International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO (Kansas Farm Bureau; Texas Farm Bureau; and American Farm Bureau Federation)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD International Longshoremen's Association, AFL- CIO and Kansas Farm Bureau; Texas Farm Bureau; and American Farm Bureau Federation South Atlantic & Gulf Coast District, International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO and Kansas Farm Bureau; Texas Farm Bureau; and American Farm Bureau Federation International Longshoremen's Association, Local 872, AFL-CIO and Kansas Farm Bureau; Texas Farm Bureau; and American Farm Bureau Federation International Longshoremen's Association, Local 1273, AFL-CIO and Kansas Farm Bureau; Texas Farm Bureau; and American Farm Bureau Federation. Cases 23-CC-762-1, 23- CC-763-1, 23-CC-764-1, 23-CC-762-2, 23- CC-763-2, 23-CC-764-2, 23-CC-762-3, 23- CC-763-3, 23-CC-764-3, 23-CC-762-4, 23- CC-763-4, and 23-CC-764-4 September 30, 1982 DECISION AND ORDER This case, like the proceedings in International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO, and Local 799, etc. (Allied International, Inc.), 257 NLRB 1075 (1981), and International Longshoremen's Associ- ation, Local 1414, AFL-CIO (Occidental Chemical Company), 261 NLRB 1 (1982), addresses the issue of whether the National Labor Relations Board can assert jurisdiction over conduct alleged to vio- late Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, where that con- duct is secondary to a primary dispute between an American union and a foreign nation. As in the companion cases, the Administrative Law Judge found that jurisdiction does not lie.' We disagree for substantially the same reasons set forth in our decisions in Allied and Occidental. We find conclu- sive support for this position in the United States Supreme Court's recent opinion in International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO, et al. v. Allied International, Inc., 456 U.S. 212 (1982.) That decision involved a suit for damages under Section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 187, which creates a private remedy for the victims of secondary boycotts vio- lative of Section 8(b)(4) of the Act. The case pre- sented the same facts as those in the Board's Allied case: a refusal by the ILA to unload cargoes ema- nating from the USSR. The Court held that the disputed conduct was within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board and that the ILA's i On March 16, 1981, Administrative Law Judge Bernard Ries issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter the General Counsel and the Charging Party filed exceptions and a supporting brief and Re- spondents filed consolidated exceptions and a brief in support of those ex- ceptions and the Administrative Law Judge's determination 264 NLRB No. 55 boycott violated Section 8(b)(4). Accordingly, we assert jurisdiction and find that Respondents 2 have engaged in conduct classically subject to and viola- tive of Section 8(b)(4) of the Act. In so doing, we find no fault with the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact and credibility resolutions, which we adopt.3 The essential facts are as follows: The Charging Parties, Kansas Farm Bureau, Texas Farm Bureau, and the American Farm Bureau Federation, are general bureaus which pro- mote the business interests of farmers and promote the marketing and selling of agricultural products. Cargill, Inc. (Cargill), is a corporation engaged, inter alia, in the business of the sale of American grain to the Soviet Union. Cargill maintains an export grain elevator in the Houston Ship Channel. The transfer of the purchased grain to the USSR is managed by the Sovfracht Chartering Corporation (Sovfracht), a Soviet government maritime agency. Sovfracht is specifically responsible for the charter- ing and loading of vessels for transporting the grain. On January 9, 1980,4 2 weeks after the USSR in- vaded Afghanistan, 5 Respondent ILA's Interna- tional president, Thomas W. Gleason, made the fol- lowing public statement: In response to overwhelming demands by the rank and file members of the Union, the lead- ership of ILA today ordered immediate sus- pension in handling all Russian ships and all Russian cargoes in ports from Maine to Texas and Puerto Rico where ILA workers are em- ployed. This order is effective across the board on all vessels and all cargoes. Grain and other foods as well as high valued general frieght. Howev- Respondents are the International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO; the South Atlantic & Gulf Coast District, International Long- shoremen's Association Locals 872 and 1273, AFL-CIO. They are col- lectively referred to as the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA). 3 Respondents have excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credi- bility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence con- vinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products. Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings. 4 All dates are in 1980, unless otherwise indicated. 5 We take administative notice that, because of the invasion of Af- ghanistan by the USSR, President Carter imposed an embargo on exports to the USSR in early January. The President exempted from the embargo the outstanding amount of unshipped grain committed under art. I of the 1975 agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Supply of Grain 26 U.S.T. 2972; T.I.A.S. No. 8206. The President's state- ment and directives concerning the embargo issued under the Export Ad- ministration Act, 50 U.S.C. AP. § 3401, et seq., are contained in the "Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents," Vol. 16, No. 2, Monday, January 14 at pp. 25-27, 32-33. 404 INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION er, any Russian ship now in process of loading or discharging at a waterfront will be worked until completion. The reason for this action should be apparent in light of international events that have affect- ed relations between the U.S. and Soviet Union. However, the decision by the Union was made necessary by the demands of the workers. It is their will to refuse to work Russian ves- sels and Russian cargoes under present condi- tions in the world. People are upset and they refuse to continue the business as usual policy as long as the Rus- sians insist on being international bully boys. It is a decision in which the Union leadership concurs. On January 10, J. H. Raspberry, president of Re- spondent South Atlantic & Gulf Coast District, sent a telegram to all ILA locals under his jurisdic- tion, including Respondent Locals. The telegram contained the body of Gleason's statement fol- lowed by this notation from Raspberry: "I concur with President Gleason's position and advise you to act accordingly." After ILA President Gleason's announcement of the boycott, Cargill received a license from the United States Department of Commerce to export several million dollars worth of grain to the USSR under an exception to President Carter's general embargo order. Sovfracht then arranged for the Belgium, a Belgian foreign flagship, to arrive in the Houston Ship Channel on January 24 to load and transport the grain to the USSR. TTT Ship Agencies, Inc. (Agencies), an Ameri- can corporation, is Sovfracht's ships' agent in the port of Houston. Agencies has a subsidiary steve- doring company, TTT Stevedores of Texas, Inc. (Stevedores), which loads the Cargill grain bound for the USSR. Stevedores is a member of the West Gulf Maritime Association (Association). Through the Association, Stevedores is party to a collective- bargaining agreement with Respondent Locals which contains a no-strike clause. 6 Stevedores ob- tains its longshoring gangs through hiring halls maintained by each Local as required by the col- lective-bargaining agreement.' A grain gang which is supplied by the Union consists of 13 employees. 6 Rule 43 of the collective-bargaining agreement provides, in part. "[tlhe Union agrees that during the life of this Agreement there shall be no strikes or other stoppages of work." I In practice, Stevedores requests its longshoremen through the Asso- ciation which places those requests simultaneously with the two Locals. Prior to the arrival date of the Belgium, Cargill requested Sherman Hailes, general superintendent of Stevedores, to contact Respondent ILA Locals in order to supply the longshoremen to load the grain. When Hailes asked the Locals if they would supply longshoremen, both local presidents replied that no labor would be supplied until further instructions were received from the International Union. Hailes then contacted Cargill and Agencies with this information. When the position of the Locals was communicated to Sovfracht, it decided to cancel the Belgium s stop at Houston and to divert it to other ports.8 The Administrative Law Judge found that, while casual employees where available in the port, and some of these were nonunion, there was no evi- dence presented that a full gang of skilled experi- enced stevedores could have been obtained without the union hiring hall process. The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the complaint in this case, concluding that the National Labor Relations Board lacked jurisdiction. He relied here, as he did in Allied and Occidental, on a series of Supreme Court cases which have defined the statutory term "commerce" so as to limit the Board's jurisdiction in situations where the disput- ed conduct inescapably interfered with the mari- time operations of foreign vessels.9 In Allied and Occidental the Board rejected the Administrative Law Judge's reading of those Supreme Court's opinions as unduly expansive, noting that the Court has never barred jurisdiction over activity affecting neutral parties simply because that activity had some relation to foreign maritime operations. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Allied explicitly limits the holdings of its earlier cases and unmistak- ably finds conduct such as that at issue here to be within the Board's jurisdiction. The Court held: Applying the principles developed in these cases [Benz through Mobile] to the circum- stances here, we find that the ILA's activity was "in commerce" and within the scope of the NLRA. Unlike the situation in every case from Benz through Mobile, the ILA's refusal to unload Allied's shipments in no way affected Evidence was presented that, at all material times, 8 million tons of grain each year were shipped by the United States to the USSR per the terms of the agreement between Cargill and the USSR. Approximately 4 million tons were shipped through the Port of Houston. The value of the grain that was to be shipped aboard the Belgium was 59.5 million. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo. S.A., 353 U.S. 138 (1957); McCul- loch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963); Incres Steamship Co.. Ltd. v. International Maritime JWorAers Union, 372 U.S. 24 (1963); International Longshorc men .As.sociation, Local 1416. AFL-CIO v. Ariadne Shipping Co.. Ltd. et au, 397 U.S. 195 (1970); Wind- ward Shipping (London) Ltd. et al. v American Radio Association. .4FL- CIO, et al., 415 U.S. 104 (1974); and American Radio Association. .FL- CIO et al. v Mobile Steamship Auociation. Inc., 419 U S. 215 (1974). 405 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the maritime operations of foreign ships. The boycott here did not aim at altering the terms of employment of foreign crews on foreign- flag vessels. It did not seek to extend the bill of rights developed for American workers and American employers to foreign seamen and foreign ship owners. The longstanding tradi- tion of restraint in applying the laws of this country to ships of a foreign country-a tradi- tion that lies at the heart of Benz and every subsequent decision-therefore is irrelevant to this case. [456 U.S. at 221.] Although the factual setting in this case differs from Allied and Occidental where the contractual relationship of many of the neutral employers was with American corporations,' 0 the operative activ- ity in this case is not materially different from that in Allied and Occidental: The secondary activity is primarily directed against American entities, and that directed against foreign entities focuses on for- eign flagships uninvolved in the primary dispute between Respondents and the USSR. The difference here is that Cargill, Agencies, Stevedores, and the Belgium hold subcontracts with Sovfracht, an agency of the Soviet govern- ment. The existence of these contractual relation- ships with the Soviet government, however, does not make these employers agents of the USSR or indicate that they are party to the primary dispute between the ILA and the USSR. In N.L.R.B. v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951), the Supreme Court found a viola- tion of Section 8(b)(4) where a union engaged in activity with an object of forcing neutral secondary employers to terminate their contractual relation- ship with the nonunion subcontractor on a con- struction project. In so doing, the Court adopted the Board's conclusion that: [T]he fact that the contractor and subcontrac- tor were engaged on the same construction project, and that the contractor had some su- pervision over the subcontractor's work, did not eliminate the status of each as an independ- ent contractor or make the employees of one the employees of the other. ' The present situation is analogous. Cargill, Agen- cies, Stevedores, and the Belgium are subcontactors for an agency of the USSR. As such they are inde- pendent contractors, neutral to the dispute between the ILA and the USSR. Thus, the pressure brought by Respondents to force these parties to terminate 'O We note that Cargill, Inc., is in a similar contractual relationship as that of Allied International, Inc, in the Allied case and Occidental Chemical Company in the Occidental case. " 341 U.S. at 689-690. their contractual relationship with Sovfracht falls directly within the proscriptions of Section 8(b)(4). Nor, as we set forth in Occidental,12 does the presence of a foreign flagship deprive the Board of jurisdiction. A foreign-owned entity is a "person" under the Act, entitled to protection as a pro- scribed target of secondary activity prohibited by Section 8(b)(4). We noted that the 1959 amend- ments to Section 8(b)(4) inserted the words "any person engaged in commerce" in place of "any em- ployer," to bring within the secondary boycott provisions activities directed against entities which did not fall within the Act's definition of employ- er.'3 We noted further that the Board has applied this language to conclude that a Bermuda corpora- tion was a person within the meaning of the Act. Local 1355, International Longshoremen's Association (Ocean Shipping Service, Ltd.), 146 NLRB 723 (1964), enforcement denied on other grounds 332 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1964). Thus, we find that the Belgium is a neutral person entitled to the protec- tions of Section 8(b)(4). We also conclude, as noted above, that its contractual relationship with Sov- fracht does not involve it in the primary dispute between the ILA and the USSR regarding the in- vasion of Afghanistan.'4 Not only is the operative conduct in this case virtually the same as that in Allied and Occidental, but the same policy interests are also at stake. At the Supreme Court noted in Allied, the ILA boy- cott commenced just a few days after President Carter ordered an embargo, with certain exemp- tions, on exports to the USSR. This embargo dif- fered in significant respects from the ILA boycott and thus the ILA boycott conflicted with signifi- cant U.S. policy interests. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that Federal jurisdiction em- bodied in the National Labor Relations Act is sup- ported by the national interests affected by the ILA boycott. s The facts here more dramatically demonstrate the necessity of Federal jurisdiction. In this case, unlike Allied and Occidental, Cargill received an ex- emption from the President's embargo allowing it 12 See Occidental, supra at 2-3. '3 See, cg., II Leg. Hist., 1470-71 (LMRDA 1959). 14 See discussion of ?.:L.R.B. v Denver Building & Construction Trades Council. supra. Member Jenkins dissented in Allied and Occidental. supra, where, for the reasons set forth by the Administrative L.aw Judge in those cases, he would have found that the Board lacked jurisdiction. However, he is per- suaded that the Supreme Court's decision in the related Allied case, supra, disposes of the ILA's attacks on the Board's jurisdiction Although here, unlike .4llied, a foreign flagship is involved as one of the neutral persons affected by the ILA's boycott, Member Jenkins believes there is sufficient involvement of American parties-the boycotting employees, their em- ployer, and the exporter---to meet the Supreme Court's most recent expli- cation of "commerce." See Allied, 456 U.S. at 221. 5 See IL4 v. Allied International. Inc., 456 U.S. at 221-222. 406 INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION to export several million dollars worth of grain to the USSR. Thus, Respondents' actions forced the cessation of transactions which the United States Government had specifically sanctioned. Turning to the violation of the secondary boy- cott provisions, we find that the conduct involved in this case is not materially different from that in Allied and Occidental, which the Supreme Court found in Allied to be a violation of Section 8(b)(4). Thus, as set forth in further detail below, it is pre- cisely the type of conduct prohibited by Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act. As in Allied, Respondents contend that they did not induce their members to boycott Russian goods. Despite these contentions, the Administra- tive Law Judge found the boycott decision was in- stigated, implemented, and enforced by the union leadership despite Respondents' contention to the contrary. He further found Gleason's statement to be an "order" binding on the rank and file, and that it was so understood by the membership and local union leadership. We agree. Local 872 Presi- dent J.C. Young and Local 1273 President Millard Barrington both testified about the widespread dis- sension among their members about the Russian in- vasion of Afghanistan. Barrington testified that he contacted District President Raspberry serval times to inform him of the dissension. Raspberry told him to keep the Locals working until he "received further word from the International Office." The Local members kept working until they received the telegram from Raspberry ordering the members to cease handling Russian cargoes. Neither Bar- rington nor Young testified that they took a vote among their members, and Barrington testified that he took the "Raspberry telegram as more than an authorization." Raspberry testified that, while he received numerous complaints from members in his district, he did not poll the membership as to their sentiments prior to issuing his directive.'6 Accord- ingly, we conclude that Respondents engaged in, induced, and encouraged ILA members employed by Stevedores and Agencies to engage in a refusal in the course of their employment to handle the loading of Sovfracht's grain bound for the USSR. Second, Respondents argue that there was never a refusal to handle the grain because Hailes did not "order" gangs of longshoremen from Respondent Locals on January 21. We find this argument to be without merit. Hailes testified that both Local presidents informed him that, until they heard from the International ILA, the boycott would stand and they would not provided labor. On the basis of this information, Hailes reached the conclusion that '6 There are some 132 locals uinder Raspberry's jurisdiction encom- passing 2000X) to 301,100 longshoremen. orders would not be filled if they had been made. In these circumstances, we conclude that Respond- ents' action amounted to a refusal to load the Bel- gium. Finally, Respondents argue that their only object in refusing to handle Russian cargo was to demon- strate their disapproval with Soviet foreign policy and their unwillingness to contribute in any way to the Soviet cause. As we concluded in Allied,'7 Re- spondents are responsible for the foreseeable conse- quences of this conduct. 8 Those findings apply with equal force in this case. The record establishes that, pursuant to an agree- ment between Cargill and the USSR and a license from the United States Government which gave Cargill certain exemptions from President Carter's embargo, Cargill exported grain through Houston to the USSR. In fact, as noted above, 4 million tons of grain bound for Russia went through Hous- ton each year. To handle these exports, Sovfracht contracted with ships, ships' agents, and stevedor- ing companies. Thus, the refusal to handle the Rus- sian grain obviously could be expected to threaten the above parties with a breach of those contrac- tual relationships and substantial economic loss. The value of the grain to be shipped on the Bel- gium alone was $9.5 million. As the Administrative Law Judge concluded, it was equally foreseeable that no non-ILA labor could be employed by the neutral parties in the face of the ILA boycott. The Administrative Law Judge found: While there are casual employees available in the port, and some of these are not members of the Union, there is no basis for inferring from this record that Stevedores could have secured, from other than Union sources, 13 [one gang] sufficiently skilled, experienced, casual employees who would have been will- ing to perform the necessary work. [ALJD sec. II, "Findings of Fact."] In these circumstances, as in Allied and Occident- al, Respondents had every reason to foresee that implementation of the boycott meant that the grain would not move out of Houston, and that Sov- fracht and the Soviet government would cease pur- chasing grain from Cargill for shipment out of ports affected by the boycott. Similarly, Respond- ents must have foreseen that neutral employers such as Agencies, Stevedores, and the Belgium would be forced to cease doing business with Sov- I7 See Allied, discussion of NL.R.B. v Retail Store Employees Union. Local 001,. Retail Clerks International As4soctiaton, 4FL-CIO [.Sa'co Title Insurance Co.J, 447 U S 607 (1980), 257 NLRB 1075 '' See also ILA..4 v Allied International. Inc.. 456 U S. at 224. 407 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD fracht and Cargill, and with each other. Thus, under the same analysis as set forth in Allied, Re- spondents induced this boycott with an object of forcing the business entities involved to cease busi- ness operations among themselves and to cease handling goods destined for the USSR.' 9 Accordingly, we find that, within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4), Respondents have engaged in, and induced and encouraged their members to engage in, refusals in the course of their employment by Agencies and Stevedores to process or otherwise handle Soviet grain which is owned by and des- tined for the USSR. In addition, Respondents have threatened, coerced, and restrained Stevedores, Agencies, and the Belgium with a refusal to refer Respondents' members for loading grain being shipped to the USSR. An object of Respondents' above-described conduct was (1) to force or re- quire Stevedores to cease doing business with Agencies, and the Belgium, and (2) to force or re- quire Agencies to cease doing business with the Belgium, and (3) to force or require Stevedores, Agencies, and the Belgium to cease loading, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of the USSR, each in violation of Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act. Having found that Respondents have engaged in certain unfair labor practices, we shall order them to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain af- firmative action deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. CONCI USIONS 01o LAW 1. Cargill, Inc., TTT Ship Agencies, Inc., and TTT Stevedores of Texas, Inc., are employers en- gaged in commerce and in operations affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. The Belgium is a person within the meaning of the Act. 3. International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO, the South Atlantic & Gulf Coast Dis- trict, International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO, and Locals 872 and 1273, International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO, collec- tively referred to here as Respondents, and each of them are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 4. By inducing and encouraging employees of Stevedores, members of the Respondents, not to handle and unload goods owned by the USSR and transported by the Belgium, and by coercing and restraining Cargill, Stevedores, Agencies, and the Belgium, with an object of forcing or requiring Cargill, Stevedores, Agencies, and the Belgium to 19 See ILA v. Allied. International, Inc., 110 LRRM at 2005. cease doing business with each other, Respondents engaged in unfair labor practices affecting com- merce in violation of 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re- lations Board hereby orders that Respondents, In- ternational Longshoremen's Association, AFL- CIO; the South Atlantic & Gulf Coast District, In- ternational Longshoremen's Association, AFL- CIO; International Longshoremen's Association, Local 872, AFL-CIO; and International Long- shoremen's Association, Local 1273, AFL-CIO, in- dividually and collectively, their officers, agents, and representatives, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Inducing or encouraging individuals em- ployed by Stevedores, or any other persons in commerce, to engage in a strike or refusal in the course of their employment to process, transport, load, unload, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities, or to perform any services, where an object thereof is to require Cargill, Agencies, Stevedores, and the Bel- gium, or any other person, to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or man- ufacturer, or to force Cargill, Agencies, Steve- dores, and the Belgium to cease doing business with each other. (b) Inducing or encouraging individuals em- ployed by Stevedores, or any other persons en- gaged in commerce, to engage in a strike or refusal in the course of their employment to process, trans- port, load, unload, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities, or to perform any services where an object thereof is to require Cargill, Agencies, Stevedores, and the Belgium, or any other person, to cease using, sell- ing, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to force Cargill, Agencies, Steve- dores, and the Belgium to cease doing business with each other. (c) Threatening, coercing, or restraining Cargill, Stevedores, Agencies, and the Belgium, or any other persons engaged in commerce or in an indus- try affecting commerce, where an object thereof is to require the above-named persons, or any other person, to cease using, selling, handling, transport- ing, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to force Cargill, Stevedores, Agencies, and the Bel- gium to cease doing business with each other. 408 INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Post in their business offices and meeting halls copies of the attached notice marked "Appen- dix." 20 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 23, after being duly signed by Respondents' representatives, shall be posted by Respondents immediately upon re- ceipt thereof, and be maintained by them for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to their members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondents to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Promptly after receipt of copies of said notice from said Regional Director, return the signed copies for posting by Stevedores, Agencies, and the Belgium, those parties willing, at all places where notices to their respective employees are customarily posted. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 23, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondents have taken to comply herewith. 20 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals. the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu- ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX NOTICE To MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT induce or encourage individ- uals employed by TTT Stevedores of Texas, Inc., or any other person engaged in com- merce or in an industry affecting commerce, to engage in a strike or refusal in the course of their employment to process, transport, load, unload, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities, or to perform any services, where an object thereof is to require Cargill, Inc., TTT Ship Agencies, Inc., TTT Stevedores of Texas, Inc., and the Belgium, or any other person, to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or other- wise dealing in the products of any other pro- ducer or manufacturer, or to force Cargill, Inc., TTT Ship Agencies, Inc., TTT Steve- dores of Texas, Inc., and the Belgium to cease doing business with each other. WE WIL.L NOT threaten, coerce, or restrain TTT Ship Agencies, Inc., TTT Stevedores of Texas, Inc., or the Belgium or any other per- sons engaged in commerce, or in an industry affecting commerce, where the object thereof is to require the above-named persons, or any other person, to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the prod- ucts of any other producer, processor, or man- ufacturer, or to force TTT Ship Agencies, Inc., TTT Stevedores of Texas Inc., and the Belgium, to cease doing business with each other. INTI:RNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO SOUTH ATLANTIC & GUILF COAST DISTRICT, INTERNATIONAl LONG- SHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 872, AFL-CIO INTERNATIONAl LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION, LOCAl 1273, AFL- CIO DECISION BERNARD RItES, Administrative Law Judge: This matter was heard in Houston. Texas, on October 27-28, 1980. It has two companion cases: International Long- shoremen's Association. AFL-CIO (Allied International, Inc.), Case l-CC-1753, and International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO (Occidental Chemical Company), Cases 10-CC- 1141-1, -2. -3, and -4, which were heard by me on, respectively, August 27-28, 1980, in Boston, Massachusetts, and September 4-5, 1980, in Savannah, Georgia. The complaints in the three cases have a common theme-that Respondernt International and various of its locals violated Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act by announcing and implementing a boycott of Russian ships and cargo in the early part of 1980. Separate hearings were conducted, however, with the Charging Parties in each case confining their participation to the proceeding to which their charges had given rise. No motion having been made that the cases be consolidated for purposes of decision,' and since each of the Charging Parties has played a role in only the case of particular interest to it, I shall issue separate decisions in each case. Because of the commonality of certain facts and issues in the three cases, reference will be made occasionally to arguments and circumstances in cases other than the present one. Briefs were received from the parties in all three cases on or about January 9, 1981. On the basis of the record Prior to the hearings, Respondents had moved that the three com- plaints be consolidated for hearing. Oppositions filed by the General Counsel and all the Charging Parties led the Associate Chief Administra- tive Law Judge to deny the motion 409 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD made at the hearing, my recollection of the demeanor of the witnesses, and the briefs, I make the following find- ings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation. 1. THE ISSUES On January 9, 1980,2 2 weeks after the invasion of Af- ghanistan by the army of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Respondent International President Thomas W. Gleason made the following public statement: In response to overwhelming demands by the rank and file members of the Union, the leadership of ILA today ordered immediate suspension in han- dling all Russian ships and all Russian cargoes in ports from Maine to Texas and Puerto Rico where ILA workers are employed. This order is effective across the board on all ves- sels and all cargoes. Grain and other foods as well as high valued general freight. However, any Rus- sian ship now in process of loading or discharging at a waterfront will be worked until completion. The reason for this action should be apparent in light of international events that have affected rela- tions between the U.S. and Soviet Union. However, the decision by the Union leadership was made necessary by the demands of the workers. It is their will to refuse to work Russian vessels and Russian cargoes under present conditions in the world. People are upset and they refuse to continue the business as usual policy as long as the Russians insist on being international bully boys. It is a deci- sion in which the Union leadership concurs. On January 10, J. H. Raspberry, the president of Re- spondent South Atlantic & Gulf Coast District, located in Galveston, Texas, sent to all ILA locals under his ju- risdiction, including Respondent Locals 872 and 1273 in Houston, a telegram containing the body of President Gleason's statement with the appended notation from Raspberry that "I concur with President Gleason's posi- tion and advise you to act accordingly." Thereafter, ac- cording to the complaint, the presidents of Locals 872 and 1273 informed a stevedoring company that they would refuse to refer longshoremen to load grain onto a ship bound for Russia from Houston and would continue to refuse to refer such employees until the Respondent International gave notice that the boycott had ended. The complaint concludes that by virtue of the public an- nouncement issued by President Gleason, the telegram to Respondent Locals issued by Respondent District Presi- dent Raspberry, and the conduct of the presidents of the two Respondent Locals, Respondents have induced and encouraged individuals employed by secondary employ- ers to engage in strikes or refusals to handle goods or commodities, and have thereby threatened, coerced, and restrained secondary employers with an object of forcing the secondary employers to cease handling the products of, or doing business with, other employers or persons, 2 All dates hereafter refer to 1980 all in violation of Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act . II. FINDIN(iS OF I:ACI Cargill, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, is engaged, inter alia, in the business of selling grain to the Soviet Union. Cargill maintains an export grain elevator on the Hous- ton Ship Channel. The transfer of purchased grain from Cargill to the Russian government is managed by a maritime agency of the USSR called Sovfracht Chartering Corporation, which charters vessels and arranges for the loading of the grain onto the vessels. In the port of Houston, Sov- fracht has a business relationship with TTT Ship Agen- cies, Inc. (Agencies), a Delaware corporation which acts as ship's agent for Sovfracht, and with a subsidiary of Agencies, a stevedoring concern called TTT Stevedores of Texas, Inc. (Stevedores), a Texas corporation. When Cargill has grain to ship to Russia, it makes arrangements through Agencies and Stevedores. The latter firm is a member of a Texas employer asso- ciation known as West Gulf Maritime Association (WGMA), which is a party to a collective-bargaining agreement with Respondent Locals 872 and 1273. That agreement establishes separate hiring halls maintained by each local which the employer-members of WGMA must use as the source of their longshore labor. In prac- tice, WGMA has established an ordering office which takes requests for labor from employer-members and places those requests simultaneously with the two locals, which in turn divide the work between them. On January 18, Cargill received a license from the United States Department of Commerce to export sever- al million dollars worth of grain to the USSR.4 Sov- fracht arranged for a Belgian ship, the Belgium, to arrive in Houston on January 24 to unload the grain. Cargill undertook to discover whether Respondent Locals would provide longshoremen to load the Belgium, and, to that end, Sherman Hailes, general superintendent for Stevedores, telephoned the presidents of the two Locals on January 21. He told both of them that the Belgium I The cited provisions state, in relevant part: (h) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents- (4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual em- ployed by an), person engaged in connmmerce or in an industry af- fecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture. process, transport, or oth- erwise handle or work on anly goods, articles, materials, or com- modities or to perform any services: or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affect- ing commerce, where in either case all object thereof is: (B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, han- dling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person . . . Provided, rhat nothing con- tained in this clause (IB) shall be colstrued to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary pick- eting . 4 This was permitted under an exception. for committed grain, to the general embargo order promulgated by President Calter in early January in consequence of the Afghanistan incursion 410 INTERNATIONAL. LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION was scheduled to arrive on January 24 to load grain for Russia and asked whether they would supply longshore- men; he also told each of them that he would be report- ing their answers to other persons. Hailes testified that the two presidents answered in substantially identical terms that there "would be no labor supplied" until there were further instructions from the International Union.; Hailes then notified Cargill and Agencies. When the po- sition of the Locals was communicated to Sovfracht, it decided to cancel the Belgium's stop at Houston and to divert the ship to other ports. I address here, as I have in the two companion cases, three issues which Respondents have uniformly raised in the three cases. As I hold in the other cases, there is no question in my mind that the statement released by Glea- son on January 9 was intended to be of mandatory effect, and the same is undoubtedly true of the January 10 telegram from District President Raspberry. 6 In support of the contention by Respondents that Gleason's order was merely a passive recognition and translation into action of the desires of the membership, Respondents have introduced somewhat more substantial evidence in this proceeding than in the other two hear- ings. In my view, however, it is hardly enough to make the point (for whatever it may be worth) that Respond- ent International attempts to make. The two lIocal presidents gave very general testimony about dissension within the ranks of their membership after the Afghanistan invasion. Local 872 President J. C Young testified that members complained to him about working Russian cargo. and Local 1273 President Mil- lard Barrington said that. after the invasion, lie "had a hard time keeping membership in line as far as loading any kind of Russian grain .... " The two presidents agreed that they spoke to one another about the prob- lems that existed and that Barrington was appointed to call District President Raspberry. Barrington said that he called Raspberry several times and told him that "my entire union and the port of Tlouston was completely. to- tally upside down over the incidents." Raspberry told him to keep working until he "received further word from the International office." Barrington also testified that, when he received Raspberry's telegram, he showed it to some grain foremen who were present at the union hall. and they were "extremely happy" about the deci- sion. Young said that, when he received Raspberry's telegram, it was read to the membership at the hiring hall and the members "hollered hurray." Raspberry testified that he received complaints about working Russian cargo not only from Barrington but 5 While the two Local presidents did not confirm Hailes' testimony. I round Hailes o bhe the more convincing witrness, and I credit him I At the hearing, Raspberry testified that he used the words ".dise you to act accordingly" in his telegram because he "has been stung legal- ly many, many times" in the past when he has used the word "order" as opposed to "giving sage advice." Ocie Bass, first vice president of Local 872, testified that, shen he read Rasnberr.'s telegram to the men in the hiring hall, he explained to them both that "this was a directive from our District President" and that the inen "would act on their own accord." also from members of Barrington's Local and from mem- bers in New Orleans, Savannah, and, he thinks, Mobile. There are some 132 locals under Raspberry's jurisdiction, encompassing perhaps 20,000-30,(00 longshoremen; he did not poll the membership as to their sentiments. While Raspberry testified that he told Gleason about the com- plaints he was receiving, and that Gleason told him that he was receiving similar calls from all over the country and was canvassing the vice presidents "to set a policy for the ILA to follow," Gleason himself did not testify in this or the other proceedings to attest to the wave of anti-Russian backlash which assertedly arose in the ranks of American longshoremen following the Russian inva- sion. The record shows that, contrary to the complaint alle- gation, General Superintendent Hailes of Stevedores did not "order" gangs of longshoremen from the Respondent Locals on January 21. What Hailes attempted to do was to establish whether the Locals would respond to any such orders if placed, and the response that he got would have satisfied any reasonable person that the orders would not have been filled had they been made. I find little in this record, like the other ones, to indicate that it would have been feasible for Stevedores to secure a gang of longshoremen to load the Belgium from sources other than the two hiring halls. A grain gang consists of 13 employees. While there are casual employees available in the port, and some of these are not members of the Union. there is no basis for inferring from this record that Stevedores could have secured, from other than union sources, 13 sufficiently skilled, experienced, casual employees who would have been willing to perform the ne cessary vwork. 111. CONCLUSIONS In International. Longshoremen's Association, .4FL-CIO (Allied International, Inc.), Case 1- CC-1753, issued this day. I reach the conclusion that the 8(b)(4) complaint proceedings heard by me should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. No useful end would be served by duplicat- ing here the lengthy legal analysis undertaken in that case, and it is incorporated by reference herein. As in that decision, I believe that I have made here all factual findings which might be relevant to a different result, should some higher authority conclude that I have erred on the jurisdictional issue. CONCI USIONS OF LAW I. Respondents are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 2. 1The activities complained of herein are not in "com- merce" within the meaning of the Act, and the com- plaint must therefore be dismissed for want of jurisdic- tion. [Recommended Order for dismissal omitted from pub- lication.] 411