322 NLRB 354
Royal Manor Convalescent Hospital
ROYAL MANOR CONVALESCENT HOSPITAL
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
322 NLRB No. 56
Royal Manor Convalescent Hospital, Inc. and Service Employees Union,
Local No. 22, Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO. Cases 20-
CA-26278, 20-CA-26332, and 20-RC-17051
OCTOBER 17, 1996
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN GOULD AND MEMBERS BROWNING AND FOX
This case presents issues involving alleged violations of Section
8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, election misconduct, and the propriety of a
remedial bargaining order.\1\ The Board has considered the decision and
the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge's rulings, findings,\2\ and conclusions,\3\ and to
adopt the recommended Order as modified.\4\
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\1\On March 26, 1996, Administrative Law Judge Burton Litvack issued
the attached decision. The General Counsel and the Respondent each filed
exceptions and a supporting brief. The Charging Party joined in the
General Counsel's exceptions. The General Counsel filed an answering
brief to the Respondent's exceptions.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in
this proceeding to a three-member panel.
\2\The Respondent and the General Counsel have excepted to some of
the judge's credibility findings. The Board's established policy is not
to overrule an administrative law judge's credibility resolutions unless
the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that
they are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950),
enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record
and find no basis for reversing the findings.
\3\We find it unnecessary to pass on the General Counsel's exception
to the judge's failure to find that Andre Paige's inquiry to Faye
Wilkerson about her union sympathies violated Sec. 8(a)(1). This
violation, if found, would be cumulative and would not materially affect
the remedy.
\4\We shall modify the judge's recommended Order in accordance with
our decision in Indian Hills Care Center, 321 NLRB No. 23 (May 8, 1996).
We shall also substitute a notice that correctly identifies the
Respondent and conforms the provisions of the notice to the recommended
Order.
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The General Counsel has excepted to the judge's recommendation to
dismiss the allegation that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act by granting a wage increase prior to the election. Although we
acknowledge the suspicious nature of the wage increase's scope and
timing, we emphasize that, based on the judge's credited testimony: the
Respondent had a legitimate and timely business need for the wage
increases in order to attract and retain more certified nursing
assistants (CNA's), thereby reducing excessive overtime expenses in a
time of financial stress; the Respondent's officials made their decision
to grant the wage increase prior to the filing of the representation
petition; and, the decision to increase the wages of all CNAs, not just
those who were underpaid according to a survey of area hospitals, was a
reasonable means to implement the increase, because it gave equitable
treatment to employees performing the same work in the same
classification. As previously stated, there is no basis for overturning
the judge's credibility resolutions in this regard. Consequently, the
totality of circumstances shown by credited evidence demonstrates a
business necessity for the wage increase warranting dismissal of the
8(a)(1) allegation.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of
the administrative law judge as modified below and orders that the
Respondent, Royal Manor Convalescent Hospital, Inc., Sacramento,
California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take
the action set forth in the Order as modified.
1. Substitute the following for paragraphs 2(a) and (b).
``(a) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its
facility in Sacramento, California, copies of the attached notice marked
`Appendix.'\51\ Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 20, after being signed by the Respondent's
authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and
maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all
places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event
that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone
out of business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings,
the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of
the notice to all current employees and former employees employed by the
Respondent at any time since August 26, 1994.
``(b) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official on a
form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent
has taken to comply.''
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the administrative law
judge.
It is further ordered that the election conducted in Case 20-RC-
17051 is set aside and that Case 20-RC-17051 is severed from this
proceeding and remanded to the Regional Director for Region 20 for the
purpose of conducting a second election among employees in the
appropriate unit.
Dated, Washington, D.C. October 17, 1996
____________________________________
William B. Gould IV, Chairman
____________________________________
Margaret A. Browning, Member
____________________________________
Sarah M. Fox, Member
(seal) National Labor Relations Board
APPENDIX
Notice To Employees
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the
National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide by
this notice.
We will not interrogate our employees with regard to their union
membership, sympathies, or activities or the union membership,
sympathies, or activities of their fellow employees.
We will not create in the minds of our employees the impression that
we are engaging in surveillance of their union activities.
We will not inform our employees that, despite the presence of a
union as their bargaining representative, it would not be able to save
their jobs, thereby conveying to our employees that it would be futile
to select a union as their bargaining representative.
We will not solicit our employees to interrogate their fellow
employees, regarding their union sympathies and activities, on our
behalf.
We will not solicit grievances from our employees, thereby impliedly
promising to correct them.
We will not in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain,
or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7
of the Act.
Royal Manor Convalescent Hospital, Inc.
Lucile L. Rosen and Shelley Brenner, Esqs., for the General Counsel.
David A. Laporiere, Esq. (Hubert, Shanley & Cohen), of Sacramento,
California, for the Respondent Employer.
Paul Supton, Esq. (Van Bourg, Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld), of Oakland,
California, for the Charging Party-Petitioner.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Burton Litvack, Administrative Law Judge. The original and the first
amended unfair labor practice charges in Case 20-CA-26278 were filed by
Service Employees Union, Local No. 12, Service Employees International
Union, AFL-CIO (the Union), on August 26 and November 29, 1994,
respectively, and the unfair labor practice charge in Case 20-CA-26332
was filed by the Union on September 21, 1994. Based upon the unfair
labor practice charges, on January 27, 1995, the Acting Regional
Director of Region 20 of the National Labor Relations Board (the Board)
issued an amended consolidated complaint alleging that Royal Manor
Convalescent Hospital, Inc. (Respondent)\1\ engaged in conduct,
violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act
(the Act), and that the appropriate remedy for the alleged unfair labor
practices is the issuance an order, requiring Respondent to bargain with
the Union. Respondent timely filed an answer, denying the commission of
any of the alleged unfair labor practices. Subsequently, on April 12,
1995, the Acting Regional Director of Region 20 issued a report of
objections in Case 20-RC-17051, ordering that the matter be consolidated
with the above-described unfair labor practice cases for trial.
Thereafter, pursuant to a notice of hearing, these consolidated matters
came to trial before me on June 1 and 2, 1995, in Sacramento,
California. At the trial, all parties were afforded the opportunity to
examine and to cross-examine all witnesses, to offer into the record all
relevant documentary evidence, to argue their legal positions orally,
and to file posthearing briefs. The documents were filed by counsel for
the General Counsel and by counsel for Respondent and these were
carefully considered by me. Accordingly, based upon the entire record
herein, including the posthearing briefs and my observation of the
respective testimonial demeanor of the several witnesses, I make the
following
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\1\Although the parties never moved to amend these proceedings'
formal papers to reflect the correct name of Respondent, its corporate
president, Bryan Jennings, testified that the correct name of Respondent
is Royal Manor Health Care, Inc. d/b/a Royal Manor Convalescent
Hospital. Accordingly, herein, when referring to the corporation, I
shall call it Respondent and, when referring to Royal Manor Convalescent
Hospital itself, I shall term it, Royal Manor.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent is a California corporation with an office and place of
business in Sacramento, California, the Royal Manor, at which it is
engaged in the operation of a convalescent hospital. During the 12-month
period ending July 1994,\2\ in the normal course and conduct of its
above-described business operations, Respondent derived gross revenues
in excess of $250,000. Further, Respondent admits that it is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act.
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\2\Unless otherwise stated, all events herein occurred during 1994.
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II. LABOR ORGANIZATION
Respondent admits that the Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ISSUES
In his amended consolidated complaint, the General Counsel alleges
that Respondent engaged in several acts and conduct, violative of the
Act. Specifically, he alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
and (3) of the Act by terminating employee, Eunice Gates; that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by granting its employees
a raise in pay during the time period between the Union's filing of a
petition for a representation election and the Board-conducted
representation election; and that, through various management officials,
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by interrogating its
employees regarding their union activities and sympathies and the union
activities and sympathies of their fellow employees, creating amongst
its employees the impression that their union activities were under
surveillance, informing employees that it would be futile for them to
select the Union as their representative for purposes of collective-
bargaining, threatening employees with discharge if they selected the
Union as their representative for purposes of collective bargaining, and
soliciting employees to tell their fellow employees to vote against the
Union. Finally, given their serious nature and breadth, the General
Counsel alleges that requiring Respondent to bargain with the Union is
the most appropriate remedy for its unfair labor practices. Contrary to
the General Counsel, Respondent denies the commission of any unfair
labor practices and, while admitting that it did, in fact, implement a
raise in pay for certain of its employees during the critical period
prior to the representation election, argues that such was planned prior
to the filing of the representation election petition by the Union.
Finally, assuming that it is found to have committed unfair labor
practices herein, Respondent asserts that standard Board remedies are
sufficient and that an extraordinary bargaining order remedy is
unnecessary.
IV. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. THE FACTS
Respondent, a State of California corporation, is engaged in
business in the operation of Royal Manor Convalescent Hospital, which is
located in Sacramento, California, and which is a 49-bed skilled nursing
facility offering 24-hour nursing care to patients who are required to
have such attention, providing them with meals and social services, and
ensuring that the patients' medications are administered and treatments
are done. The record establishes that Bryan Jennings is the president of
the corporation; that Judy Jenson is the administrator of Royal Manor
and responsible for its day-to-day operations; that, since August 1,
Vikki Gagnon has been the director of nurses for Royal Manor;\3\ and
that Andre Paige is the administrative assistant to Jenson, performing
office manager and clerical operations for the Royal Manor.\4\ The
record further establishes that, as of July, at the Royal Manor,
Respondent employed 33 individuals in various job classifications
including certified nursing assistant,\5\ restorative nurse aide, cook,
dietary aide, activity assistant, laundry aide, housekeeping, medical
records director, and social services director.
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\3\Prior to Gagnon, Alenia Dial was the director of nurses.
\4\Respondent admits that Jennings, Jenson, Gagnon, and Paige are
supervisors within the meaning of Section 2(11).
\5\Approximately 19 of the employees are in this job classification.
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Alleged discriminatee, Eunice Gates, testified that, as the social
services director at the Royal Manor, she was responsible for taking
care of the patients' needs including making doctor appointments and
arranging transportation to doctors' offices, calling patients'
families, and purchasing clothing, food, and other supplies for the
patients. According to Gates, who had been a member of the Union from
1977 through 1985 during her employment at another Sacramento-area
convalescent hospital, at which the employees were represented by the
Union,\6\ while not the instigator of the union movement amongst
Respondent's employees at the Royal Manor, commencing in the spring, she
was involved in the discussions, concerning whether to seek
representation by the Union,\7\ and volunteered to approach officials of
the Union in order to inform them of the employees' interest in
organizing and to obtain union authorization cards. Gates spoke to the
Union's secretary/treasurer and was given 35 authorization cards, ``and
I took some to the [Royal Manor]. I spoke to the employees, one on one,
and told them I had the cards, and if they were interested, they want to
fill them out, and we could meet and start discussing.'' As to what
Gates said regarding the purpose of the authorization cards, all of
which bear the heading, ``I hereby authorize SEIU Local 22, AFL-CIO to
represent me and, in my behalf, to negotiate and conclude any and all
agreements as to wages, hours and other conditions of employment,'' she
admitted telling employees that the cards were to be signed ``if they
wanted to get a union'' and that ``. . . filling in the card didn't mean
it was going to automatically give them a union'' and doing so ``. . .
could give them their right to vote for a union.'' The record reveals
that, in all, during the period March 3 through June 30, Gates
distributed to and collected from employees 19 signed authorization
cards,\8\ executed her own authorization card, returned these same 19
authorization cards to the Union, and witnessed another employee,
Cynthia Harris, sign an authorization card at a meeting of the Royal
Manor employees with union officials. After obtaining the 21 executed
authorization cards, on July 7, the Union filed a representation
election petition in Case 20-CA-17051, seeking to be selected as the
collective-bargaining representative of certain of Respondent's
employees at the Royal Manor.\9\ The record reveals that Gates, was
inadvertently listed in the petition as the ``employer representative to
contact;'' that, after a representation case hearing,\10\ on August 19,
the Regional Director of Region 20 issued a decision and direction of
election in which he set forth the scope of the unit appropriate for
bargaining as encompassing all employees in the above-described job
classifications, including social services director;\11\ and that,
Respondent did not request review of the Regional Director's decision
and direction of election and the representation election was eventually
scheduled to be conducted on September 16 by the Board.
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\6\Gates testified that, at this facility, Countryside Convalescent
Hospital, she became acquainted with Vikki Gagnon, who was a charge
nurse there.
\7\According to Gates, ``different groups'' of employees would
discuss the situation in the employees' breakroom. She estimated that
approximately 25 to 30 employees participated in these discussions.
\8\According to Gates, she collected and returned to the union
authorization cards from 15 employees (Eddie Milton, Alice Gavin,
Dorothy Haddox, Sandra Joe, Beverly Hopkins, Suwaran Kaur, Mohni Kumar,
Roshmi Kumar, Barbara McIntosh, Christine Ramirez, Joyce Scott, Dora
Simmons, John Wesley, Robyn Taylor, and Faye Wilkerson), each of whom
signed a card in her presence. In addition, Gates distributed
authorization cards to four employees (Jovita Acosta, Ruby Johnson,
Joseph Judon, and Adrienna Lee), who returned their signed cards to her.
\9\The petition described the bargaining unit as including only
certified nursing assistants, dietary aides, laundry employees, and
housekeeping employees.
\10\At the trial, counsel for Respondent conceded that, at the
representation case hearing, Respondent stipulated to the scope of the
bargaining unit except for the social services director.
\11\The Regional Director concluded that the social services
director, Eunice Gates, was neither a supervisor nor a managerial
employee.
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Respondent admitted that it announced a wage increase for all its
certified nursing assistants\12\ at the Royal Manor in mid-July and that
such became effective on or about August 1, and Judy Jenson, the Royal
Manor administrator,\13\ conceded that a raise in pay would have been
unexpected by employees in that job classification ``because the staff
didn't know that I was out . . . working on trying to get an increase. .
. .'' Initially, the record discloses that Respondent implemented this
wage increase notwithstanding anticipated severe budget problems in the
near future. In this regard, Jenson, whose job duties include
responsibility for ensuring that Royal Manor operates within its
established budget, testified that, during 1994, day-to-day operating
costs continually increased and that, in May, she had been advised, by
Respondent's president, Bryan Jennings, that the anticipated 1994-1995
State of California budget would include no increase in the daily Medi-
cal patient reimbursement rate for convalescent hospitals of the size of
Royal Manor.\14\ This was of critical import to Respondent as most of
its patients are unable to afford the cost of daily resident care at the
Royal Manor and rely upon Medi-cal payments to cover most of this
cost,\15\ and Respondent had come to depend upon a regular yearly
increase in the reimbursement rate to help offset any increased
expenditures.\16\ Nevertheless, Jenson and Jennings each testified that
the pay raise for the Royal Manor's certified nursing assistants was
required. According to the former, at approximately the same time in May
she became aware of the lack of increase in the Medi-cal reimbursement
rate, the director of nurses, Alenia Dial, informed her that the
certified nursing assistant complement was down by three or four
individuals; that she was experiencing difficulty in hiring new
employees in that job classification; and that, as a result, certified
nursing assistants were being required to work overtime in order to
maintain proper staffing levels on all shifts.\17\ Jenson added that
Dial\18\ explained the reason for Respondent's hiring difficulties was
that certified nursing assistant applicants ``. . . didn't want to
accept the pay rate that we were giving out.''\19\
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\12\Employees in this job classification, according to Administrator
Jenson, ``take care of the daily activities of living for the resident,
assist them with those . . .,'' including dressing, feeding, grooming,
relieving themselves, and bathing.''
\13\Jenson testified that she is also the administrator at Riverside
Convalescent Hospital, another Sacramento area convalescent hospital,
the operations of which, in some manner unclear from the record, are
related those of Respondent, and that she divides her time between
Riverside and Royal Manor, working 20 hours a week at the latter.
\14\Although unclear in the record, the State of California's Medi-
cal program appears to be the State's version of the Federal Medicare
program and provides financial relief for individuals who are unable to
pay for the cost of health care. Jennings corroborated Jenson,
testifying that, in May, he became aware that the proposed State of
California budget contained no Medi-cal reimbursement rate increase for
the next fiscal year and that the lack of an increase would cause a
financial strain on Respondent as the reimbursement rates ``. . . have
always increased since I've been in business. There's always been a
general increase.''
\15\The 1993 Medi-cal reimbursement rate had been $79.25 per day for
each patient.
\16\In fact, as enacted, the new state budget retained the previous
Medi-cal $79.25 daily reimbursement amount for convalescent hospitals of
the size of the Royal Manor.
\17\Jenson added that these required ``double shifts'' worsened
Respondent's existing budget problems.
\18\Dial was not called as a witness by Respondent, and the latter's
counsel failed to explain its failure to do so.
\19\During cross-examination, Jenson testified that Dial could not
find people to work at the low per diem rate.
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Thereafter, according to Jenson, she spoke to Jennings, who ``. . .
suggested that I conduct a survey and call the other facilities in the
area and find out how our [wage rate] compared to their wages'' for
certified nursing assistants.\20\ Jenson testified that she conducted
such a survey, contacting seven other skilled nursing convalescent
hospitals in the Sacramento area, and discovered that Respondent's
certified nursing assistant starting standard wage rate was 20 cents per
hour higher than three, the same as two, and 25 cents per hour beneath
the starting wage rate paid by two others but that Respondent's starting
per diem wage rate was significantly lower than paid by six of the other
convalescent hospitals. Jenson further testified that she informed
Jennings of the result of her survey but that, given the Medical funding
problem, he decided to wait before committing to anything. Jenson added
that, ``towards the middle to the end of June,'' she told Jennings ``. .
. that I was still having problems, we were still having trouble trying
to attract a competent staff.'' Jennings replied ``. . . that he had
also done a survey of his own and found that the results were very
similar to what I had shared with him,'' and ``. . . he said that he
thought we were going to have to have to go ahead and do an increase.''
Jenson then testified that, ``towards the end of June,'' at a meeting of
the staff, an announcement was made that certified nursing assistants
would receive a wage rate increase. However, upon examining Respondent's
Exhibit 3, payroll sheets for July and August, Jenson changed her
testimony, stating that ``the pay increase took effect the 1st of
August. So, it must have been towards the middle of July that we had our
meeting, telling the employees that were going to be getting the
increase.'' Finally, on this point, Jenson stated that, notwithstanding
that the problem was with the low per diem wage rate, all certified
nursing assistants received a wage increase ``because . . . I just
didn't feel like I wanted to punish the people that were on the non-per
diem wage'' and that, after the wage increase, certified nursing
assistants worked significantly reduced overtime.
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\20\Apparently, as do most convalescent hospitals, Respondent
maintains two pay scales for certified nursing assistants. Some work for
an hourly pay rate and receive benefits including paid holidays, paid
vacations, and paid sick leave. Others are paid a so-called per diem
rate of pay, which is higher than what the other certified nursing
assistants receive, but receive no fringe benefits. As of July, regular
certified nursing assistants were hired at a wage rate of $6 per hour
and per diem certified nursing assistants were hired at a $6.25 per hour
wage rate. The record is contradictory as to whether Respondent employed
more regular or more per diem certified nursing assistants. Thus, during
direct examination, Jenson testified, ``. . . the biggest portion of our
CNA's were not on a per diem wage, which means they don't get
benefits.'' However, she later testified during cross-examination that
``. . . most of our [certified nursing assistants] didn't elect to take
benefits. They went with the per diem rate.''
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Bryan Jennings corroborated Jenson with regard to the rationale for
and to the timing of the decision to grant the wage rate increase for
certified nursing assistants. According to him, he had a conversation
with Jenson in May or June with the latter telling him ``they were
having problems in staffing the facility, as far as nurses, and so I
told Judy to do a survey . . . to find out what other facilities were
paying. . . . She reported the survey results to me, and then I called
up some other hospitals and verified her results were accurate.'' His
survey, assertedly done in June, Respondent's Exhibit 9, reveals that he
contacted three area convalescent hospitals in order to confirm Jenson's
findings.\21\ Thereafter, in June, he again discussed the certified
nursing assistants' wage rates with Jenson over the telephone, and ``the
main discussion was between per diem rate and a rate . . . other than
per diem rate. And figuring out what the difference should be . . . .
The decision was to increase the CNA's and try to make it as equitable
as possible . . . .''\22\ He added that the Royal Manor's other
employees' wage rates remained the same as these were equal to or better
than those paid by the other area convalescent hospitals.
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\21\During cross-examination, Jennings testified that he was
concerned only with the hourly wage rates of certified nursing
assistants and did not consider fringe benefit packages and that he
assumed that Respondent's fringe benefits were comparable.
\22\Jennings dated this decision as being reached in the third or
fourth week of June with the raise to become effective on August 1.
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Mickey Noble, who worked for Respondent at the Royal Manor as its
medical records clerk,\23\ testified that, on August 12, the day of the
hearing, based upon issues raised by the Union's petition for a
representation election, she was in Jenson's office using the
photocopying machine and spoke to Jenson, who had just returned from the
hearing. According to Noble, in the midst of their conversation, Jenson
``. . . asked me if I had heard about the Union and the people trying to
get in, and I said, `Yes.' And she asked me what I would vote, and I
told her I'd vote no.'' Jenson generally denied ever having interrogated
employees about the Union but did not specifically deny this
conversation. Further, although she could not remember the date, Noble
was able to recall a subsequent conversation with Jenson during which
the former raised the subject of the Union and ``I recall [Jenson]
saying that Eunice started it.'' Noble also testified that,
approximately 2 weeks before Eunice Gates was laid off by Respondent on
August 23, Jenson approached her and asked if she could handle the
social services director job duties, and ``I said, no, I didn't think I
would be able to.''
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\23\This job entails auditing patients' health records, ensuring
that nurses and the certified nursing assistants have done their patient
charting correctly and have documented each shift that they have worked,
performing admissions and discharges, and setting up and breaking down
patient charts. Respondent contends that, in order to perform this job,
the medical records clerk must have training and experience for it, and,
during her cross-examination, Mickey Noble not only confirmed this but
also agreed that it would be very difficult for someone with no training
in medical records to work in that position.
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Eunice Gates, who worked a 4-1/2-hour shift, 5 days a week,
testified that, on August 23, upon being informed by Vikki Gagnon that
Jenson wanted to speak to her before she went home, she went to Jenson's
office and found Jenson and Andre Paige there. Gates asked why Jenson
wanted to speak to her, and the former ``. . . said she was sorry that
she had to lay me off because of empty beds, and she was giving me my
vacation pay along with my regular pay check and that she was sorry she
had to do it, but . . . the kind of business it is, empty beds, but she
had her orders from the office, so she had to do that.'' Judy Jenson
failed to deny this conversation. With regard to the layoff of the
alleged discriminatee, Vikki Gagnon conceded that, on August 23,
subsequent to being informed of her layoff, Gates had a conversation
with her in the breakroom and that ``. . . I told her that I had heard
what had happened, and I wished her good luck in finding a new job. She
said she'd be okay because the Union had already offered her another
position.'' Certified Nursing Assistant Faye Wilkerson, who overheard
this exchange, testified that, later in the day, she overheard a
conversation between Jenson and Gagnon by the nurse's station in the
front of the Royal Manor, with Jenson saying ``. . . `See, Vikki, I told
you Eunice worked for the Union.''\24\ Also, in the last week of August,
Jenson once again offered Mickey Noble the combined social services/
medical records position and informed her that Respondent was
terminating Gates. As an inducement, Jenson offered Noble a $1-per-hour
raise, and the latter agreed to work the combined jobs.\25\ Further,
Mickey Noble testified that, one day during that same week, Bryan
Jennings visited the Royal Manor and entered her office.\26\ ``He just
said that he understood from what people were telling him that Eunice
was a lot of trouble, and she was the cause of the Union and wanting the
employees to be union, and he thanked me for doing the social services
job. And I really didn't say anything.''\27\ Finally, the record
discloses that, subsequent to the termination of Gates, Respondent hired
the following employees at the Royal Manor: five certified nursing
assistants, one licensed vocational nurse, one registered nurse, one
maintenance supervisor, and an activities director, who also performs
the social services work.
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\24\Jenson denied making such a comment. Mickey Noble testified
that, on the day of the election, she overheard Gagnon make a similar
comment to Jenson as they observed Gates leave Royal Manor, accompanied
by a Board agent and a representative of the Union. Gagnon could not
recall making such a comment.
\25\This meant approximately $40 more per week for Noble, reducing,
by almost half, any financial saving realized by the layoff of Gates,
who earned $5 per hour for no more than 22 hours a week.
Noble eventually tired of doing the combined social services/medical
records job for Respondent, was able to find another job, and, on
October 4, quit her job with Respondent, declining Jenson's offer to
continue just in the medical records job. Jenson testified that,
thereafter, Respondent hired an individual to perform only the medical
records work as ``. . . the person that I hired . . . I didn't feel was
qualified to do social services.'' Conveniently, Royal Manor's
activities director also quit her job at that time, and, to fill the
position, Jenson advertised for an individual, who could perform that
work and who was experienced in social services work. She admitted that
she never offered the job to Eunice Gates.
\26\She described such an event as entirely out of the ordinary as
he had previously never come into her office.
\27\Jennings, who stated that he visited the Royal Manor for 2 days
prior to the election and spoke to approximately 14 employees and that,
when he does ``rounds'' at any of his facilities, he tries to speak to
each employee on a personal basis, admitted going into Noble's office,
thanking her ``for doing such a good job,'' and asking ``. . . was there
anything I could do to make things better or anything that needs to be
improved at the facility;'' however, ``I don't remember talking to her
about Eunice Gates.''
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Respondent's defense to the amended consolidated complaint
allegation, that Gates was terminated in violation of Section 8(a)(1)
and (3) of the Act, is that such was incidental to Respondent's effort,
during the spring and summer of 1994, to cut costs due to the lack of an
increase in the Medi-cal daily patient reimbursement rate in the 1994-
1995 State of California budget and a concomitant significant decline in
the Royal Manor's daily patient census.
In these regards, Jenson testified that, given the pay raise for the
certified nursing assistants and the State of California's failure to
raise the Medi-cal daily patient reimbursement rate for convalescent
hospitals of Royal Manor's size, her budgetary mandate was to reduce
expenses as much as possible.\28\ Initially, she sought to reduce the
cost of supplies by ``. . . trying to find a cheaper vendor that would
still give us the same quality that we needed for our supplies.'' Also,
``. . . we . . . looked into how we could decrease the payroll and check
the staff.'' As to this, she testified, at the end of July, Riverside
Convalescent Hospital's director of staff development, a full-time
position, quit her job, and Jenson decided to combine the positions at
Riverside and Royal Manor, enabling her to make the director of staff
development position at Royal Manor a half-time position and to reduce
the salary paid by Respondent to the individual in that job
classification by half--a saving of $500 per pay period. Other cost-
savings personnel decisions, reached by Jenson during this time period,
included not replacing a laundry supervisor who quit and combining the
position with a housekeeping supervisory position and eliminating a 4-
hour afternoon certified nursing assistant shift, the hours of which had
been shared by individuals in that job classification.
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\28\This is not to say that Respondent eliminated all efforts to
raise additional revenues. Thus, according to Jenson, the daily patient
rate for private payers was increased by $5.
Bryan Jennings testified that Respondent's cash flow problems are
reflected on ``its cash flow sheets,'' which are kept by Jenson on a
month-to-month basis. Respondent failed to offer such documents into the
record in support of its economic defense.
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While implementing these cost-savings measures, according to Jenson,
she observed, in August, that the daily patient census, or bed count, at
the Royal Manor ``. . . went down, down, down. . . . It went down
significantly.''\29\ On this point, Respondent has 49 available patient
beds, and analysis of Respondent's Exhibits 4 and 7 reveals that, in
June, the daily patient census was 48 on most days and never became
lower than 46; that, in July, the daily patient census ranged between 47
(July 1 through 4) and 44 (July 24 and 25) with the bed count on most
days being 45; that, in August, the daily patient census was either 44
or 45 with the bed count at the latter figure from August 1 through 13
and August 24 through 31; and that, in September, the daily patient
census ranged between 47 and 42 with the bed count during the final 6
days ranging from 44 to 42. Confronted with these figures which do
support an asserted precipitous decline in the daily patient census in
August, Jenson averred that a change in the daily bed count of just one
to three beds has a significant effect upon income and costs and is
something about which to be concerned.\30\ The Royal Manor administrator
testified that, with matters in the above posture in August and with
Jennings pressuring her to further reduce costs by, among other things,
cutting employees' hours of work, ``. . . the only thing we could think
of was to eliminate . . . the social services person and put that with a
full-time position,'' the medical records clerk, which combined job was
offered to Mickey Noble.\31\
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\29\Bryan Jennings testified that the daily patient census began
going down in May or June; however, no records were offered to support
his assertion, and Jenson failed to corroborate him on this point.
\30\Gates testified that there were no more than ``maybe five''
empty beds on August 23; that, during her 3-1/2 years of employment at
the Royal Manor, the daily patient census never dropped below 42; that
the bed count normally was in the mid to upper 40's; and that no one had
ever previously been laid off when the bed count dropped. Certified
nursing assistant, Fay Wilkerson, testified that, she was surprised that
Gates was laid off as ``. . . we had been down patients before, and they
have never laid nobody off. . . .''
\31\The job of social services director was the only regular part-
time position at Royal Manor.
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Respondent advanced several reasons for failing to offer the
combined social services/medical records job to Eunice Gates. According
to Jenson, her primary consideration was the alleged discriminatee's
lack of training to perform the job. She testified, ``[Gates] couldn't
do medical records . . . . She didn't have the training or the skills to
do medical records.'' In this regard, Jenson stated that Gates did not
have strong documentation and charting skills and pointed to an early
August incident in which, after investigating a complaint by the family
of a former patient regarding the patient's transfer to another
convalescent hospital, State of California officials issued a
``statement of deficiencies'' to Respondent, which document, among other
deficiencies, noted the absence of a documented discharge plan, the
preparation of which was the responsibility of the social services
director.\32\ Also, Jenson testified, she did not consider Gates for the
new position as, in the fall of 1993, Gates temporarily assumed the
additional duties of activities director and, when asked to take over
the combined job on a permanent full-time basis, Gates said, ``I don't
want a full-time position.''\33\ As Respondent's final reason for
concluding that Gates would not be able to perform the new combined job
as well as Noble, Jenson pointed to the undisputed fact that, unlike
Noble, Gates neither possessed a driver's license nor owned a car. On
this point, notwithstanding that there is no record evidence that Gates'
lack of a driver's license or car was ever mentioned to her as a job
performance problem and while conceding that Gates never requested her
help, Jenson stated that ``. . . there were several times that [Gates]
needed to perform an errand . . . for a resident that either myself or
another staff member had to do because Eunice didn't have a vehicle.''
Jenson added that such placed a strain upon the staff as ``. . . it took
time away from their work.'' Nevertheless, during her cross-examination,
Jenson admitted that Respondent never told the alleged discriminatee
that her job was in jeopardy because she did not have a car or a
driver's license, and Gates denied that her lack of a driver's license
ever caused a problem and stated that her practice was to purchase items
for patients while on her way to and from work.
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\32\Analysis of the deficiencies report reveals that lack of a
documented discharge plan is the final finding of the state
investigators and not one upon which the investigators placed much
emphasis. Thus, the report is critical of the Royal Manor staffs failure
to develop a ``comprehensive care plan'' to meet the patient's medical,
nursing, mental, and physiological needs; Royal Manor's apparent
exclusion of the patient's family from the decision making process; and
the lack of a clear plan to place the patient in another convalescent
facility.
Vikki Gagnon corroborated Jenson that Gates had failed to prepare a
discharge plan for the patient and that such was Gates' responsibility.
Thereafter, according to Gagnon, ``. . . I tried to make sure that
Eunice was up on her charting.'' Gates recalled the state investigation
and conceded being informed by Alenia Dial that there had been
documentation ``deficiencies.'' During cross-examination, she conceded
that she was responsible for documenting discharge plans and that the
patient's file was incomplete in this regard.
\33\During cross-examination, Gates denied that the combined
activities director/social services director job had ever been offered
to her on a full-time basis and stated that she would have accepted the
combined job if it had been offered on such a basis. Finally, she stated
that such was never stated as a reason for her layoff.
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Based upon the allegations of the amended consolidated complaint and
the testimony of the various witnesses, several alleged unfair labor
practices occurred during the two week period prior to the day of the
election, September 16. There is no dispute that, early one morning,
Certified Nursing Assistants Robyn Taylor and Faye Wilkerson had a
conversation with Vikki Gagnon in the breakroom. According to Taylor,
who placed the conversation as occurring 2 weeks before the election,
she was speaking to Wilkerson and another employee, Dorothy Haddox, when
Gagnon entered the room, sat down, and asked, ``What can the Union do
for you?'' Haddox responded that the Union could help with medical
benefits, and Gagnon replied, ``. . . that if we did get the Union in .
. . they would still find a reason to fire us . . . and we wouldn't get
unemployment.'' Taylor added that she departed at that point and heard
nothing more, and she denied that Gagnon mentioned implementing a
progressive discipline system for employees. Wilkerson, who recalled the
conversation as occurring 2 or 3 days before the election and who
conceded that she is a close friend of Gates, corroborated Taylor that
she, Haddox, and Taylor were speaking in the breakroom when Gagnon
entered and immediately asked ``. . . what the Union can do for us, and
I told her it could pay for our medical . . . . because I know, because
I have been in a union before.'' Wilkerson further recalled that, with
regard to what the Union could or could not do for the employees, Gagnon
said that ``[j]ust because you have a union in there, it doesn't mean
that the union can save your job'' and that, with regard to whether she
knew how to terminate people, ``she said she knew how to go by steps.
She would have to go by steps . . .'' and ``[the Union] couldn't save
your job.'' Gagnon agreed that such a conversation occurred, testifying
that the three employees ``. . . asked me my opinion of the Union. . . .
And basically what I remember saying was that I didn't feel that they
protected their employees. I also made mention that I thought that union
dues could be better spent for their Christmas.'' She added that the
subject of progressive discipline arose as ``we were just talking,'' and
``. . . I told them my process of discipline and termination is exactly
the same as the Union's.''
Faye Wilkerson testified that she had a conversation with Andre
Paige, the Royal Manor's administrative assistant, on the Friday before
the election. They were in the dining room, and ``he was telling me that
Judy Jenson was looking for me . . . because she wanted to talk to me''
and ``it had something to do with the Union.'' Thereupon, Paige ``. . .
asked me if I wanted the Union. I didn't answer it, though. I didn't say
yes or no.''\34\ According to Wilkerson, on the following Monday, just
before her break, she approached Jenson in a hallway and asked if the
latter wanted to speak to her. Jenson asked ``. . . did I know anything
about the Union, and I told her, `no' And she asked me if it was okay if
[Bryan Jennings] talked to me, and I told her, `yes.'''\35\ Later in the
same day, Wilkerson testified, while she was taking a break in a rear
office, Jennings approached and asked if they could step outside the
building. They walked outside by the kitchen, and Jennings began, asking
``. . . did I know anything about the Union. And I told him, `no.' And
he said when he was in the hospital, he . . . got really sick hearing .
. . they were trying to get the Union in there.'' Continuing, Jennings
``. . . wanted to know why we wanted the Union. . . . And he wanted to
know if I could help him to keep the Union out of there'' by speaking to
the other employees and finding out why they wanted a union. The subject
of the conversation turned to the Royal Manor employees' benefits and,
in particular, her wage rate. Wilkerson said she was earning $6.35 per
hour and wanted at least $7 per hour, and ``he said that . . . I should
have a raise coming up pretty soon.'' Although giving a different
version, Jennings admitted that such a conversation occurred ``. . . in
the back of the hospital, near the kitchen.'' According to Jennings, ``I
had asked her what was going on, why the Union was coming in . . . . and
she said `I don't know' and shrugged her shoulders.'' Wilkerson then
remarked she was concerned about health insurance and asked why
Respondent didn't pay half of each employee's insurance, and Jennings
responded that there had been a rate increase and that he wouldn't pay
it. Jennings specifically denied soliciting Wilkerson to tell other
employees to vote against the Union.\36\
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\34\Paige denied the conversation.
\35\Jenson denied ever asking Wilkerson anything about the Union.
\36\Jennings averred that, while speaking to other employees, as
``I'm very close to some,'' two or three volunteered the information
that Wilkerson was the ``ringleader'' of the union campaign.
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Finally, alleged discriminatee, Eunice Gates, testified that, on
September 16, the day of the election, which, apparently was divided
into two sessions, accompanied by a union business agent, she arrived at
the Royal Manor in order to vote. She went inside and recognized David
Cohen, an attorney for Respondent. The latter spoke to Gates, and ``. .
. he told me I have to leave the facility, that I shouldn't even be
there, because I had been terminated, I shouldn't be there. . . . And I
couldn't vote. . . .'' Gates characterized Cohen's tone of voice as ``.
. . kind of abrupt and short'' and stated that she did not cast a ballot
that day.\37\ During her cross-examination, Gates testified that the
Board agent ``. . . [wasn't] going to explain [the procedure for casting
a challenged ballot] to me. This is when Mr. Cohen got involved.''
Confirming that he saw and spoke to Gates on the day of the election but
denying that he ever said she was not entitled to vote or that he
ejected Gates from the facility, attorney Cohen testified, ``I
questioned whether she had the right to be the Union observer since she
was not currently employed at the facility.'' Cohen added that the only
time voting arose with regard to Gates was in the afternoon when she
appeared after the closing of the election and was denied an opportunity
to vote by the Board agent.
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\37\During cross-examination, Gates was confronted with her pretrial
affidavit in which she stated that the initial part of the conversation
concerned the Union's use of her as an observer during the election,
Cohen's objection to said status for Gates as she was no longer an
employee, and the Union's ultimate acquiescence to Cohen's arguments and
agreement to use another observer. Then, the Union asked that Gates be
allowed onto the premises in order to vote. Cohen again objected because
Gates had been terminated and was no longer an employee. The Board agent
then explained that she could vote a challenged ballot. Gates did not do
so, and the affidavit, on this matter, ends with the words ```I did not
vote that day because Cohen said that I was not eligible to vote.'''
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The tally of ballots for the election shows that, of 33 eligible
voters, 22 employees cast ballots and that 11 voted in favor of the
Union and 11 voted against the Union. There were no challenged ballots.
On September 19, the Union filed objections to the conduct of the
election, listing eight objections.
B. LEGAL ANALYSIS
The amended consolidated complaint alleges that Respondent engaged
in several acts and conduct, violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act,
and, in this regard, I initially turn to consideration of the legality
of the wage increase, which was announced in mid-July and given to all
certified nursing assistant employees on or about August 1.\38\ Arguing
that Respondent's granting of the wage increase was ``clearly well-timed
to influence the Union election the following month'' and citing the
decision of the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S.
405 (1964), counsel for the General Counsel contends that the purpose of
the raise was to convince employees to reject the Union as their
bargaining representative rather than to aid in recruiting certified
nursing assistants and that, therefore, the wage increase was unlawful.
To the contrary, counsel for Respondent argues that the pay increase was
given in response to surveys which showed that the Royal Manor was
paying its certified nursing assistants less than what other area
convalescent hospitals were paying to employees in the job
classification and that the decision to implement the increase was
reached prior to the Union's filing of its representation petition. In
Exchange Parts, the Supreme Court stated that ``the danger inherent in
well-timed increases in benefits is the suggestion of a fist inside the
velvet glove. Employees are not likely to miss the inference that the
source of benefits now conferred is also the source from which future
benefits must flow . . . .'' Id. at 409. In several subsequent
decisions, the Board adopted the position that the granting of a wage
increase during the course of a union's organizing campaign is prima
facie or presumptive evidence that such is intended to undermine the
union's effort and is, thus, violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and
that the burden rested with the respondent to establish that the
increase was granted for reasons other than to undermine employee
support for the union. Brooks Bros., 261 NLRB 876, 882 (1982);
Montgomery Ward & Co., 253 NLRB 196, 205 (1980); Chester Valley, Inc.,
251 NLRB 1435 (1980).
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\38\The amended consolidated complaint allegation, that such was an
``across-the-board'' wage increase is apparently incorrect, and counsel
for the General Counsel did not challenge Respondent's evidence that the
raise was only given to certified nursing assistants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
More recently, however, the Board has refused to rely upon any such
presumption that a pay raise conferred during an organizing campaign is
unlawful; rather, it now examines the record evidence as a whole,
including whether the respondent has established legitimate reasons for
the timing of the increase, in order to determine whether an inference
may properly be drawn that the intent of the wage increase was to
interfere with its employees' freedom of choice. Speco Corp., 298 NLRB
439 at fn. 2 (1990); Montgomery Ward & Co., 288 NLRB 126, 127 at fn. 6
(1988). Herein, the record evidence, regarding the timing of, and
underlying rationale for, the announcement and implementation of the
wage increase for Respondent's certified nursing assistants, was
uncontroverted. Moreover, while the respective credibility of
Respondent's witnesses, Judy Jenson and Bryan Jennings, appeared to be
markedly deficient in comparison to that of two of the witnesses, who
were proffered by counsel for the General Counsel, I did not find either
to be inherently incredible. Accordingly, relying upon the respective,
unrefuted testimony of Jennings and Jenson,\39\ I find that the impetus,
underlying the challenged wage increase, was Respondent's inability to
recruit qualified certified nursing assistants during the month of May
and the resulting necessity that its employees, in the job
classification, work substantial, and costly, overtime hours; that the
latter was a significant cost factor at a time when Respondent was faced
with the lack of an increase in the State of California's daily Medi-cal
reimbursement rate for patients; that, in May and June, Jenson and
Jennings spoke to officials of comparable Sacramento-area convalescent
hospitals and ascertained that, while Respondent's starting standard
rate of pay for certified nursing assistants was higher than some and
lower than others, its starting per diem rate of pay for certified
nursing assistants was significantly lower than the area norm;\40\ and
that, in June, Jennings and Jenson concluded that, despite the lack of
the anticipated Medi-cal reimbursement rate increase, in order to
recruit and hire competent certified nursing assistants and to reduce
overtime costs, Respondent had no choice but to increase its starting
per diem wage rate for certified nursing assistants and, in order to be
equitable, also to increase the standard wage rate for the employees. In
these circumstances, I find that Respondent did establish legitimate
reasons for the timing of its challenged wage increase, which were
unrelated to its employees Section 7 rights or to the pending election
and shall recommend dismissal of paragraph 13 of the amended
consolidated complaint. Stanton Industries of California, 313 NLRB 838
(1994).
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\39\It is, of course, not unusual that a trier of fact believes
some, but not all, of a witness' testimony.
\40\Counsel for the General Counsel attacks the validity of
Respondent's surveys, which were limited to wages, as failing to
consider and compare the cost of the fringe benefits, which were paid by
the other area convalescent hospitals, to those paid by Respondent to
its certified nursing assistants. However, Jennings was adamant that he
was only concerned with wage rates, and, of course, the issue herein is
not the sufficiency of the wage surveys but whether such were, in fact,
conducted. In this regard, I credit both Jenson and Jennings that each
conducted such a survey.
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With regard to the remaining allegations of violations of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act, analysis of the respective credibility of the
various witnesses is required. At the outset, I believe that, as
compared to Bryan Jennings and Judy Jenson, Faye Wilkerson, who was
employed by Respondent at the time of the hearing, and Mickey Noble, who
voluntarily left her job with Respondent in October 1994, were
significantly more impressive witnesses, with each appearing to have
testified in a forthright and candid manner.\41\ Therefore, I shall rely
upon Wilkerson's and Noble's versions of conversations in considering
whether such constitute violations of the Act. Several acts of unlawful
interrogation allegedly occurred during the period between the filing of
the representation election and election on September 16. As to these, I
find that, on August 12, in her office, Jenson asked Noble whether she
had heard about the Union and what she was going to vote; that, one
morning shortly before the election, Vikki Gagnon encountered employees
Faye Wilkerson, Robyn Taylor, and Dorothy Haddox in the breakroom and
questioned the three employees as to what the Union could do for them;
that, on the Friday before the election, Andre Paige located Faye
Wilkerson in the dining room and, after informing her that Jenson wanted
to speak to her, asked Wilkerson whether she ``wanted'' the Union; that,
on the following Monday, after Wilkerson found Jenson in a hallway and
asked if the latter wanted to speak to her, Jenson asked Wilkerson
whether she knew anything about the Union; and that, later in the same
day, after requesting Wilkerson to speak with him outside the facility,
Jennings admittedly asked her why the employees wanted the Union.
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\41\Likewise, Wilkerson and Noble impressed me as being more candid
witnesses than either Vikki Gagnon and Andre Paige and shall be relied
upon whenever in conflict with the latter two individuals. Robyn Taylor
was not an impressive witness and shall be relied upon only to the
extent she was corroborated by Wilkerson.
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As directed by the Board in Rossmore House, 269 NLRB 1176, 1177
(1984), I must consider the circumstances surrounding each incident in
determining whether each constituted unlawful, coercive
interrogation.\42\ Thus, I note that, as to the Jenson interrogation of
Noble, there is no record evidence that Noble was an avowed supporter of
the Union, Jenson is the administrator of the Royal Manor and the
individual in charge of day-to-day operations, the interrogation
occurred in Jenson's office, and there appears to have been no purpose
for Jenson's questions other than to determine Noble's union sentiments;
that, as to the Jenson interrogation of Wilkerson, there is no record
evidence that Jenson had any knowledge as to Wilkerson's Union
sympathies and the only conceivable purpose for Jenson's question was to
discover the employee's union sentiments; and that, with regard to the
Jennings interrogation of Wilkerson, there is no record evidence that
Wilkerson was an avowed supporter of the Union, Jennings is the
president of the corporation which operates the Royal Manor, Jennings
requested that Wilkerson speak to him in private outside the facility,
and there appears to have been no valid purpose for his question. In the
above circumstances, noting that Jenson's and Jenning's questions sought
to elicit the precise type of information employees are privileged to
keep from their employers, I find that Jenson's interrogations of Noble
and Wilkerson and Jennings admitted interrogation of Wilkerson were each
coercive and violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Custom Window
Extrusions, 314 NLRB 850, 855-856 (1994); Waste Management of Utah, 310
NLRB 883, 890 (1993). Likewise, the question, which was posed by Gagnon
as she commenced her conversation with employees Wilkerson, Taylor, and
Haddox in the breakroom must be considered coercive. Thus, she had no
knowledge of the employees' union sentiments, the purpose of the
question could only have been to determine the union sentiments of the
employees, and her question was accompanied by later comments, which, as
shall be discussed infra, unlawfully conveyed to the employees the
futility of supporting the Union. Accordingly, Gagnon's interrogation of
the three certified nursing assistants constituted coercive
interrogation, violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, and I so find.
Debber Electric, 313 NLRB 1094, 1097 (1994). On the other hand, Andre
Paige was not Wilkerson's immediate supervisor, and his question of
Wilkerson seems to have been casually placed and not coercive.
Accordingly, I find that his question was not violative of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
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\42\The surrounding circumstances include the time and place of the
interrogation, whether the employee is an avowed supporter of the Union,
and the capacity of the interrogator. The Hertz Corp., 316 NLRB 672, 683
(1995).
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Crediting the testimony of Mickey Noble, I find that, prior to the
election, during a conversation, Jenson informed Noble that she knew
Eunice Gates had ``started'' the Union and that, one day during the last
week of August, Jennings came into her office and, among other things,
said he knew Gates had ``caused'' the Union. The Board has long held
that, when, in comments to its employees, an employer specifically names
other employees as having started a union movement or as being among the
union leaders, the employer unlawfully creates the impression, in the
minds of its employees, that he has been engaged in surveillance of his
employees' union activities. Jenson's and Jenning's comments to Noble
are of this type and were, therefore, violative of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act. Athens Disposal Co., 315 NLRB 87, 98 (1994); Garney Morris,
Inc., 313 NLRB 101, 116 (1993). On the other hand, while I believe that
the incidents occurred as described and reveal the extent to which
Respondent believed Gates was involved in the Union's organizing
campaign, I do not believe that Jenson's comment to Gagnon on August 23,
which was overheard by Wilkerson, or Gagnon's comment to Jenson on
September 16, which was overheard by Noble, were unlawful. Thus, the
comments were made during conversation between the two management
officials and were not directed to the employees; therefore, neither
could not have been intended to create the impression of surveillance in
the mind of either employee. Accordingly, neither comment was violative
of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Crediting, in particular, Faye Wilkerson and Robyn Taylor, to the
extent she corroborated Wilkerson, I find that, during the breakroom
conversation with Wilkerson, Taylor, and Haddox, after interrogating the
three employees as to what the Union could do for them, Gagnon informed
the employees that, being represented by a union ``. . . doesn't mean
that the union can save your job'' and that, in order to terminate
employees ``she would have to go by steps and ``[the Union] couldn't
save your job.'' While I do not believe that the comments arise to the
level of unlawful threats of discharge,\43\ I do agree with counsel for
the General Counsel that, by her comments, Gagnon, in effect,
communicated to the employees that, despite the presence of the Union,
Respondent could act as it pleased with regard to them. The Board has
long held, and I find, that comments, such as made by Gagnon, constitute
unlawful expressions of the futility of selecting a union as their
bargaining representative and, therefore, are violative of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. Hertz Corp., supra; American Furniture Co., 293 NLRB
408 at fn. 2 (1989).
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\43\I shall, therefore, recommend dismissal of par. 11(b) of the
amended consolidated complaint.
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Again crediting Wilkerson, I find that, during her conversation with
Jennings on the Monday preceding the election, the latter ``. . . wanted
to know if I could help him to keep the Union out of there'' by speaking
to the other employees and finding out why they wanted a union. The
Board holds that a solicitation by an employer of an employee to
campaign against a union violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. McCarty
Processors, 292 NLRB 359, 367 (1989); Delco-Remy Division, 234 NLRB 995,
996 (1978). Similarly, by soliciting Wilkerson to interrogate her fellow
employees as to their union sympathies and activities on Respondent's
behalf, Jennings likewise engaged in conduct violative of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act, and I so conclude. Finally, although counsel for the
General Counsel did not seek to amend the amended consolidated complaint
to allege his comment as unlawful, Bryan Jennings admitted that, during
his conversation with Mickey Noble in her office, he asked her ``. . .
was there anything I could do to make things better or anything that
needs to be improved at the facility.'' I do not believe that Jenning's
comment was innocently intended and find that it constituted nothing
less than a solicitation of complaints or grievances from Noble. The
Board has long held that, during an organizing or election campaign, by
asking employees for their complaints concerning their working
conditions, an employer unlawfully impliedly promises to make changes.
HarperCollins Publishers, 317 NLRB 168 (1995); Great Plains Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 311 NLRB 509, 513 (1993); Columbus Mills, 303 NLRB 225,
227 (1991). Accordingly, I find\44\ that Jennings comment was violative
of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
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\44\Given that this finding is based upon an admission by
Respondent, it obviously was fully litigated.
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Turning to consideration of whether Respondent's termination\45\ of
Eunice Gates was violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, I
note, at the outset, that my determination of the legality of
Respondent's conduct is governed by the traditional precepts of Board
law in alleged union animus discharge cases, as modified by the Board's
decision in Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1990), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st
Cir. 1981), cert. denied 453 U.S. 989 (1982), approved in Transportation
Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983). Thus, in order to prove a prima
facie violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, the General
Counsel has the burden of establishing that the alleged discriminatees
engaged in union activities; that Respondent had knowledge of such
conduct; that Respondent's actions were motivated by union animus; and
that the discharges and layoffs had the effect of encouraging or
discouraging membership in the Union. United Broadcasting Co. of New
Hampshire, 253 NLRB 697, 703 (1980). Further, the General Counsel has
the burden of proving the foregoing matters by a preponderance of the
evidence. Gonic Mfg. Co., 141 NLRB 201, 209 (1963). However, while the
above analysis is easily applied in cases in which a respondent's
motivation is straightforward, conceptual problems arise in cases in
which the record evidence discloses the presence of both a lawful and an
unlawful cause for the allegedly unlawful conduct. In order to resolve
this ambiguity, in Wright Line, supra, the Board established a causation
test in all Section 8(a)(1) and (3) cases involving employer motivation.
``First, we shall require that the General Counsel make a prima facie
showing sufficient to support the inference that protected conduct was a
`motivating factor' in the employer's decision. Once this is
established, the burden will shift to the employer to demonstrate that
the same action would have taken place even in the absence of the
protected conduct.'' Id. at 1089. Two points are relevant to the
foregoing analytical approach. First, in concluding that the General
Counsel has established a prima facie showing of unlawful animus, the
Board will not ``. . . quantitatively analyze the effect of the unlawful
motive. The existence of such is sufficient to make a discharge a
violation of the Act.'' Id. at 1089 fn. 4. Second, once the burden has
shifted to the employer, the crucial inquiry is not whether Respondent
could have engaged in the discharges and layoffs herein, but, rather,
whether Respondent would have done so in the absence of the alleged
discriminatees' union activities and support. Structural Composites
Industries, 304 NLRB 729 (1991); Filene's Basement Store, 299 NLRB 183
(1990).
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\45\While Respondent may not have discharged Gates, given the fact
that Jenson failed to offer her the combined activities/social services
director job in October, it is clear that the personnel action was more
than just a simple layoff.
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Herein, there can be no question but that the General Counsel has
established a prima facie violation that Respondent's termination of
Gates was violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. Thus, it was
uncontroverted that Gates was the employee who initially contacted the
Union regarding representing the employees at the Royal Manor and that
Gates personally distributed to and collected from the employees of the
Royal Manor most, if not all, of the Union's executed authorization
cards. Moreover, it is clear that Respondent knew or believed that, if
not the originator of the union organizing campaign amongst the Royal
Manor employees, Gates was, at least, one of the leading union
adherents. In this regard, I previously have found that Ruth Jenson told
Mickey Noble that Gates was the employee, who ``started'' the union
movement at the Royal Manor and that, in another conversation with
Noble, Bryan Jennings labeled Gates as the employee, who had ``caused''
the union movement. Also, I credit Faye Wilkerson that, on the day of
Gates' layoff, after being told by Gates that the Union had found
another job for her, Gagnon reported the conversation to Jenson, and,
overheard by Wilkerson, Jenson responded to Gagnon, ``I told you Eunice
worked for the Union.'' Further, that Respondent harbored unlawful
animus toward Gates may be seen from Jennings remark to Noble, which I
credit, that ``. . . people were telling him that Gates was a lot of
trouble . . . .'' Accordingly, I believe that the General Counsel
established a prima facie showing that Gates was terminated because
Respondent believed that she was one of the organizers of the union
campaign at the Royal Manor.
In these circumstances, the burden shifted to Respondent to
establish that it would have terminated Gates notwithstanding her
involvement in the Union's organizing campaign. As to this, Respondent
contends that, due to budgetary considerations and a declining patient
census, the decision was reached to eliminate the position of social
services director, the only part-time position remaining amongst its
work force. Thus, Respondent's contention, that, in August, faced with a
pending budget crisis due to increased costs, in part, resulting from
the necessary wage rate increase given to certified nursing assistants,
and stagnant revenues due to the State of California's failure to
provide, in its 1994-1995 budget, for a daily Medi-cal reimbursement
rate increase for convalescent hospitals of the size of the Royal Manor,
it began to implement cost-savings measures, including combining the
social services and medical records jobs, was uncontroverted. In these
circumstances, I credit the testimony of Jenson\46\ that, among the
cost-savings measures implemented by Respondent, were seeking less
expensive service and product vendors; combining the director of staff
development positions at the Royal Manor and at Riverside Convalescent
Hospital, a saving of $500 per pay period; leaving unfilled a vacant
housekeeping supervisory position and combining the position's
responsibilities with those of a laundry supervisory position; and
eliminating a 4-hour afternoon certified nursing assistant's shift.
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\46\I recognize that Respondent offered no financial records,
corroborative of Jenson's testimony and considered the lack of such in
crediting Jenson. However, her testimony was utterly uncontroverted. If
counsel for the General Counsel had cast the slightest degree of doubt
on Jenson's testimony on these points, the lack of corroborative
evidence might have weighed more heavily in my decision to credit
whether or not to credit Jenson; however, no contrary evidence was
adduced by counsel. Finally, I recognize that I have not credited
Jenson's testimony in other regards. However, as I stated above, it is
not unusual for a trier of fact to believe portions of a witness'
testimony and to disbelieve other aspects.
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When viewed against the aforementioned background of a foreseeable
revenue shortfall and cost reduction efforts, the decline in the patient
census, Respondent's second reason for eliminating the social services
director position and the reason given to Gates for her layoff, also
appears valid and reasonable. Thus, notwithstanding Jenson's unwarranted
hyperbole regarding the August daily patient census, the record evidence
is indisputable that Respondent did experience a decline in the daily
patient bed count from a range of 46 to 48 patients in June to 44 or 45
in August, and, in light of the above circumstances, Jenson's comment,
regarding the negative impact of a seemingly slight one to three bed
patient census decline, is credible. Moreover, while the record
establishes that the daily patient census had become as low as 44 or 45
on previous occasions without occasioning an employee layoff, there is
no record evidence, regarding Respondent's surrounding financial
circumstances, on those other occasions, and the instant uncontroverted
record evidence of budget problems, resulting from the unchanged Medi-
cal patient reimbursement rate, warrants a conclusion that the declining
August patient census did, in fact, adversely impact upon Respondent's
perceived financial difficulties.
In these circumstances, I must credit Jenson that a logical cost-
savings measure was to eliminate the social services director position,
which was the only regular part-time job at the Royal Manor, and to
combine the job duties of said position with those of the medical
records clerk. This combined job was, of course, offered to Mickey
Noble, and, while, I believe, Jenson may have been less than candid as
to one of her reasons for doing so,\47\ I further credit Respondent's
administrator's testimony that her primary consideration in not offering
the position to Gates was Gates's lack of experience and training for
the medical records job and that another consideration was Gates'
previous rejection of an offer of a full-time combined social services
director and activities director job. As to the former reason, Mickey
Noble, who otherwise testified adversely to Respondent's interests,
stated that the medical records job required training and experience and
that it would have been exceedingly difficult for someone, with no such
training or experience, to perform the required job tasks. There is no
record evidence that Eunice Gates possessed the necessary skills or
training for that work. Further, Jenson did not believe Gates had the
required charting and documentation skills for the position, and I
believe Gates' failure to document a discharge plan for a patient, which
was noted by State of California investigators in a deficiencies report
and which was conceded by Gates, exemplifies her lack of documentation
skills. As to the latter reason, inasmuch as it is highly unlikely that
Respondent would have insisted that she perform combined jobs on a part-
time basis, I credit Jenson over Gates that, in the fall of 1993, she
offered Gates the combined activities/social services director job on a
full-time basis and that the latter refused the position. Accordingly,
based upon consideration of the record as a whole, I am convinced that,
despite what I consider to be obvious fabrication of other aspects of
its defense to the amended consolidated complaint allegations,
Respondent has established, to my satisfaction, that it would have laid
off Gates on August 23 notwithstanding its suspicions of her part in the
Union's organizing campaign and its demonstrable animus toward her and
that, therefore, her layoff on August 23 was not violative of Section
8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. In these circumstances, I shall recommend
dismissal of paragraph 14 of the amended consolidated complaint.
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\47\In particular, I do not believe that Gates' lack of a driver's
license or a car had anything to do with Jenson's decision and do not
credit her in this regard. Gates had performed the social services
director job for 2-1/2 years, and it seems obvious that, if Gates' lack
of a driver's license or a car had been a problem for Respondent, it
would have been resolved before August 1994.
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C. THE PROPRIETY OF A BARGAINING ORDER REMEDY
The General Counsel seeks a bargaining order as the only appropriate
remedy for Respondent's unfair labor practices herein. In this regard,
in determining whether the various acts and conduct, violative of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, in which Respondent engaged, are
sufficiently serious to warrant the imposition of a bargaining order
remedy, I am, of course, guided by the test of the Supreme Court set
forth in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 295 U.S. 575 (1969). Therein, the
Court described two types of situations where such an order would be
appropriate. The first category involves ``exceptional'' cases, marked
by ``outrageous'' and ``pervasive'' unfair labor practices as to which
traditional remedies cannot erase their coercive effects with the result
that a fair election is rendered impossible. The second concerns ``less
extraordinary cases marked by less pervasive [conduct] which nonetheless
still have the tendency to undermine majority strength and impede the
election processes.'' Id. at 613-614. The Supreme Court added that, in
the latter type of case, a bargaining order should issue whenever the
Board finds that ``the possibility of erasing the effects of past
practices and of ensuring a fair election . . . by the use of
traditional remedies, though present, is slight and that employee
sentiment once expressed through cards would, on balance, be better
protected by a bargaining order.'' Id. at 614-615. While, in my view,
Respondent's unlawful acts and conduct arguably fall within the second
category, even assuming that the Union established majority status in
the bargaining unit, which the amended consolidated complaint alleges as
appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining,\48\ at the time
Respondent committed the unfair labor practices, which I have found
herein, I do not believe that the acts and conduct were not so egregious
as to preclude the holding of a fair and reliable second election after
the application of the Board's traditional remedies.
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\48\In view of my holding herein, I need not decide whether the
Decision and Direction of Election, which was issued by the Regional
Director of Region 20, as to which there was no request for review
filed, acts as res judicata on the question of the appropriateness of
the bargaining unit or whether such is the ``best evidence'' of a
stipulation of the parties on that issue.
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Thus, I have found that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act by interrogating its employees about their union activities and
sympathies and those of their fellow employees, creating, in the minds
of its employees, the impression that their union activities were under
surveillance, informing its employees that selecting the Union as their
bargaining representative would be futile as the Union would not be able
to save their jobs; soliciting employees to interrogate their fellow
employees concerning their union sympathies and activities on its
behalf; and soliciting grievances from employees and impliedly promising
to remedy the complaints. There is no question that each of the
foregoing unlawful acts and conduct constitutes a serious violation of
the Act; however, none of Respondent's acts, which I have found
unlawful, involves such employer misbehavior as closing the business or
threatening to do so, discharging employees or threatening to do so, or
the granting of benefits to employees--the so-called ``hallmark''
violations of the Act, the presence of which clearly warrant the
issuance of a bargaining order. NLRB v. Jamaica Towing, 632 F.2d 208 (2d
Cir. 1980); Horizon Air Services, 272 NLRB 243 (1984). In this regard,
the instant matters may be distinguished from such cases as
HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., supra, and Kona 60 Minute Photo, 277
NLRB 867 (1985), in which bargaining orders were issued based upon
violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act but also in which the unlawful
conduct included hallmark violations, including threats of discharge and
office closure. Moreover, without denigrating their seriousness, the
instant unfair labor practices involve statements as opposed to employer
actions or threatened acts, such as unlawful discharges or plant
closure, and, therefore, did not have a lasting inhibitive effect on a
substantial percentage of the work force as would have the latter
misconduct. Cf. Horizon Air Services, supra. Finally, I note that the
alleged unfair labor practices were directed toward just three
employees, one of whom voluntarily quit in October. In the foregoing
circumstances, I cannot find that Respondent's unlawful acts and conduct
constituted unfair labor practices so pervasive and substantial so as to
have dissipated the Union's majority status and to have been so
disruptive of the election process to preclude the holding of a fair and
reliable second election after the application of the traditional
remedies. Accordingly, the General Counsel's request for a bargaining
order remedy is unwarranted. Blue Grass Industries, 287 NLRB 274 (1987);
Fiber Glass Systems, 278 NLRB 1255 (1986); Evans Bros. Barber & Beauty
Salons, 256 NLRB 121 (1981).
THE OBJECTIONS TO THE CONDUCT OF THE ELECTION
In view of Respondent's above-described unfair labor practices,
including interrogating employees regarding their union sympathies and
activities and those of their fellow employees, creating, in the minds
of employees, the impression that Respondent was engaging in
surveillance of their union activities; informing employees that
selection of the Union as their bargaining representative would be
futile as the Union would not be able to save their jobs; soliciting
employees to interrogate their fellow employees, on its behalf,
regarding the Union, and soliciting grievances from employees and,
thereby, impliedly promising to correct them, and given that such
occurred during the critical period between the filing of the instant
petition for a representation election and the holding of the election,
I find merit in Objection No. 7 of the Union's objections to the conduct
of the election.\49\ Accordingly, it will be recommended that the
election, which was conducted on September 16, 1994, in Case 20-RC-17051
be set aside and the matter be remanded to the Regional Director of
Region 20 for the purpose of conducting another election at such time
and place he deems circumstances permit the free choice of a bargaining
representative.
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\49\As to the remainder of the objections, as no evidence was
adduced with regard to any of them, I shall recommend their dismissal.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
3. By interrogating employees with regard to their union sympathies
and activities and the union sympathies and activities of their fellow
employees, Respondent engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
4. By creating the impression, in the minds of its employees, that
it was engaged in surveillance of their union activities, Respondent
engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. By informing employees that, despite the presence of the Union as
their bargaining representative, it would not be able to save their
jobs, Respondent informed employees it would be futile for them to
select the Union as their bargaining representative, thereby engaging in
conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
6. By soliciting employees to interrogate their fellow employees
with regard to their union sympathies and activities, on its behalf,
Respondent engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
7. By soliciting grievances from employees and impliedly promising
to correct them, Respondent engaged in conduct violative of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
8. The above-described acts and conduct constitute unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7)
of the Act.
9. Unless specifically found above, Respondent engaged in no other
unfair labor practices.
THE REMEDY
I have found that Respondent engaged in serious unfair labor
practices violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Therefore, my
recommended Order will require Respondent to cease and desist therefrom
and to take certain affirmative actions designed to effectuate the
purposes and policies of the Act, including the posting of a notice.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire
record, I issue the following recommended\50\
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\50\If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board's Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and
recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived
for all purposes.
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ORDER
The Respondent, Royal Manor Convalescent Hospital, Inc., Sacramento,
California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Interrogating employees as to their union sympathies and
activities and the union sympathies and activities of their fellow
employees.
(b) Creating the impression, in the minds of its employees, that it
is engaging in surveillance of their union activities.
(c) Informing employees that, despite the presence of the Union as
their bargaining representative, it would not be able to save their jobs
and, thereby, conveying to them that selection of the Union as their
bargaining representative would be futile.
(d) Soliciting employees to interrogate their fellow employees,
regarding their union sympathies and activities, on its behalf.
(e) Soliciting grievances from employees and, thereby, impliedly
promising to correct them.
(f) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by
Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the
purposes and policies of the Act.
(a) Post at the Royal Manor Convalescent Hospital in Sacramento,
California, copies of the attached notice marked ``Appendix.''\51\
Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director of
Region 20, after being signed by the Respondent's authorized
representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon
receipt and maintained by for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
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\51\If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading ``Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board'' shall read ``Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.''
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(b) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the
date of this Order what steps the Respondent has taken to comply.
It is further ordered that the amended consolidated complaint be
dismissed insofar as it alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
and (3) of the Act by terminating Eunice Gates and Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act by granting a wage increase to its certified nursing assistants
and that the election held on September 16, 1994, in Case 20-RC-17051
be, and it hereby is, set aside and the case is hereby remanded to the
Regional Director of Region 20 for the purpose of scheduling and
conducting another election at such time that he deems circumstances
permit the free choice on the issue of representation.
Dated March 26, 1996.
APPENDIX
Notice To Employees
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations
Board has found that we violated
the National Labor Relations Act
and has ordered us to post and
abide by this notice.
We will not interrogate our employees with regard to the union
membership, sympathies, or activities or the union membership,
sympathies, or activities of their fellow employees.
We will not create in the minds of our employees the impression that
we are engaging in surveillance of their union activities.
We will not inform our employees that, despite the presence of a
union as their bargaining representative, it would not be able to save
their jobs, thereby conveying to our employees that it would be futile
to select a union as their bargaining representative.
We will not solicit our employees to interrogate their fellow
employees, regarding their union sympathies and activities, on our
behalf.
We will not solicit grievances from our employees, thereby impliedly
promising to correct them.
Service Employees Union, Local No. 22, Service
Employees International Union, AFL-CIO