Beverly Manor Nursing Home

598 325 NLRB No. 95 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an admin- istrative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear prepon- derance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incor- rect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings. 1 Certain errors in the transcript have been noted and corrected. 2 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and rec- ommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes. Beverly Enterprises—Massachusetts, Inc., d/b/a Beverly Manor Nursing Home and Hospital Workers Union, Local 767, Service Employees International Union, AFL–CIO. Cases 1–CA– 31323, 1–CA–33587, 1–CA–31862, 1–CA–33978, and 1–CA–34299 April 9, 1998 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN GOULD AND MEMBERS FOX AND HURTGEN On April 15, 1997, Administrative Law Judge Ste- ven N. Charno issued the attached decision. The Re- spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed an answering brief. The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has de- cided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and con- clusions and to adopt the recommended Order. In adopting the judge’s finding that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) by, inter alia, reducing the maximum 1996 wage increase from 4 percent to 3 per- cent, we reject the Respondent’s contention that the 3- percent maximum increase was the result of its consist- ent application of an inflexible formula for computing wage increases that it had employed in past years. In a March 14, 1996 letter to the Union in response to its complaint over the reduction, the Respondent’s human resources representative, Begley, characterized the maximum amount as a ‘‘compromise’’ between the parties’ positions during stalled contract negotiations, in which the Respondent had proposed a 2-percent maximum figure and the Union had proposed a 4-per- cent maximum wage increase. The letter was a direct explanation of the Respondent’s current administration of wage increases, and as such constitutes an admis- sion that the 1996 maximum wage increases were not tied to any prior formula used by the Respondent. We view the Respondent’s established merit in- crease program as consisting mainly of fixed features, i.e., awarding standard 4-percent maximum increases to most (90 percent) employees following their annual appraisals. In this respect, the program resembles most closely the one in Southeastern Michigan Gas Co., 198 NLRB 1221 (1972), which the Board discussed at length in Daily News of Los Angeles, 315 NLRB 1236, 1239 fn. 28 (1995). Consistent with the discussion in Daily News of wage increases like those at issue in the instant case, the employees must be made whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered by reason of the Respondent’s unilateral discontinuance of the merit increase program. In addition, as the judge correctly ordered, the 4-percent maximum increases must con- tinue to be paid until changes in the program are agreed to or are lawfully implemented pursuant to a valid bargaining impasse. ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec- ommended Order of the administrative law judge and orders that the Respondent, Beverly Enterprises—Mas- sachusetts, Inc., d/b/a Beverly Manor Nursing Home, Plymouth, Massachusetts, its officers, agents, succes- sors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order. MEMBER HURTGEN, concurring. I concur in the result. Although the past practice was that Respondent had discretion with respect to whether an individual employee would get a merit in- crease, and as to how much an employee would get, there was a fixed maximum of 4 percent with respect to such increases. It was this fixed maximum that was unilaterally changed to 3 percent, in violation of Sec- tion 8(a)(5). Thus, it is unnecessary to decide whether an employer violates the Act by continuing the past practice of exercising discretion as to matters that are variable and at the discretion of the employer. Catherine E. D’Urso, Esq., for the General Counsel. David B. Ellis, Esq. and Jonathon A. Keselenko, Esq. (Foley, Hoag & Eliot), of Boston, Masschusetts, for the Respond- ent. BENCH DECISION AND CERTIFICATION STEVEN M. CHARNO, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried before me in Boston, Masschusetts, on March 17 and 18, 1997. After oral argument on March 19, 1997, I issued a bench decision pursuant to Section 102.35(a)(10) of the Board’s Rules and Regulations. Appendix A is the por- tion of the transcript containing my decision, while Appendix B [omitted from publication]1 contains corrections to that transcript. In accordance with Section 102.45 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, I certify the accuracy of the amended transcipt containing my decision. Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained therein and on the en- tire record in this case, I issue the following recommended2 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:35 May 01, 2002 Jkt 197585 PO 00004 Frm 00598 Fmt 0610 Sfmt 0610 D:\NLRB\325.073 APPS10 PsN: APPS10 599 BEVERLY MANOR NURSING HOME 2 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.’’ ORDER The Respondent, Beverly Enterprises—Massachusetts, Inc., d/b/a Beverly Manor Nursing Home, Plymouth, Massachu- setts, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Failing and refusing to recognize and to bargain in good faith with Hospital Workers Union, Local 767, Service Employees International Union, AFL–CIO (the Union), as the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees in the following appropriate collective-bargaining unit with re- spect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment: All full time and regular part-time service and mainte- nance employees, including nursing assistant, dietary aides, cooks, rehabilitation aides, and activity assistants employed by the Employer at its Plymouth, Massachu- setts nursing home but excluding all managers, super- visors, RNs and LPNs, business office clericals, per diem casuals, Administrator, Director of Nursing, Di- rector of Staff Development, Social Services Director, Activities Director/Coordinator, Dietary Manager, Med- ical Records Professional, maintenance supervisor, and guards within the meaning of the National Labor Rela- tions Act. (b) Unilaterally changing the terms and conditions of em- ployment of its employees without having first bargained with the Union in good faith to impasse with respect to (1) the payment of annual wage increases to unit employees, (2) the timecard policy requiring all unit employees to pay $5 for each lost timecard, or (3) any other term or condition of employment. (c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain- ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guar- anteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef- fectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Immediately put into effect the annual 4-percent in- creases in wage rates which were issued to unit employees prior to January 1, 1996, and continue such increases in ef- fect until it negotiates with the Union in good faith to a col- lective-bargaining agreement or reaches an impasse after bar- gaining in good faith, and make whole its unit employees for any loss of pay they may have suffered due to its unilateral change, in the manner prescribed in Ogle Protection Service, 183 NLRB 682 (1970), with interest as set forth in New Ho- rizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987). (b) Eliminate the $5 fee charged to unit employees for lost timecards until it negotiates with the Union in good faith to a collective-bargaining agreement or reaches an impasse after bargaining in good faith, and make whole its unit employees for any loss they may have suffered due to its unilateral change. (c) On request, bargain with the Union as the exclusive representative of its employees in the appropriate unit with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment and embody any understanding reached in a written agreement. (d) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board or its agents for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, personnel records, and re- ports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its Plymouth, Massachusetts facility copies of the attached no- tice marked ‘‘Appendix C.’’2 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 1, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecu- tive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the no- tices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other mate- rial. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceed- ings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent at any time since February 26, 1996. (f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found. APPENDIX A 420 (D)on’t go away because I will get back to you as soon as I can. Thank you. MR. KESELENKO: Thank you. MS. D’URSO: Thank you. (Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.) JUDGE CHARNO: Back on the record. . . . derived goods and revenues in excess of $100,000 an- nually. To wit, purchases and received goods valued in ex- cess of $5000 outside of the State. Have submitted—and I find that Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 226 and 227 of the Act, and is a health care institution within the meaning of Section 214. The Union is admitted to be and I find is a labor organiza- tion within the meaning of the Act. On March 23, 1993, the Union was certified as the exclu- sive collective-bargaining representative of employees in the following units: ‘‘All full-time and regular part-type and time service and maintenance employees, including nursing assist- ants, dietary aides, cooks, rehabilitation aides, and activity assistants employed by Respondent at its Plymouth, Massa- chusetts nursing home, but excluding all managers, super- visors, RNs and LPNs, business office clericals, per diem casuals, administrator, director of nursing, director of staff development, social services director, activities direc- tor/coordinator, dietary manager, medical records VerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:35 May 01, 2002 Jkt 197585 PO 00004 Frm 00599 Fmt 0610 Sfmt 0610 D:\NLRB\325.073 APPS10 PsN: APPS10 600 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 421 professional, guards, maintenance supervisor, and all other supervisors within the meaning of the National Labor Rela- tions Act.’’ The consolidated complaint sets forth a group of alleged violations in Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. In discussing those, I would like to note the—I believe the evidence relating to Mr. Ray Martinez is too remote in time to be probative in this proceeding, given the fact that Mr. Martinez was not shown to be employed by Respondent during any of the al- leged—during the time when any of the alleged violations— when any of the violations alleged in the complaint were al- leged to have taken place. The first 8(a)(1) allegations concern evidence relating to a November 1993 meeting. The basis for the General Coun- sel’s allegation is confined in the testimony of Diana Hemil, or Diana Curtis as she was known at the time. Ms. Hemil was unable to tell us when she testified whether at the time of the November meeting she was a member of the unit, or an accepted office clerical employee. She testified merely that she believed she was performing duties relating to both positions. Given the absence of probative evidence that Ms. Hemil was a member of the unit, I find that the General Counsel did not meet the requisite burden of proof, and therefore con- clude that Respondent did not violate the Act as alleged in paragraph 7(a) and paragraph 7(b)(1) of the complaint. 422 The second alleged violation of Section 8(a)(1) involves testimony by Ms. Gace that Director of Nursing Toomey told Ms. Gace that Ms. Gace could ‘‘thank the union’’ for the de- nial of the shift change request, which Gace had made to Toomey. Toomey was no longer in Respondent’s employ at the time she testified, and her testimony that she had not handled the type of requests made by Gace was corroborated by Hemil’s wholly credible testimony concerning Hemil’s duties as schedule coordinator. Given the improbability of the situation having occurred as described by Gace, I credit Toomey’s denial. The final 8(a)(1) allegation involves Ms. Remick’s testi- mony that Assistant Director of Nursing Norman stated that the union would have to reduce its bargaining demands or Respondent would close its doors, or words to that effect. Norman, who was no longer employed by Respondent at the time she testified, testified without refutation that she was not involved in any way in collective-bargaining negotia- tions, and denied the comment attributed to her by Remick. Remick testified that at the time of the alleged comment she was the foremost union organizer employed by Respond- ent. Given the inherent probability of the alleged situation, together with the lack of interest Norman had in the proceed- ing, I credit her denial over Remick’s testimony. Accord- ingly, the relevant 8(a)(1) allegation will be dismissed. Contract negotiations between the Union and Respondent 423 began in June of 1993. The General Counsel contends that from July 26, 1993, until the end of February 1994, Re- spondent failed to meet with the Union ‘‘at reasonable times and for reasonable intervals’’ for the purpose of negotiating a collective-bargaining agreement. The record establishes that the parties met on 11 occasions during the 7-month period during April 1993 and February 1994. There is no probative evidence that the negotiating ses- sions on any of those sessions exceeding 4-1/2 hours of length. During that period, however, the parties reached agreement on the majority of points of contention between them, and most of those agreements were focused on propos- als which had been advanced by the Union. I conclude, therefore, that the record does not demonstrate ‘‘behavior which is in effect a refusal to negotiate, or which directly obstructs or inhibits the actual process of discussion, or which reflects a cast of mind against reaching agreement’’ because the focus of the Board’s decision in Exchange Arts Co., 139 NLRB 710, 714–715 (1962). I therefore conclude that neither the frequently nor duration of the negotiating ses- sions during the 7-month period has been demonstrated to show bad-faith bargaining by Respondent. At the time the unit was certified, Respondent was sub- contracting its housekeeping and laundry work. During the last week of September 1995, Respondent began hiring its own 424 housekeeping and laundry employees. On October 12, 1995, the Union asked in writing for certain information con- cerning the new hires. To wit, ‘‘name, address, home tele- phone, job category, scheduled hours, shift, floor assignment, hire date, pay, date and percentage of last raise.’’ As Mrs. Valedano pointed out to me yesterday, the last two requests were impossible to meet since hires of less than 1 month’s tenure would not have received the raise cus- tomarily granted by Respondent on the annual anniversary of their hire date. Mrs. Valedano credibly and candidly testified that the Union had indicated that it desired the information which I just described for two purposes. First, to bargain on behalf of the housekeeping and laun- dry workers whom the Union believed should be in the unit, and second, to ascertain whether the housekeeping and laun- dry workers were receiving comparable pay to that received by kitchen workers, a group already represented by the Union. At an October 31, 1995 negotiating session, Mr. Bagely, the chief spokesperson for Respondent, verbally in- formed the Union of the rate of pay and benefits received by the housekeeping and laundry workers. Mr. Bagely and Mrs. Valedano both testified to this effect without controversion. There is no evidence that the Union ever indicated the in- formation supplied on October 31 was inadequate to meet its comparability objective, or that it ever identified its renewed 425 request for all of the information just described as being re- lated to its comparability objective. Under these cir- cumstances, I find that Respondent supplied information suf- ficient to meet the Union’s professed comparability objective in a timely fashion. A dispute thereafter arose between Respondent and the Union over the question of whether the Union represented Respondent’s housekeeping and laundry employees. On No- vember 20, 1995, the Union filed a unit clarification petition VerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:35 May 01, 2002 Jkt 197585 PO 00004 Frm 00600 Fmt 0610 Sfmt 0610 D:\NLRB\325.073 APPS10 PsN: APPS10 601 BEVERLY MANOR NURSING HOME with the Board, and a hearing was held on the issue on De- cember 4 of that year. Respondent supplied information fully responsive to entirety of the Union’s request at sometime around February 1996. That compliance with the Union’s re- quest was, however, admittedly unintentional. On June 26, 1996, the Board issued an order which stated that Respondent’s housekeeping and laundry employees were not part of the bargaining unit. Accordingly, the full range of information sought by the Union was not shown to be necessary for and relevant to the performance of its duties as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the unit. Accordingly, Respondent’s failure to provide that full range of information in a timely manner did not violate the Act. The parties held a last negotiating session on December 13, 1995. At that session they discussed wages for the first time in over a year. That finding is based on Mr. Bagely’s notes 426 of this session, and his testimony concerning those notes. When Respondent proposed a 2-percent annual wage in- crease, the Union professed shock and did not immediately make a counteroffer or abandon the 4-percent figure it pre- viously offered. A prior spokesperson for the Union had stated in October 1994 that it would be very difficult for the Union to sell an increase of less than 4 percent to the unit. I believe that those are the only two pieces of evidence of record concern- ing the Union’s position on the matter of wages, other than the fact that when they were requesting 5 percent, they sug- gested that Respondent would have to come up from its posi- tion. This evidence clearly falls short of establishing the ex- istence of an impasse on the question of wages, under any conceivable set of standards. The Union again, when it pressed for Respondent’s rec- ognition of the Union’s representation of housekeeping and laundry workers, Respondent again declined. Tempers ap- peared to flare and the union spokesperson departed, saying he needed to check the housekeeping and laundry employee issue with his attorney, that he would call Mr. Bagely, and that the latter shouldn’t hold his breath. Between 1990 and 1995 Respondent gave its employees a 4-percent maximum wage increase on the anniversaries of their respective dates of employment. In 1996, Respondent gave unit 427 employees a maximum wage increase of 3 percent. As the testimony in this proceeding indicated, the maximum wage increase was given in excess to 90 percent of the employees in both 1995 and 1996. Respondent’s 1996 action was taken without notice to or bargaining with the Union. Around January 1996, Respondent shifted from using paper timecard to using plastic timecards bearing a magnetic strip. When the change was made Respondent implemented a policy requiring all unit employees to pay a $5 fee for lost timecards. Respondent took this action without notice to or bargaining with the Union. Since the policy was imple- mented, Respondent has collected the fee on at least 17 occa- sions. There is no evidence that any other fee for lost equip- ment has been implemented or modified since the bargaining unit was certified. The amount of the unit’s annual wage increases and the imposition of lost equipment fee are terms and conditions of employment of the unit and are mandatory subjects for col- lective bargaining. Respondent’s unilateral modification of these terms and conditions of employment in the absence of impasse are a violation of Section 8(a)(5). For 4 months in 1996, the Union wrote Mr. Bagely pur- porting to request bargaining over Respondent’s change from the 4- to the 3-percent annual wage increase, but in fact was preconditioning further negotiations on Respondent’s 428 remedying the alleged unfair labor practice. On April 23, 1996, Respondent supplied information requested by the Union concerning the timecard issue. On June 1, 1996, the Union’s chief negotiator and a group of individuals representing the Service Employees Inter- national Union committed a trespass at Respondent’s facility while ostensibly handbilling Respondent’s employees. On June 17, 1996, the Union again wrote Respondent offering to bargain if the latter rectified all outstanding conduct which the Union perceived to be violative of the Act. On June 25, 1996, Respondent’s administrator, Mrs. Valedano, wrote the Union withdrawing recognition based solely and explicitly on the events of June 1. During the hearing, I excluded evidence relating to the June 1 events on the ground that the evidence concerning those events did not rise to the level found by the Board in other cases to justify cancelling the Union’s certification. I hereby reaffirm that ruling for the reasons I gave when I originally made it. Respondent now contends that it withdrew recognition on two additional grounds. First, because the Union was dor- mant and had abandoned its responsibilities, and second, be- cause the Union made conditional offers to bargain. Assum- ing that both reasons are something more that posttalk ration- alizations, neither provides the justification for Respondent’s actions. Respondent has supplied no decisional authority, and I’m aware 429 of none which would permit a withdrawal of recognition simply because the Union is argued to have violated Section 8(a)(5) by making a conditional offer to bargain. The facts of record do not permit a conclusion that the Union has abandoned its responsibilities. All of the relevant evidence demonstrates that the union was extremely upset over Respondent’s refusal to recognize the Union as the rep- resentative of Respondent’s housekeeping and laundry em- ployees. A hiatus in negotiations pending the outcome of that issue would not have been unreasonable, but that hiatus could not have been brought to a close until the day after the recognition was withdrawn. The record does not demonstrate that the Union was un- able or unwilling to perform its representative functions. A break in negotiations does not constitute a basis to withdraw registration in the absence of a demonstration of loss of sup- port. Penex Aluminum Corp., 288 NLRB 439, 441 (1988). The existence of outstanding unfair labor practices constitute a valid reason for breaking off collective bargaining negotia- tions. J. H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 209 NLRB 6, 7 (1974). VerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:35 May 01, 2002 Jkt 197585 PO 00004 Frm 00601 Fmt 0610 Sfmt 0610 D:\NLRB\325.073 APPS10 PsN: APPS10 602 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD I therefore find that Respondent withdrew recognition un- lawfully, and thereby violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. Since any holding the record open now would clearly delay the disposition of this matter, the General Counsel’s motion to hold 430 open the record pending their evaluation of additional charge is denied, and General Counsel’s Exhibit 23 is rejected. Let me ask both of the parties if they have observed my omission of any element of the complaint which should be resolved at this point, since my notes are somewhat chaotic. MS. D’URSO: Nothing aside from remedy, Your Honor. MR. KESELENKO: Likewise. JUDGE CHARNO: All right. Obviously, the remedy status quo—I believe that since 8(a)(5) violations, failure to bargain in good faith, have been demonstrated, a bargaining order is appropriate under the circumstances of this case. I will upon receipt of the transcript and my correction of any perceived transcript errors, I will issue the appropriate order. Time for exception does not begin to run until that order issues. Are there any other matters to take up before I close the record in this proceeding? MS. D’URSO: No, Your Honor. MR. KESELENKO: I have one question, Your Honor. The decertification petition was dismissed, presumably on the grounds that at the time it was filed they were unfair labor practice that tainted the petition—given your rulings at the time that the petition was filed, there were no unfair labor practices. All the ones that you did find occurred after the decertification petition was filed. Therefore we do request that that petition be reinstated. APPENDIX C NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio- lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice. Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights. To organize To form, join, or assist any union To bargain collectively through representatives of their own choice To act together for other mutual aid or protection To choose not to engage in any of these protected concerted activities. WE WILL NOT refuse to recognize or to bargain with the Hospital Workers Union, Local 767, Service Employees International Union, AFL–CIO as the exclusive bargaining representative of our employees in the following appropriate unit: All full-time and regular part-time service and mainte- nance employees, including nursing assistant, dietary aides, cooks, rehabilitation aides, and activity assistants employed by the Employer at its Plymouth, Massachu- setts nursing home but excluding all managers, super- visors, RNs and LPNs, business office clericals, per diem casuals, Administrator, Director of Nursing, Di- rector of Staff Development, Social Services Director, Activities Director/Coordinator, Dietary Manager, Med- ical Records Professional, maintenance supervisor, and guards within the meaning of the National Labor Rela- tions Act. WE WILL NOT unilaterally change the terms and conditions of employment of our employees without having first bar- gained with the Union in good faith to impasse with respect to (a) the payment of annual wage increases or (b) the $5 fee charged to unit employees for lost timecards. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaran- teed you by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL immediately put into effect the annual 4-percent increases in wage rates which were issued to unit employees prior to January 1, 1996, and continue such increases, until we negotiate with the Union in good faith to a collective-bar- gaining agreement or reach an impasse after bargaining in good faith, and WE WILL make whole our unit employees for any loss of pay they may have suffered due to our unilateral change, with interest. WE WILL immediately eliminate the $5 fee charged to unit employees for lost timecards, until we negotiate with the Union in good faith to a collective-bargaining agreement or reach an impasse after bargaining in good faith, and WE WILL make whole our unit employees for any loss they may have suffered due to our unilateral change. WE WILL, on request, bargain with the Union as the exclu- sive representative of our employees in the appropriate unit with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment and embody any understand- ing reached in a written agreement. BEVERLY ENTERPRISES—MASSACHUSETTS, INC., D/B/A BEVERLY MANOR NURSING HOME VerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:35 May 01, 2002 Jkt 197585 PO 00004 Frm 00602 Fmt 0610 Sfmt 0610 D:\NLRB\325.073 APPS10 PsN: APPS10