees to refrain from supporting the Union, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I 11. Respondent engaged in objectionable conduct re- quiring that the election conducted on April 11, 1980, in Case 8-RC-12044 be set aside. 12. The violations of the Act found herein interfered with the election process, had a tendency to undermine the Union's strength, prevented the holding of a fair election, and warrant the issuance of a collective-bar- gaining order. 13. The unfair labor practices set forth above are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 14. Respondent did not engage in any other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record in this proceeding, and pursu- ant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the fol- lowing recommended: ORDER ' 7 The Respondent, Richland Co. & Assoc., Division of McDonald Construction, Inc., Defiance, Ohio, its agents, officers, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Threatening employees with company closure if the Union becomes their collective-bargaining repre- sentative. (b) Delaying bidding on new work or telling employ- ees such bidding is being delayed in order to coerce them in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. (c) Threatening to discontinue paying employee insur- ance premiums if the Union is voted in, or promising to continue such payments if the Union is voted out. (d) Threatening to bill or billing employees for insur- ance premiums while they are in layoff status in order to coerce them into abandoning their union activities. (e) Promising or granting employee benefits in order to induce them to forswear union activities. (f) Delaying promised wage increases in order to coerce employees to refrain from supporting the Union. 1t In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. (g) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guar- anteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to ef- fectuate the purposes of the Act: (a) Recognize and bargain with the Union as the desig- nated representative of all employees in the appropriate bargaining unit and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a written, signed agree- ment. (b) Post at its Defiance, Ohio, offices and facilities copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."' s Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 8, after being signed by Respond- ent's authorized representative, shall be posted by Re- spondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be main- tained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in con- spicuous places, including all places where notices to em- ployees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 8, in writ- ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petition in Case 8- RC-12044 be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 18 In the event this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu- ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board" APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with com- pany closure or loss of jobs by telling them that we will close our business if they select a union to rep- resent them. WE WILL NOT delay bidding on new work in order to coerce our employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. WE WILL NOT threaten to discontinue paying em- ployee insurance premiums if the Union comes in, nor will we promise to continue such payments if the Union is voted out. WE WILL NOT threaten to bill or bill employees for insurance premiums while they are in layoff status in order to coerce them to abandon union ac- tivities. WE WILL NOT promise or grant benefits to our employees in order to induce them to refrain from union activities. WE WILL NOT delay promised wage increases in order to coerce our employees to refrain from sup- porting the Union. RICHLAND CO. & ASSOC. 115 116 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exer- cise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. WE WIL.L immediately recognize and bargain in good faith with United Union of Roofers, Water- proofers and Allied Workers, AFL-CIO, Local Union No. 134, as the designated collective-bargain- ing representative of our employees in the bargain- ing unit described below. Such recognition and bar- gaining shall be retroactive to November 13, 1979. If we reach an understanding, WE WIll. reduce such agreement to writing and WE WILL sign and honor it. The bargaining unit is: All employees performing composition roofing employed by us out of our Defiance, Ohio, facili- ty, excluding all office clerical employees and professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act, and employees working in other crafts. RICHLAND CO. & Assoc., DIVISION OF MC- DONALD CONSTRUCTION, INC.