Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company and Communications Workers of America, AFL- CIO, Local 9404. Cases 20-CA-15348 and 20- CA-I5349 July 20, 1982 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS JENKINS, ZIMMERMAN, AND HUNTER On February 13, 1981, Administrative Law Judge Jay R. Pollack issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed ex- ceptions and a supporting brief, the General Coun- sel filed cross-exceptions and a supporting brief, and Respondent filed an answering brief in support thereof. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find- ings,' and conclusions2 of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re- lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the Respondent, Pacific Tele- phone and Telegraph Company, Greenbrae, Cali- fornia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recom- mended Order. I Respondent and the General Counsel have excepted to certain credi- bility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule an administrative law judge's resolu- tions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings. 2 In the instant case, the Administrative Law Judge found that Re- spondent met its burden of proving that the decision to discipline the em- ployees in question was not based upon information obtained at the un- lawful interview and therefore declined to order a "make whole" remedy. The General Counsel excepted to this finding, contending that the Employer's decision to discharge the employees in question was based on information learned during the course of the unlawful inter- views, specifically, the employees inability to satisfactorily explain the improper use of company equipment. We agree with the Administrative Law Judge. In so doing, we note that on a prior occasion, in a narrow factual set- ting, the Board found that a make-whole remedy was appropriate because discipline was based not on the subject under investigation, but on the employee's failure at the interview to furnish a "satisfactory explanation." Ohio Masonic Home, 251 NLRB 606 (1980). However, that decision does not suggest that anytime an employee fails to offer a satisfactory explana- tion during an unlawful interview reinstatement is required under our de- cision in Kraft Foods Inc., 251 NLRB 598 (1980). In this case, we are satisfied that the discharges were based on information other than that obtained during the unlawful interviews. 262 NLRB No. 125 MEMBER JENKINS, concurring in part and dissent- ing in part: I concur in the Administrative Law Judge's find- ing that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when it denied employees Martinez and Revada the right to prior consultation with their union representative before participating in the in- vestigatory interview with Respondent. In light of my dissent in Kraft Foods, Inc.,3 and the facts existing in the instant case, I cannot agree with my colleagues' failure to find that a "make- whole remedy" for these employees is appropriate. The record shows that Respondent's supervisor, Susan King, had two purposes in mind when she conducted the unlawful interviews: to suspend the two employees pending further investigation and to discover whether the employees could explain the misuse of the Company's equipment. Moreover, King admitted that her recommendation that the two employees be discharged was made after she conducted the unlawful interviews and was based on several factors, and it appears she relied on as the most significant factor the employees' failure to produce a satisfactory explanation of what hap- pened. Further, I am in agreement with the Gener- al Counsel that this factor was reflected in the se- verity of Respondent's discipline of Martinez and Revada. Respondent's past practice shows that it only suspended, rather than discharged, employees for this kind of misuse of equipment when Re- spondent believed that the accused employees were being cooperative and candid. In this instant matter, Respondent believed that Martinez and Revada were being less than candid, a belief which may well have resulted from Respondent's unlaw- ful denial to them of consultation with their union representative. Because I do not subscribe to the decision in Kraft Foods, I reject my colleagues' view that this case substantially differs from Ohio Masonic Home,4 since in both cases Respondent affirmatively relied on the employees' inability to offer a satisfactory explanation. Accordingly, I would find that the de- cision to discharge these two employees, flowing from an unlawful interview, was tainted, and in ac- cordance with Ohio Masonic Home, a make-whole remedy is appropriate. MEMBER HUNTER, dissenting: For the reasons expressed in my dissent in Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company,5 I would find merit in Respondent's exceptions to the Adminis- trative Law Judge's finding that it unlawfully re- 3 251 NLRB 598 (1980). 4 251 NLRB 606 (1980). 5 262 NLRB 1048 (1982). 1034 PACIFIC TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH CO. fused to allow employees Martinez and Revada to consult with their union representatives prior to their investigatory interviews. Thus, since I believe there is no statutory right to prior consultation, and since it is clear that the employees were assisted during their interviews by knowledgeable union representatives, I would find that Respondent con- ducted lawful interviews in accordance with the employees' Weingarten rights. Accordingly, I would dismiss the complaint in its entirety. 6 s In view of my dissent herein, I find it unnecessary to address the issue of the appropriateness of a make-whole remedy in the instant case. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JAY R. POLLACK, Administrative Law Judge: This case was heard before me in San Francisco, California, on November 20, 1980.' On June 27, the Regional Di- rector for Region 20 of the National Labor Relations Board issued a consolidated complaint and notice of hearing, based on unfair labor practice charges filed by Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Local 9404, herein called the Union, on May 13. The complaint alleges that Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company, herein called Respondent, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, herein called the Act. The parties have been offered full opportunity to appear, to introduce evidence, to examine and cross-ex- amine witnesses, and to file briefs. Post-trial briefs were filed on behalf of the General Counsel and Respondent. Based on the entire record, on the briefs filed by counsel, and on my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS I. JUIRISDICTION At all times material herein, Respondent has been a California corporation with an office and place of busi- ness in Greenbrae, California, engaged in the operation of a telephone and telegraph system. During calendar year 1979, Respondent derived gross revenues in excess of $100,000 from the operation of its telephone system. During the same time period, Respondent purchased and received at its Greenbrae, California, facility goods and materials valued in excess of $5,000 directly from suppli- ers located outside the State of California. The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that Respondent has been at all times material herein, an employer engaged in commerce and in a business affect- ing commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. t Unless otherwise stated, all dates hereinafter refer to calendar year 1980. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that the Union has been, at all times material herein, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background As discussed above, Respondent is engaged in the op- eration of a telephone system. The Union represents Re- spondent's employees at its facility located at Greenbrae, California, referred to in the record as the Larkspur TSPS.2 This case arises out of investigatory interviews involving two employees at the Larkspur TSPS: Helena Martinez and Betty Revada. On May 5, Respondent experienced a problem with certain equipment involved in its Traffic Service Position System, covering four offices, including the Larkspur TSPS. Pat Shoemaker, a facilities manager for Respond- ent, began an investigation to determine the reason for the problems in the system. In the course of Shoemaker's investigation, she discovered, inter alia, that two calls in- volving operator positions at the Larkspur TSPS were tying up needed equipment. Shoemaker called the Lark- spur TSPS and had the equipment released back into the system. Shoemaker also called Rae Morgan, the supervi- sor on duty at the Larkspur TSPS that evening, and asked Morgan to prepare a list of the operators on duty at the time of the two calls in question. On May 6, Susan King, then manager of operator services at the Larkspur TSPS, called Shoemaker to as- certain the details concerning the problem of the previ- ous evening. Shoemaker advised King that two question- able calls involving the Larkspur TSPS had tied up equipment in the system. Shoemaker told King that the calls appeared to represent billable calls for which no biling charge was indicated. Shoemaker referred to each call as "traffic busy," from which King incorrectly in- ferred that Shoemaker had confirmed that conversation had taken place. Shoemaker provided King with the in- formation that one call was placed at 8:15 p.m., involv- ing a local number and a number in central California and the other call involved was placed at 8:42 p.m., in- volving a local number and a number in Hawaii. At her discussion with Shoemaker, King compared the local numbers with a list of numbers of employees at the Larkspur TSPS. Thus, King learned that the number in- volved in the call to central California was Martinez' home phone number and that the number involved in the call to Hawaii was Revada's home phone number. King then checked the list of operators on duty prepared by Morgan and found that both Martinez and Revada were on duty when the subject calls were placed. Based on the above information, King determined to interview both Martinez and Revada to ascertain what information they could provide to explain what appeared to be unauthorized use of Respondent's equipment. Before conducting such interviews, King called Bernard 2 TSPS stands for Traffic Service Position System. 1035 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Chiaravalle, president of the Union, and advised him of the two questionable phone calls. King at first refused to identify the employees involved but was persuaded by Chiaravalle to do so. King told Chiaravalle that the phone numbers involved were that of Martinez and Revada and that both were on duty at the time the calls were placed. King mistakingly believed that conversation was confirmed and so she also relayed that information to Chiaravalle. Further, King told Chiaravalle that she would be suspending both employees pending further in- vestigation. The further investigation included interview- ing Martinez that same day, and interviewing Revada when Revada returned from her day off. King requested Chiaravalle's assistance in ensuring that union stewards would be present for the interviews. Chiaravalle agreed to contact the stewards. It is the conduct of the investigatory interviews which gives rise to the instant case. The complaint alleges that Respondent violated the Act by refusing to allow Mar- tinez and Revada consultation with a union steward prior to conducting the investigatory interviews. Further litigated was the issue of whether Respondent's subse- quent decision to discharge Martinez and Revada was based on information obtained at the allegedly unlawful interviews. B. The Investigatory Interviews As discussed above, King, based on information that improper calls had been placed from the Larspur TSPS involving Martinez' and Revada's home phones, decided to suspend these employees pending further investiga- tion. King advised the Union of the forthcoming investi- gatory interviews and sought assistance in obtaining the presence of a union steward. At 5 p.m. on May 6, shortly after King called Chiaravalle,3 she met with Christina Opaso, union steward. King asked Opaso whether Chiar- avalle had advised her about Martinez' interview. Opaso stated that he had not. King then told Opaso that she would be suspending Martinez because of the improper call involving Martinez' home phone. Opaso asked to speak with Martinez prior to the meeting so that she could advise the employee. King answered that Opaso could not do so prior to the interview but could do so afterwards. King, Opaso, and Martinez then met in a conference room. Martinez asked, "[W]hat's going on?" Before King could answer, Opaso said, "I just want you to know that I feel that I cannot adequately represent this employee without first having time to discuss their rights with them and go over things with them before we go into the discussion." Martinez indicated her agreement with that request.4 King answered that Opaso was there as a witness and that was all that was required. King then told Martinez that during the previous evening, in inves- tigating equipment trouble, Respondent had discovered a a Although there is conflicting testimony regarding the time of the conversation between King and Chiaravalle, it is undisputed that Chiara- valle was unable to contact Opaso prior to 5 p.m. 4 There is conflicting testimony as to whether Martinez expressed her desire to speak with Opaso. However, as there is no dispute that Mar- tinez nodded her approval, there is no reason to resolve the conflict in testimony. questionable phone call involving her home number. King asked Martinez if she had any explanation and Martinez answered that she did not know anything about it. King asked if anyone had access to Martinez' home telephone and Martinez asnwered yes. King asked for the name of persons with access to Martinez' telephone. Opaso told Martinez that she did not have to answer any questions "that made her feel uncomfortable." Martinez then stated that she would rather not answer King's question. King ended the meeting by telling Martinez that she was suspended pending investigation. King per- mitted Opaso and Martinez to meet privately and then escorted Martinez out of the building. After the conclusion of the Martinez interview, King met briefly with Opaso and told the steward of her in- tention to interview Revada the next morning. Roxanna Ferris, another union steward, was subsequently assigned to represent Revada at her interview. Ferris was told of this assignment by Opaso either on the evening of May 6 or the morning of May 7. When Ferris arrived at King's office, King asked whether Opaso had briefed Ferris re- garding the interview. When Ferris answered that Opaso had not, King explained that she would be suspending Revada because of a questionable call involving Revada's home phone on the evening of May 5. Ferris asked to meet privately with Revada prior to the interview. At the outset of the meeting with Revada, Ferris again asked King if she could speak privately with Revada and King answered that she could not. 5 Ferris then said that she felt that she could not properly represent Revada without first speaking with her. Ferris told Revada that the employees did not have to say anything or answer any questions that she was uncomfortable with. King ex- plained to Revada that a questionable call had tied up equipment during the evening of May 5. King told Revada that the call involved the employee's home phone number and a number in Hawaii. Revada was asked what she knew about the incident and she said she did not know anything about it. King asked if anyone else had access to her telephone and Revada laughed and said, "a lot of people do." Revada was asked if she had any further information that could help and she an- swered that she did not. King then suspended Revada pending investigation and agreed to call Revada and inform her of the outcome of the investigation. At the conclusion of the meeting, King permitted Revada and Ferris to meet privately before she escorted Revada out of the building. C. The Discharge On the afternoon of May 8 or on the morning of May 9, King recommended to her supervisor, Sandy Breaum, that Martinez and Revada be dismissed. King testified that she based her decision on the fact that the question- able calls had been placed from the Larkspur TSPS to Martinez' and Revada's home numbers, at times when Martinez and Revada were on duty as operators. She concluded that Martinez and Revada had each placed a 6 Revada testified that she did not say anything in regard to Ferris' request but that she nodded her head in approval. 1036 PACIFIC TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH CO. call which misused company equipment and her own time. King testified that she decided on discharge as the penalty, rather than suspension, based on the fact that the calls involved were to numbers outside the area code. On May 12, Martinez was informed that she was dismissed for misuse of company time and equipment. King called Revada and told her of her discharge on May 10. The General Counsel and the Charging Party contend that, had the employees been granted consultation with their union stewards prior to the interviews, they would not have denied knowledge of the subject calls. Further, the General Counsel and the Charging Party contend that had the employees not denied knowledge of the sub- ject calls they would have been suspended but not dis- charged. To this end, Chiaravalle testified that three em- ployees, not operators, were suspended but not terminat- ed for having made free telephone calls. Each of these three employees had told the truth upon being ques- tioned about the subject calls. Further, Chiaravlle and Revada both testified that in May, an operator, who was initially terminated for making free calls, was reinstated 3 weeks later. Finally, Chiaravalle testified that two opera- tors who were terminated for committing similar viola- tions had both lied about the events to Respondent's offi- cials. There is no evidence, however, that any of the inci- dents recited by Chiaravalle involved employees super- vised by King. King denied that either Martinez' or Re- vada's conduct as the subject interviews played any part in the decision to discharge them. She further testified that even if Martinez or Revada had admitted wrongdo- ing it would not have changed her recommendation to discharge them. D. Analysis and Conclusions The General Counsel and the Charging Party contend that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by denying Martinez and Revada the right to consult with their union representatives prior to the commencement of the subject disciplinary interviews. Respondent con- tends that Martinez and Revada were each assisted by a knowledgeable steward and, therefore, that the employ- ees' rights under Weingarten6 were not violated. In Weingarten, the Supreme Court upheld the Board's determination that, under Section 7 of the Act, an em- ployee has the right to insist on the presence of a union representative at an interview which the employee rea- sonably believes might result in disciplinary action. The critical issue herein is whether the right to the presence of a union representative at a Weingarten interview in- cludes the right to prior consultation with the union rep- resentative. In Climax Molybdenum Company, a Division of Amax, Inc., 227 NLRB 1189 (1977), the Board held that the right to union representation clearly embraced the right to prior consultation. The Board stated at 1190: Surely, if a union representative is to represent effectively an employee "too fearful or inarticulate 6 N LR.B. v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975). to relate accurately the incident being investigated" and is to be "knowledgeable" so that he can "assist the employer by eliciting favorable facts, and . . . getting to the bottom of the incident," these objec- tives can more readily be achieved when the union representative has had an opportunity to consult be- forehand with the employee to learn his version of the events and to gain a familiarity with the facts. Additionally, a fearful or inarticulate employee would be more prone to discuss the incident fully and accurately with his union representative with- out the presence of an interviewer contemplating the possibility of disciplinary action. These consid- erations indicate that the representative's aid in elic- iting the facts can be performed better, and perhaps only, if he can consult with the employee before- hand. To preclude such advance discussion, as our colleagues would, seems to us to thwart one of the purposes approved in Weingarten. Nothing in the ra- tionale of Weingarten suggests that, in its endorse- ment of the role of a "knowledgeable union repre- sentative," the Supreme Court meant to put blinders on the union representative by denying him the op- portunity of learning the facts by consultation with the employee prior to the investigatory-disciplinary interview. Knowledgeability implies the very oppo- site. The right to representation clearly embraces the right to prior consultation [at 1190]. Further, in Climax, the Board held that the union's re- quest for prior consultation was sufficient to invoke the right. 7 The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir- cuit denied enforcement of the Board's Order.8 First, the court found that Weingarten required that the employee must request representation and at no time did the two employees in Climax request that a union representative be present. Further, neither employee ever manifested an interest in consulting with his union representative prior to the investigatory interview." Secondly, the court found that the Board's holding would run contrary to the admonition in Weingarten that the right of union representation may not interfere with legitimate employer prerogatives. Accordingly, the court held that an employer is under no obligation to accord the employee subject to an investigatory interview with consultation with his union representative on company time if the interview date otherwise provides the em- ployee adequate opportunity to consult with union repre- sentatives on his own time prior to the interview. The court added, however, that Weingarten requires that the 7 The Board has apparently reversed this aspect of Climax. In Appala- chian Power Company, 253 NLRB 931 (1980). the Board affirmed, without comment, an administrative law judge's holding that a union could not invoke an employee's Weingarten right to representation This issue need not be reached in the instant case as Martinez and Rexada each clearly indicated, to King, her agreement with the request made by her union representative. a 584 F.2d 360 (1978). a It must be noted that the two employees in Climax had 17-1/2 hours between the time they were advised of the pending investigation and the time it took place but did not consult with their union representative during such time 1037 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD employer set investigatory interviews at such a future time and place that the employees will be provided the opportunity to consult with his representatives in ad- vance thereof on his own time. The Board has not addressed this issue since the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Climax. Thus, I am constrained to apply the Board's decision in Climax to the instant case.' o Here there is no question that Martinez and Revada had reasonable cause to believe that the subject inter- views might result in disciplinary action. Respondent made provision for the presence of a union representa- tive. The critical question is whether the employees had a right to consult with their representatives prior to the interview. The Board has decided in Climax that the right of representation includes the right to prior consul- tation. Accordingly, I find that Respondent violated Sec- tion 8(a)(1) of the Act by refusing to permit Martinez and Revada to consult with their union representatives prior to the subject investigatory interviews which they reasonably believed might result in disciplinary action. THE REMEDY In Kraft Foods. Inc., 251 NLRB 598 (1980), the Board announced the following test for determining the appro- priate remedy for an employer's violation of an employ- ee's Weingarten rights. First, the General Counsel must make prima facie showing that a make-whole remedy lI is warranted. The General Counsel satisfies this burden by proving that the employer conducted an investigatory interview in violation of Weingarten and that the employ- ee whose Weingarten rights were violated was subse- quently disciplined for conduct which was the subject matter of the unlawful interview. Second, the burden shifts to the employer to demon- strate that its decision to discipline the employee in ques- tion was not based on information obtained at the unlaw- ful interview. Third, the Board stated that the burden on the employer in cases of this type is in the nature of an affirmative defense. Thus, the ultimate burden of proof is on the employer to establish this affirmative defense. Applying the principles of Kraft Foods to the instant case, it is clear that the General Counsel has established a prima facie case for a make-whole remedy. The Gener- al Counsel has shown that Respondent conducted unlaw- ful interviews with Martinez and Revada and that the employees were later discharged for conduct which was the subject of the unlawful investigatory interviews. I also find that Respondent has met its burden in rebutting the prima facie case by showing that the decision to dis- charge Martinez and Revada was not based on any infor- mation obtained at the unlawful interviews. Martinez and Revada were discharged because they misused company equipment and company time. The information on which this decision was based had been known to Respondent prior to the interviews. No further information was ob- i0 It is well settled that it is the duty of an administrative law judge "to apply established Board precedent which the Supreme Court has not reversed." Los Angeles New Hospital, 244 NLRB 960, 962 at fn. 4 (1979), citing Iowa Beef Packers Inc., 144 NLRB 615, 616 (1965). 1 Eg., reinstatement, backpay, and expungement of all disciplinary records. tained by Respondent at the unlawful interviews and there is no evidence on which to find that the employees were discharged because they did not provide informa- tion at the interview. The General Counsel and the Charging Party contend that the employees were discharged, rather than suspend- ed, based on their failure to admit wrongdoing at the subject interviews. Such a contention requires that I make two suppositions: (1) that the employees would have conducted themselves differently had they been permitted consultation with their stewards, and (2) that Respondent would have dispensed lesser discipline based on such conduct. I cannot engage in such speculation. Rather, I find in accordance with King's testimony that the determining factor with regard to the degree of disci- pline was the nature of the telephone calls involved. King decided on discharge because long-distance, rather than local, calls were involved. There is a business justi- fication for such a decision and it would be inappropriate for me to second guess Respondent. Therefore, I find that Respondent has sustained its burden of proving that its decision to discharge Martinez and Revada resulted from their suspected wrongdoing on the evening of May 5 and not from their conduct at the unlawful interviews. Accordingly, I will recommend a cease-and-desist remedy for Respondent's violation of Section 8(a)(1) but will not recommend a make-whole remedy. CONCLUSIONS Of: LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean- ing of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by re- fusing to permit employees Helena Martinez and Betty Revada to consult with their union representatives prior to investigatory interviews which they reasonably be- lieved might result in disciplinary action. 4. The unfair labor practices specifically found above are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and the entire record herein and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER' 2 The Respondent, Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company, Greenbrae, California, its officers, agents, suc- cessors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: " All outstanding motions inconsistent with this recommended Order hereby are denied. In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purtposes. 1038 PACIFIC TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH CO. (a) Refusing to permit employees to consult with their union representatives prior to investigatory interviews which they reasonably believe might result in disciplin- ary action. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed under Section 7 of the Act: 2. Take the following affirmative action to effectuate the purposes of the Act: (a) Post at its facility in Greenbrae, California, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."13 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 20, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediate- ly upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, in- cluding all places where notices to employees are cus- tomarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Re- spondent to ensure that said notices are not altered, de- faced, or covered by any other material. (b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 20, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. 1" In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu- ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a hearing at which all sides had an opportunity to present evidence and state their positions, the National Labor Relations Board found that we have violated the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and has or- dered us to post this notice. The Act gives employees the following rights: To engage in self-organization To form, join, or assist any union To bargain collectively through representa- tives of their own choice To engage in activities together for the pur- pose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection To refrain from the exercise of any or all such activities. WE WILL NOT refuse to permit employees to con- sult with their union representatives prior to investi- gatory interviews which they reasonably believe might result in disciplinary action. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner in- terfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed under Section 7 of the Act. PACIFIC TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY 1039