Vantran Electric Corp.

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Vantran Electric Corporation and Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union No. 50, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf- feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America. Case 14-CA-9551 August 31, 1977 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS JENKINS, MURPHY, AND WALTHER On April 13, 1977, Administrative Law Judge Marion C. Ladwig issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, counsel for the General Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and Respondent filed a brief in answer to General Counsel's exceptions. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge only to the extent consistent herewith. We affirm the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact which are, in large part, unchallenged by the parties. We cannot, however, affirm his ultimate conclusion that Respondent has not violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. In this regard, the Administrative Law Judge has misapplied our earlier decision in Pride Refining, Inc., 224 NLRB 1353 (1976), enforcement denied 555 F.2d 453 (C.A. 5, 1977). Rather, we conclude, as explained below, that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by withdrawing recognition from the Union on August 6, 1976. As found by the Administrative Law Judge the Union, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union No. 50, IBT, was certified as the bargaining representative in a production and maintenance unit on February 14, 1975. On March 25, 1975, after two negotiating sessions, the Union called a strike which continued for over a year. In April 1975, Respondent filed a suit in state court for property damages allegedly caused by the Union during the strike. In September 1975, while the strike continued, the Union filed unfair labor practice charges claiming that Respondent had illegally refused to bargain. On October 22, 1975, the General Counsel issued a complaint which dated Respondent's alleged refusal to bargain from March Poole Foundry and Machine Company, 95 NLRB 34, 37 (1951), enfd. 192 F.2d 740 (C.A. 4, 1951). cert. denied 342 U.S. 954. 231 NLRB No. 169 18, 1975. Subsequent union charges were consolidat- ed in a complaint which issued on March 11, 1976. On March 22, 1976, however, Respondent and the Union signed a non-Board settlement agreement in which Respondent agreed to seek dismissal of the pending state court complaint; reinstate 11 former strikers; provide information supporting its reduction in manning; and "[u]pon request ... engage in collective bargaining negotiations with the Union." In return, the Union agreed to withdraw the charges pending before the Board, and provide a list of all strikers seeking reinstatement. On the same day that the agreement was signed, the Union requested, and the Regional Director approved, the withdrawal and dismissal of the charges. Approximately 4-1/2 months later, on August 6, 1976, Respondent withdrew recognition from the Union based upon the Union's alleged loss of majority status in the bargaining unit. General Counsel had alleged that, as in Pride Refining, supra, the parties' March 22 agreement operated as a settlement of the unfair labor practice charges such that the certification year was extended for approximately 11 months from March 22. As a result, the General Counsel argued that Respon- dent's withdrawal of recognition from the Union only 5 months after the agreement violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. The Administrative Law Judge, however, found Pride Refining factually distinguishable. Because the Union had not abided by its agreement to furnish the Company with a list of the strikers seeking reinstate- ment and had bargained only haphazardly after the agreement, he concluded that the Union's real interest in reaching agreement was not settlement of the refusal-to-bargain charges, but rather its desire to have the damage suit brought by Respondent dismissed. Accordingly, he held that the agreement did not operate as a settlement of the pending Board charges so that the certification year should be extended. Finally, the Administrative Law Judge concluded that Respondent had bargained for a reasonable period of time after the agreement and that it, therefore, lawfully withdrew recognition from the Union on August 6, 1976. The Board is thus faced with determining the legal effect to be afforded the parties' March 22 agree- ment. In prior cases, the Board has required parties to negotiate for a "reasonable time" following a settlement agreement resolving refusal-to-bargain charges; I and where the agreement resolves allega- 1014 VANTRAN ELECTRIC CORPORATION tions of a refusal to bargain in the certification year it has extended the union's certification. 2 In Pride Refining, supra, we held that a non-Board settlement agreement which resolved the union's unfair labor practice charges extended the certification year, since the employer's concessions were the "quidpro quo for the Union's withdrawing its charges," and the charges had alleged a refusal to bargain in the certification year.3 Consistent with these principles, we conclude that here the parties' March 22 agreement was a settle- ment agreement which extended the certification year. The agreement itself states that it is "for the purpose of amicably settling and resolving the following differences .... " Thereafter, in item 7, Respondent agrees to bargain with the Union. As a result of that and other concessions, the Union withdrew its charges which had alleged, inter alia, a refusal to bargain by Respondent commencing I month after certification. Accordingly, from the time of the settlement agreement, the parties were entitled to bargain for at least Il months so that the Union could have that portion of the certification year to which it was still entitled free of any encumbrances. As Respondent withdrew recognition from the Union during the certification year as extended, it violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. The Administrative Law Judge's and Respondent's misapprehension of Respondent's duties in this proceeding stems from their misunderstanding of what the Board held in Pride Refining. The issue there was whether a private agreement between the parties constituted a settlement agreement where it had resulted in the union's withdrawing its 8(a)(5) charges, but it contained no agreement to bargain. The employer argued that it had lawfully withdrawn recognition since the agreement "was simply a contract, with an express expiration date, and that between the time the parties signed the contract and its expiration date the Union lost its majority status." 4 General Counsel, on the other hand, argued that the parties' agreement, was, in fact, a settlement agreement and that the Poole Foundry rules applied to it. The Board agreed with the General Counsel. It concluded that the agreement, which set certain conditions of employment, was a settlement agree- Mar-Jua Poulirv Company. Inc., 136 NLRB 785 (1962): Electralab Fl'ctronics Corporation, 146 NLRB 328 (1964): Mid-City Foundr) Co., 167 NIRB 795 (1967). :' 224 NLRB at 1354. The appellate court's denial of enforcement does not warrant a different result here. See discussion at fn. 5, infra Id/ : 224 NLRB at 1354, fn. 8. In its denial of enforcement. however. the Fifth Circuit has found that there is not substantial evidence to support this conclusion. While we respectfully believe that our holding in Pride Refining, in this regard, was correct, we note that the appellate court's decision would. in an3 event. have little effect on this case, since here there is no factual issue ment, rather than a contract, since "the impelling consideration for the Union's withdrawal of the charges" or the "quid pro quo" for the withdrawal, was the various concessions respondent had made in the agreement.5 To determine the quid pro quo for the agreement of the parties in this case, the Administrative Law Judge incorrectly considered later events rather than restricting himself to the four corners of the agree- ment. From later events, he divined that the Union's real reason for settling the charges was its desire to see the lawsuit dismissed. In so concluding, the Administrative Law Judge completely missed the points (1) that Respondent had agreed as part of the settlement to recognize and bargain with the Union, and (2) that as a result the Union withdrew its charges. Yet it is this kind of settlement agreement which we have held extends the certification year. As noted in Pride Refining, "in the ordinary settlement agreement, the employer simply agrees to bargain with the union with an object of reaching a collective-bargaining agreement." 6 We stress again that the Board's decision in Pride Refining was not meant to constitute a rule whereby this Board would attempt to ferret out which of various concessions was the real reason for the parties' entering into a settlement agreement. We conclude that when an employer, as Respondent here, agrees as one of its concessions to bargain with a union and that union, based on that concession, thereupon withdraws unfair labor practice charges against the employer, alleging an unlawful refusal to bargain, we will construe that agreement as a typical settlement agreement warranting application of Poole Foundry? rules. Respondent appears to argue further, however, that, as the March 22 agreement did not include a concession by Respondent on every allegation of the complaint which was ultimately withdrawn, the agreement cannot trigger the Poole Foundry rules. Such a contention is without merit. It is irrelevant that the settlement agreement did not fully resolve every complaint allegation. What is important is that the March 22 agreement, taken as a whole, clearly as to whether the agreement was a settlement agreement. It was so designated on its face. As such, it appears from the court's dicta that it, too, would find Poole Foundrv rules applicable: It is not open to question that ordinarily in an S(aX5) settlement agreement the employer acknowledges the majority status of the Union and agrees to bargain collectively for a reasonable time. 1555 F.2d at 458.1 6 224 NLRB at 1354, fn. 8. 1015 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD settled, to the Union's and Respondent's satisfaction, the outstanding complaint.7 This document then was a settlement agreement which, even more so than in Pride, constituted the "quid pro quo for the Union's withdrawing of the charges."" And, as one of the elements in the agreement was that Respondent would bargain with the Union on request, the Poole Foundry rules clearly apply to that commitment. As we noted above, Poole Foundry allows the parties to negotiate for a "reasonable time" following a settlement agreement. In situations where the agreement settles charges alleging a refusal to bargain in the certification year, the Board has determined that the reasonable time should "com- pensate for the failure to bargain during any period of the certification year." 9 The Union was certified on February 14, 1975, and the complaint alleged a refusal to bargain from March 18, 1975, approxi- mately 1 month after certification. Accordingly, the Union was entitled to the remaining 11 months of its certification year after the March 22 agreement, and, as withdrawal of recognition occurred on August 6, only some 4-1/2 months after the agreement, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act when it withdrew recognition.)0 Our dissenting colleague agrees that Poole Foundry, supra, is applicable and he would require Respondent to bargain for a "reasonable" time following the settlement agreement. However, our colleague at- taches no significance to the fact that the conduct underlying the settlement agreement arose during the certification year. He would, in effect, render meaningless the Board's longstanding rule, which has obtained court approval, requiring that, absent unusual circumstances, an employer will be required to honor a certification for I year." In Mar-Jac Poultry Company, supra, the Board, citing the aforementioned Supreme Court decision, stated that "[a]mong the reasons supporting the adoption of this rule is to give a certified union 'ample time for carrying out its mandate' and to prevent an employer from knowing that 'if he dillydallies or subtly undermines union strength' he may erode that strength and relieve himself of his duty to bargain." 136 NLRB at 786. Under our colleague's theory of the case, an employer may easily flout the requirement that it honor the certification for 1 year by simply refusing 7 Moreover, the Regional Director, on the same date on which the parties signed the agreement, approved as "appropriate" the withdrawal of the charges , 224 NLRB at 1354. We note that the Board in the past has found much less formal understandings than the parties' March 22 agreement to be tantamount to settlement agreements. See, e.g., Gebhardt-Vogel Tanning Companra, 154 NL.RB 913 (1965): Los Angeles Tile Jobbers, Inc., 210 NLRB 789 (1974). " Mid-Citr Foundry, supra at 799. "' Respondent's objective considerations for withdrawing recognition at to bargain during the certification year and then entering into a settlement agreement.s In the case before us, Respondent has, by its refusal to bargain, taken from the Union a substantial part of the period when unions are at their greatest strength-the 1- year period immediately following the certification. In fact, Respondent bargained with the certified Union for only I month, and then for 4-1/2 months following the settlement agreement. To permit Respondent to bargain for an undefined lesser period of time would be to allow it to "take advantage of its own failure to carry out its statutory obligation, contrary to the very reasons for the establishment of the rule that a certification requires bargaining for at least 1 year." 13 Because of the violation we have found, we herewith substitute the following Conclusions of Law for those of the Administrative Law Judge. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. At all times material, since February 14, 1975, the Union has been the exclusive representative of the production and maintenance employees in Vandalia, Illinois, for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 2. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by withdrawing recognition from the Union on August 6, 1976. THE REMEDY The appropriate remedy in this case was aptly stated by the Trial Examiner in Mid-City Foundry Co., 167 NLRB at 799. We set out his remedy with appropriate insertions covering the facts herein: There should have been bargaining for at least a year following the certification, and for a reasonable time after the agreement. The reasonable period of time should compensate for the failure to bargain during any period of the certification year. The General Counsel charged Respondent in the com- plaint that was settled by the agreement with refusing to bargain from March 18, 1975. The certification was issued by the Board on February 14, 1975. So there was no refusal to bargain for the first month of the certification year. It is undisputed that Respon- dent and the Union bargained for 4-1/2 months that time are unavailing for, with the extension of the certification year, by operation of law, the Union was free from challenge to its majority status during the extended certification year. See, e.g., Mar-Jac Poultry Company, supra. "i Ray Brooks v. N.L.R. B, 348 U.S. 96 (1954). 12 The effect of that theory would be to discourage participation by charging parties in settlement procedures, since no meaningful remedy would result. I3 Mar-Jac Poulry Company, supra at 787. 1016 VANTRAN ELECTRIC CORPORATION following the agreement. Therefore, Respondent is required to bargain for at least a period of 6-1/2 months from the date on which Respondent and the Union resume bargaining, and, if an agreement is reached, to embody it in a signed written contract. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Vantran Electric Corporation, Vandalia, Illinois, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Withdrawing recognition from and refusing to meet and bargain with the Union. (b) In any other manner interfering with the efforts of the Union to negotiate for and represent its production and maintenance employees excluding office clerical employees, professional employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. (c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of its employ- ees in an appropriate unit of production and maintenance employees, excluding office clerical employees, professional employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act, for at least 6-1/2 months from the date it resumes bargaining with the Union, and embody any understanding reached in a written agreement. (b) Post at its place of business in Vandalia, Illinois, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 14 Copies of said notice, on forms to be provided by the Regional Director for Region 14, after being duly signed by Respondent's representa- tive, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respon- dent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 14, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, " In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of' the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." t- 224 NI.RB at 1359. i Id In ms prior dissent, I cited Automated Business Systems, a Division what steps Respondent has taken to comply here- with. MEMBER WALTHER, dissenting: Once again, as in Pride Refining, supra, I must respectfully dissent. The majority has found that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) by unlawfully withdrawing recognition from the Union during the certification year. While the Union was certified on February 14, 1975, and Respondent withdrew recog- nition on August 6, 1976, over a year and a half later, the majority finds that as of August 6 the Union still had 6-1/2 months remaining in its certification year. This is so, it reasons, because Respondent only bargained in good faith for I month from the date of the original certification, and for 4-1/2 months after the March 22 agreement. Thus, to provide the Union with a full year in which to bargain with immunity from challenge to its majority status, my colleagues extend the certification year and order Respondent to bargain in good faith for at least 6-1/2 more months. As I noted in Pride Refining, this outcome necessarily presupposes that "Respondent's earlier conduct justified extending the certification year."15 That is, my colleagues are imposing a remedy here as if the original charge-i.e., that Respondent refused to bargain during the certification year-had been litigated and Respondent found in violation of Section 8(a)(5). There has, however, been no judicial finding that Respondent in fact contravened any section of the Act during the certification year. Rather, there are only allegations in the General Counsel's complaint that on March 18, 1975, Respondent embarked upon a course of conduct which amounted to a refusal to bargain in good faith. These allegations were not admitted, they were not litigated, and the Board has made no formal determination with regard to them, other than to approve the Union's request to withdraw its charge, and then, to dismiss the complaint. I, therefore, reiterate that "it is . . . improper to treat the allegation[s] as proved. [Footnote omitted.]" 16 Moreover, the decision to extend the certification year is contrary to sound labor policy, for it will discourage voluntary non-Board settlement agree- ments, while encouraging, at the least sign of disagreement, the filing of refusal-to-bargain charges. Neither the parties nor this Agency will be better served by such a result. of Litton Business Systems, Inc., a Subsidiary of Litton Industries, Inc., 205 NLRB 532, 533 (1973). There, the Board recognized that it is improper to treat allegations of pnor misconduct by a respondent as evidence to be weighed in determining the lawfulness of that respondent's later conduct. Yet this kind of bootstrap logic is the predicate for the majority's decision here. 1017 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Rather than engage in the convoluted and ques- tionable reasoning of the majority, which requires them to examine past allegations of misconduct, I would instead focus on the conduct of Respondent at the time of the settlement agreement. Thus, in cases involving an unlitigated refusal to bargain followed by a voluntary non-Board settlement agreement, I would merely determine whether the withdrawal of recognition violated Poole Foundry, supra. Here Respondent signed an agreement in which it volun- tarily agreed to bargain with the Union.'7 Having agreed to bargain, Respondent was obligated under Section 8(a)(5) of the Act to bargain in good faith. As part of that good-faith bargaining obligation, Poole Foundry requires Respondent to bargain for a "reasonable time." is Therefore, the issue in this case is whether Respondent bargained for a reasonable time follow- ing the signing of the settlement agreement. As in the past, this determination will turn on the peculiar facts of the case.19 I would adopt the finding of the Administrative Law Judge that 4-1/2 months was a reasonable time, and that, consequently, Respon- dent's withdrawal of recognition on August 6, 1976, was lawful. Accordingly, having found that the certification year had expired, and that Respondent had bargained for a reasonable time, I would dismiss the complaint in its entirety. 17 In this regard, this case is significantly different from Pride Refining. In Pride Refining, I agreed with the Administrative Law Judge that the document executed by the parties was a contract, rather than a collective- bargaining agreement. The Fifth Circuit has now denied enforcement of the majority opinion for this very reason. Here, however, I agree with the majority that the agreement between the parties was a traditional settlement agreement in which Respondent agreed to bargain with the Union in exchange for the Union's withdrawal of the refusal-to-bargain charge. i' "The test of the legality of the refusal to bargain in a case of this nature is whether or not a reasonable time has elapsed between the execution of the settlement agreement and the refusal to bargain .. " Poole FoundrVt. 95 NLRB at 37. A" See. e.g.. Mid-Citny Foundry Co., 167 NLRB at 799. APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT withdraw recognition from and refuse to bargain collectively with the Union as the certified exclusive bargaining representative with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment by refusing to recog- nize the Union. WE WILL NOT, in any other manner, interfere with the efforts of the Union to negotiate for and represent our production and maintenance em- ployees. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL bargain, upon request, with the Union as the exclusive representative of our production and maintenance employees, for at least 6-1/2 months from the date we resume bargaining with the Union, and embody in a written signed agreement any understanding reached with this Union regarding these employees. VANTRAN ELECTRIC CORPORATION DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE MARION C. LADWIG, Administrative Law Judge: This case was heard at Vandalia, Illinois, on November 2, 1976.1 The charge was filed by the Union on August 11 and the complaint was issued on September 24. The primary issue is whether the Company (Respondent) unlawfully with- drew recognition from the certified Union, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Upon the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after due consideration of the briefs filed by the General Counsel and the Company, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. JURISDICTION The Company, an Illinois corporation, is engaged in the manufacture of electrical equipment in Vandalia, Illinois, where it annually ships goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly to points located outside the State. The Company admits, and I find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act, and that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. All dates are in 1976 unless otherwise stated. 1018 VANTRAN ELECTRIC CORPORATION II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Strike and Settlement On February 6, 1975, the Union won an election in a unit of 72 production and maintenance employees at the Company's Vandalia plant. The vote was 52 for and 15 against union representation, with 2 challenges. The certification was issued on February 14, 1975. Because of undisputed economic necessity, the Company laid off a total of 26 employees within a month following the certification. On March 25, 1975, after only two negotiating sessions in which union security was a key issue, the Union called a strike which was joined by most of the 46 active and 26 laid-off employees. The strike continued for nearly a year, without any of the strikers returning to work. It is stipulated that when the strike ended on March 6, the Company's manning requirements were reduced to "ap- proximately 25" employees for the "reasonable foreseeable future." By this time, five of the former foremen were working in the bargaining unit, along with other nonstrik- ers and strike replacements. During the strike, there was some reported picket line violence involving nonstrikers and strike replacements; nails were placed on the driveway; a nonstriker's house was damaged; car windows were broken; and salt was placed in a strike replacement's gas tank. In April 1975, the Company filed a damage suit in state court against the Union, its business agent, and 57 of the strikers. In September 1975, about 7 months after the certifica- tion, the Union filed unfair labor practice charges against the Company in Case 14-CA-8783. On October 22, 1975, a complaint was issued, alleging 8(aX5) and (1) violations for bad-faith bargaining since March 18, 1975, and for increased benefits given to strike replacements, causing and/or prolonging the strike. On March 5, the Union filed additional charges in Case 14-CA-9143, and on March 11 (5 days after the end of the strike), a consolidated complaint was issued, again alleging an unfair labor practice strike, and further alleging an unlawful refusal to reinstate 56 listed strikers following unconditional offers to return to work. On March 22, the Company and Union signed a non- Board settlement agreement. The agreement first provided that the Company would dismiss the pending complaint in the state court damage suit against the Union. It next provided that the Union would seek withdrawal and dismissal of the charges and complaint in the two Board cases. Then it provided that the Union would furnish the Company a list of former strikers who desired to return to work, and that from this list, the Company would reinstate II former strikers-to take the place of 11 strike replace- ments-and put the others on a preferential hiring list. The agreement also stated that "Upon request, the Company will engage in collective bargaining negotiations with the Union." Thereafter, the state court dismissed the damage suit, and the Regional Director approved the Union's withdrawal of the charges, and dismissed the consolidated complaint. B. Postsettlement Occurrences After signing the settlement agreement, the Union failed to furnish the Company with the list of former strikers who desired to return to work. In the absence of such a list, the Company used the list attached to the consolidated complaint, reinstated II of the former strikers, and laid off 11 strike replacements. Most of the former strikers declined reinstatement, and some of them quit after being reinstat- ed. By August 6, when all 56 former strikers (with the possible exception of the union steward and three others) had been offered reinstatement, only 12 of them had returned and remained at work. By this time, five of the laid-off strike replacements had been rehired. During the 4-1/2 months between the March 22 settlement agreement and the August 6 withdrawal of recognition, the Union did not hold any membership meetings with the unit employees, nor report to them on progress of the negotiations. During this time, there were four negotiating sessions, and continued deadlock on the union-shop issue. On August 6, the bargaining unit consisted of 27 employees. In this total, there were 12 former strikers, 10 nonstrikers (including 5 former foremen), and 5 strike replacements. Thus on that date, the returning strikers were outnumbered 15 to 12. From the undisputed testimony, there is no doubt that the Union had lost its majority support among the unit employees. Personnel Manager Jerry Little gave undis- puted testimony that all 10 of the nonstrikers and all 5 of the strike replacements had told him during the strike and/or between March 22 and August 6 that they were opposed to the Union. Many of them cited the purported strike violence and misconduct. On August 6, the Company sent the Union a letter, stating that the Union had lost its majority support and refusing to recognize or negotiate with the Union any further. C. Contentions and Concluding Findings Relying primarily on the Board's decision in Pride Refining, Inc., 224 NLRB 1353 (1976), the General Counsel contends that the March 22 agreement operates as a settlement of the unfair labor practice charges in Cases 14- CA-8783 and 14-CA-9143; that the certification year (beginning February 14, 1975) should be extended for I I months because of the interruption in negotiations during the strike by the litigation (the complaints alleging bad- faith bargaining since March 18, 1975); and that the Company "withdrew recognition from the Union after only slightly more than 5 months of the Union's extended certification year had expired." The Company seeks to distinguish Pride Refining. The Company contends that the March 22 non-Board agree- ment did not operate as a settlement of the two pending Board cases, arguing that the "primary benefit derived by Local 50, and its motivation for entering the agreement, was Respondent's agreement to seek dismissal of its damage suit against the Union filed after illicit acts of violence and vandalism occurred." 1019 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD I agree with the Company that the Pride Refining decision is inapplicable under the circumstances of this case. The Union's conduct after the March settlement agreement demonstrates that the Union was primarily interested in the dismissal of the damage suit, not the reinstatement of the 56 strikers (as sought in the consoli- dated complaint). The bargaining unit had been reduced to 25 from 72 employees, and the Union did not abide by its agreement to furnish the Company with a list of those seeking to fill the few remaining jobs available in this reduced bargaining unit. The Union did meet privately with the Company in four negotiating sessions over a 4- 1/2-month period, but it did not keep in contact with the unit employees or notify them about developments in the negotiations. Under these circumstances, I find that the March 22 non-Board settlement between the Company and the Union did not operate as a settlement of the pending Board cases, entitling the Union to "an extended certification year of 11 months within which time it was free from any challenge to its majority status" (in the words of the General Counsel). I further find that in the absence of an extended certification year, the Company bargained for a reasonable time (a period of 4-1/2 months), and lawfully withdrew recognition from the Union on August 6, when it became clear that the antiunion nonstrikers and strike replacements outnumbered the former strikers (by a total of 15 to 12) and that the certified Union had lost its majority status. Accordingly, I shall dismiss the complaint. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The Company did not violate the Act when it withdrew recognition from the certified Union after the Union lost its majority status at the plant. [Recommended Order for dismissal omitted from publi- cation.l 1020