Prineville Stud Company

18 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Prineville Stud Company and Lumber, Production and Industrial Workers Local 2902, United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of Amer- ica, AFL-CIO. Case 36-CA-2820 May 15, 1981 SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER On January 31, 1977, the National Labor Rela- tions Board issued its Decision and Order in the above-entitled proceeding,' in which it directed Respondent Prineville Stud Company, inter alia, to make whole 17 employees for their losses resulting from unfair labor practices committed by Respond- ent in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. There- after, the Board's Order was enforced by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir- cuit. 2 Pursuant to a backpay specification and notice of hearing issued by the Regional Director for Region 19, a hearing was held on May 30, 1979, before Administrative Law Judge Russell L. Stevens for the purpose of determining the amount of backpay due the discriminatees. On July 3, 1979, the Ad- ministrative Law Judge issued the attached Supple- mental Decision Summary Judgment. Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. On Novem- ber 16, 1979, the Board issued an unpublished Order reopening the record and remanding the proceeding for further hearing in order to allow Respondent to introduce "evidence concerning the dates when inclement weather would have reduced or prevented the Employer's operations between January 19, 1976, and February 20, 1976." Thereafter, a hearing was held on April 8, 1980, before Administrative Law Judge Roger B. Holmes. On October 7, 1980, the Administrative Law Judge issued the attached Second Supplemen- tal Decision. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and Respondent filed a reply brief. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Supplemental Decision and Second Supple- mental Decision in light of exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judges, as modified herein. The instant backpay proceeding arises pursuant to the Board's earlier Decision, as enforced by the court of appeals, in which the Board found that Respondent closed its operations between January 19 and February 20, 1976, 3 in violation of Section ' 227 NLRB 1845. 2 578 F.2d 1292 (1978). 3 Except as otherwise indicated, all dates refer to 1976. 256 NLRB No. 5 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. During the backpay hearings, Respondent claimed, and Administrative Law Judge Holmes found, that it could not have operated on some of the 25 working days encom- passed within the backpay period. Accordingly, the Administrative Law Judge denied backpay for 5 of the 25 working days within the period. The Gener- al Counsel excepted to the denial of backpay for these 5 days and argues that Respondent has not established that it could not have operated on any of the days in question. We find merit in the Gen- eral Counsel's exception. Respondent stipulated that it would have operat- ed on 4 of the 25 days within the backpay period, but claimed that "there would be a 50-50 probabil- ity" of operating on the remaining 21 days of the backpay period. Respondent urged that the Admin- istrative Law Judge make the "equitable" decision to halve the 21 days, crediting the discriminatees with backpay for 10-1/2 of the 21 days, and credit- ing Respondent with a lack of operating ability during the other 10-1/2 days as an offset to the backpay liability for the period. Administrative Law Judge Holmes rejected Respondent's formula, but found that Respondent would not have been able to operate on 5 days during the backpay period when the temperature stayed below freez- ing. In so finding, the Administrative Law Judge relied largely on Respondent's use of water in its operations and on testimony by Respondent's presi- dent, Rhoden, that temperatures which were "con- sistently below freezing twenty-four hours a day" made operations impossible. In its brief in support of exceptions, the General Counsel correctly points out that, notwithstanding Respondent's argument that cold weather made op- erations impossible, Respondnet did, in fact, oper- ate throughout the winter of 1974. A review of the weather records for that winter reveals that on 12 days during January 19744 the temperature did not rise above freezing. However, rather than close during this prolonged cold spell, Respondent con- tinued its operations by utilizing various means to thaw frozen pipes and insure the continued flow of water. Further, in this testimony before Adminis- trative Law Judge Holmes, Rhoden testified that, even if temperatures remained below freezing for a week, Respondent would try to operate the mill for the first 2 days of the week unless it was known that temperatures would stay below freez- ing "for a period of time." During the backpay period, the city of Burns experienced one 2-day and 3-day series of subfreezing days. In view of the record of Respondent's operations in prior years 4 January I -11 and January 20. PRINEVILLE STUD COMPANY 19 and the testimony concerning Respondent's estab- lished policy of attempting to continue operations on cold days, we conclude that Respondent has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that, absent its unlawful decision to shut down the plant in response to the discriminatees' organiza- tional activity, it would have closed during these cold spells rather than take its usual steps to combat frozen pipes. Accordingly, we conclude that Respondent's backpay obligation should in- clude wages for the 25 working days encompassed within the backpay period, this amount to be calcu- lated in the manner set forth in our original Deci- sion herein.5 ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re- lations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Prineville Stud Company, Burns, Oregon, its offi- cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall make the following named employees whole by payment to them of the amounts set opposite their names, to- gether with interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum, less any lawful tax withholdings. David Armstrong Dene Bennett Thomas Bowen Jerry Brewer Ronald Carroll Harold Conklin Benny Daugherty Ray Galvin Max Gee Michael Greiner John Jones John Koyle Elmer Kruse Ronald Leoney Harvey Miller Larry Minniear Edward Tyner $856.00 1,170.88 962.00 1,396.50 852.00 932.00 852.00 1,106.75 1,086.40 212.00 1,617.00 852.00 552.00 852.00 1,268.00 112.80 552.78 facts in his statement of the case in his Supplemental De- cision, and there is no need to repeat all of those matters here. The sole issue presented to me was framed specifically by the language in the National Labor Relations Board's Order reopening record and remanding proceedings for further hearing dated November 16, 1979, wherein the Board ordered "that a further hearing be held for the purpose of receiving evidence concerning the dates when clement weather would have reduced or prevented the Employer's operations between January 19, 1976, and February 20, 1976." Pursuant to the Board's Order, a further hearing was held before me on April 8, 1980, at Burns, Oregon. The parties introduced additional documentary evidence, and two witnesses were called by the Respondent. One of the witnesses was Jack Rhoden, who is the president and the general manager of Pine Products Corporation of Prineville, Oregon. In addition, Rhoden is the president of the Respondent, which formerly operated two stud mills. One mill is located in Prineville, but it had closed by the time of this hearing. The other mill is located in Burns, Oregon. It was sold in October 1978 to Craig Woodward, who was the other witness to testify in this proceeding. Woodward is the owner and the general manager of the Highland Stud Company. The findings of fact to be set forth herein will be based primarily upon documentary evidence and upon certain portions of the testimony offered by Rhoden and by Woodward, particularly with regard to a physical de- scription of the Burns facility and the nature of the mill's operations. Both the counsel for the General Counsel and the at- torney for the Respondent made closing arguments on the record at the hearing. In addition, the attorney for the Respondent prepared and filed a post-hearing brief by the due date of May 9, 1980. FINDINGS 01 FAC The nature of the Respondent's business during the times relevant to this proceeding have been described in the underlying unfair labor practice proceeding and the decisions issued earlier in the same case. The Respond- ent's Exhibit 2 in this proceeding is a diagram which il- lustrates the location of the buildings, the equipment, and process utilized to make studs. The Respondent used what are known as old or dead logs, as distinguished from green logs. Such old logs are partially decayed. Normally, the bark is missing from such old logs, and there are rocks and dirt in the cracks of the old logs. A herbicide and a pesticide are sprayed on the wood after the studs are produced. In addition to the primary product of studs, there are byproducts such as wood chips, shavings, sawdust. and firewood. About 100 tons of such byproducts are pro- duced in normal day's operation. The mill is located on "a flat, lowland marshy area just south of town." There are no natural windbreaks in the area, such as trees or vegetation. The land is approxi- mately 25 acres in size, and the mill is located just south of the city limits of Burns. 5 Administrative Law Judge Russell directed that interest be calculated in the manner prescribed in Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977). As noted by Administrative Law Judge Holmes, the method of determining the interest rate as set forth in that decision is not applicable in cases in which an earlier Order of Ihe Board providing for a different interest rate has been enforced by a court of appeals SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION ROGER B. HOLMES, Administrative Law Judge: This reason that this is entitled a "Second Supplemental Deci- sion" is that a Supplemental Decision has already been issued in this backpay proceeding on July 3, 1979, by Administrative Law Judge Russell L. Stevens. Adminis- trative Law Judge Stevens has set forth the pertinent PRINEVILLE STUD COMPANY 19 20 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The buildings are of a metal frame construction with a reinforced concrete floor. The level of the floor in the mill is lower than the surrounding mill yard, which re- sults in water, or ice in below freezing temperatures, to remain on the concrete floor. There are several large openings in the buildings where logs are brought in; re- jected logs are taken out, studs removed, and wood chips removed. The buildings are neither heated nor insulated. The use of water is essential to the operation of the mill. For example, a constant jet of water is sprayed onto each one of the two head righ saws used at the mill. The water prevents damage to the saws, overheating, and po- tential fires. A direct water spray is also directed onto the double arbor edger when a log is present. There is a water-cooled chipper at the mill, and water-cooled brakes are also utilized. All of the water pipes at the mill are exposed. To remove the sawdust, which becomes water-saturat- ed during the mill's operation, a low-pressure vacuum system is used, and to remove the wood chips a higher pressure blower system is utilized. During the relevant backpay period, the working hours at the Respondent's mill were from 7:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. The employees were scheduled to work a 40- hour week. According to Rhoden, if the temperatures were con- sistently "below freezing" for 24 hours a day, the Re- spondent physically could not operate its mill. He de- fined his use of the term "below freezing" to mean "down to twenty to twenty-five degrees and it stays cold twenty-four hours a day. ... " Normally, the Respondent knew the day before that the mill would not operate the next day, and the Re- Depar- Max. Min. fure Temp Temp. Nor- mal Snow or Ice on Ground at 4 a. m. Jan. 29 Jan. 30 Feb. 2 Feb. 3 Feb. 4 Feb. 5 Feb. 6 Feb. 9 Feb. 10 Feb. I I Feb. 12 Feb. 13 Feb. 16 Feb. 17 Feb. 18 Feb. 19 Feb. 20 45 45 44 48 23 22 31 36 39 48 19 5 5 i1 5 4 17 3 2 15 4 1 7 -14 T 3 -16 T 2 -12 T 18 -3 T 11 -5 T 16 2 T Fastest Precipita- Wind tion Speed 0 9 0 14 0 12 0 46 0 39 0 20 0 26 0 21 0 14 .02 29 0 23 .19 20 2.55 50 52 27 9 38 27 2 45 32 7 45 29 5 38 26 0 1 T .23 41 T T 35 37 20 -3 2 38 16 -5 3 3.94 30 0 18 *T-Trace Amount. Conclusions spondent s employees operate bec tice was to Copies o National W ment of months of into the ree 10 and th those docu formation which seen ceeding. TI the 25-day Mg Ten Jan. 19 Jan. 20 Jan. 21 Jan. 22 Jan. 23 Jan. 26 Jan. 27 Jan. 28 o informed the employees. However, i the At the outset of the backpay hearing held before me, reported to work and the mill was unable to the counsel for the General Counsel filed a document en- mause of the weather, the Respondent's prac- titled, "Counsel for the General Counsel's Statement of ) pay them "show-up time" for I or 2 hours. Position, Motion for Reconsideration, and for Summary f official climatological data prepared by the Judgment." In summary, the General Counsel predicates Veather Service of the United States Depart- his motion on two grounds: (1) that the Respondent's Commerce for Burns, Oregon, during the answer to the Board's backpay specification did not meet January and February 1976 were introduced the specificity requirements set forth in Section 102.54 of cord as the General Counsel's Exhibits 9 and the Board's Rules and Regulations and (2) that the doc- e Respondent's Exhibit 4. From examining trine of res judicata precludes the litigation of the Re- ments, I will set forth below some of the in- spondent's "First Affirmative Defense" set forth in the contained therein. I have selected certain data Respondent's answer, which asserts that the Respond- ns relevant to the issue presented in this pro- ent's facility would have been closed on certain days he dates shown are the workweek days during during the backpay period due to cold and inclement backpay period. weather. (See G.C. Exh. 4 the full particulars of the General Counsel's motion. See also G.C. Exh. (f)(2) for Depar- Snow or the full particulars of the Respondent's answer and first ture Ice on pita- Fastest affirmative defense.) np Temp from Ground tPil Wind The matters raised by the General Counsel's motion or- at 4 Speed were extensively discussed on the record. ma u.m. I denied the General Counsel's motion at the hearing 40 17 4 6 0 14 for the reasons fully stated on the record. I adhere to 34 10 -3 6 0 16 327 1 35 6 o 12 that ruling. In summary, my view is that the Board in 27 18 -2 6 T* 9 Washington, D.C., has already ruled on and has previ- 34 14 -2 6 0 8 ously rejected both of the bases urged by the General 38 15 1 5 0 12 Counsel in his motion. In this connection, I referred to 44 19 6 5 0 1( the Board's "Supplemental Decision and Order Denying 51 26 12 5 0 10 Motion," dated March 15, 1979 (G.C. Exh. I(k)), and the HOW. . A..... T T PRINEVILLE STUD COMPANY 21 Board's "Order Reopening Record and Remanding Pro- ceedings for Further Hearing," dated November 16, 1979 (G.C. Exh. 3(d)). With regard to the amount of backpay for the discri- minatees, the General Counsel seeks the amount set forth in the backpay specification, which contemplates that the employees would have worked on 25 days during the backpay period from Monday, January 19, 1976, through Friday, February 20, 1976. On the other hand, the Re- spondent seeks to have the backpay amounts computed on the basis that the employees would have worked 14- 1/2 days during the backpay period. As the attorney for the Respondent explained at page 18 of his brief: At the hearing, counsel for Respondent stipulated that four days of the backpay period were charac- terized by sufficiently warm wheather that there was a reasonable chance that the mill could operate on those days, and that therefore these days were properly included in the backpay period. The spe- cific dates were January 28 and February 12, 16, and 17. However, with respect to the rest of the backpay period, it is the Respondent's contention that on any given day there would be a 50-50 prob- ability that the mill could not physically operate be- cause of the extremely low temperatures. Thus, the formula utilized by the Respondent was to subtract the 4 days not disputed by the Respondent from the maximum of 25 days alleged in the backpay specifi- cation. That left 21 days in question under the Respond- ent's view. Then the Respondent divided the 21 days by 50 percent and the Respondent arrived at a figure of 10- 1/2 days. By adding the 4 days not in dispute to the 10- 1/2 unspecified days, the Respondent urges that the dis- criminatees be paid for 14-1/2 days. With regard to the unspecified days in the Respondent's calculations, the at- torney for the Respondent stated at page 20 of his brief: Admittedly, it is impossible for Respondent to point to any particular one of these 21 days, and say with absolute scientific certainty that the mill would not have been able to operate on that day because of weather conditions. Because of the inner-relation- ships of the many factors involved, and the many different kinds of equipment that can be affected by weather conditions, it is impossible to make such a categorical statement. The fact circumstances of this case simply do not allow such an accurate estima- tion. What is clear, however, is that it would have been impossible to operate the mill on many of these days, even if no one can say without doubt which specific days the mill could or could not have operated. With the opposing viewpoints of the General Counsel and the Respondent, in mind, I have looked first to the records prepared by the National Weather Service of the United States Department of Commerce. I found that on 5 days during the backpay period that the maximum tem- perature in Burns, Oregon. did not rise above the water freezing level of 32 degrees Fahrenheit. Those 5 days were: January 21 and 22 and February 4, 5, and 6, 1976. On January 21, 1976, the maximum temperature in Burns, Oregon, was 27 degrees, and the minimum tem- perature was 12 degrees. That was a minus 5-degree de- parture from normal. There was 6 inches of snow or ice on the ground at 4 a.m. There was no precipitation. The fastest wind was 12 miles per hour. On January 22, 1976, the maximum temperature in Burns was 27 degrees, and the minimum temperature was 18 degrees. That was a minus 2 degree departure from normal. Six inches of snow or ice were on the ground at 4 a.m. There was just a trace of precipitation. The fastest wind on that day was 9 miles per hour. On February 4, 1976, the maximum temperature in Burns was 23 degrees, and the minimum temperature was 7 degrees. That was a minus 14-degree departure from normal. There was a trace of snow or ice on the ground at 4 a.m. There was no precipitation. The fastest wind was 39 miles per hour. On February 5, 1976, the maximum temperature in Burns was 22 degrees, and the minimum temperature was 3 degrees. That was a minimum 16-degrees depar- ture from normal. There was a trace of snow or ice on the ground at 4 a.m. There was no precipitation. The fas- test wind was 20 miles per hour. On February 6, 1976, the maximum temperature in Burns was 31 degrees, and the minimum temperature was 2 degrees. That was a minus 12-degree departure from normal. There was a trace of snow or ice on the ground at 4 a.m. There was no precipitation. The fastest wind on that date was 26 miles per hour. Next, I have considered the foregoing reliable weather data in the context of the Respondent's physical location, the Respondent's facilities, and the Respondent's operat- ing procedures which require the free flow of water. In addition. I have considered the foregoing in connection with Rhoden's testimony: If the temperatures are consistently below freezing twenty-four hours a day, you physically really can't run the mill at all. By below freezing, I would say, if it gets down to twenty to twenty-five degrees and it stays cold twenty-four hours a day . . . After considering the foregoing, I conclude that the Respondent has met its burden of proof in this backpay proceeding by showing that the Respondent's facility would not have operated on January 21 and 22 and Feb- ruary 4, 5, and 6, 1976, even if the Respondent's facility had not been closed for discriminatory reasons. Accordingly, I have computed the backpay on the basis that the employees would have worked on 20 spe- cific days during the backpay period. For each employ- ee, I have multiplied 20 days by 8 hours to arrive at the number of hours. As pointed out by Administrative Law Judge Stevens in his Supplemental Decision, and also in the backpay specification, certain employees would have worked overtime hours daily. Therefore, I have added 20 overtime hours for Bennett, Brewer, Galvin, and Miller. Since overtime hours are computed in this partic- ular case at time and a half, I have added 30 hours to the 160 regular hours for a total of 190 hours for those four employees. PRINEVILLE STUD COMPANY 21 22 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Gee and Jones are in a higher category because they would have worked 2 hours overtime each day under the theory of the backpay specification. Thus, they are entitled to 40 overtime hours. Using the time-and-a-half formula in this situation, I have added 60 hours to the regular hours for Gee and Jones. Thus, their total gross hours are 220 hours. The further mathematical computations used to arrive at the net backpay are shown in the Appendix (omitted from publication). It is not possible for me to compute the amount of money due as interest on the backpay owing to the dis- criminatees, because the amount of the interest, which the Respondent will have to pay to the discriminatees, will continue to increase until the Respondent makes payment. The Board's Order in the underlying unfair labor prac- tice proceeding, in this case, as enforced by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, provides that interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum be added to the amounts of backpay. Thus, 6-percent interest on the backpay amounts has been accruing since the first quarter of 1976 and will continue to accrue until the pay- ments are made. The Board's subsequently adopted "sliding interest scale charged or paid by the Internal Revenue Service on the underpayment or overpayment of Federal taxes" would not be applicable to this case. Florida Steel Corpo- ration, 231 NLRB 651 (1977). In this connection, see also the Board's decision in George Webel d/b/a Webel Feed Mills & Pike Transit Company, 236 NLRB 1192 (1978). Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Rela- tions Act and upon the basis of the foregoing findings and conclusions, and the entire record in this proceeding, I hereby issue the recommended: ORDER' The Respondent, Prineville Stud Company, Burns, Oregon, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall make whole the discriminatees named below by payment to them of the amount of money set forth beside each name, plus 6-percent interest per annum from the first quarter of 1976 until payment is made to the discrimina- tees, less any lawful tax withholdings: Elmer Kruse Ronald Leoney Harold Miller Larry Minniear Edward Tyner 381.60 681.60 1,014.60 0 340.38 SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE RUSSELL L. STEVENS, Administrative Law Judge: This case was heard in Portland, Oregon, on May 30, 1979. On January 31, 1977, the Board issued a Decision and Order affirming as modified the September 29, 1976, de- cision of Administrative Law Judge George Christensen finding that Respondent discharged 17 employees in vio- lation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.1 Respondent was ordered to reinstate the employees with backpay. On July 25, 1978, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit entered its judgment, enforcing in full the rein- statement and backpay provision of the Board's Order. Respondent has offered reinstatement to the 17 em- ployees, but has disputed the amount of backpay due them. On November 30, 1978, a backpay specification and notice of hearing issued, and properly were served on Respondent. On December 6, 1978, Respondent filed an answer to the backpay specification, denied the allegations of the specification, and interposed an affirmative defense. On December 13, 1978, the General Counsel moved the Board to strike Respondent's affirmative defense and to issue a summary judgment. 2 On January 4, 1979, the Board issued a Notice To Show Cause and on March 15, 1979, the Board issued a Supplemental Decision and Order denying the General Counsel's motion, and remanding the case to the Region- al Director for Region 36 for the purpose of holding a hearing before an administrative law judge on the issues raised in Respondent's answer to the backpay specifica- tion. All parties were afforded full opportunity to appear and to argue orally. In view of the nature of the pro- ceedings, discussed infra, the Administrative Law Judge determined that no legal or factual issues were presented, and that briefs would not be submitted. Upon the entire record in the case, 3 I make the fol- lowing: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS At the hearing on May 30, the General Counsel intro- duced, without objection by Respondent, the backpay specification and supporting documents. Respondent's counsel admitted, in open court, Respondent's liability for backpay, the accuracy of the specification, and the accuracy of all computations therein. The discriminatees have been offered reinstatement. Respondent's counsel 227 NLRB 1845. Art erratum to the backpay specification was issued on December 13, 1978. a The General Counsel's motion to strike affirmative defense, dated May 30, 1979, is denied David Armstrong Dene Bennett Thomas Bowen Jerry Brewer Ronald Carroll Harold Conklin Benny Daugherty Ray Galvin Max Gee Michael Greiner John Jones John Koyle $684.80 936.70 769.60 1,117.20 681.60 745.60 681.60 885.40 809.20 41.60 31,293.60 681.60 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board. the find- ings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. PRINEVILLE STUD COMPANY 23 stated that the only basis for his appearance in opposition to the backpay specification was to offer evidence in mitigation of the backpay liability. Respondent's counsel offered to introduce testimony of approximately 1 or I- 1/2 hours in length to support Respondent's contention that inclement weather would have caused closure of the plant during some of the time covered by the backpay specification. However, counsel stated that he could not show any specific times or dates when closure would have been affected; counsel wanted the Administrative Law Judge to estimate an amount in mitigation of the backpay liability. The offer of testimony made by Re- spondent was rejected under the doctrine of res judicata, on the basis that the matter of inclement weather was urged as a defense at the hearing, was litigated, and was rejected by the Administrative Law Judge; the National Labor Relations Board affirmed the finding conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge, and the record then was reviewed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir- cuit, which ordered enforcement of the Board's order of reinstatement and backpay. Further, the testimony that was offered could not have provided a basis for accurate computation; it could have provided only a basis for speculation. The Board consistently has held that, in the event amounts claimed to be in mitigation of backpay lia- bility are uncertain, doubts must be construed against the wrongdoer. 4 I find: 1. The backpay period for all discriminatees named infra began January 19, 1976. Backpay is claimed through February 20, 1976. 2. Each discriminatee was employed at the rate of pay shown opposite his name in Appendix A (omitted from publication.) 3. An appropriate measure of the earnings all discri- minatees would have earned during the 25-workday backpay period is 8 hours per day, 5 days per week (40 hours per week), supplemented by the overtime hours shown in Appendix A (omitted from publication) for Bennett, Brewer, Galvin, Gee, Jones, and Miller, who were assigned overtime of either 1 hour or 2 hours per day based on their payroll experience both before and after the plant closure. 4. The quarterly gross backpay for all discriminatees is set forth in Appendix A (omitted from publication). 5. Interim earnings, if any, during the backpay period are shown in Appendix A (omitted from publication). 6. The gross backpay for the discriminatees was deter- mined by multiplying the number of hours that each would have worked during the backpay period, but for the discrimination practiced by Respondent against him, times his hourly rate of pay. 4 N.LRB. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862 (2d Cir 1938)., cert. denied 304 U.S. 585; N.L.R.B. v. A. B. Swinerton. Richard Walberg and Howard Hassard. d/b/a Swinerton and Walberg Company, 202 F.2d 511, 516 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied 346 U S. 814 7. Net backpay is the difference between gross back- pay and interim earnings. 8. The obligation of Respondent is to make whole the following named discriminatees by payment to each, of the amount set forth opposite his name, plus interest to date of payment, minus the tax withholding required by Federal and state laws: David Armstrong Dene Bennett Thomas Bowen Jerry Brewer Ronald Carroll Harold Conklin Benny Daugherty Ray Galvin Max Gee Michael Greiner John Jones John Koyle Elmer Kruse Ronald Leoney Harold Miller Larry Minniear Edward Tyner $856.00 1,170.88 962.00 1,396.50 852.00 932.00 852.00 1,106.75 1,086.40 212.00 31,617.00 852.00 552.00 852.00 1,268.25 112.80 522.78 ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings and conclu- sions, it is ordered that Prineville Stud Company pay to the following individuals amounts of money set opposite their names, plus interest thereon to be computed in the manner prescribed in F. W Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977). 5 David Armstrong Dene Bennett Thomas Bowen Jerry Brewer Ronald Carroll Harold Conklin Benny Daugherty Ray Galvin Max Gee Michael Greiner John Jones John Koyle Elmer Kruse Ronald Leoney Harold Miller Larry Minniear Edward Tyner $856.00 1,170.88 962.00 1,396.50 852.00 932.00 852.00 1,106.75 1,086.40 212.00 31,617.00 852.00 552.00 852.00 1,268.25 112.80 522.78 S See, generally, Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962) PRINEVILLE STUD COMPANY 23