Florida Steel Corp.

Florida Steel Corporation and United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO. Case II -CA-6327 August 31, 1977 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS JENKINS, MURPHY, AND WALTHER On January 5, 1977, Administrative Law Judge Karl H. Buschmann issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the Charging Party and the Respondent filed exceptions and supporting briefs. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions' of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order, 2 as modified herein. We agree with the Administrative Law Judge that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (I) of the Act by unilaterally changing wages, hours, and conditions of employment, including prohibiting the continued use of credit cards, reducing reimburse- ment rates for lodging and meal expenses, and stating that it would deduct one-half hour pay for lodging and meal expenses. We find further, in agreement with the Administrative Law Judge, that these reductions in benefits, considered with the increase in benefits for Respondent's nonunionized employees, discriminated against Respondent's unionized employees in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1). Our dissenting colleague agrees that the elimina- tion and reduction of certain benefits constituted conduct in violation of Section 8(a)(5), but he would find that there is no evidence to support a finding that Respondent's actions were motivated by a desire to discourage membership in the Union. We note that when Respondent unilaterally changed the working conditions for its drivers in Croft, it almost simultaneously increased the benefits in the non- unionized plant in Tampa. Our colleague espouses the fiction that the labor policies at Respondent's various I In the Administrative Law Judge's Decision there is some possible ambiguity with respect to whether or not he found that the Respondent independently violated Sec. 8(aX I) b threatening drivers that 30 minutes sould be deducted from their time if the); claimed a $1.75 meal allowance. Members Jenkins and Murphy conclude that no such finding was in fact made: Member Walther would view such a finding, assuming it was made, as improper. because no such violation was alleged in the complaint or urged bs the G<ieneral Counsel at the hearing. 231 NLRB No. 135 FLORIDA STEEL CORP. plants are unrelated, and the fact that Respondent informed its Tampa employees, who were in the midst of an organizing campaign, that the Croft employees were penalized because they had selected the Union has no relation to Respondent's motiva- tion. The foreshortening of our colleague's percep- tion of Respondent's conduct is evident when one considers the numerous cases in which Respondent has been found to have violated the Act.3 Several of those cases involved unfair labor practices commit- ted at the Croft facility. In fact, the Board, noting a proclivity on the part of Respondent to violate the Act, has imposed posting of the remedial notice at all of Respondent's locations. 4 Thus, Respondent's actions are simply what they appear to be: retaliation against employees for selecting the Union at Croft as an example to employees at nonunionized plants as to what would happen in the event they selected the Union. Such conduct is inherently destructive of employees' rights. In view of the foregoing, and in the absence of any attempt by Respondent to offer a business justifica- tion for its dual standard as applied to union and nonunion plants, we agree with the findings of the Administrative Law Judge that Respondent's actions violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the Respondent, Florida Steel Corporation, Croft, North Carolina, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order, as so modified: Substitute the following for paragraph 2(c): "(c) Make the truckdrivers at its Croft, North Carolina, plant whole for any financial loss they may have suffered by reason of(l) the unlawful unilateral changes at Respondent's plant in Croft, North Carolina, and (2) by the discriminatory increase in lodging and meal reimbursement at its plant in Tampa, Florida. Backpay is to be computed as set forth in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962), and Florida Steel Corporation. "5 2 In view of our recent decision in Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977), we shall also modify the Administrative Law Judge's recom- mended Order to provide that interest on the backpay award shall be computed in the manner set forth therein See for example the Administrative Law Judge's Decision, fn. 4. 4 Florida Steel Corporation. 224 NLRB 45 (1976). s In accordance with our decision in Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977), we shall apply the current 7-percent rate for periods prior (Continued) 923 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD MEMBER WALTHER, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree with my colleagues that Respondent refused to bargain with the Union in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. However, I do not agree with their adoption of the Administrative Law Judge's additional finding that Respondent also discriminated against its employees in violation of Section 8(a)(3). In order to place the issue on which I dissent in proper perspective, a brief summary of the facts is necessary. The Union was certified as the majority representa- tive of Respondent's drivers in Croft, North Caro- lina, on January 16, 1974. At the time of the alleged unfair labor practices, in August 1975, the parties had met and bargained about 27 times without reaching agreement on a contract. The record shows that, effective July 1972, Respon- dent had a written policy which provided for a lodging allowance of $10 and a meal allowance of $1.75 if a driver was away from home overnight. The policy also allowed a meal allowance of $1.75 if a driver was away from the plant for more than 7 hours. However, if the meal allowance were paid, then 30 minutes would be deducted from worktime. In order to claim reimbursement for lodging and meals, employees were required to submit trip expense vouchers. The employees were allowed to use Respondent's credit cards to purchase fuel and oil while away from the plant on a road trip. From August 1974 to July 1975, the drivers began to use Respondent's credit cards to charge some lodging and meal expenses which exceeded the maximum allowed, although they occasionally also received reimbursements limited to the amounts set out in 1972. In July 1975, Respondent announced to employees at its Tampa facility, which was then the object of an organizing campaign, that their lodging and meal allowances were being increased from $10 and $1.75 to $12.50 and $2.50, respectively. In August 1975, Respondent informed its drivers at Croft who were using its credit cards to charge items other than gas and oil that they would no longer be allowed to use the credit cards, and that they would now be required to adhere to the $10 and $1.75 allowances for lodging and meals, respectively, and that 30 minutes would be deducted from their worktime if they claimed a meal allowance.6 I disagree with the Administrative Law Judge's finding that Respondent's conduct in this proceeding constituted a violation of Section 8(a)(3). To find such a violation, the Board must specifically find disparate treatment resulting in discouragement of to August 25. 1977, in which the "adjusted prime interest rate" as used by the Internal Revenue Service in calculating interest on tax payments was at least 7 percent. union membership.s I have serious doubts that Respondent's action in the circumstances of this case meets those requirements. The Administrative Law Judge's conclusion that Respondent discriminated against its employees is based, inter alia, on his observation that Respondent carried on an antiunion campaign at its Tampa plant, more than 500 miles away, and that it had a history of opposition to union organizing attempts at various facilities which it operates. These facts do not establish a violation in the circumstances of this case. Initially, I disagree with the Administrative Law Judge's finding that Respondent's conduct was "inherently destructive" of employee rights. To reach such a conclusion, the Administrative Law Judge noted the dissimilarity in benefits given the employ- ees at Croft and at Tampa, and relied on the Respondent's campaign literature distributed at its Tampa plant. However, the campaign literature distributed to employees at Tampa obviously has no relevance to the alleged misconduct in this proceed- ing. Further, I cannot subscribe to the Administrative Law Judge's rationale for, in essence, characterizing Respondent's policy as a "dual standard"; i.e., one for its union employees at Croft and another for its nonunion employees at Tampa. On the record before us, the Respondent operates its Croft facility inde- pendently from its other plants in order to service different customers. There was no need, much less a requiremrent, for Respondent to offer business justification for maintaining different rates at plants which are about 500 miles apart. Also, the Croft employees had selected the Union as their majority representative at least 2 years prior to the alleged unfair labor practice in this proceed- ing. In the meantime, the parties met and had bargained a total of 46 times prior to the hearing herein, and they had met 27 times before the alleged unfair labor practices occurred. There is no context of prior unfair labor practices at Croft into which this incident fits and the Administrative Law Judge cited no evidence to support a finding that Respondent's action was motivated by a desire to discourage membership in the Union rather than a desire to influence the ongoing Croft negotiations. Accordingly, I would reverse the Administrative Law Judge's finding that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 6 The parties stipulated that. in practice, the 30 minutes were never deducted from a driver's pay. 7 N.L.R.B. v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967); American Ship Building Co. v. N.LR.B., 380 U.S. 300(1965). 924 FLORIDA STEEL CORP. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE KARL H. BUSCHMANN, Administrative Law Judge: On April 23, 1976, a complaint issued pursuant to a charge dated November 7, 1975, by the Union. The complaint alleges that Respondent herein, Florida Steel Corporation, had violated Section 8(a)(l), (3), and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, by discriminatorily and unilaterally changing certain working conditions. Respon- dent filed a timely answer admitting numerous factual and jurisdictional allegations in the complaint, but it denied that any unfair labor practices were committed. A hearing was held before me on June 21, 1976, in Gastonia, North Carolina. Upon the entire record, includ- ing my observation of the witnesses and after consideration of the briefs filed by counsel for the General Counsel, counsel for the Union, and counsel for Respondent, I make the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. FINDINGS OF FACT Florida Steel Corporation, a Florida corporation with plants in Croft, North Carolina, and Tampa and Indian- town, Florida, is engaged in the business of manufacturing and fabricating steel products. The Croft, North Carolina, plant is primarily involved in this proceeding. During the past 12 months, which period is representative of all times material herein, Respondent received goods and raw materials from points directly outside the State of North Carolina valued in excess of $50,000. Respondent is now and has been at all times material herein an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. On August 30, 1973, a majority of the employees in a unit which includes truckdrivers, production employees, and others, designated and selected the Union as their repre- sentative for the purpose of collective bargaining. Since January 16, 1974, the Union has been the exclusive bargaining representative for the unit for purposes of collective bargaining concerning wages, hours, working conditions, and other terms and conditions of employment. Since on or about April 24, 1974, and continuing to date, the Union has requested Respondent to bargain collective- ly on behalf of the unit employees with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, including new limitations for reimbursement to truckdriv- ers for lodging and meal expenses.' The record shows that Florida Steel had seven or eight truckdrivers at its Croft, North Carolina, plant. The Company had a longstanding policy of reimbursing the drivers for their expenses incurred on overnight trips such as food and lodging when they were on the road more than 7 hours. The manner and amounts of reimbursement, however, have not been uniform. I Respondent has admitted the allegations on which the foregoing findings are based. 2 I he record does not reveal which day in August the meeting was held. From at least November 25, 1972, to August 15, 1974, the drivers were reimbursed $10 a night for lodging and $1.75 for each meal (Resp. Exh. 8). Beginning August 15, 1975, this practice began to change. The record contains several charge receipts which indicate that at various times from August 1974 to July 1975 the drivers used the Company's credit cards for food and lodging in amounts in excess of the $10 and $1.75 for lodging and meals, respectively (G.C. Exhs. 15-25), although the record also contains cash receipts indicating that occasionally drivers were still reimbursed at the old rates of $ 10 for lodging and $1.75 for meals. According to the record testimony, the truckdrivers had free and customary use of Respondent's credit cards prior to August 1975 to charge fuel costs, as well as meal and motel expenses. Their expenses were not limited to certain amounts, but a driver was expected to use his reasonable judgment in charging any expenses to the Company. The drivers received the reimbursement for meals without any deductions from their worktime. In August 1975, the drivers' supervisor, Mike Barnhart, posted a notice on the board requesting all drivers to meet at 8 a.m.2 At this meeting Barnhart informed the drivers that the Company had just put into effect a new policy concerning drivers' expenses. The new policy provided for $10 a day for motel expenses and $1.75 for meals. Barnhart also informed the drivers that they would no longer be permitted to use the Company's credit cards and that 30 minutes would be deducted from their time if they claimed the $1.75 for meals. 3 The Company's new policy was effectuated in August 1975 without consultation with the Union. The record also shows that only a month earlier, in July 1975, Respondent had increased the reimbursement rates for its drivers in its Tampa, Florida, plant where the employees were not unionized and where the Union had been making a concentrated effort to organize the employees. The new policy there provided for $12.50 for overnight expenses and $2.50 for meals. In other words, while Respondent increased the lodging and meal benefits in its nonunion plant in Tampa, it reduced the benefits for its drivers in Croft, a unionized plant. Analysis Respondent argues that its policy with regard to lodging and meal reimbursement had never changed. According to Respondent, Barnhart's announcement in August was merely "a restatement or reaffirmation of established policy" which resulted in a restoration of the past practice or an implementation of an existing policy, as opposed to a modification of it. To be sure, the record is far from clear on this issue, since at or about the time of Barnhart's meeting in August the Company also began furnishing its drivers with diesel powered trucks which have a longer range than the trucks with conventional engines. The drivers had, therefore, a diminished need to use the Company's credit cards with which to charge gasoline. Considering all the surrounding circumstances, it is my conviction, however, that the Barnhart announcement I It was stipulated, however, that in practice. neither before nor after the announcement, was the one-half hour worktime deducted from the dnvers pas. 925 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD amounted to a change in policy. First, Respondent's witnesses themselves were uncertain and vague as to whether the use of credit cards and an unlimited - subject to reasonableness - reimbursement policy prior to August 1975 had become an established practice at the plant. Second, the reimbursement rates of $10 and $1.75 which had been in effect as far back as 1972 seem unrealistically low in 1975, particularly in comparison to the new policy in Tampa, Florida. Third, the testimony of two drivers - stipulated to be representative of the testimony of five drivers - was uncontradicted that Barnhart's reference in his announcement in August 1975 was to a new "policy." Fourth, the record is clear that for almost a year the Company acquiesced in and tolerated the use of credit cards and the unlimited reimbursement amounts. Fifth, the practice had become well established, otherwise Respon- dent would not have had to go through the formalities of a specially announced meeting of all drivers. Accordingly, whether the meeting between Barnhart and the drivers is regarded as a new policy announcement or an implementa- tion of a previous policy or a revision of past practices, it amounted to a change in policy covering certain benefits and terms of employment. The record is uncontroverted that this change in policy was put into effect without union consultation. Several months later, after the Union found out about the August announcement, it initiated a discussion with Respondent. The discussion, however, was merely a request by the Union that the Company explain and negotiate the changes. The Company promised to but never did offer an explanation for the changes in the drivers' benefits. The remaining issues are whether Respondent's practices are violative of Section 8(a)(l), (3), or (5) of the Act on the basis that Respondent (a) discriminated among its employ- ees because they elected the Union as their bargaining representative and (b) unilaterally, without consulting or bargaining with the Union, adopted changes in employees' working conditions. The unilateral changes in working conditions: The law is clear, once the employees have selected the Union as their bargaining representative, an employer violates Section 8(a)(1) and (5) when it unilaterally-without consultation or negotiation with the Union-affects changes in wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of employment. N.L.R.B. v. Katz, et al., 369 U.S. 736 (1962). It is also clear, without having to belabor the point, that the prohibition against the continued use of credit cards, the reduced reimbursement rates for lodging and meal expenses, and a deduction of one-half hour pay for each reimbursed meal amount to changes in wages, hours, and working condi- tions. Although it was stipulated in the record that Respondent had in practice not deducted the one-half hour pay, it is also clear that Barnhart's statement discouraged drivers from claiming the meal reimbursement because they received more hourly pay than the $1.75 reimbursement. In short, Respondent's statement was a threat even though it was not employed in actual practice. It easily follows that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(l) and (5) of the Act. The alleged discriminatory conduct: Unlawful discrimina- tory conduct by an employer can be found where a company treats employees in one plant differently from those in another plant and where such differing treatment is union motivated. McGraw-Edison Company v. N.L.R.B., 419 F.2d 67 (C.A. 8, 1969). In determining the unlawful- ness of the discriminatory treatment, matters for consider- ation are the Respondent's business motive and the Company's union animus; for the statutory language "discrimination . . . to . . . discourage" is interpreted to require an antiunion motive. However, in some instances antiunion motive is not necessary to prove a violation. The Supreme Court in N.L.R.B. v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967) summarized: First, if it can reasonably be concluded that the employer's discriminatory conduct was "inherently destructive" of important employee rights, no proof of an antiunion motivation is needed and the Board can find an unfair labor practice even if the employer introduces evidence that the conduct was motivated by business considerations. Second, if the adverse effect of the discriminatory conduct on employee rights is "comparatively slight," an antiunion motivation must be proved to sustain the charge if the employer has come forward with evidence of legitimate and substan- tial business justifications for the conduct. Thus, in either situation, once it has been proved that the employer engaged in discriminatory conduct which could have adversely affected employee rights to some extent, the burden is upon the employer to establish that he was motivated by legitimate objectives since proof of motivation is most accessible to him. Applying these principles to the case before me, it is clear that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1). Initially the record is devoid of any attempt by Respondent to offer a business justification for the dual standard for its lodging and meal reimbursement policy which prevailed in its nonunion plant in Tampa, Florida, on one hand and in Croft, North Carolina, on the other. In July 1975, employees in Tampa were informed that they would receive $12.50 for overnight expenses and $2.50 for meals. In August of the same year, Respondent informed its employees in Croft, North Carolina, of the reduced reimbursement rates and the prohibition against the use of credit cards. The Tampa plant was Respondent's nonunion installation where the Union has been attempting to organize the employees. I regard such discriminatory conduct as inherently destructive of employees' rights. In any case, Respondent's antiunion campaign literature leaves no doubt that its disparate treatment of the employees at the different plants was a calculated effort to discourage any organizational attempt at Tampa. For instance, in one leaflet, Respondent warns: "Don't go down the Charlotte road." (G.C. Exh. 7.) In a memoran- dum addressed to the employees in Tampa, Respondent already warned its people in August 1974: "Why gamble with your wages and benefits? Don't get caught in the union trap. Wait, watch, and see what happens in Indiantown . . . and in Charlotte." (G.C. Exh. 4.) With these and other statements Respondent has not only expressed its union animus but also provided direct evidence relating its discriminatory treatment to its 926 FLORIDA STEEL CORP. antiunion campaign in Tampa. Any suggestion that the Company should be free to treat its employees in a nonunion plant differently from its employees in a unionized plant in order to give effect to its bargaining obligation is unpersuasive under the present circumstances. Respondent did not attempt to bargain or consult with the Union, it unilaterally changed the working conditions for its drivers in Croft, North Carolina. In addition, almost simultaneously it increased the benefits in the nonunion plant in Tampa. Finally, General Counsel cited numerous past Board decisions involving this Respondent. The Board's findings in these cases support the findings and conclusions here, insofar as Respondent has demonstrated its union animus, its proclivity to violate the Act, and its practice to use its employees in one plant as an example to the employees in another plant.4 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW I. Respondent, Florida Steel Corporation, is an em- ployer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act and engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) of the Act. 2. The Union, United Steelworkers of America, AFL- CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By unilaterally, without consulting or bargaining with the Union, reducing the reimbursement rates for lodging and food expenses of its truckdrivers, by prohibit- ing the continued use of company credit cards for such items, and by threatening to deduct one-half hour of pay for each reimbursed meal, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 4. By discriminatorily prohibiting at its unionized plant in Croft, North Carolina, the continued use of company credit cards, by reducing the amount it reimbursed its drivers for lodging and meal expenses on overnight trips, by threatening to deduct one-half hour of pay for each reimbursed meal, and by increasing the allowable expenses for lodging and meals in its nonunionized plant in Tampa, Florida, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(l) and (3) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act, I recommend that Respondent be ordered to cease and desist from its unlawful practices. I further recommend that a broad order be issued which will prohibit Respon- dent from "in any manner restraining or coercing employ- ees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act." In their briefs, the Union and the General Counsel have cited numerous prior decisions 5 which have shown Respondent's violations of the Act upon which I In numerous prior cases, Respondent has been found to have violated the Act. Florida Steel Corporation. 214 NLRB 264 (1974); 215 NLRB 97 (1974): 220 NLRB 225 (I975): 220 NLRB 260 (1975): 220 NLRB 1201 (1975): 221 NLRB 554 (1975); 221 NLRB 371 (1975).: 223 NLRB 174 (1976); 224 NLRB 45 (1976). and 224 NLRB 587 (1976). See Florida Steel Corporation. cases, fn. 4. supra. Floridoa Steel (Corporation. 214 NLRB 264 (1974); 220 NLRB 260 (1975). and 221 NLRB 554(1975). conclude that Respondent had a proclivity to violate Section 7 rights of its employees. Moreover, in view of the violations found herein in which, as in the past,6 Respon- dent has used its employees in one plant as an example to employees in another of its plants, I recommend that Respondent be required to post a notice at all of its locations and plants. In addition, I recommend that Respondent make whole its drivers at the Croft, North Carolina, plant by reimburs- ing them at the rates for meals and overnight lodging expenses equal to or exceeding the rates of $2.50 for meals and $12.50 for motel expenses during the time period beginning with the Barnhart announcement in August 1975 until an agreement is reached between the Union and Respondent pursuant to the bargaining order herein. If the drivers can show that during this time they had incurred expenses in excess of $2.50 and $12.50, respectively, they should be reimbursed at such higher amounts so long as they are "reasonable." And drivers who refrained from requesting reimbursement for meals because they preferred not to lose the one-half hour of pay should be also reimbursed for the meals. Finally, I recommend that Respondent bargain with the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the drivers and other employees in the established unit regarding the Company's policy dealing with lodging and meal expenses on overnight trips and any other terms and conditions of employment. Other extraordinary remedies, including those proposed by the Union, are in my opinion, not reasonably related to the violations found herein. Accordingly, I recommend against their adoption. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER 7 The Respondent, Florida Steel Corporation, Croft, North Carolina, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) In any manner, interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. (b) Unilaterally changing wages, hours, or conditions of employment, including putting into effect new limitations for reimbursement for overnight lodging and meal expens- es, of employees in the established unit, including truckdriv- ers, in derogation of its bargaining obligation to the aforesaid Union and to the rights of employees under the Act. (c) Discriminating in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment, including the adoption of discriminatory reimbursement 7 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings. conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall. as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations. be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order. and all objections thereto shall he deemed waived for all purposes. 927 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD policies at different plants, to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request bargain collectively with United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bargaining representative for the established unit, includ- ing truckdrivers, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours, and other conditions of employment, including reimburse- ment rates and policies for lodging and meal expenses on overnight trips, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a written agreement. (b) Upon request by the Union, revoke the August 1975 policy with regard to the truckdrivers' rate of reimburse- ment for overnight lodging and meal expenses, the use of credit cards, and the threat to deduct one-half hour of pay for each reimbursed meal. (c) Make the truckdrivers at its Croft, North Carolina, plant whole for any financial loss they may have suffered by reason of (1) the unlawful unilateral changes at Respondent's plant in Croft, North Carolina, and (2) the discriminatory increase in its lodging and meal reimburse- ment at its plant in Tampa, Florida, in the manner set forth in the section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy." (d) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records relevant or necessary to facilitate determination of the amounts due to employees under the terms of this Order. (e) Post at each place of business, including plants located in Croft, North Carolina, and Tampa and Indian- town, Florida, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."" Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 12, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (f) Notify the Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. I In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court o' Appeals. the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to . Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board. APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a hearing in which all parties had the opportunity to present their evidence, it has been found that we violated the law and we have been ordered to post this notice. We intend to carry out the Order of the Board and abide by the following: WE WILL NOT interfere with, restrain, or coerce in any manner employees' rights guaranteed under Sec- tion 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. WE WILL NOT unilaterally change any rates, wages, hours, and other working conditions, including reim- bursement rates for overnight lodging and meal expenses, the use of credit cards, or any deductions from pay for reimbursed meals of our employees and truckdrivers without first consulting and bargaining with the Union. WE WILL NOT discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment, or any term or condition of employ- ment, including the adoption of discriminatory reim- bursement policies at different plants, to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with the Union which was elected as exclusive bargaining agent for our truckdrivers and other employees with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours, and other conditions of employment, including reimbursement rates and poli- cies for lodging and meal expenses on overnight trips, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a written agreement. WE WILL make the truckdrivers at our Croft, North Carolina, plant whole for any financial loss they may have suffered by reason of our practices which the Board found unlawful. FLORIDA STEEL CORPORATION 928