Arrow Elastic Corp.

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Arrow Elastic Corporation and International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO. Cases I- CA-11793 and 1-RC-14379 June 10, 1977 DECISION, ORDER, AND DIRECTION OF SECOND ELECTION BY MEMBERS JENKINS, MURPHY, AND WALTHER On January 21, 1977, Administrative Law Judge Joel A. Harmatz issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, General Counsel and Re- spondent filed exceptions and supporting briefs. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings,1 findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the Respondent, Arrow Elastic Corporation, Springfield, Massachusetts, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the election conducted on May 6, 1976, in Case l-RC-14379 be, and it hereby is, set aside and that the case be remanded to the Regional Director for Region I for the purpose of conducting a new election in the appropriate unit at such time as he deems the circumstances permit the free choice of a bargaining representative. [Direction of Second Election and Excelsior foot- note omitted from publication.] Respondent's motion to expand the record to include two union campaign letters and a letter from Respondent's insurance agent is hereby denied. The union campaign letters were both clearly part of the Union's election campaign which ended in May 1976, more than 5 months before the hearing. The letter from Respondent's insurance agent is dated April 26, 1976, more than 5 months before the hearing date. Thus, there appears to be no reason why Respondent could not have submitted the three letters at the hearing (as it had ample opportunity to do) nor is there any showing that the three letters were somehow unavailable to Respondent at the time of the hearing. 230 NLRB No. 23 DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JOEL A. HARMATZ, Administrative Law Judge: Upon an unfair labor practice charge filed on May 19, 1976, a complaint was issued on July 6, 1976, alleging that Respondent violated Section 8(a)() of the Act by an- nouncing increased wages and other benefits, in order to discourage union activity. In its duly filed answer, Respondent denied that any unfair labor practices were committed. Pursuant to a representation petition in Case I-RC- 14379 filed on March 22, 1976, and a Stipulation for Certification Upon Consent Election Agreement approved on April 9, 1976, an election by secret ballot was conducted on May 6, 1976, among employees in the appropriate unit. The results of that election showed that of approximately 95 eligible voters, 34 ballots were cast for, and 61 against, the Petitioner, I ballot was void, and there were no challenges. Thereafter, Petitioner filed timely objections to conduct of the election. On June 22, 1976, the Acting Regional Director for Region 1 issued a Report on Objections, in which he noted that, as Petitioner had withdrawn certain objections, the issue as to the propriety of the election was limited "to the employer's May 4, 1976, announcement of benefits and wage increases," and stated further that the remaining objection raised issues identical to those involved in Case I-CA-11793. Accordingly, the Acting Regional Director consolidated Case I-RC-14379 with Case I-CA-11793 for hearing, ruling, and decision by an Administrative Law Judge. Pursuant thereto, a consolidated hearing was conducted before me in Northampton, Massachusetts, on October 21, 1976. After close of the hearing, briefs were filed by the General Counsel and Respondent. Upon the entire record in this proceeding, including my observation of the witnesses while testifying, and consider- ation of the posthearing briefs, I find as follows: FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER Respondent is a Massachusetts corporation, with a plant located in Springfield, Massachusetts, from which it is engaged in the production, sale, and distribution of clothing and narrow fabric elastic webbing and related products. In the course and conduct of said operations, Respondent annually receives at said location goods in excess of $50,000 and ships from said location goods of such value to and from points located outside the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, respectively. The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that, at all times material herein, Respondent is and has been an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II1. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that, at all times material herein, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, is and has been a 110 ARROW ELASTIC CORPORATION labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNLAWFUL CONDUCT A. The Issue The sole question presented in this proceeding is whether an announcement by Respondent's president of prospec- tive new benefits, made in a speech held 2 days prior to an election, independently violated Section 8(aXl) of the Act and interfered with free choice so as to warrant a rerun election. B. Background The Respondent is one of four companies, interrelated by ownership and control, which are engaged in the manufacture of various kinds of elastic web and related products. The employees of these companies are not represented by any labor organization. The plant involved here is located in Springfield, Massachusetts, and employs a work force of between 80 and 100, depending on business conditions. In the first part of 1976,1 the Union commenced organizing employees at the Springfield plant. On March 22, the Union filed an RC petition in Case l-RC-14379. On April 8, the parties executed a Stipulation for Certification Upon Consent Election Agreement, setting May 6 as the date for the election. The instant controversy relates to the content of speeches given by Robert Kingsbury, president of Arrow Elastic, on May 4, 2 days prior to the election. That day Kingsbury, on working time, addressed separately the employees on the two shifts. In the course of the speeches, Kingsbury, while presenting various arguments against employee designation of the Union, announced three benefits not then enjoyed by employees, including (I) an amendment to the existing profit-sharing plan adding a fixed-pension program, (2) an additional paid holiday, and (3) a 15-cent general increase effective August 1. The announcement of the new benefits was made in advance of their date of implementation, with the benefit to be realized on the earliest date not to be effective until August 1, several months after the election. Kingsbury, in expressing his reasons for apprising employees of these benefits on May 4, admitted that his purpose in doing was as follows: [T]he Union had been making all kinds of propaganda, all of the kinds of benefits they could give and I wanted to remind them of the benefits they already had. * * I spoke to the people because there was going to be a union election and I wanted to win it and I wanted to remind them of all the things they had.2 The benefits announced by Kingsbury on May 4 undeniably were new and represented an upgrading of All dates refer to 1976, unless otherwise indicated. 2 An inadvertent error appearing in the official transcript is hereby corrected by, p. 24, I. 12, deleting "1975," and substituting therefore "1976." employment conditions in several areas at the Springfield plant. And considering the antiunion nature of the speeches and Kingsbury's admission, there is little room for an argument on Respondent's behalf that the announce- ment was not calculated to influence employees to vote "No." On the other hand, the claim that Kingsbury's action was lawful is aided by stipulations made by the parties that Respondent had a historic policy of granting annual wage increases in August, and further that the decision to integrate a pension program with the existing profit-sharing program, as well as the granting of a ninth paid holiday, was made in advance and without the knowledge of union activity. C. The Positions of the Parties The General Counsel, placing heavy reliance on N.LR.B. v. Exchange Parts Conrpany, 375 U.S. 405 (1964), argues that the violation is established simply by the announcement of the new benefits in the context of an antiunion diatribe. The General Counsel asserts that the fact that these changes in employment terms were decided on prior to the advent of the Union is immaterial, since announced with the intention of influencing the outcome of a scheduled election. As I understand the General Counsel's position, it is claimed that the Act bars an employer from utilizing new benefits as part of its affirmative preelection campaign under any and all circumstances. Respondent, on the other hand, claims that employees were informed and mindful of the benefits before any union activity, and, furthermore, in the circumstances presented, the employer was privileged to remind or notify employees of the benefits in question since "clearly relevant to their decision on whether they wish to be represented by a labor organization." 3 D. Concluding Findings 1. Preliminary statement Under established Board policy, absent a showing by an employer that the timing of an announcement of new benefits during the period preceding an election was justified by considerations other than the pendency of the election, such an announcement is deemed unlawful as calculated to influence the employees in their choice of a bargaining representative. Thus, the burden of disassociat- ing the announcement from the preelection campaign is upon the employer.4 This allocation of proof responsibility is repeatedly alluded to in Board precedent and tends to support the General Counsel. It lacks qualification and, literally construed, precludes, in any and all circumstances, an employer from combating union promises of economic progress through collective bargaining, by an announce- ment of predetermined upward revisions in the benefit structure. Furthermore, the General Counsel seemingly derives support from such decisions as Hinelines Meat Plant, Inc., 193 NLRB 867 (1971), Diamond Motors, Inc., 212 NLRB 3 See, e.g.. Domino of Caliornia, 205 NLRB 1083 (1973). ' See, e.g.. Essex International, 216 NLRB 575. 576 (1974). 111 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 820 (1974), and Fox Valley Truck Service, Inc., 153 NLRB 727, 737 (1965). In those decisions, the Board found that the announcement of new benefits during the preelection period violated Section 8(a)(1), even though decided on or considered in advance of the union organization campaign. Despite the foregoing, through certain subsequent decisions such as Big G Supermarket, Inc., d/b/a Town and Country Family Center, 219 NLRB 1098 (1975), and Domino of California, Inc., supra, the Board has acknowl- edged the existence of circumstances in which predeter- mined increases may be announced during the critical preelection period and in the context of an active campaign conducted by an employer to persuade employees to reject union representation. As should be apparent from the foregoing, viable Board precedent does not appear to interdict the preelection announcement of benefits to the degree argued for by the General Counsel, nor do the controlling authorities brand such announcements as legitimate to the degree claimed by Respondent. From a distillation of the decisions evidencing present Board policy in this area, it appears that preelec- tion announcements of upward revisions in employment terms are presumptively unlawful, even if based on determinations made prior to the advent of union activity. However, said presumption is rebuttable. Thus, an employ- er is free to include such references in antiunion propagan- da if he can demonstrate either (1) that such announce- ments were limited to terms already integrated into the existing benefit structure,5 or (2) at a minimum that the original determination to grant the prospective benefit was followed up and implemented by a sequential chain of events during the period before any union activity so as reasonably to dispel notions that the ultimate implementa- tion was accelerated because of the union activity,6 or that employee organization prompted a revitalization of a since- abandoned determination to grant such benefits. 7 Thus, in order for Respondent to prevail in this proceeding, the facts must demonstrate that the entirety of the benefit package announced on May 4 was privileged under either of the standards set forth above. Therefore, the legitimacy of such conduct entails a separate analysis of each of the benefits communicated to employees on that date, as set forth below. 2. The benefits a. The wage increase Commencing in 1974, Respondent established a policy of granting annual wage increases on or about August 1. Thus, in August 1974, a 10-cent hourly increase was conferred on employees, s and an identical 10-cent increase was received by the employees in August 1975. With respect to the means and timing of employee notification concerning the August increases, it appears that in 1974 a formal notice was posted in the plant on I See, e.g., Schwab Foods, Inc., Scotts IGA Foodliner, 223 NLRB 394 fn. I (1976). 6 See, e.g., Mr. Fine, Inc., 212 NLRB 399, 402. 7 Cf. D'Youville Manor Nursing Home, 217 NLRB 173, fn. 2 (1975). 8 The August 1974 general increase was the second granted employees in that year. The first, also a 10-cent increase, was granted earlier in May 1974. 9 Kingsbury testified that in his speech to the first shift, he referred to the May 10, 1974, announcing the increase effective August 1, 1974. In addition, on July 31, 1975, a notice was posted announcing the increase effective on August 4, 1975. On May 4, 1976, Kingsbury advised the employees that "as is company policy and as happened in 1974 and 1975, on August 1, we will have a general wage increase of 15 cents."9 After the election, a notice was posted, dated July 22, 1976, which formally announced the 15-cent increase effective August 1. It is fair to assume that most employees in the unit were mindful, prior to May 4, of Respondent's historic practice of granting general increases on or about August 1. Thus, it was stipulated that of the 95 employees eligible to participate in the 1976 election, 82 were on active payroll status and received the increase implemented on August 4, 1975, and 65 were on active payroll status and received the increase granted on August 1, 1974. They were not, however, aware of the amount of the 1976 increase until informed by Kingsbury on May 4. Kingsbury testified that the size of general increases was based on business conditions and the rate of inflation. It is the sense of his testimony that the 1976 determination of 15 cents was made upon receipt from accountants of financial data in March.10 He asserts that the decision to give the additional 5 cents was predicated on the Company's improved financial condition and a higher inflation rate. There can be no question that Kingsbury, in his May 4 speeches, alluded to the new 15-cent increase, in the effort to persuade employees against designation of the Union. It is noted in this connection, however, that Kingsbury testified credibly and without contradiction that the Union through its propaganda machinery was promising a variety of benefits which it could achieve on behalf of the employees if designated. I find, in accordance with his testimony, that to refute this propaganda, Kingsbury announced the predetermined benefits. In the circumstanc- es, he was privileged to allude to the 15-cent increase in his speeches of May 4. Thus, Respondent had a policy of granting increases on August I in prior years. Most of the eligible voters would have been aware of this practice, and in my judgment would have expected this increase in August 1976. Although the size of the increase was greater than conferred in August 1974 or 1975, I do not regard the 5- cent deviation as fatal. It is noted that in 1974, Respon- dent's employees received general increases totaling 20 cents. An additional 5 cents, over that conferred in 1975, was granted, according to the credited testimony of Kingsbury, to reflect improved business conditions and to offset the impact on employees of intensified inflation. I find that the 5-cent increment was neither excessively beyond the normal pattern of general increases, nor arrived at in consequence of any organizational activity. 1 It is true that, although the increases were not to be effective until August 1, the Employer opted to make its August I increase in response to an inquiry from an employee. Kingsbury indicates that, if not asked, he would have announced the wage increase anyway, and, indeed, during the speech on the second shift, Kingsbury admittedly raised the issue himself. 'o The record does not permit a finding that the Union was engaged in organizational activity at the time of this determination. I See Essex International, supra. 112 ARROW ELASTIC CORPORATION announcement several months earlier during the critical preelection period. However, in 1974, employees were also notified of the August increase in May, and, although not announced until July the following year, neither this factor, nor the possibility that Respondent could have delayed until after the election in announcing the increase, in the circumstances operated to preclude Respondent of availing itself of the intended increase as part of its campaign propaganda. 12 As heretofore indicated, recent Board precedent confirms that employers are free to campaign against union representation by reminding employees of existing benefits.'3 That this was the case here should be evident from other aspects of Board policy which bear upon the question. It is a fact that under the Employer's past practice, the anniversary date for the general increases was in August, several months after the election. But, if, at that time, a question concerning representation were pending, by virtue of the past practice, Respondent would have been obligated to grant the increase in accordance with the familiar principle that "an employer, in deciding whether to grant benefits while a representation election is pending should decide that question as it would if a union were not in the picture." 14 Thus, by operation of law, Respondent, in such a case, would have been obligated to grant the increase at that time. The very policy which deems the Employer's past practice to be a fixed employ- ment condition, cannot logically be withheld so as to "deprive the Respondent of legitimate campaign strategy necessary to counter the Union's claim that it offers better benefits." Schwab Foods, supra, fn. I. Accordingly, I find that Respondent's May 4 announce- ment of the 15-cent increase was merely a reminder made within the framework of Respondent's existing benefit program, and, as such, neither violated Section 8(a)(XI) nor interfered with the election. b. The pension plan amendment By way of background, it appears that, for several years prior to 1976, the Employer maintained and financed a profit-sharing plan whereby contributions were invested on behalf of employees in tax-exempt mutual funds. As a result of the downturn in the economy in 1974, the value of employee holdings under the plan declined. In 1975, the Company decided to amend the profit-sharing plan to include pension benefits so the employees would have a fixed income on their retirement. This "decision," however, was not reduced to a binding, legal commitment until well after the election. Documentary evidence reveals that Respondent, at least as of January 1976, well prior to any union activity, had retained Sapers & Wallack, an employee benefit consulting firm, for the purpose of arranging a suitable pension program with a carrier. Kasimierz Moszynski, the assistant plant manager, testified that following a January manage- ment meeting with Kingsbury, pursuant to instructions '2 Cf. Diamond Motors, Inc., 212 NLRB 820 (1974), where there was no evidence that, in prior years, the benefit involved was announced at a time corresponding to that selected by the employer dunng the preelection campaign. from Kingsbury, he informed 12 or more employees as follows: . . . on the profit-sharing plan, that its going into effect. It's being worked upon, that they were going to have it. A plan which would suit Respondent's needs was put out for bid to various carriers in 1976. It does not appear that details as to the structure and benefits thereof were communciated to employees prior to the plan's implemen- tation. Ultimately, Respondent executed an agreement with New England Life Insurance Company to administer and finance the new retirement plan. However, Respon- dent made no binding commitment to provide such benefits until an agreement with the carrier was executed at a directors meeting on September 10, 1976. No explanation is offered as to what transpired in connection with the effort to secure a plan, during the period between January 1976 and September 10, 1976. This, despite Kingsbury's testimony that the pension program under consideration in January 1976 was identical to that adopted in September 1976. Board precedent with respect to preelection announce- ments of third-party administered employee benefit pro- grams is not susceptible to simplified application. The search for a common thread running through these decisions leads to the view that where such benefit programs are announced to persuade employees to vote against union representation, the onus is on that employer, as heretofore indicated, to show that the grant of such benefits was neither revived nor accelerated by union activity. It is not enough that the employer had previously decided on the grant of such benefits, if in fact it had not become lawfully committed to provide such benefits prior to the union campaign. It remains the further burden of the employer to show that its announcement was reasonably timed as a sequential step in, and a byproduct of, a chronology of conception, refinement, preparation, and adoption, so as to lead one reasonably to conclude that the announcement would have been forthcoming at the time made even if there were no union campaign.' 5 Any other result would give employers a considerable advantage, possibly allowing discretionary action to alter the balance which must be maintained if employees are to exercise an uncoerced choice. An initial decision to effect a benefit program which must be administered and funded through third parties necessarily rests on a number of impondera- bles. Although at the time of that decision, the employer would be aware of the cash it is willing to allocate to such a program, whether such an expenditure will purchase, on a sustained basis, a program sufficient to finance the retirement benefits desired is an unknown. Extensive exploration is required before commitment and unforeseen factors could arise from that process, which might well produce a reconsideration of the initial decision, culminat- ing in deferral or abandonment of the original plan. The 13 See, e.g., Schwab Foods, supra, and Big G Supermarkets, supra. 14 Essex International, supra at 576. 15 See, e.g., Mr. Fine, Inc., 212 NLRB 399, 402. 113 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD proof presented in such cases as Domino of California, supra, and Mr. Fine, supra,'6 sufficed to assure that the preelection announcement was not a byproduct of employ- er manipulation born of a design to influence the outcome of the election. No similar proof was presented here. To the contrary, in the instant case, substantial concern arises from the unexplained delay between the original determi- nation and the Employer's final commitment to extend such benefits. Only the employer is in a position to explain delays in the implementation of such benefits and the type of proof presented in such cases as Domino of California, supra, Mr. Fine, supra, imposes no unreasonable burden on the employer, if in fact the ultimate grant of such benefits and the timing thereof were not influenced by the organization campaign. Here, the decision to establish such a program was made in 1975, and not implemented until several months after the election by action of Respondent's board of directors on September 10, 1976. No explanation whatever is offered for the lapse of time, nor does the record disclose what transpired in the period between Respondent's definition of the program and its commit- ment, of a binding nature, to that very same program. Quite clearly, the decision made by Respondent to grant the benefit was unilateral and revocable until September 10, 1976.'7 As far as this record shows, it was not until that date that employee enjoyment of this benefit was no longer speculative. In the circumstances, Respondent has not furnished evidence justifying its reference to a prospective increase in pension benefits as part of its preelection propaganda, and, absent such proof, I find that Respondent unlawfully interfered with the election and violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.' 8 c. The additional holiday The General Counsel and Charging Party concede that in January 1976 the Employer decided to grant a ninth paid holiday without knowledge of union activity. Thus, at a meeting with the supervisory staff at the Springfield plant in January 1976, Kingsbury announced that an additional holiday would be added at the plant because that facility was behind others in connection with paid holidays. Kingsbury asked Kasimierz Moszynski to talk to employ- ees and report back to him which holiday they wanted. Moszynski thereafter spoke to 12 or more employees relaying, among other things, that they would get an additional holiday of their collective choice. Moszynski claims that he was informed that a majority of the employees wanted the new holiday to be on George 1s Also noteworthy is the fact that the cited cases involve pension plans actually implemented at the time announced, and, thus, the legitimacy of the conduct in question there was not beclouded, as here, by notification to employees during the critical preelection period of a benefit which the Employer did not become obligated to provide until 4 months later. it Resp. Exh. I is a letter dated January 12, 1976, from Sapers & Wallack concerning the pension amendment. That letter sets forth the benefit program in detail, indicates that the annual cost of the program would be approximately $1 i1,000, and urges a prompt response from Respondent. The sole evidence of a response by Respondent to this proposal is the September 1976 action of the board of directors. This, despite Kingsbury's testimony that the plan finally adopted was identical to that defined in Resp. Exh. 1. 18 In so finding, I have not overlooked the testimony that the pension Washington's Birthday, and that he reported this to Kingsbury. A new paid holiday, although not to be effective until 1977, was formally announced by Kingsbury during the speeches of May 4. Although not free from doubt, I am willing to accept the uncontradicted testimony of Kings- bury, Moszynski, and rank-and-file employee Walter Koloszyc that certain employees were informed and canvassed concerning the new additional holiday benefit in January 1976.19 Unlike the pension amendment, an initial decision to grant an additional holiday rests upon cost variables susceptible to predetermination. Once an employer has been moved to communicate a promise of such a benefit to employees, a renege is unlikely and such notification carries an inherent assurance that the benefit will be bestowed. With this distinction in mind, I am persuaded that the evidence adduced by Respondent suffices to establish that, prior to the advent of the Union, the additional paid holiday had become a condition of work at the Springfield plant. As indicated, by way of stipulation, the parties agreed that the Employer decided to grant a ninth paid holiday prior to the advent of the Union. Credible evidence establishes that the decision in this respect was made known to employees in January, with the only detail left open being the particular day on which employees elected to take the new holiday. The determina- tion and communication to employees of this new benefit, in my opinion, was made under circumstances which reduced the ninth paid holiday to a term of employment prior to the May 4 speeches and before any organizational activity occurred. The Board has upheld an employer's right, during a preelection campaign, to legitimately propagandize on the basis of existing benefits, even though certain employees were unaware of such benefits. Thus, in Schwab Foods, supra, the Board stated at fn 1: I Contrary to the Administrative Law Judge, we do not find the Respondent's announcement of the availability of certain existing insurance benefits to be violative of Sec. 8(aXI). Prohibiting the Respondent from publicizing existing benefits-an issue raised by the Union itself-merely because the employees had not previously been made aware of such benefits, would deprive the Respondent of legitimate campaign strategy necessary to counter the Union's claim that it offers better benefits.20 Here, as in Schwab Foods, supra, and Big G Supermarket, supra, "it cannot reasonably be held that Respondent was required to conceal innocent facts from the employees simply because the facts might lessen their ardor for unionization." Accordingly, I find that Respondent did not program was implemented at the same time at all three plants in which Kingsbury had an interest. However, this consideration is neutralized by Kingsbury's admission that during the first 6 months of 1976 some form of union activity took place at each of said locations. 19 I do not regard testimony adduced by the General Counsel's witness Carl Dupres, a former employee of Respondent, as creating a material conflict in testimony with respect to this issue. The testimony of Respondent's witnesses in this regard is not that all employees were informed, and it is entirely possible under their accounts that certain employees, including Dupres, did not learn of the new holiday until the May 4 speeches. 20 See also Schwab Foods, supra at 407. 114 ARROW ELASTIC CORPORATION engage in conduct interfering with the election or violate Section 8(a)(l) by Kingsbury's apprising employees of the new holiday benefit in his May 4 speeches. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. Respondent independently violated Section 8(aX)( of the Act, and engaged in conduct interfering with the conduct of an election, by during the critical preelection period announcing a new pension program, under circum- stances calculated to influence employees to reject union representation in a Board-conducted election. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practice constitutes an unfair labor practice affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirma- tive action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. I shall further recommend that the election held in Case 1- RC-14379 on May 6, 1976, be set aside and that rerun election be conducted at an appropriate time. Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommend- ed: ORDER 21 The Respondent, Arrow Elastic Corporation, Spring- field, Massachusetts, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: i. Cease and desist from: (a) Announcing new benefits to employees under conditions calculated to influence employees in the exercise of their right to choose freely whether or not they wish to be represented by a labor organization. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is found necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Post at its Springfield, Massachusetts, plant copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 2 2 Copies of the notice on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 1, after being duly signed by Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 1, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Case I-RC-14379 be severed and remanded to the Regional Director for Region 1, that the election conducted on May 6, 1976, be set aside, and that said Regional Director conduct a rerun election at such time that he deems the circumstances permit a free choice on the issue of representation. 21 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 22 In the event this Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a hearing in which all parties were represented and afforded the opportunity to present evidence, it has been found that we have violated the National Labor Relations Act in certain respects and we have been ordered to post this notice and to carry out its terms. The National Labor Relations Act gives you, as employees, certain rights, including the right: To engage in self-organization To form, join, or help a union To bargain collectively through a representa- tive of your own choosing To act together for collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection To refrain from any or all of these things. Accordingly, we give you these assurances: WE WILL NOT announce new benefits under circum- stances calculated to influence our employees in their choice of whether or not they wish to be represented by International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL- CIO. ARROW ELASTIC CORPORATION 115