260 NLRB 243
Parkview Nursing Center II Corp.
PARKVIEW NURSING CENTER II CORP.
Parkview Nursing Center II Corp. and District
Union 427, United Food and Commercial Work-
ers International Union, AFL-CIO-CLC. Cases
8-CA-13706 1 and 8-CA-14069
February 16, 1982
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MI:MBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND
ZIMM ERMNAN
On July 21,
1981, Administrative Law Judge
Phil W. Saunders issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed
exceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,2
and conclusions a of the Administrative Law Judge
and to adopt his recommended Order,4 as modified
herein. 5
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modi-
fied below, and hereby orders that the Respondent,
Parkview Nursing Center II Corp., Warren, Ohio,
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
' This case
.as incorrectly cited by the Administratise L aw Judge as
Case 8 CA-13076
2 The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by
the Administrative L.aw Judge It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credi-
bilitv unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant esidence con-
vinces us that the resolutions are incorrect Standard fDri Wa/l Produi't.
Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd 188I F2d 362 (3d Cir 1951)
We have
carefully examined the record and find no basis for re'serslng his findings
' While the individual proposals made by the Respondent at the bar-
gaining table do not bh themselves constitute per se violations of the Act.
it was, as found by the Administrative Law Judge, the "totalit 5' of Re-
spondent's conduct both at and away from the bargaining table" which
clearly demonstrated the Respondents intent to frustrate any meaningful
bargaining with the Union and which constituted a xiolation Oir Sec
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act
I In accordance with his partial dissent in Olvmpc Mhedical Corpoatrion.
250 NLRB 146 (1980),
Member Jenkins would award interest oin the
backpay due based lin the formula set forth thereint
\We agree with the Administrative L aw Judge that the Respondent
violated Sec
8(a)(3) and (I) of the Act by refusing to reinstate certain
unfair labor practice strikers upon their June 10. 1980. unconditional offer
to return to work and that the Respondenl's backpay;
obligationl began as
of June 10, 1910. the date itlch
ffetr was made
e;uprt
.
'w .A',Shiphuild-
ing & Drvdocl Companr. 236 NlRB 1637, It
538 (1978)
See also Drug
Package Company. 228 Nl RB 108. 114 11(77)
In his recommended Order. the Adrnilistrallv
e Law Judge inadcertenl-
ly failed to include a prosi,aon requiring the Respondent
to retlllta tc the
unfair labor practice strikers We shall moodify hi recotlmnmended Order to
include such a proslsioln
260 NLRB No. 37
take the action set forth in the said recommended
Order, as so modified:
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(b):
"(b) Offer those employees, who were denied re-
instatement on June 4, 1980, because they partici-
pated in an unfair labor practice strike, full and im-
mediate reinstatement to their former jobs or, if
those jobs no longer exist, to substantially equiva-
lent positions, without prejudice to their seniority
or any other rights or privileges previously en-
joyed, and make them whole for any loss of earn-
ings they may have suffered as a result of the Re-
spondent's unlawful conduct, with interest, as out-
lined in 'The Remedy' portion of this Decision."
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
PHIl W. SAUN)DERS, Administrative Law Judge: Based
on charges filed on April 3 and July 29, 1980, by District
Union 427, United Food and Commercial Workers Inter-
national
Union,
AFL-CIO-CLC,
herein called
the
Union or the Charging Party,' an amended consolidated
complaint was issued on September 26,
1980, against
Parkview Nursing Center II Corp., herein called Re-
spondent, Company, or Nursing Home, alleging viola-
tions of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act. All par-
ties filed briefs in this matter.
Upon the entire record in the case, and from my ob-
servation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. TIHF BUSINISS OF RESPONI)ENI
Respondent is a corporation duly organized under and
existing by virture of the laws of the State of Ohio, with
its facility and place of business located in Warren, Ohio,
where it is engaged in the operation of a nursing home.
Annually, Respondent derives gross revenues in excess
of $100,000 from its business operations, and receives
products valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points
located outside the State of Ohio.
Respondent
is an employer engaged
in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. TIl I ABOR OR(iANIZArTION INVOI VED
The Charging Party and Local Union 200 are labor
organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
I It is undisputed that District Union 42'; has acted as agent for l ocal
21(1. United Food and Commercial Workers International !nion. AFI
CI() CI C, the certified hargaining representati'e herein, for the pur-
poses of cillectixe bargaining with Respondent since in or about Mae
1479 Further. since on or about the aboe date. attorney Gregory J
Miller has acted as a negotiator for the Union in the collectile-hargainining
negotiat
nis insol ed herein, and Business Represenltatise Roi!
Archer
has acted as lte U'niln's agent for purposes of collectice hargaining fr m
Mais 17'9 to the present
243
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1it. THI AI.
GEDt) UNFAIR l.ABOR PRACrTICES
The amended complaint alleges that, commencing on
or about the dates set forth below, Respondent has re-
fused to bargain collectively with Local 200 as the bar-
gaining representative of the employees in the unit by
the following acts and conduct 2 --that on or about De-
cember 10, 1979, at a motel in Canton, Ohio, Respond-
ent's representative, Rayford Blankenship, told negotia-
tors for the Union that Respondent's president, Robert
Leatherman, had not made up his mind as to whether he
would sign a contract with the Union; that on or about
December 15, 1979, Respondent unilaterally changed its
sick pay policy; that in February 1980, Respondent re-
duced its monetary proposal to the Union by offering to
pay minimum wage to all non-LPN employees, and $3.85
per hour to all LPN employees and that this would have
resulted in a loss of wages to both categories of employ-
ees considering the offer that Respondent had originally
made to the Union in September 1979; that in bargaining
on or about February 6, 1980, Respondent proposed an
agency-shop provision to the Union but that on or about
February 12, 1980, withdrew its agency-shop provision
and has thereafter proposed an open-shop provision in
negotiations with the Union; and that in or about Febru-
ary and March 1980, during negotiations, Respondent's
negotiators indicated to the Union a lack of authority to
negotiate for Respondent.
It is further alleged that the strike, starting on April
21, 1 9 80 ,:t' was caused by Respondent's unfair labor prac-
tices; that on June 4, 1980, by means of a letter signed by
the strikers, the Union notified Respondent of their un-
conditional offer to return; and that on June 18, 1980,
Respondent refused to reinstate the employee strikers.
It appears that on or about February 12, 1976, the Re-
gional Director for Region 8 certified Local 200 as the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of a unit of
Respondent's service, maintenance, and technical em-
ployees, including licensed practical nurses. However,
Respondent contested the Board's unit determination in
an unfair labor practice proceeding and which was not
resolved until the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit issued its decision in May 1979 (G.C. Exh.
2), sustaining the Board. As a result of this litigation, the
first bargaining sessions between the parties herein did
not take place until August 1979. There were approxi-
mately 20 or so bargaining sessions between August 1979
and April 17, 1980, when negotiations broke off.
Respondent was represented at almost all of the nego-
tiations by its chief negotiator, Rayford Blankenship,
I Admittedly, the fiulloling employees of Respondenlt constitute a uniit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the rmeaninig
of Sec. 9(b) of the Act
All service and maintletlance cnplphys,, technlical employees,
ticlud-
ing licensed practical nurise, [I l'Ns] emplosed at the Elmployer's a-
cility located in Warren, ()hio, excluding all busiless office clericdl
employees, professilmial employees, guards and supervisors as definred
in the Act
: On April 2, 1980. the Union delivered a letter to Respondent il cnrm-
pliance with Sec.
(g) of the Act, ildicating it intended to strike on April
14. 1980. On April i, attornc) Palecek for Resplondent, aind attorney
Miller for the Union, signed ali agreement indicating that the Union in-
tended to initiate a woirk stoppage on Monday, April 21. 19I0, at 7 aim
in the event the Unionri decided rIot to strike onl April 14
while the Union was represented by attorney Gregory
Miller and Business Representative Roy Archer. In the
early months of the negotiations, Respondent was also
represented by attorney Ted Chuparkoff, but on or about
March 21, 1980, Chuparkoff was replaced as counsel for
Respondent by attorney Thomas Palecek. In addition to
the above, Robert Leatherman, either principal or sole
owner of Respondent, attended the first two sessions,
and on a few other occasions was present in the motel
where negotiations were being held and was also availa-
ble by telephone. Further, the comptroller for Respond-
ent was also at the motel where bargaining sessions were
held on two occasions, and it appears that the Union was
aware that the comptroller was present for the purposes
of providing financial information, but never requested
to talk to him. The present administrator for the Nursing
Home, Anthony Pucillo, was also present at each bar-
gaining session but one.
During the negotiation sessions between the parties,
Respondent accepted several proposals made by the
Union and, conversely, the Union accepted a consider-
able number of proposals made by Respondent. In fact,
Respondent's attorney, Ted Chuparkoff, testified that by
late February 1980, he thought the parties had resolved
all of the noneconomic issues.
Turning to the allegation that bad faith is indicated in
that on December 10, 1979, Respondent informed the
Union that President Robert Leatherman had not made
up his mind as to whether he would sign a contract.
The General Counsel produced testimony through
Gregory Miller, one of the negotiators for the Union, to
the effect that on or about December 10, 1979, he met
his fellow negotiator, Roy Archer, at the Holiday Inn,
Belden Village, Canton, Ohio, and they were then joined
at the motel dining room, around 10 p.m., by Respond-
ent's chief negotiator, Ray Blankenship, for the purpose
of meeting informally in order to expedite negotiations
scheduled for the following day in Akron, and testified
that on this occasion Blankenship stated that Leatherman
had not made up his mind yet whether he would even
sign a contract with the Union. Miller was corroborated
in this respect by Roy Archer who also stated that the
meeting was held at the Holiday Inn, Belden Village,
Canton, Ohio, and was certain of this because Miller
stayed at his home in the North Canton area that eve-
ning rather than renting a hotel room or returning to
Cleveland. Archer stated that the meeting in question
was held in the restaurant and Blankenship did not arrive
until around 10 p.m. due to transportation problems from
the airport, and then told them that he did not know if
Leatherman had made up his mind whether to enter into
a contract with the Union.
Blankenship denied that he had ever made such a
remark: denied that he ever met privately with Archer
or Miller prior to December 11; and denied meeting with
Archer and Miller in Canton or North Canton, Ohio, at
the Holiday Inn. Moreover, evidence was presented that
Blankenship had flown by Allegheny Airlines from In-
dianapolis to Cleveland, and from there a limousine serv-
ice had taken him to the Exchange Street Holiday Inn in
244
I'ARKVIEW NURSING CENTER 11 CORP.
Akron, Ohio, where he was staying.4 and where the bar-
gaining session would be held the next morning.
Counsel for Respondent argues that Blankenship did
not make the statements attributed to him by Miller and
Archer on the basis that this remark is alleged to have
been made away from the bargaining table at a private
meeting between the negotiators. and the remark was al-
legedly made at a motel at which a bargaining session
had never occurred and where Blankenship had never
been back to after October 1979.
Counsel for Respondent further argues as follows:
Consider, then, whether it is the least bit feasible,
that an employer had not made up his mind to sign
a contract, when he had hired a chief negotiator
from Indiana to handle his bargaining sessions and
was paying him for his time and his travel to and
from these negotiating sessions; that he had author-
ized proposals to be presented to the Union; that he
had actually attended sessions with the Union. that
he had actually spent 2 days sitting in the Holiday
Inn awaiting a call from the Union to discuss cer-
tain financial matters, that he had brought his comp-
troller with him on two other occasions, for pur-
poses of discussing financial matters with the Union;
that he had offered to let the Union see his books,
that he authorized a monetary proposal, specifically
in February of 1980; that he met with his chief ne-
gotiator and administrator prior to all bargaining
sessions. The foregoing are not the acts of someone
who is in the process of refusing to bargain with the
Union. The fact that the Union negotiators are at-
tempting to disparage the owner of a nursing home
with unsupported allegations allegedly made away
from the bargaining table, casts a great cloud upon
this allegation as well as others in this unfair labor
practice charge.
After my consideration of all the testimony in respect
to this allegation and arguments in relation thereto, I
have credited the testimony of Miller and Archer.) As
pointed out, first of all it is entirely logical that Miller
should spend the night at Archer's residence after meet-
ing with Blankenship at the nearby motel
in North
Canton, Ohio. Both Archer and Miller clearly recall
4 See Resp Exh 6
t It should be noted and pointed out that the credited testimony and
facts found in this Decision are based on the record as a swhole upon my
observation of the witnesses. Ihe credibility resolutions herein hase been
derived from a review of the entire testimonial records and exhibits wilh
due regard for the logic of probability, the demeanor of the witnesses.
and the teaching of A.L.R.R. v talton .Manufacturing Company & Lo-
ganville Pants Co.. 369 U S 404 (1962) As to those witnesses testifying in
contradiction to the finding herein, their teslimony has been discredited.
either as having been in conflict w ith the testimony of credible witnesses
or because it was in and of itself incredible and unworthy of belief
As
has been frequently indicated in these types of cases
ultimate choice be-
tween conflicting testimony rests on the demeanor of the switnesses. the
weight of the evidence, the established or admitted facts, the inhereni
probabilities., the reasonable inferenlces drawn fronm the record and events.
and, in sum, all of the other s'ariant factors which a trier of fact must
consider in resolvsing credibility For the most part, I have fiound the
it-
nesses for the Union in this case to he open. straightforward. spionanc-
ous, and convincing witnesses with more. precise memory and recollec-
tion of the events and details involved. as will be set forth and discusscd
herein
Blankenship telling them that Leatherman had not made
up his mind whether he would sign a contract with the
Union. On the other hand, Blankenship maintains that he
did not make the statements here in question, and also
maintains that he was not at the Belden Village motel on
the evenling of December 10. and in support of this asser-
tion he provided a receipt for a hotel room at a hotel in
Akron. Ohio. However, it is noted that the Holiday Inn
in Beldetn Village in Canton and the Holiday Inn on East
Fxchange Street in Akron are only a short distance apart
and, of course, the fact that Blankenship had a room re-
ceipt for the evening of December 10 for a motel ap-
proximately 15 miles or so from the North Canton Holi-
day Inn does not preclude a conclusion that Blankenship
met and spoke to the union negotiators at the North
Canton motel on the same evening, as he could have
easily traversed the relatively short distance between the
Akron motel and the Canton motel. I have concluded
that during the evening in question Blankenship did, in
fact, inform Miller and Archer that his client had not
made up his mind whether or not he would sign a con-
tract with the Union." As indicated, it is also significant
that Blankenship testified that he "normally" met with
Chuparkoff, Pucillo,
and
Leatherman
on the nights
before a negotiation session as a "standard practice," yet
Chuparkoff, Leatherman, and Pucillo were called as wit-
nesses by Respondent, and none of them testified as to
meeting with Blankenship on December 10 at the Akron
motel. Moreover, additional events, which will be fur-
ther detailed later herein, also reveal considerable sub-
stantiations for my conclusion here.
Turning to the allegation that Respondent failed to
bargain in good faith in that on or about December 15,
1979.
Respondent
unilaterally changed
its sick
pay
policy.
The General Counsel produced testimony through em-
ployee Diane Smolinsky to the effect that she worked at
Respondent's Warren nursing home from August 1974 to
October 1978, and then returned there in February 1979,
and continued to work at this facility until she went out
on strike in April 1980. She testified that in February
1979. William Hoffman, the administrator of the Home at
that time, told her of Respondent's sick pay policy
wherein employees were entitled to 6 days per year. Ac-
cording to Smolinsky, this policy was instituted in Janu-
ary 1979, and, if an employee did not use the 6 sick days
during 1979, the employee would receive monetary com-
pensation for all unused sick days at the end of the year.
Smolinskv testified that she took none of her 6 sick days
in 1979, and that, in Janaury 1980, she complained to a
man by the name of Masinko, who was an official of the
I hase reached the abhose conclusion solels on the hasis of the eXl
dence and events in this record, and s ithout any reference or reliance oit
an) prior labor
asre in swhich Ray Blankenship man have been a wilness
Counlsel for Respondent also objects in his molion to dismiss or sirike to
ia cerliai map sWhich the General Counsel attached to his brief btt re-
gardless of whether Respondent had prior knowledge thiat such map
would be altached--lI have
ot in anll
,as relied on such a;lachmentl
titow4cer. the distance betsweeil the two mlttel
is it pertinent mailer aind
certainly at iarguable issue of fact properly beftore me since bolth Itcatllonl
'scre spec ificalls mentioned hb Ihe sh itnte'ssc inosl,,led il aforestatcd (ii
the basis of the abosve. Respondent', miotioni t l strike, to dismiss. or fo a
rner hearing, Is hereby denied
245
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Nursing Home, and he attempted to rectify the matter by
contacting Respondent's home office, but was never able
to obtain compensation for her in accordance with the
information she had previously received from the former
administrator, Hoffman. Smolinsky stated that she also
attempted to obtain her sick day payment from Anthony
Pucillo, but received no satisfaction. Smolinsky testified
that she had worked full time for the Nursing Home
since she reentered its employ in February
1979-a
scheduled 37-1/2 day week.
Ersie Stubbs began working for the Nursing Home on
or about June 30, 1978, and testified that during the
winter of 1978-79, she attended a meeting of employees
at which former Administrator William Hoffman advised
employees that Respondent's president, Leatherman, had
decided to give employees 6 paid sick days, and indicat-
ed it would be like getting an extra week's pay for
Christmas since the employees would receive pay for
unused sick days on or about December 10, 1979. How-
ever, when Stubbs received her paycheck on or about
December 10, 1979, she only received payment for 2-1/2
unused sick days. She testified she could not understand
the low amount since she had not used any of her 6 sick
days and was entitled to 6 paid sick days. She com-
plained to Masinko but was then advised that, since the
"policy book" did not go into effect until July 1979, she
was only awarded pay for 2-1/2 unused sick days.
The General Counsel is taking the position that Re-
spondent instituted a sick pay policy in early
1979
through Administrator Hoffman and then unilaterally
changed it on December 15, 1979. However, Respondent
maintains that its sick-day benefits were based on provi-
sions outlined in a policy book effective July 1, 1979.
The General Counsel points out that the testimony of
employees Stubbs and Smolinsky reveals that they were
notified during the winter of 1978-79 by William Hoff-
man, then administrator of the Nursing Home, that
during the following year they would receive 6 paid sick
days and would be paid in December 1979 for all sick
days that they had not used. Moreover, argues the Gen-
eral Counsel, Respondent never called Hoffman during
the hearing to deny the statements, and, consequently, an
inference is warranted that, if Hoffman had been called
by Respondent, he would have testified unfavorably to
Respondent's case and would have indicated that he did
make the announcement as to the 6 paid sick days as tes-
tified to by Stubbs and Smolinsky, and, in light of all
such testimony, Respondent's defense that the sick pay
plan was not announced until the summer of 1979 when
employees received copies of the plan in an employee
policy book is without merit-accordingly, it is the posi-
tion of the General Counsel that Respondent unilaterally
changed its sick pay policy by paying its employees less
than the amount called for as a result of Hoffman's an-
nouncement.
As pointed out, General Counsel's Exhibit 3 is the
policy book instituted by Respondent and which has an
effective day, July 1, 1979. This policy book sets forth
that an employee will be paid for unused sick pay at the
rate of one-half day per month or 6 days per year and
that the unused sick-pay days will be paid on the Decem-
ber 15 pay period. Diane Smolinsky, a witness on behalf
of the Union, testified on cross-examination that she re-
ceived her policy book in June 1979, that it was to be
effective July 1, 1979, and this was the first policy book
she had received. Ersie Stubbs, another witness for the
General
Counsel, as aforestated,
indicated
that
she
learned during negotiations that the sick pay was to be
paid on the basis of half a day per month, and she also
indicated that the parties had gone through the policy
hook at the negotiation sessions. She then admitted that
when the initial announcements concerning sick days
were made earlier in 1979, Administrator Hoffman did
not say when the sick days would become effective, and
further stated that, in negotiating sessions during August,
September, October, and November 1979, there were
discussions concerning the policy book, and this is when
she found out that the policy book was effective July 1.
I am in agreement with counsel for Respondent that
simply on the testimony of the General Counsel's own
witnesses there can be no basis for this allegation of a
unilateral change in sick pay policy. Roy Archer, the
chief negotiator, admitted in his own testimony that the
policy book was discussed in September, October, and
November 1979. Ersie Stubbs and Diane Smolinsky even
support Respondent's position that a half day per month
was to be paid, and the date of the policy book was ef-
fective July 1, 1979, and to be paid in December 1979.
While Smolinsky and Stubbs had some impressions or
believed that sick leave would be paid starting in early
1979 due to statements by Hoffman, neither one could
testify as to his definite pronouncement as to when such
benefits would actually start. Moreover, at no time has
the Union ever argued that Respondent did not pay em-
ployees what they were to receive, but rather that the
policy was changed with regard to the effective date of
the sick pay provisions. The General Counsel has not
sustained the burden of proof in this instance, and, ac-
cordingly, this allegation is hereby dismissed.
Another allegation of bad-faith bargaining is that in
February 1980 Respondent reduced its monetary propos-
als.
Union negotiator Gregory Miller testified as to Re-
spondent's position in respect to wages and fringe bene-
fits. Initially, in September 1979, or thereabouts, Re-
spondent, through its chief negotiator, Blankenship, indi-
cated that the position of the Company was to maintain
the status quo regarding wages and fringe benefits. How-
ever, on or about February 5, 1980, the union presented
its second economic proposal package, and, on the next
day, according to Miller and Archer, Blankenship re-
sponded by stating that non-LPN employees would re-
ceive the minimum wage, and then offered LPNs $3.85
per hour. According to Miller, Blankenship proposed no
fringe benefits for part-time employees specifically refer-
ring to vacation pay, holiday pay, and funeral leave.
Miller testified that at this time part-time employees were
enjoying most of the fringe benefits enjoyed by full-time
employees. Miller stated that he responded to this wage
proposal by asking Blankenship whether he was aware
that certain non-LPNs were making more than $3.85 per
246
PARKVIEW NURSING CENTER 11 CORP2
hour. Blankenship's response was brief and to the point
"Well-that is our proposal. "-
Blankenship testified that at the negotiating session on
February 6, 1980, he presented some economic proposals
relating to full-time and part-time employees-that all
employees had just received it, and they would bring the
LPNs to $3.85 per hour-those not already at this rate.H
He also stated that on this occasion there were discus-
sions on vacation eligibility, backdating seniority, sick
days, and additional days off. Blankenship admitted that
the Union then asked if these proposals did not represent
a reduction of wages and benefits to employees, and tes-
tified that in reply he stated that Respondent did not and
would not take anything away from any of the employ-
ees that they currently had.9
In essence, the General Counsel is maintaining that by
reducing its monetary proposal in February 1980, Re-
spondent presented another incident considered indicia of
a course constituting bad-faith bargaining.' 0
Counsel for Respondent points to the testimony of
Blankenship wherein he stated that Respondent would
not take anything away from any of the employees that
they currently had, and that this was in a direct response
to a question of Greg Miller as to whether or not Re-
spondent was in fact taking away certain money from
some of the employees. Ted Chuparkoffs testimony was
in corroboration of Blankenship, and who also stated that
this was the last time any question was ever raised con-
cerning the reduction of wages of any of the employees.
Counsel for the Company argues that, if, in fact, the
Union had sincerely believed that management was pro-
posing to reduce wages for employees who were earning
more than what the monetary proposal was, then there
would have been extensive discussions concerning why
Respondent was presenting such a proposal, but, to the
contrary, there were no lengthy discussions concerning
that proposal because the Union knew that Respondent
was not going to reduce any wages for an employee who
was earning more than the minimum wage or more than
$3.85 per hour.
' Anthony Pucillo, Respondent's administrator, admitted on cross-ex-
amination that four LPNs (Reed, Rocco, Youngman, and Stash) em-
ployed by Respondent prior to the negotiating sessions in February
198().
were making in excess of 53.85 per hour. Moreover, a non-LPN employ-
ee, Walter Miller, a part-time maintenance man who was in the bargain-
ing unit, received in excess of $2.90 per hour as of August i, 1979, and
had already received a raise to $3 41 per hour by July 15, 1978. In addi-
tion, Annie Staggers and Gerry Williams, whom the parties also agreed
to include in the unit, received in excess of the $2.90 per hour minimum
wage prior to January 15, 1980, and in excess of $3.10 per hour minimum
wage after January 15, 1980.
s Leatherman testified that he authorized this monetary proposal and
that $3.85 per hour proposal for LPNs would not affect those employees
earning more than this amount
9 While not directly in issue in this case, there was, nevertheless, some
testimony relative to fringe benefits, and it was Blankenship's understand-
ing that anyone who worked less than 20 hours did not get certain fringe
benefits. He also stated that Respondent had four classifications-regular
full-time, regular part-time, and casuals-but under his proposal employ-
ees who worked on a regular part-time basis, even if for only 8 hours.
would be entitled to fringe benefits
lO The nature of this allegation is specifically in relation to a monetary
proposal Respondent was offering to reduce wages to employees who
were already earning more than the amounts proposed and does not
relate to fringe benefits.
At the start of the negotiations, Respondent's wage
offer to the Union was merely a continuation of the
status quo. There is also testimony by Attorney Chupar-
koff to the effect that, on several occasions during the
negotiations, he stated that the financial condition of Re-
spondent was such that management could not increase
operational costs, and, therefore, Respondent's negotia-
tors took the viewpoint that they were not in a position
to give any wage increases.
In the final analysis, this record shows that in Febru-
ary 1980, after numerous bargaining sessions, Respond-
ent's chief negotiator, Rayford Blankenship, made a
lesser and regressive offer of minimum wage to all non-
LPNs, and $3.85 per hour to LPNs, and evidence in this
record indicates that at least two or three non-LPNs
were making in excess of the minimum wage in February
1980, and four LPNs were making in excess of $3.85 per
hour at that time. Consequently, after several months of
negotiation, Blankenship was making a reduction in cer-
tain instances in Respondent's wage offer and to the det-
riment of several employees in the bargaining unit. I
have rejected Respondent's testimony to the effect that
Blankenship gave assurances that no employee would re-
ceive less than that being currently paid. The credited
evidence shows that when Miller specifically asked this
question, Blankenship merely replied, "Well, that is our
proposal."
Here, imposing its own procedural straitjacket on the
negotiations, Respondent first sought the Union's agree-
ment to tentatively resolve all noneconomic issues prior
to meaningful discussion of economics, and then-when
Respondent did offer its economic proposal-it presented
an unacceptable position on wages for the reasons here-
tofore given. In this respect, Respondent's purpose and
conduct in the instant case is not too far different from
that found violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) in Yama
Woodcraft, Inc. d/b/a Cal-Pacific Furniture Mfg. Co., 228
NLRB 1337, 1342 (1977).
To show later wage proposals, and in so doing reveal-
ing the full totality and sequence of events in this record,
it should also be noted that as the negotiations began to
reach a crucial stage on or about April 9, 1980, Blanken-
ship indicated that he had a proposal that would satisfy
the Union, and which would permit the Union to extend
its original strike deadline, and, accordingly, on April 12,
1980, he sent a telegram addressed to Miller and Archer,
and then called Miller at his residence on Saturday,
April 12, 1980, to orally relay the contents of the tele-
gram to him. In essence, Respondent's telegram accepted
several
proposals by the Union (jury duty, medical
exams, unused sick days, a paid break period, call-in pay,
overtime for holiday work, and severance pay). More-
over, Respondent agreed to grant a 6-percent increase in
wages during the first year of the contract on a merit
basis, 8 percent on the second year on a merit basis, and
6 percent for the third year on a merit basis. l '
The next bargaining session was held on April 14,
1980, and the Union made its economic counteroffer.
Miller testified that the Union's counteroffer was close to
I See G C Exh
10
247
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Blankenship's offer set forth in General Counsel's Exhibit
10, but the Union eliminated "merit" as being the sole
criterion for wage increases for the employees, and set
forth its economic package in dollar amounts. At the
time, Blankenship indicated he would recommend the
Union's proposal to Respondent's
president,
Robert
Leatherman. All of the parties then adjourned to a res-
taurant to celebrate the satisfactory conclusion of con-
tract negotiations.
The next and last bargaining session was held on April
17, 1980, and at this meeting Blankenship indicated that
Respondent was not changing any of its proposals from
the telegram sent to the union negotiators (G.C. Exh. 10)
with but two exceptions-a lead person rate would call
for a 15-percent increase, but only on the basis of merit,
and Blankenship stated that the Union would have no
input concerning who would receive merit increases.
Management would inform the Union who received
merit increases and how much they would receive. Re-
spondent further indicated that it would maintain ceilings
on merit increases. Miller asked Blankenship why should
there be ceilings on merit increases. Blankenship indicat-
ed that Respondent would abide by the ceilings but it
would agree to move the ceiling for merit increases up
to 15 percent for a lead person. The discussion deterio-
rated at this juncture and no further meetings in respect
to collective bargaining ever occurred between the par-
ties.
It is further alleged that Respondent failed to bargain
in good faith in that on or about February 6, 1980, it
proposed an agency-shop provision, but on or about Feb-
ruary 12, 1980, withdrew its agency-shop provision and
has proposed an open shop.
Union negotiator Miller testified that the bargaining
session on February 5, 1980, began with Blankenship
holding a packet of papers in his hand which he indicat-
ed was Respondent's latest proposal, and stating that the
proposal would "wrap everything up," but he could not
present it until he reviewed it with Chuparkoff and
Leatherman, and then apologized to the union negotia-
tors for not mailing the proposal earlier.
Miller testified that on the following day at the Febru-
ary 6 session, Blankenship appeared with the same
packet of papers he had with him the day before, but the
papers were now covered with red marks, and Blanken-
ship stated, "Gentlemen, last night I got me an ass-chew-
ing . . . Mr. Leatherman and I went over this entire pro-
posal and it is just not acceptable where he is concerned
so he told me what to present to you." Then, according
to Miller, Blankenship presented his counterproposal by
going down the list in a "curt fashion." Miller stated that
at this time there were approximately 30-40 issues on the
table, and that the Union's position prior to this meeting
was that the union-security provision in the contract
should be a union-shop clause, but that Blankenship's
brief response to the Union's proposal of union shop was
an agency shop.
Less than a week later, on February 12, Blankenship
gave a new response to the union-security issue. During
negotiations that day a conversation had occurred be-
tween
Respondent's
attorney,
Chuparkoff,
and
the
Union's attorney, Miller, concerning agency shop versus
union shop. Chuparkoff maintained that an employee
should be given the right to choose whether or not to
join the Union and whether to pay dues. Miller then re-
plied that an agency-shop provision meant that all em-
ployees had to pay dues and were merely given the
choice as to whether or not they wished to join the
Union. Miller testified that at this time they wished to
join the Union. Miller testified that at this time Chupar-
koff turned to Blankenship and asked him if this was cor-
rect, and Blankenship replied, "Well, an agency shop
provision is really something like a modified open shop,"
and then Blankenship continued with more discussion
but basically taking the position that an agency shop and
an open shop were pretty much the same thing. Miller
stated that he took issue with Chuparkoff and Blanken-
ship on this interpretation. According to Miller, attorney
Chuparkoff was not an experienced negotiator, but Blan-
kenship had a history of participating in bargaining nego-
tiations for a number of years, and Miller then specifical-
ly recalled that Blankenship took the position at this
meeting that agency shop and open shop were pretty
much the same thing, and that at that juncture Respond-
ent's position was for an open shop-changing from an
agency shop-and that Respondent maintained this posi-
tion until negotiations ended.
Attorney Chuparkoff testified that the Union never
modified its position and proposal as to a union shop, but
that Blankenship "kept on saying 'agency shop"' and Re-
spondent's negotiators "never changed," but the Union
disagreed by definition of what it meant. Blankenship tes-
tified that throughout the negotiations Respondent main-
tained that the employees should have the right of
choice to be in the Union or not to be in the Union, and
that the proposal he made at the meeting on February 6
was for a "modified agency clause," but that he entitled
it an "agency shop" to make it "more palatable" to the
Union. Blankenship then went on to testify as follows:
But, essentially, it provided that the employees who
wanted to be members could and would made a de-
cision. The ones who currently worked for the
Company within 30 days, they would withdraw
from the Union. Anyone who would not, they
would have 30 days from the date of their employ-
ment to make up their minds as to if they wanted to
join the Union. So to speak, an escape clause is ac-
tually what it was termed. They had a right to join
or not to join. It was up to them.
Blankenship stated that he did not modify this proposal
at any later time, but testified that this issue caused a
breakdown in the negotiations.
Counsel for Respondent points out that, when the
Union made its first initial proposals in August 1979, it
handed Respondent a packet of proposals that contained
language which provided that the Union reserved the
right to add or to delete from those proposals, and since
the Union acknowledged that Respondent had also a
right to withdraw or delete its proposals-then it would
seem logical that the Union waived any claim that it
might have had for Respondent withdrawing their pro-
posal. Moreover, argues Respondent, a closer look at the
248
PARKVIEW NURSING CENTER II CORP.
actual facts surrounding the agency/union-shop matter
will show that management withdrew its proposal of a
"strict agency type" clause-pointing out that Ted Chu-
parkoff did not have a background in labor relations and
that Blankenship
was the labor negotiator and the
spokesman for Respondent, and had indicated that, if the
employees wanted to join a union, or if they did not
want to join a union, Respondent was not going to make
them-and that the question then amounted to what was
the definition of an agency shop, a modified agency
shop, and a union shop-that there was much confusion
in respect thereto and there were many negotiating state-
ments made back and forth between the parties. Further-
more, maintains Respondent, the Union at no time ever
accepted
an agency-shop
provision,
or a
modified
agency-shop provision, but admittedly there was confu-
sion on the part of Ted Chuparkoff as to what was an
agency shop and what was a modified agency shop, and
there was also confusion between Miller and Ray Blan-
kenship as to what the definition of an agency shop
was-therefore, it would seem ludicrous that when there
was so much confusion as to the definition of a particular
term, that management could be held to have committed
an unfair labor practice on the basis of agreeing to one
type of shop and then withdrawing same, when the testi-
mony is resplendent within the fact that the parties were
not sure as to what they were agreeing to anyway, and
that no agreement had actually been reached, nor would
the Union agree to a less-than-union-shop provision. and
that this cannot form the basis for an unfair labor prac-
tice allegation.
Respondent's chief negotiator. Blankenship, agreed, in
accordance with the credible testimony of both Archer
and Miller, that Respondent's position as to the Union's
proposed union shop was a flat rejection, and that Re-
spondent's proposal was entitled an "agency shop," as
aforestated. The record shows that this proposal was
made on February 6, 1980, but less than a week later, on
or about February 12, 1980, Blankenship insisted that
when he proposed an agency shop on February 6, he
really meant an open shop, and up to the last negotia-
tions in April 1980, Respondent continued to insist upon
an open shop. I am in agreement with the General Coun-
sel that it strains credulity that Blankenship, a representa-
tive with many years of negotiating experience, would
not know the difference between an agency shop and an
open shop, and Blankenship's testimony that when he
proposed an agency shop on February 6 he really meant
an open shop on February 6, he would have stated that
management meant an open shop.
An agency shop is, of course, a far different type of
union-security provision, and its operational aspects do
not equate to those of an open shop. In essence, Blanken-
ship admits that on February 6, whether to make it more
"palatable" or not, he did propose an agency shop, but
then his subequent testimony shows, as detailed earlier
herein, that he ended up proposing an open shop.
It is also alleged that Respondent failed to bargain in
good faith in that, during February and March 1980,. Re-
spondent's negotiators indicated to the Union a lack of
authority to negotiate.
Miller stated that at the opening of negotiations in
August 1979, Blankenship had indicated that he was the
chief negotiator for Respondent and had authority to
bind Respondent-this was in response to Business Rep-
resentative Archer's question as to who had authority to
bind Respondent, but, at a later date, according to
Miller, Blankenship indicated that he no longer had the
authority to bind Respondent.
This record shows that a bargaining session was held
in Akron on February 26, 1980, where Respondent was
represented by Attorney Chuparkoff and Administrator
Pucillo. When Miller noticed that Blankenship was not
present at this session, he then inquired as to his where-
abouts, and Chuparkoff responded by saying that Blan-
kenship would no longer represent Respondent in negoti-
ations, and that the Company would either be represent-
ed by himself or Pucillo. After this meeting, however,
Attorney Chuparkoff never attended any further negotia-
tions sessions, and Blankenship then reappeared.
Miller testified that at the negotiating session on
March
5, 1980,
Blankenship requested
that
he and
Archer meet with him privately away from the negotiat-
ing room, and they agreed to do so. According to Miller,
Blankenship then stated that he had received a communi-
cation from Respondent
in which
President
Robert
Leatherman had fired him, but that on the following day
he had received communications from Respondent rehir-
ing him specifically for the one session on March 5.
Blankenship also told Miller and Archer that this latest
communication said nothing about representing Respond-
ent after March 5, and then explained to Miller and
Archer that he had responded to the above telegram by
sending a communication to Respondent advising that he
would not accept responsibility for any of the negotia-
tions after February 6. Miller also testified that on this
occasion Blankenship further told him that he had no au-
thority to bind the Company and he did not know why
he was at the negotiating session, and that no one at the
bargaining table had any authority. In response to Mill-
er's question as to which of Respondent's representatives
had the authority since Blankenship did not, Blankenship
replied no one else at the table had authority-only
Leatherman had authority, and that Tony Pucillo had no
authority' to bind the Company-that Pucillo ,was only
present to indicate the impact of the Union's proposal on
the operations of Respondent.
Miller referred to the arrival at negotiations of Attor-
ney Thomas I'alecek for the first time on or about March
21, 1980, by indicating that Palecek arrived a few hours
late, and that he remembered the incident because Attor-
ney Palecek offered his apologies by explaining that he
was in his office that morning in "dungarees and a sweat-
shirt not anticipating having to leave the office," when
he received a call from Leatherman asking him for the
first time to represent Respondent. Miller believed that at
this meeting Leatherman and his accountant were also
present at the request of the Union, but they did not
appear in the negotiating session and stayed in another
room. It is not clear whether Blankenship was at this
meeting on March 21, but Archer testified that about 90
percent of the time in this session was spent reviewing
249
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and bringing Attorney Palecek up to date as to where
they stood in the negotiations.
Leatherman testified that he hired Chuparkoff and
Blankenship as his negotiators, and he instructed them to
negotiate the best contract they could within the guide-
lines of the Company, and that he would meet with his
negotiators before each negotiating session.
Blankenship testified that at the outset of the negotia-
tions his role was that of chief spokesman for Respond-
ent, and that at the first meeting he made it clear to the
Union that he did not have the power and authority to
bind Leatherman to an agreement, but that he could ef-
fectively recommend such. Blankenship stated that he
continued in this capacity until an impasse was reached
in April or May 1980. He also testified that, prior to
going into meetings, he would sit down and go over
strategy with
Leatherman
and get recommendations
from him, and also to bring him up to date on the prog-
ress of the negotiations.
Counsel for Respondent argues that the nature of this
particular allegation in the complaint seems to be that
the negotiators for Respondent had authority to negoti-
ate in August, September, October, November, Decem-
ber, and January, and did not have authority to negotiate
in February and March, but then had authority to nego-
tiate in April 1980. It is pointed out that from August
1979 through January 1980, Ray Blankenship, Ted Chu-
parkoff, and Anthony Pucillo were all present at the bar-
gaining table throughout
this period and that even
Leatherman was present at the first meeting, and that he
was also available by telephone; that the Union had not
raised the question that these same people did not have
authority to negotiate from August through January and,
in fact, proposals were made to the Union during this
period of time. Moreover, these same negotiators were
present at all of the February meetings and, in fact, a
package offer was made to the Union in February con-
taining an economic proposal on wages, and which had
been authorized by Leatherman. In addition, maintains
Respondent, other proposals were made in March 1980,
particularly with regard to jury duty and fringe benefits,
and, if these proposals were accepted by the Union, how
can the Union now say there was no authority to negoti-
ate during this period of time.
Miller testified and admitted that, in August, Septem-
ber, October, and November 1979, he believed that Blan-
kenship had the authority to negotiate for Respondent,
but stated that, after the December 10, 1979, meeting
(wherein Blankenship had indicated to Miller and Archer
that Leatherman had not made up his mind whether he
would sign a contract), his belief concerning the authori-
ty of Blankenship and Chuparkoff was considerably
shaken.
I find that the fourth indicia of bad-faith bargaining is
in the area of lack of authority to either negotiate for
Respondent or bind Respondent. As pointed out, there is
a considerable amount of evidence in this record reveal-
ing that both Chuparkoff and Blankenship indicated from
time to time that they did not have sufficient authority in
these areas. Credited testimony indicates that in later
February 1980 Chuparkoff told union negotiators that
Blankenship no longer had authority to bind Respondent.
Then, in early March, Blankenship reappeared and told
Miller and Archer that Respondent had discharged him
and had only rehired him for the one meeting, and then
further stated that he would not accept responsibility for
negotiations after February 6, that he did not have au-
thority to bind Respondent and neither did anyone else,
and did not know why he was present at the negotiations
on this particular occasion.
It should be noted that the statements attributed to Re-
spondent's negotiators Chuparkoff and Blankenship in
these respects are not specifically denied. Blankenship
merely suggested that he was the chief spokesman until
an impasse was reached in April or May 1980.
Respondent's attorney, Thomas Palecek, entered the
negotiations on March 21, 1980, as aforestated, and in-
formed the Union that he was not going to override any
of the agreements already made, but would "make sure"
that management knew what they had agreed to. He also
informed Miller and Archer that Blankenship "would
remain exactly as he had been at the beginning of the ne-
gotiations."
Although an employer is not required to be represent-
ed by an individual possessing final authority to enter
into agreement, this is subject to a limitation that it does
act to inhibit the progress of the negotiations. United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America. AFL-
CIO. Local Union No. 1780, 244 NLRB 277 (1979). The
degree of authority possessed by the negotiator is a
factor which may be considered in determining good-
faith bargaining.
Lloyd A.
Fry Roofing Company v.
N.L.R.B., 216 F.2d 273, 275 (9th Cir. 1954).
In the instant case Respondent allowed its chief nego-
tiator to agree to numerous contract proposals over a
rather prolonged period of time, and then later apparent-
ly fired and rehired him, but with open admissions to the
Union by Blankenship, wherein he, himself, seriously
questioned his own authority, and such changing and
confusing circumstances could only serve to disrupt and
impede the bargaining process. Therefore, I have found
that Respondent's failure to vest its chief negotiator with
sufficient authority to conduct negotiations and by re-
scinding his authority in February and March 1980, also
constitutes evidence of bad-faith bargaining by Respond-
ent.
Turning now to the sequence of events following the
last negotiating session. This record shows that on June
4, 1980, Union Representative Archer requested rein-
statement for all 20 strikers listed on General Counsel
Exhibit 6 by advising Administrator Pucillo, in person,
that "these people are ready. willing and able to come
back to work. When are you going to put them back?"
Pucillo then informed Archer that he had replaced all of
them.i" However, on June 18, 1980, at a hearing before
the Ohio Bureau of Unemployment Compensation con-
cerning whether the strikers would receive unemploy-
'l
h.he documnllt handed tl
i'ucillo on the date here in queslion-(i C
[ xh
6
stated, Inter alia. Ihatl or
Julne 4.
19H0, the strike and picketing
hwould stop. arid that "the
unldersigined employces herehN request rein-
staterienl ad r
are immediately available and willing to return to their
former emplo)ymeint"
Ulnder the clrcumstance-. here, this mut he deemed
an u lllcondlit
rlal oflfer to returrl Ihe sIrikers
250
PARKVIEW' NURSING CENTER II CORP.
ment compensation,
Pucillo
admittedly advised
the
Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, in Archer's
presence, that the strikers were discharged for violation
of company policy by not reporting that they were off
work at the time of the strike. At the hearing before me,
Pucillo admitted that he had replaced all of the strikers
with new hires, and at no time did he or any other repre-
sentative of management notify the Union that Respond-
ent was setting up a preferential hiring list wherein the
20 strikers would have preference as to hire in the event
any strike replacements left Respondent's employ.
Roy Archer testified as to Respondent's refusal to re-
instate the strikers and discharging them for allegedly
violating company policy by not reporting they were off
work-notwithstanding the fact that the Respondent had
notice of the Union's intentions to strike, as aforesaid.
Archer also testified as to a union meeting held in March
1980, at which the employees authorized the Union to go
out on strike because of the state of negotiations between
the parties, and testified that a picket line was then estab-
lished around 7 a.m. on April 21, with signs at the picket
line indicating, "UFCW, District Union 427 on Strike,"
and the name Parkview Xwas also penned in on the sign.
Final Conclusions
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act makes it an unfair labor
practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively
with representatives of its employees. As defined in Sec-
tion 8(d) of the Act, "bargain collectively" requires the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative
of its employees "to meet at reasonable times and confer
in good faith with respect to wages, hours and other
terms and conditions of employment . . . but such obli-
gation does not compel either party to agree to a propos-
al or require the making of a concession."
Recently, in United Contractors Incorporated, JMCO
Trucking Incorporated, Joint Employers, 244 NLRB 72, 73
(1979), the Board defined an employer's obligation in a
bargaining situation stating:
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act establishes a duty "to
enter into discussion with an open and fair mind,
and a sincere purpose to find a basis of agreement."
N:L.R.B. v. Herman Sausage Company. Inc., 275
F.2d 229, 231 (5th Cir. 1960). As the Supreme
Court stated in
.:L.R.B. v. Insurance Agents' Inter-
national Union, AFL-CIO [Prudential Insurance
Company of America], 361 U.S. 477, 485 (1960):
Collective bargaining, then, is not simply an oc-
casion for purely formal meetings between man-
agement and labor, while each maintains an atti-
tude of "take it or leave it"; it presupposes a
desire to reach ultimate agreement, to enter into
a collective bargaining contract.
This obligation does not compel either party to
agree to a proposal or to make a concession.
N.L.R.B. v. American A'ationa/l Insurance Co., 343
U.S. 395 (1952). However, the Board may, and
does, examine the contents of the proposals put
forth, for "if the Board is not to be blinded by
empty talk and by the mere surface motions of col-
lective bargaining, it must take some cognizance of
the reasonableness of the positions taken by an em-
ployer in the course of bargaining negotiations."
,N:L.R.B. v. Reed & Prince Manufacturing Company,
205 F.2d 131, 134 (Ist Cir. 1953), cert. denied 364
U.S. 887.
The standard for assessing whether or not a particular
course of bargaining meets the tests of "good faith" was
well stated by Administrative Judge Arthur Leff, which
the Board adopted in "'A" System. Inc., Mobile Home Di-
vision AMid-States Corporation, 129 NLRB
527 (1960),
where it is said (at 547):
Good faith, or the want of it, is concerned essen-
tially with a state of mind. There is no shortcut to a
determination of whether an employer has bar-
gained with the requisite good faith the statute com-
mands. That determination must be based on rea-
sonable inference drawn from the totality of conduct
evidencing the state of mind with which the em-
ployer entered into and participated in the bargain-
ing process. The employer's state of mind is to be
gleaned not only from his conduct at the bargaining
table, but also from his conduct away from it-for
example, conduct reflecting a rejection of the prin-
ciple of collective bargaining or an underlying pur-
pose to bypass or undermine the Union manifests
the absence of a genuine desire to compose differ-
ences and to reach agreement in the manner the Act
commands. All aspects of the Respondent's bargain-
ing and related conduct must be considered in
unity, not as separate fragments each to be assessed
in isolation. [Emphasis supplied.]
Applying the above principles to the instant case, and
even accepting the fact that, by February 1980. the par-
ties had resolved most of the noneconomic matters, nev-
ertheless, I conclude and find that substantial evidence in
this record supports the conclusion that Respondent re-
fused to bargain with the Union in good faith in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, and such finding is
based on the totality of Respondent's conduct both at and
away from the bargaining table taking particularly in ac-
count the cumulative force of the various circumstances
entering into this case.
As pointed out, although Respondent and the Union
met on numerous occasions between August 1979 and
April 17, 1980, Respondent did not bargain with the
intent of reaching an agreement. First of all, its chief ne-
gotiator indicated in December 1979 that Respondent's
president, Leatherman, had not made up his mind wheth-
er he would sign a contract with the Union. On Febru-
ary 6, 1980, Blankenship framed his initial monetary pro-
posal so that several employees in the unit would have
even received less wages than they were already getting.
and a week or so later withdrew his agency-shop propos-
al in favor of an open shop. Moreover, in February and
March 1980, negotiators for Respondent were under,;o-
ing a serious division in their ranks with numerous cotn-
251
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
flicts surrounding their status, and which all indicated a
definite lack of authority to negotiate.
In the final analysis, Respondent was willing to reach
accords on noneconomic matters where extra costs
amounted to very little or nothing, and in most instances
these agreements or accords only resulted from the
Union accepting Respondent's proposal. Then in a nego-
tiation session in late February 1980, a few weeks after
Respondent did make their economic proposal, and
which reduced wages to several employees, the Union
noticed that Blankenship was not present, and were then
notified that the chief negotiator could no longer bind
Respondent, but at the next session in early March, Blan-
kenship returned to the negotiations, but with the an-
nouncement that he was only rehired for one meeting
and also with the information that he has no authority to
negotiate nor does anyone else. Attorney Thomas Pale-
cek was then suddenly hired by Leatherman to represent
Respondent, and by informing the Union that he (Pale-
cek) wanted to make sure management knew what they
had agreed to-placed at least some of the proposals and
accords previously agreed to on a more or less tentative
basis pending his review, but with assurances to the
Union that Blankenship would "still remain and function
as he had from the beginning." Then in April 1980, right
around the time of the initial strike deadline, Blankenship
sent a telegram to the Union accepting numerous propos-
als and making economic offers, but at the last negotiat-
ing session amply surrounded his economic proposals
with such restrictions that the Union could not accept
them. In essence, the Union was right back where it
started from when negotiations commenced, but now
with the full realization that, whenever any real progress
was made in the important segments of the negotiations,
all or most of that progress was continually subject to
needless delays, sudden changes, and outright repudi-
ations of agreed-on proposals, along with the introduc-
tion by Leatherman of new proposals, new negotiators
or changing the status and authority of those still in his
service. This is not bargaining in good faith.
As pointed out, within the context of bad-faith bar-
gaining, the unit membership voted to strike, and thereby
engaged in an unfair labor practice strike commencing
April 21, 1980, which was caused and prolonged by Re-
spondent's unfair labor practice. On June 4, 1980, Union
Business Representative Roy Archer unconditionally re-
quested reinstatement for all striking employees.' :
In the instant case, Respondent has never offered im-
mediate and unconditional reinstatement to the striking
employees who made it clear through their bargaining
representative that they wished to return. Rather, its re-
sponse was to discharge them for allegedly violating a
a3 It is pointed out by Respoindent that Roy Archer did not talk toi teic
three strikers listed o)n the second page of GC Exh 6, arid that the strik-
ers wanted to return to their same positions--therefore, argues Respond-
ent. there was no unconditional offer to return. From all Ihe surrounding
circumstances in this record. Archer was given ample aulhority to re-
quest reinstatement for all the strikers, alid as unfair labor practice strik-
ers they were immediately entitled to their jobs back or, ir the positions
no longer exist, to substantially equivalent jobs. The burden is 1In the em-
ployer to offer reinstatement to unfair labor practice strikers. notwilh-
standing the fact that it may have to terminate striker replaccrimnlt
to
make room for returning strikers
company rule for failure to notify Respondent that they
were not reporting for work on April 21, 1980-the first
day of the strike. As indicated, Respondent was well
aware of the employees' intentions to go out on strike
having received written notice to this effect on April 2
and 9, 1980.14 Furthermore, having complied with the
statutory requirements for giving Respondent notice, the
Union did not hide its intentions while it was on the
picket line, but identified who it was striking against on
its picket signs as soon as the strike commenced. There-
fore, the reason given by Pucillo for discharging the
strikers at the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation
hearing on June 18, 1980, was a mere pretext to mask its
intention of discharging its employees for having en-
gaged in concerted protected activity. Moreover, on
June 4, 1980, Respondent had an obligation to offer im-
mediate and full reinstatement to its returning unfair
labor practice strikers, and its failure to terminate strike
replacements in order to make room for these strikers
also violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
RI MI:I)Y
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease
and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that on June 4, 1980, Respondent re-
fused to timely reinstate the striking employees upon
their unconditional offer to return to work from an
unfair labor practice strike, it is recommended that they
offer those employees named in Appendix A, attached
hereto, immediate and full reinstatement to their former
jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substantially
equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority
or any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed, and
make them whole for any loss of earnings they may have
suffered due to the discrimination practiced against them
by paying each of them a sum equal to what he would
have earned, less any net interim earnings, plus interest.
Backpay shall be computed on a quarterly basis in the
manner established by the Board in F W. Woolworth
Company, 90 NLRB 289, 291-294 (1950), and with inter-
est thereon computed in the manner and amount pre-
scribed in Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651
(1977).i5
Having further found that Respondent has unlawfully
refused to bargain collectively with the Union, I shall
recommend that, upon request, it be ordered to do so
concerning rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment, and, if an understanding
is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agree-
ment.
CONCI.USIONS 01 LAW
I. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union and Local 200 are labor organizations
within the meaning of the Act.
'I See (i C I xhll 8 and 9
Al A s
ee lc ,
AI Plumhin; & lat
(uiig
Co,
138 Nl RB 716 (1962)
252
PARKVIE\W NURSING CENTER 11 C()RP.
3. By engaging in conduct described and detailed in
section 111, above. Respondent has engaged in and is en-
gaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(1), (3) and (5) of the Act.
4. The unit set forth herein constitutes a unit appropri-
ate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
5. Since on or about February 12, 1976, and at all ma-
terial times herein, Local 200 represented a majority of
employees in the appropriate unit, and has been the ex-
clusive representative of said employees for the purpose
of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section
9(a) of the Act. i
6. Respondent has refused to bargain with the Union
in violation of the Act.
7. The strike starting on April 21, 1980, was an unfair
labor practices strike.
8. The above-described unfair labor practices affect
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER' 7
The Respondent, Parkview Nursing Center II Corp.,
Warren, Ohio, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively concerning rates of
pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of em-
ployment with Local 200 as the exclusive bargaining rep-
resentative of its employees in the appropriate unit as de-
scribed and set forth herein.
(b) Refusing to reinstate and/or discharging or other-
wise discriminating against employees for engaging in
concerted union activity.
(c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights
to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organi-
zations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act,
or to refrain from any or all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to ef-
fectuate the polices of the Act:
(a) Recognize and, upon request, bargain collectively
with the aforesaid Union or Local 200 as the exclusive
representative of all the employees in the above-de-
i6 The General Counsel contends. and with no evidence otherwise I
am in accord. that the certification year would only begin to run from
the date of the U.S. Court of Appeals decision (May 24, 1979), and there-
fore there was an irrebutable presumption from the abo'e date to May
24, 1980, mandating that Local Union 200 enjoyed majority status Fur-
ther, that Local 200 continued to enjoy majority status after May 198(
because of Respondent's unfair laboxr practlices, as all delailed previously
herein
17 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec
102 46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided
in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto
shall be deemed waised for all purposes
scribed unit, and, if an understanding is reached, embody
such understanding in a signed agreement, provided,
however, that nothing herein shall be construed to re-
quire Respondent to vary or abandon the wage rate or
benefit changes made, or to prejudice the assertion by its
employees of any rights they may have emitting there-
from.
(b) Make whole those employees refused reinstatement
for any loss of earnings by reason of Respondent's un-
lawful conduct as outlined in the section of this Decision
entitled "The Remedy."
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, time-
cards, personnel records and reports, and all other re-
cords necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due
under the terms of this Order.
(d) Post at its place of business and Nursing Home
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix B. ""'8
Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 8, after being duly signed by Re-
spondent's representative, shall be posted by Respondent
immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by
it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 8, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision,
what steps have been taken to comply herewith.
' In the ercnt that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
State, Court of Appeals. the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the Natiolnal I ahor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgnliclt of the United State, Court of Appeals Enforcing an
()rdcr of the National L abor Relations Board
APPENDIX A
Betsy Adams
Anna Benard
Mary Ellen Carroll
Marie Cleveland
Anna Dean
Sue Dumira
JoAnn Finch
Blanche Hughley
Diane Jones
Kimberly Keeder
Rene Maler
Barbara Morgan
Mozel Robertson
Martha Rodgers
Diane Smolinsky
Ersie Stubbs
Cheryl Thomas
Anne Tinsley
Sheila Wagoner
Marion Williams
APPENDIX B
NOTIICE TO EMPLtOYFi- S
POSTED HY ORI)/R OF I'HE
NA-IlONAI
LABOR RFI AlIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all sides had an opportunity to
present evidence and state their positions, the National
Labor Relations Board found that we have violated the
253
DF CISIONS OF NATIO()NAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and has or-
dered us to post this notice.
Wi- Wi.t. NOI refuse to bargain collectively with
the Union and/or Local 200.
WI: wii . NOT refuse to reinstate strikers, nor will
we lay off, discharge, or otherwise discriminate
against employees because of union activities.
WI. wi.L
NOr discourage membership in the
Union or Local 200, or any other labor organiza-
tion, by discriminating against employees in regard
to their hire and tenure of employment or any terms
and conditions of employment.
WE wi.. NOT ill any other manner interfere with
our employees' exercise of the rights guaranteed by
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended.
Wi wii.L recognize and bargain collectively,
upon request, with the Union named herein or
Local 200 as the exclusive representative of all the
employees in the bargaining unit described herein
with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of em-
ployment, or other conditions of employment, and,
if an understanding is reached, embody it in a
signed contract.
Wi wiil.
offer reinstatement to those employees
refused reinstatement on June 4, 1980, and give
them backpay, plus interest, as set forth in the Deci-
sion of the Administrative Law Judge.
PARKVII'w NURSING CFNTI R II CORP.
254