261 NLRB 609
World Evangelism, Inc.
WORLD EVANGELISM, INC.
World Evangelism, Inc. and International Union of
Operating Engineers, Local 501, AFL-CIO and
Irvin E. Watkins. Cases 21-CA-19073 and 21-
CA-19726
April 30, 1982
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN VAN DE WATER AND
MEMBERS FANNING AND ZIMMERMAN
On September 23, 1981, Administrative Law
Judge William J. Pannier III issued the attached
Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions' of the Administrative Law Judge and
to adopt his recommended Order, as modified
herein.
We
disagree with the
Administrative
Law
Judge's finding and conclusion that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) by discharging Chief Engi-
neer Watkins, a supervisor as defined by Section
2(11) of the Act. The Administrative Law Judge
concluded that Watkins was discharged for failing
to engage in unfair labor practices, but we do not
think the evidence is sufficient to warrant this con-
clusion. There is evidence that the Respondent's
general manager told former employee Johnston
that he was going to have to terminate Watkins be-
cause Watkins could not control the "union thing,"
and evidence that the Respondent's president told
Watkins if he "had talked to the men in the first
place they would have throwed the Union out
anyway." The record, however, does not establish
that the Respondent expected Watkins to use coer-
cive and unlawful means to further the Respond-
ent's antiunion position or that it suggested that
Watkins engage in unfair labor practices. Accord-
ingly, we dismiss the allegation of the complaint
that the Respondent unlawfully discharged Wat-
kins. 2
' We find, as did the Administrative Law Judge, that the Respondent is
an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec. 2(6) and
(7) of the Act, and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to assert
jurisdiction herein. See World Evangelism. Inc., 248 NLRB 909 (1980),
enfd. N.LR.B. v. World Evangelism. Inc., 656 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1981).
'See
PPG Industries Inc., Lexington Plant, Fiber Glass Division, 260
NLRB 401 (1982).
261 NLRB No. 88
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modi-
fied below, and hereby orders that the Respondent,
World Evangelism, Inc., San Diego, California, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take
the action set forth in the said recommended
Order, as so modified:
1. Delete paragraphs l(b), 2(a), and 2(b), and re-
letter the remaining paragraphs accordingly.
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all sides had an opportu-
nity to present evidence and state their positions,
the National Labor Relations Board found that we
have violated the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, and has ordered us to post this notice.
The Act gives employees the following rights:
To engage in self-organization
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choice
To engage in activities together for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection
To refrain from the exercise of any or all
such activities.
WE WILL NOT offer to provide wages, bene-
fits, and conditions equal to those that a union
could obtain for our employees if they aban-
don support for continued representation by
International Union of Operating Engineers,
Local 501, AFL-CIO, or by any other labor
organization.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employ-
ees in the exercise of any of the rights set forth
above which are guaranteed by the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended.
WORLD EVANGELISM, INC.
609
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
WILLIAM J. PANNIER III, Administrative Law Judge:
This matter was heard by me in San Diego, California,
on August 6, 1981. On December 18, 1980,' the Acting
Regional Director for Region 21 of the National Labor
Relations Board issued a complaint and notice of hearing
in Case 21-CA-19726, based on an unfair labor practice
charge filed on November 12, alleging that the discharge
of Supervisor Irwin E. Watkins on May 13 violated Sec-
tion 8(aXl) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151, et seq., herein called the Act.
On December 19, the Acting Regional Director set aside
a settlement agreement, approved previously on June 30
in Case 21-CA-19073, based on an unfair labor practice
charge filed on May 20. On December 31, the Acting
Regional Director issued an order consolidating cases,
consolidated amended complaint and amended notice of
hearing, consolidating these two cases for hearing and al-
leging, in addition to the above-described discharge of
Watkins, that certain statements to employees by Vice
President/General Manager Tony Drago on April 28 or
29 violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Answers were
filed to both the complaint and amended complaint. In
essence, they denied the jurisdictional allegations, denied
that President Morris Cerullo, as well as Drago and
Watkins, had been supervisors within the meaning of
Section 2(11) of the Act and agents within the meaning
of Section 2(2) and (13) of the Act, denied that Drago
had made the unlawful statement attributed to him on
April 28 or 29, and, while admitting that Watkins had
been terminated on May 13, denied that his termination
had been for a reason proscribed by the Act, alleging af-
firmatively that it had resulted from Watkins' failure to
perform his duties despite repeated warnings.
When the hearing in this matter opened, no appear-
ance was made on behalf of World Evangelism, Inc.,
herein called Respondent. Counsel for the General Coun-
sel represented that, prior to commencement of the hear-
ing, he had received a telephone call from Respondent's
counsel, J. David Epstein, who had indicated that he be-
lieved that his appearance at the hearing could prejudice
Respondent's position that the Board lacked jurisdiction
over it, both because it was a religious organization
exempt from coverage of the Act under the doctrine
enunciated in N.L.R.B. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440
U.S. 490 (1979), and because its volume of operations
were not sufficient in magnitude to satisfy the Board's
discretionary
jurisdictional
standards.
As
discussed
below, both of these issues were resolved in a prior pro-
ceeding and in view of that fact, and inasmuch as it did
not appear that a continuance would serve the purpose
of securing attendance of Respondent's counsel, I direct-
ed that the hearing go forward. Based on the entire
record, upon the brief filed on behalf of the General
Counsel, and upon my observation of the demeanor of
the witnesses, I make the following:
'Unless otherwise stated, all dates occurred in 1980.
I. JURISDICTION
The complaint and the consolidated amended com-
plaint allege that at all times material, Respondent has
been engaged in the operation of a hotel enterprise,
known as the El Cortez Hotel, in San Diego County at
7th and Ash Streets in the city of San Diego. They fur-
ther allege that in the course of operating that enterprise,
Respondent annually receives gross revenues in excess of
$500,000 and, in addition, annually receives goods valued
in excess of $5,000 directly from suppliers located out-
side the State of California. As stated above, Respondent
denies these allegations.
On July 22, 1981, counsel for the General Counsel
caused to be served on Respondent's custodian of
records a subpoena duces tecum, seeking, in essence, fi-
nancial records pertaining to the jurisdictional allegations
of the complaint. No petition to revoke that subpena was
filed by Respondent. As noted above, Respondent made
no appearance at the hearing and, accordingly,
no
records were produced in response to that subpena. It is
settled that the Board will:
"assert jurisdiction in any case in which ... an em-
ployer has refused, upon reasonable request by
Board agents, to provide . . . information relevant
to the Board's jurisdictional determinations, where
the record developed at a hearing, duly noticed,
scheduled, and held, demonstrates the Board's statu-
tory jurisdiction ...
."
Plant City Welding and Tank Company, 123 NLRB 1146,
1152 (1959), remanded on other grounds 275 F.2d 859
(5th Cir. 1960). Accord: Tropicana Products, Inc., 122
NLRB 121, 123-124 (1958); City and County Electric
Sanitary Sewer Service, Inc., 191 NLRB 167 (1971). "The
purpose of the Tropicana doctrine is to avoid delay in
processing cases and to channel resources toward investi-
gating and remedying substantive labor law violations."
N.LR.B. v. Edward Alexander, d/b/a Strand Theatre,
K.ILM.Y.B.A.
Corp., 595 F.2d 454, 457 (8th Cir. 1979).
Therefore, inasmuch as Respondent has not produced fi-
nancial information sought by the subpoena duces tecum
and has failed to show that its refusal resulted from un-
reasonableness on the part of the General Counsel, juris-
diction can be asserted in this matter if the record dem-
onstrates that there is statutory jurisdiction.
In World Evangelism, Inc., 248 NLRB 909 (1980), en-
forcement pending in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, the Board held that the doctrine of
N.LR.B. v. The Catholic Bishop of Chicago, supra, did
not apply to Respondent's El Cortez Hotel operations
and, further, that Respondent's operations were of suffi-
cient magnitude to warrant assertion of jurisdiction over
the labor dispute at issue in that case. With regard to the
latter, the Board found that Respondent's commercial ac-
tivities at its El Cortez Center operation, of which the El
Cortez Hotel is a part, were:
. .
substantial enough to meet the statutory and
discretionary standards applied by the Board in de-
FINDINGS OF FACT
610
WORLD EVANGELISM, INC.
termining whether or not to assert jurisdiction over,
for example, a hotel enterprise, or (as is arguably
the case in the revenues derived from interstate air-
line companies), a business providing services di-
rectly for an out-of-state business customer. [Foot-
notes omitted. Id. at 913-914.]
Consequently, there already has been a determination
that Respondent's operations are of sufficient magnitude
to show that statutory jurisdiction over them exists. "It is
well established that the Board may take official notice
of its own proceedings and decisions, and rely thereon
....
" Plant City Welding and Tank Company, supra, 123
NLRB at 1150.
True, the period covered by the jurisdictional determi-
nation in that earlier case precedes the one during which
the alleged unfair labor practices occurred that are the
subject of this proceeding. However, it is valid to pre-
sume "that a state of affairs once shown to exist contin-
ues until the contrary is shown." Bordo Products Compa-
ny, 117 NLRB 313, 314 (1957). Here, nothing in the
prior decision nor in the record in this case indicates that
Respondent's operations during the period encompassed
by the jurisdictional determination in that earlier case are
not typical of its continuing business operations at El
Cortez Center. Further, there is no evidence of interven-
ing circumstances which could be said to give rise to a
probability that Respondent's interstate business there
had changed substantially or had ceased altogether. Re-
spondent has "neither asserted nor offered any evidence
to show that its operations have substantially changed
since the earlier case." Id. Of course, Respondent is the
custodian of its own financial records concerning its op-
erations. Accordingly, evidence of any such changes
would involve "facts necessarily within the knowledge
of [Respondent's] managing officers." Harvey Aluminum
(Incorporated), General Engineering, Inc., and Wallace A.
Limmel, d/b/a Wallace Detective and Security Agency v.
N.LR.B., 335 F.2d 749, 758 (9th Cir. 1964). Yet, Re-
spondent has made no contention that its records would
disclose a change in its operations since the earlier case.
Indeed, by refusing to even attend the hearing in this
matter, Respondent waived its right to make such a
showing. See, e.g., Local Union No. 9, International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, and its
agents Frank Benner and Robert Fitzgerald (C.A. Rafel
and Co., Inc.), 128 NLRB 899, 900, fn. 1 (1960). In these
circumstances there is "no authority requiring the [Gen-
eral Counsel] to relitigate the issue [of statutory jurisdic-
tion]." Greene County Farm Bureau Cooperative Associ-
ation, Inc. v. N.LR.B., 317 F.2d 335, 336 (D.C. Cir.
1963).
Therefore, inasmuch as Respondent has refused to pro-
vide financial information sought by the General Coun-
sel's subpoena duces tecum and in view of the absence of
evidence of any material change in Respondent's com-
mercial operations since the determination in the prior
proceeding that jurisdiction over it existed, I conclude,
based on the determination in the prior proceeding, that
Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(2) of the Act, engaged in commerce and in oper-
ations affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.2
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
It is admitted and I find that at all times material Inter-
national Union of Operating Engineers, Local 501,
AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, has been a labor or-
ganization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Facts
As set forth above, the consolidated amended com-
plaint alleges two violations of Section 8(aX1) of the
Act: remarks made to employees at an April 28 or 29
meeting and the termination of Watkins, an alleged su-
pervisor.
On April 2, the Board issued its decision and order in
the prior case involving Respondent, directing it, inter
alia, to bargain with the Union as the representative of,
in essence, the engineering and maintenance employees
employed at El Cortez Center and, further, directing it
to execute and honor a collective-bargaining agreement
which, the Board concluded, Respondent had agreed to
execute and honor. On April 28 or 29, arrangements
were made for a meeting between the unit employees
and Union Business Representative Art Brown. Prior to
commencement of that meeting, General Manager Tony
Drago3 met with the unit employees who were working
on the day shift. He told them that Respondent did not
want a union at El Cortez Center, that he would like
them not to become members of it and that Respondent
would provide them with the same wages, benefits, and
conditions as the Union could obtain for them if they
would vote out the Union. Drago asked the employees
for their reaction to his remarks. When one of them ex-
pressed reservations regarding Respondent's trustworthi-
ness, Drago replied that he felt that Respondent could
do everything for the employees that the Union could do
without their having to pay dues. Drago's remarks at this
meeting were the basis for the settlement agreement ap-
proved by the Regional Director on June 30 in Case 21-
CA-19073. As mentioned above, that agreement was set
aside on December 19 for failure to perform the obliga-
tions undertaken by Respondent. 4
' In light of the full consideration and final determination in the prior
proceeding
rejecting Respondent's contention that the doctrine of
N.L R.B. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicag, supra, is applicable to Respond-
ent's operations at El Cortez Center, further litigation of that iasue in this
proceeding is barred. See United States v. Utah Construction & Mining
Co, 384 U.S. 394 (1966).
' In its answers, Respondent denied the allegation that at all times ma-
terial, Drago had been a supervisor within the meaning of Sec. 2(11) of
the Act and an agent of Respondent. The record discloses that, once he
had become general manager, Drago had been responsible for overseeing
and directing operations at El Cortez Center for Respondent. In doing
so, he had authority to hire and fire employees. Further, on occasion, he
directed employees to perform particular jobs. In these circumstances, I
find that at all times material Drago had been a supervisor within the
meaning of Sec. 2(11) of the Act and an agent of Respondent.
' The letter setting aside the agreement does not specify the manner in
which Respondent failed to perform its obligations under the settlement
agreement. As part of the allegations pertaining to the settlement agree-
Continued
611
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In its answer, Respondent denies that Chief Engineer
Watkins had been a supervisor and agent of Respondent
at all times material, but admits that he had been termi-
nated on May 13 and had not been offered reinstatement
thereafter, The General Counsel contends that Watkins
had been terminated for refusing to interfere with the
right of employees to join and support a labor organiza-
tion. To support that contention, evidence was presented
of certain remarks made by Drago and by Respondent's
founder and president, Morris Cerullo.
In late April,
Former Assistant Chief Engineer Max Edward Johnston
had been asked if he could talk the employees out of sup-
porting the Union by Drago, who also had said that he
was going to have to terminate Watkins because the
latter could not control the "union thing." On May 13,
during a conversation with Watkins, Morris Cerullo
stated that he did not want a union in El Cortez Center,
that he would fight it all the way to the Supreme Court
if he had to do so, and that if Watkins "had talked to the
men in the first place they would have throwed [sic] the
union [sic] out anyhow." Notwithstanding these remarks,
Watkins told Cerullo on that day that he did not feel that
Cerullo had any choice but to recognize the Union and
that the employees felt that they would be fired without
a union to protect them. Later on May 13, Cerullo ap-
proached Watkins and said to Watkins "look me straight
in the eye and tell me that you don't belong to the
union." Watkins denied that he belonged to the Union,
but during this conversation pointed out to Cerullo that,
based on what Johnston had reported to him (Watkins)
concerning Drago's above-described earlier remark, that
he (Watkins) was aware that Respondent was attempting
to relieve him of his duties.
Later that same day, Watkins was summoned to the
office where he was handed a letter, signed by Drago,
soliciting Watkins' resignation. Watkins told Drago that
he would not resign. Later that same day, he was given
a letter of termination. In essence, both letters accused
Watkins of an uncooperative attitude and of failing to
ment, the consolidated amended complaint recites that Respondent had
failed to post the "Notice to Employees", which it had agreed to post as
part of the agreement. While Respondent denied generally all allegations
relating to this settlement agreement (that it had been approved by the
Regional Director on June 30, that Respondent had failed to post the
"Notice to Employees," and that the Acting Regional Director had with-
drawn approval of it by letter dated December 19), the production at the
hearing of the agreement and of the Acting Regional Director's letter of
December 19 raises doubt concerning the reliability of Respondent's de-
nials in this area of its answers. Further, certain affirmative allegations
regarding the settlement in Respondent's answer tend to indicate that its
general denial of the settlement allegations had been intended to avoid
any possibility that it somehow might suffer prejudice on the merits by
virtue of having entered into the agreement. Finally, Respondent has nei-
ther shown nor even contended that it had, in fact, posted the "Notice to
Employees" as required by that agreement.
I Respondent denied the allegation that at all times material Cerullo
had been its president, a supervisor within the meaning of Sec. 2(11) of
the Act and its agent within the meaning of Sec. 2(2) and (13) of the Act.
That Cerullo is Respondent's president was on the findings made in the
prior proceeding. 248 NLRB at 909. There has been no showing that his
position has changed since then. To the contrary, there was testimony
that he still had been president of Respondent in May. Inasmuch as Cer-
ullo had been Respondent's highest ranking official, it hardly requires
prolonged discussion to conclude, as I do, that at all times material he
had been a supervisor within the meaning of Sec. 2(11) of the Act and an
agent of Respondent.
perform his job and to organize his department, which
assertedly had a poor performance record. Yet, at no
time prior to May 13 had Watkins' performance ever
been criticized. To the contrary, during the 6-month
period prior to his termination, Watkins had received an
award as employee of the month and, in addition, two
letters commending his performance had been written.
Of possibly greater significance, when, in approximately
March, Watkins had submitted his resignation, as a result
of a dispute over whether a particular individual could
be hired as Watkins wanted to do, Drago had withdrawn
Respondent's opposition to hiring that person and had
asked Watkins to withdraw his resignation, which the
latter did.
B. Analysis
There is credible testimony that on April 28 or 29
Drago had told unit employees that Respondent would
provide them with wages, benefits, and conditions equal
to those that could be obtained for them by the Union if
they would vote it out. It is well settled that "promises
of benefits from voting against the union are prohibited."
N.L.R.B. v. Luisi Truck Lines, 384 F.2d 842, 845 (9th
Cir. 1967). Drago's "statement clearly conveyed a prom-
ise of benefit to [the employees] in return for [their] re-
pudiation of the Union." The Conolon Corporation v.
N.L.R.B., 431 F.2d 324, 328 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied
401 U.S. 908 (1971). Therefore, I find that by promising
employees benefits to persuade them to forgo continued
representation by the Union, Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(X) of the Act.
With regard to Watkins, the record discloses that
while he had worked as chief engineer for Respondent,
he had been responsible for ensuring performance of the
engineering and maintenance work needed to keep the
facility operating. To do so, he had directed the work of
engineering and maintenance employees, assigning work
orders to whichever of them he felt was capable of per-
forming the work that needed to be done. Moreover,
whenever engineering and maintenance employes wanted
time off, they directed their requests to Watkins. He,
then, made the decision as to whether or not to grant the
request for time off. In these circumstances, I will find
that Watkins had been a supervisor within the meaning
of Section 2(11) of the Act during the time that he had
worked for Respondent as its chief engineer.
As set forth above, the remarks by Drago to Johnston
in late April and by Cerullo to Watkins on May 13 con-
stitute a virtual admission that Respondent had dis-
charged Watkins on May 13 because the latter had failed
to persuade employees to forgo continued representation
by the Union. Thus, on May 13, Cerullo had made it
plain that he was opposed to unionization of Respond-
ent's employees and that he believed Watkins to have
been at fault for having failed to induce the employees to
cease supporting the Union. Indeed, Cerullo's later ques-
tioning of Watkins, regarding the latter's possible union
membership, demonstrates that Cerullo had harbored sus-
picion that Watkins might, in fact, actually be a member,
and thus a supporter, of the Union. Drago's earlier
remark to Johnston demonstrates that Respondent had
612
WORLD EVANGELISM, INC.
contemplated termination of Watkins because of the lat-
ter's failure to persuade employees to cease supporting
the Union. No other reason for terminating Watkins on
May 13 emerges from the record. Respondent did not
appear and, consequently, did not produce any evidence
to support the assertions in its letters to Watkins regard-
ing his purported performance deficiencies. Indeed, in
view of his exemplary record of performance, as illus-
trated by an award and letters commending him and also
by Drago's request that Watkins withdraw his resigna-
tion, it is difficult to conceive of how Respondent could
have supported those assertions. In these circumstances, I
find that a preponderance of the evidence supports the
conclusions that Watkins had been terminated for failing
to induce employees to cease supporting the Union.
Of course, for Watkins, a supervisor, to have attempt-
ed to influence employees against the Union would have
constituted an unfair labor practice, inasmuch as he
would have been interfering with employee "freedom of
choice for or against unionization." N.L.R.B.
v. Ex-
change Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964). "It is for the
employees alone to decide whether . . . they wish to
oust an incumbent union and either replace it with an-
other union or forego union representation entirely."
N.L.R.B. v. A. W. Thompson, Inc., 651 F.2d 1141 (5th
Cir. 1981). While the Act generally does not protect su-
pervisors, it is an unfair labor practice "where a supervi-
sor is disciplined for refusing to commit an unfair labor
practice." N.L.R.B. v. Nevis Industries, Inc., d/b/a Fresno
Townehouse, 647 F.2d 905, 910 (9th Cir. 1981), and cases
cited therein. Accord: Gerry's Cash Markets, Inc. d/b/a
Gerry's I.G.A. v. N.L.R.B., 602 F.2d 1021, 1023 (Ist Cir.
1979). Moreover, where such an unfair labor practice is
committed reinstatement
is an appropriate
remedy.
N.L.R.B. v. Nevis Industries, supra; N.L.R.B. v. Southern
Plasma Corp., 626 F.2d 1284, 1287 (5th Cir. 1980). There-
fore, I find that by discharging Watkins for failing to
engage in unfair labor practices, Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, and, further, that the proper
remedy for that termination is reinstatement and back-
pay.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. World Evangelism, Inc., is an employer within the
meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act, engaged in com-
merce and in operations affecting commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local
501, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By offering to provide employees with wages, bene-
fits, and conditions equal to those that a union could pro-
vide if they would forgo representation, World Evangel-
ism, Inc., violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. By terminating Chief Engineer Irvin E. Watkins on
May 13, 1980, for refusing to commit unfair labor prac-
tices, and by refusing to reinstate him thereafter, World
Evangelism, Inc., violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that World Evangelism, Inc., engaged in
certain unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it
be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and that it take
certain affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the
Act.
World Evangelism, Inc., will be required to offer Irvin
E. Watkins immediate reinstatement to his former posi-
tion of employment or, if that position no longer exists,
to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice
to his seniority or other rights and privileges, dismissing,
if necessary, anyone who may have been assigned or
hired to perform the work that Watkins had been per-
forming prior to his termination on May 13, 1980. Addi-
tionally, World Evangelism, Inc., will be required to
make Watkins whole for any loss of earnings he may
have suffered by reason of his unlawful termination on
May 13, 1980, with backpay to be computed on a quar-
terly basis, making deductions for interim earnings, and
with interest to be paid on the amounts owing. See DR W
Corporation d/b/a Brothers Three Cabinets, 248 NLRB
828, 844 (1980), and cases cited therein.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and upon the entire record, and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recom-
mended:
ORDER 6
The Respondent, World Evangelism, Inc., San Diego,
California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
I. Cease and desist from:
(a) Offering to provide employees with wages, bene-
fits, and conditions equal to those that a union could
obtain for them if they would abandon support for con-
tinued representation by International Union of Operat-
ing Engineers, Local 501, AFL-CIO, or by any other
labor organization.
(b) Terminating supervisors for refusing to engage in
unfair labor practices intended to interfere with the exer-
cise by employees of rights protected by Section 7 of the
Act.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights
under Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action deemed neces-
sary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Irvin E. Watkins immediate and full reinstate-
ment to his former position of employment, dismissing, if
necessary, anyone who may have been hired or assigned
to perform the work that Watkins had been performing
prior to May 13, 1980, or, if his former position no
longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, with-
out prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privi-
leges, and make Watkins whole for any loss of pay he
' In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the find-
ings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in
Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto
shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
613
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
may have suffered as a result of the discrimination, in the
manner set forth above in the section of this Decision en-
titled "The Remedy."
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents all payroll and other records neces-
sary to compute the backpay and reinstatement rights set
forth in The Remedy section of this Decision.
(c) Post at its San Diego, California, facility, copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix."7 Copies of said
7 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
notice on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 21, after being duly signed by its authorized rep-
resentative, shall be posted immediately upon receipt
thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by World Evangelism, Inc.
to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 21, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps have been taken to comply herewith.
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