Bechtel Power Corporation

BECHTEL POWER CORPORATION Bechtel Power Corporation and Ernie GC. Benedict and Don Hanson and Gerald R. Glenn. Cases 12-CA-8927(1), 12-CA-8927(2), and 12-CA- 8974 September 29, 1982 DECISION AND ORDER By CHAIRMAN VAN DE WATER AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND ZIMMERMAN On August 5, 1980, Administrative Law Judge Henry L. Jalette issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The Re- spondent filed a brief in support of the Decision. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find- ings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order, as amplified herein. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Respondent's refusal to rehire employees Don Hanson and Ernie Benedict and Supervisor Gerald Glenn did not violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. For the reasons he gave, and for those that follow, we agree with his findings. The Administrative Law Judge found, and we agree, that Hanson, while acting in his capacity of union steward, threatened the Respondent with an unlawful work stoppage if the Respondent chose a certain individual to become a supervisor. Hanson's threat was not protected by the Act, and accord- ingly the Respondent's refusal to rehire because of the threat was not violative of the Act. The dis- sent's disagreement with our finding with regard to Hanson is, at best, a matter of interpretation. The dissent characterizes Hanson's remarks as a "lawful prognostication." However, the dissent fails to ex- plain how Hanson's remarks can be viewed as other than a threat of a work stoppage upon the Respondent's exercising its right to select a certain person as a supervisor. Hanson's statements regard- ing the Respondent's choice of a supervisor-to the effect "the men wouldn't stay on the job"-clearly exceeded a mere expression of employee concerns. As such, Hanson's statements constituted unpro- tected threats for which the Respondent could law- fully deny him rehire. The Administrative Law Judge found, and we agree, that the Respondent could lawfully refuse to rehire, even as an employee, Glenn. Glenn, a statu- 264 NLRB No. 58 tory supervisor, quit in protest over the Respond- ent's alleged unlawful appointment of a union stew- ard. Seventeen employees also quit with him. The Administrative Law Judge reasoned that the Re- spondent was privileged to deny Glenn rehire be- cause of his having quit. The dissent's contention that Glenn was unlawfully refused rehire is based on a faulty premise. The dissent contends that Glenn quit because he refused to participate in committing an unfair labor practice (i.e., the ap- pointment of a union steward by the Respondent), and thus the conduct for which he was denied rehire was protected. However, as conceded by the dissent, no charge was ever filed, nor did the com- plaint allege that the Respondent's conduct regard- ing the appointment of the steward violated the Act. Unlike the dissent, we are unwilling to find- absent notice and litigation of the issue-that the Respondent's action, which prompted Glenn to quit, was unlawful.' Absent that finding, no viola- tion with regard to the refusal to rehire Glenn can be sustained. Finally, the dissent agrues that employee Bene- dict was engaged in protected activity when he, along with other employees, demanded immediate receipt of their paychecks after informing the Re- spondent that they had quit. The dissent stresses that the Respondent offered no explanation as to why Benedict was the only employee who quit but was not rehired. Making a quantum leap, the dis- sent concludes that Benedict was denied rehire for demanding his paycheck. However, absent a prima facie case by the General Counsel, the Respondent had no burden to show why Benedict was not re- hired. It is well settled that an employer may dis- charge an employee for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all-so long as the employ- ee is not discharged for exercising Section 7 rights. Here, as found by the Administrative Law Judge, it is far from clear, under the circumstances of this case, that the employees' demand for receipt of their paychecks was protected activity. The em- ployees were not engaged in a typical protest of an employer's failure to pay wages due and owing. Rather, the employees abruptly quit, and then sought immediate receipt of their paychecks. Thus, I Assuming, arguendo, that the Respondent's conduct regarding the ap- pointment of a steward was unlawful, we are not convinced that Glenn was asked, or forced, in any meaningful sense, to "participate" in the Re- spondent's action. Glenn was not told by the Respondent to do anything regarding the appointment of the steward, nor was he asked to conceal any facts regarding the matter. When Glenn protested the Respondent's actions, he was told that the decision had already been made. The fact that Glenn might, in the future, "interact" with the union steward falls far short of establishing that Glenn was being compelled to "participate" in an unfair labor practice. Thus, the cases cited by the dissent-for the proposition that an employer may not act against a supervisor who re- fuses to commit an unfair labor practice-are inapposite to this case. 311 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the protest did not involve any terms and condi- tions of employment. Further, assuming, arguendo, that the employees' protest for their paychecks was protected, the General Counsel has, in any event, failed to establish that Benedict was not rehired be- cause of his participation in the protest. Clearly, all employees except Benedict who protested the Re- spondent's failure to distribute the paychecks were considered eligible for rehire by the Respondent. Further, the General Counsel did not demonstrate that Benedict had a particularly prominent role in the protest. Under these circumstances, we find no basis for inferring that Benedict's participation in the paycheck protest led to the Respondent's refus- al to rehire him. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re- lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the complaint be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. MEMBER JENKINS, dissenting: I cannot agree with the majority's adoption of the Administrative Law Judge's Decision recom- mending that the complaint in this case be dis- missed in its entirety. The facts, as found by the Administrative Law Judge, and as more fully set forth in his Decision, are as follows: the Respondent provides mainte- nance services to Florida Power and Light Compa- ny's Turkey Point, Florida, facility. The Respond- ent is a party to a collective-bargaining agreement with various craft unions. Theodore LaValley, the business manager for Local 725 of the United As- sociation of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada (herein Local 725), is responsi- ble for the day-to-day administration of the con- tract on behalf of the craft unions, one of which is the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Help- ers. In May 1979,2 the Respondent needed additional pipefitters but Local 725 had none available. Powell, the Respondent's superintendent, asked La- Valley if he would refer boilermakers to work as fitters on the second shift. This had been done in the past and LaValley agreed. Powell also wanted to assign a boilermaker to the position of foreman in charge of all the fitters. LaValley disagreed and he told Powell it would cause problems with the fitters. Hanson represented Local 725 as a steward 2 All dates herein are 1979. on the second shift. Upon learning of Powell's in- tention, Hanson told Powell that the men were upset over the planned appointment of a boilermak- er, an individual named Raulerson, as a foreman over the fitters. Powell refused to change his deci- sion. Hanson then approached Raulerson and told him that he was concerned that if he accepted the foreman's position the men might quit. Thereafter, Superintendent Douthit met with Hanson and Rau- lerson to discuss Raulerson's appointment. Hanson acknowledged the Respondent's right to appoint the foreman but stated that there would be prob- lems and Raulerson would be responsible. Rauler- son declined the appointment as foreman but worked as a fitter. On May 29, 3 days after the boilermakers went to work as fitters, Hanson quit. He stated that he felt harassed by the many com- plaints he was receiving from the men about the job. At that time, the Respondent noted in its records that Hanson was eligible for rehire. On May 30, Glenn, who was the pipefitter super- visor on the second shift, learned that the Respond- ent would not recognize any steward selected by the pipefitters in place of Hanson, but would select the new steward itself. Upon Glenn's request, a meeting was held with all the Respondent's super- intendents, as well as second-shift pipefitters. When Glenn contested the Respondent's attempt to ap- point a steward, 3 Superintendent Curtis declared that the decision had been made and the men would have to live with it. Under those conditions, Glenn replied he would quit because he would not work on a job where management appointed the steward. In addition to Glenn, approximately 17 other employees quit that evening. It was payday and before leaving the plant the men attempted to get their paychecks. They were told that the pay- checks were not ready and they left the area. Em- ployee Benedict was in this group. Several months later, in October or November, Superintendent Powell told Business Manager La- Valley that the Respondent needed a number of pipefitters. He also gave LaValley a list of the men the Respondent would not rehire. On the list were all of the employees who had quit on May 30 plus Hanson. Later Powell agreed to rehire all of the men except Hanson, Benedict, and Glenn. Powell told LaValley that Hanson was not being rehired because he was a troublemaker, that Benedict was not being rehired because he had threatened Powell at the time the employees had requested their paychecks, and that Glenn was not being re- hired because he had threatened Superintendent Curtis on the night Glenn quit. 3 The Respondent unilaterally selected Carl Brionne as steward. 312 BECHTEL. POWER CORPORATION The Administrative Law Judge found that Hanson was not rehired because of his comment that if Raulerson took the foreman's job there would be problems and Raulerson would be re- sponsible. The Administrative Law Judge conclud- ed that this remark constituted a threat to engage in a work stoppage in violation of the no-strike clause in the collective-bargaining agreement and therefore was unprotected. He found that it was because of this remark that the Respondent did not rehire Hanson and not as a result of his statements to Powell expressing the employees' concern over Raulerson's pending appointment. I disagree with the Administrative Law Judge's interpretation of Hanson's remark as constituting a threat of a work stoppage. Hanson's statement cannot be viewed in isola- tion. It was merely a final plea to Raulerson not to accept the position because Hanson believed that if he did the men would quit. Hanson, as steward, knew that the men were disgruntled over the pend- ing appointment and he merely expressed their concerns to management. Having failed to con- vince management, he appealed directly to Rauler- son. Hanson's statement was nothing more than a lawful prognostication-if Raulerson became the foreman there would be problems and the problems would not be a result of anything Hanson had done, but as a result of Raulerson accepting the po- sition. Hanson, as the employees' representative, had the right, in the absence of threats or other un- lawful conduct, 4 to make the employees' displea- sure known to management. 5 Hanson acknowl- edged the Employer's right to appoint the foreman. There is no evidence that Hanson ever encouraged or threatened to encourage the men to quit or engage in an unlawful strike. I find that Hanson was engaged in protected concerted activity when he made known to the Re- spondent the employees' displeasure over the pend- ing appointment of Raulerson as a supervisor, 6 and that the Respondent's subsequent refusal to rehire 4 Cf. ITO Corporation of Rhode Island. Inc., 246 NLRB 810 (1979). The Board found a violation of Sec. 8(b)1XB) of the Act when the union president threatened a foreman with discharge and called a special meet- ing in order to have the employees vote to seek the foreman's discharge. The union president then told the employer that the employees should not work unless the foreman was replaced. I I note that the Respondent never disciplined Hanson for making the alleged threat and that when he quit his notice of termination (G.C. Exh. 9) was marked eligible for rehire It thus appears that the Respondent's conduct is at odds with its contention that Hanson threatened to engage in an unlawful work stoppage. 6 The Board has long held that employees have a legitimate concern with the appointment of supervisors and that employees have a protected right to discuss such a matter with management. See Guernsey- Muskn- gain Electric Cooperative. Inc., 124 NLRB 618 (1959), enfd. 285 F.2d 8 (6th Cir. 1960); N.L.R.R v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Company, 167 F.2d 983 (1948). cert. denied 335 U.S. 845. Hanson because of this activity violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Regarding the Respondent's refusal to rehire Glenn, apparently no charge was ever filed alleg- ing that the Respondent engaged in unlawful con- duct in the selection of a steward to replace Hanson, and that incident is not presently alleged to be unlawful. However, the record clearly indi- cates that Glenn's conduct on the evening of May 30 was central to the Respondent's refusal to hire him as an employee in late 1979. Glenn's opposi- tion to the Respondent's selection of a steward is fully consistent with Board precedent. As stated in Chicago iMagnesium Castings Company:7 The Board has long held in many cases that an employer has no right to interfere or to seek to control the selection of its employees' repre- sentatives who are to deal with the employer for purposes of collective bargaining, and that to attempt to do so violates the Act. As a second-shift supervisor, Glenn had particular cause to be concerned regarding the selection of the union steward for his shift. The steward's offi- cial duties inevitably would have resulted in Glenn's being compelled to interact with the stew- ard, and thereby participate in Respondent's deci- sion to impose its selection on employees. 8 Where an employer seeks to have its supervisors partici- pate in conduct which would be unlawful, the Board has consistently stated that an employer may not act against a supervisor who refuses to engage in such activity.9 Even where no actual participa- tion in the employer's misconduct is demanded, the Board has prohibited an employer from disciplining a supervisor who acts to prevent the concealment or perpetuation of unfair labor practices.' 0 Ac- cordingly, regardless of Glenn's expected involve- ment with the appointed steward, it is clear that his actions were in resistance to an unwarranted re- striction of employees' Section 7 rights. I' In view of the foregoing, it is manifest that the Administrative Law Judge unduly restricted his analysis in considering only whether a supervisor could engage in statutorily protected activity. On the contrary, he should have ascertained whether the Respondent's refusal to hire Glenn was based on his conduct as a supervisor in refusing to allow 7 240 NLRB 400. 405 (1979). See also Monks Inn, Inc., 232 NLRB 978 (1977); Astro Electronics, Inc., 188 NLRB 572. 577 (1971). " While not fully litigated, it would appear that these two individuals would discuss grievances at the first level of the grievance procedure. 9 The Permian Corporation, 189 NLRB 860 (1971). 'O Buddies Super Markets, 223 NLRB 950 (1976). " In this circumstance, the Respondent may not contend that Glenn's refusal to accept or support its misconduct evidences supervisory disloy- alty See Iail Associates. Inc. 186 NL RB 139 (1970). 313 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the Respondent to appoint a steward, and whether such refusal to hire generally frustrates the pur- poses of the Act. 2 Particularly because Glenn sought to be hired as an employee, I believe that, under this broader analysis, the General Counsel clearly has shown that the Respondent refused to hire Glenn in violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. Finally, the Administrative Law Judge found that the Respondent's refusal to rehire Benedict was not a violation of Section 8(a)(l) because he found that, having quit his work and then request- ing his paycheck, Benedict was not engaged in pro- tected activity.'3 I would find, contrary to the ma- jority, that, notwithstanding the employees' state- ment that they were quitting, they were still en- gaged in protected concerted activity when they requested their paychecks. It was payday and the employees had every reason to expect that they would receive their paychecks. They had not left the property and some were still in the process of having the "radiation body count" performed. Under the circumstances of this case, to find that they were no longer employees would be a draco- nian application of the Act which would be incon- sistent with the principle that protected concerted activity by an individual, who is not an employee, cannot later be used as the basis for denying em- ployment to that individual.' 4 The Respondent offered no evidence during the hearing as to why Benedict was not rehired. In its brief the Respondent argues that he was not re- hired because he was engaged in an unprotected work stoppage. s The Respondent did not, howev- er, offer any explanation as to why Benedict was singled out as the only employee who quit but was not rehired. Contrary to its defense on brief to the Board, the Respondent, in November 1979, had stated that it would not rehire Benedict because of threats he had made in connection with the Re- spondent's failure to distribute the employees' pay- checks. Thus, Business Manager LaValley testified, without contradiction, that he was told by Powell that Benedict would not be rehired because he had threatened Powell when the employees were re- 12 See Illinois Fruit & Produce Corp., 226 NLRB 137, 146 (1976). 13 The Administrative Law Judge found it unnecessary to decide if Benedict was engaged in an unlawful work stoppage when he quit. He did indicate that were he to make a finding he would find that Benedict was not engaged in an unlawful work stoppage but only quit his employ- ment. I specifically find that when Benedict, in concert with the other employees, quit his job on May 30 he was not engaged in an unlawful work stoppage. 14 Indeed, Sec. 2(3) of the Act states that an "employee" is "any indi- vidual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute." See also Phelps Dodge Corporation v. NLR.B., 313 U.S. 177 (1941). is I would not find that Benedict was not so engaged. See fn. 12, supra. questing their paychecks. Benedict unequivocally testified that he never threatened anyone. His testi- mony was corroborated by Patrick Burke, a fellow employee, who also quit on May 30. Superintend- ent Powell testified for the Respondent but at no time did he refute LaValley's, Benedict's, or Burke's statements. Accordingly, I would find that Benedict did not threaten Powell and, based on Powell's admission to LaValley, that it was Bene- dict's actions of seeking, in concert with other em- ployees, his paycheck that was the basis for the Re- spondent's refusal to rehire him. As Benedict's ac- tivities were protected and were not accompanied by any disqualifying misconduct,' 6 I find that the Respondent's refusal to rehire Benedict violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Based on the foregoing I dissent from the major- ity decision on all issues. '6 See N.L.R.B. v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21 (1964). DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE HENRY L. JALETTE, Administrative Law Judge: This proceeding involves an allegation that the above-named Employer violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act by refusing to rehire the three Charging Parties named below be- cause they had engaged in concerted activities protected by Section 7 of the Act. The proceeding was initiated by the charges filed in Cases 12-CA-8727(1) and 12-CA- 8927(2) on December 17, 1979,' by Ernie G. Benedict and Don Hanson, respectively, and the charge in Case 12-CA-8974 filed by Gerald R. Glenn on January 18, 1980. Pursuant to such charges, an order consolidating cases and complaint and notice of hearing issued on Feb- ruary 4, 1980. On April 14 and 15, 1980, hearing was held in Coral Gables, Florida. Upon the entire record, including my observation of the witnesses, and after consideration of the briefs of the parties, I hereby make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT Respondent is a Nevada corporation with an office and place of business in Florida City, Florida, where it has been engaged in the construction and maintenance of nuclear and conventional power plants. Respondent admits, and I find, that it meets the Board's $50,000 direct inflow standard for the assertion of jurisdiction. 1n. THE FACTS At the times material herein, Respondent was under contract with Florida Power and Light Company to pro- vide maintenance services at Florida Power's facilities at I Unless otherwise indicated, all dates hereinafter are in 1979. 314 BECHTEL POWER CORPORATION Turkey Point, Florida. Respondent employed individuals represented by several craft unions and was party to a collective-bargaining agreement with various internation- al unions of the AFL-CIO called the General President's Project Maintenance Agreement by Contract. Included in the agreement were the United Association of Jour- neymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fit- ting Industry of the United States and Canada (herein called the UA) and the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers. In the day-to-day administration of the con- tract, including the hiring of fitters. Respondent dealt with UA Local 725 and its business manager, Theodore LaValley. In late May 1979, Respondent was in need of fitters and Local 725 had none to supply. However, Respond- ent was about to lay off some boilermakers and Project Superintendent John Powell asked LaValley if he would refer the boilermakers out to the job to work as fitters on the second shift. This had been done at other times and LaValley agreed. Powell also expressed the intention of keeping the boilermaker foreman in the position of fitter foreman. According to LaValley, he did not agree to this and pointed out to Powell that this could create problems. The fitters on the second shift heard of the proposed appointment of a boilermaker as foreman over fitters and Don Hanson, Local 725's representative on the second shift, spoke to Powell about it and communicated to him the men's opposition to such an appointment, and the fact that they would leave the job. Powell was insistent that this was his prerogative and decision. Before the appointment was made, Hanson went out to the home of the boilermaker, on Hilton Raulerson. Hanson testified that he told Raulerson he had a problem with the fitters, that he understood that Raulerson was going to accept the foreman's job, and if he did it would create all kinds of problems on the job. Hanson told Raulerson he wanted to avoid that, if possible. Raulerson suggested that Hanson did not want him on the job at all, but Hanson denied that. He told Raulerson the boil- ermakers were needed, but if he accepted the foreman's job there would be no one on the job because the men were all threatening to quit. That evening, the boilermakers, including Raulerson, reported for work as fitters where they received referral slips from Hanson. Raulerson went to work as a fitter. On May 29, 3 days after the boilermakers had reported to work as fitters, Hanson quit, assertedly because he felt harassed by all the complaints on the job. Charging Party Gerald Glenn, a member of UA Local 725, was working for Respondent on the second shift on May 30 as a pipefitter foreman. He testified that he learned that night that Respondent would not recognize whoever the fitters selected as steward but rather would itself appoint a steward. Glenn asked for a meeting with all the superintendents. Snch a meeting was held with the second-shift pipefitters in attendance. Glenn asked what the deal was that one Carl Brionne was being apointed steward. Superintendent Jim Curtis told him that since Brionne had been steward for the boilermakers before their layoff it was felt he should continue in that capacity over the pipefitters. Glenn told him that was unacceptable, but Curtis said the decision had been made and the men would have to live with it. Glenn said, if that was the case, he would quit because he would not work on a job where management appointed the stew- ard. Other discussions followed. Then Glenn told the fit- ters in attendance, "I don't know about you guys, but I quit." Glenn proceeded to leave and the other fitters, as well as boilermakers employed as fitters, did likewise. Before leaving, the employees had to be processed for a body count of radiation buildup, a process which took about an hour and a half for the 18 individuals who had decided to quit. After that they stopped at the time shack to see about their paychecks which were to have been distributed at the end of the shift. The employees were told the checks were not ready and they would have to return in the morning. The employees left and did not offer to return to work thereafter. Charging Party Ernie G. Benedict was one of the pipefitters who left the job with Glenn on May 30. About October or November 1979, Respondent faced a need for a number of pipefitters and Project Superin- tendent John Powell so advised Business Manager La- Valley. LaValley met with Powell in October or No- vember and was told the type of work to be done and the estimated number of pipefitters needed. LaValley also received a list of pipefitters Respondent would not rehire because they were troublemakers. The list con- tained 16 names. Sometime thereafter, Respondent met again with union representatives, including LaValley, and agreed to rehire all but three: Hanson, Glenn, and Benedict. Respondent gave as its reason for not rehiring Glenn, that he had threatened Superintendent Curtis on the night he quit; for not rehiring Benedict, that he had made threats to Powell in connection with Respondent's failure to distribute the paychecks when the men quit; for not rehiring Hanson, that he had caused problems with the boilermakers. 111. ANAI YSIS AND CONCIUSIONS A. Don Hanson The General Counsel contends that Respondent re- fused to rehire Hanson because he engaged in protected concerted activity; namely, because he acted on behalf of other employees in protesting to Respondent the appoint- ment of a supervisor who the employees believed lacked the qualifications for the job. Respondent contends that its refusal to rehire Hanson was because of his unprotected activity; namely, interfer- ence with the appointment of Raulerson as foreman by threats to Raulerson and by Hanson's instigation of a work stoppage in breach of the collective-bargaining agreement. The contention that Hanson instigated a work stop- page is predicated on testimony of one David Dennis, a boilermaker. He testified that on the night Hanson quit he overheard Hanson in the change house telling a number of fitters that he was leaving and that as he was the steward the employees would not have any union representation. He told the employees he was leaving at 315 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD midnight and that they were to give him 30 minutes to get out of the gate and they could do whatever they wanted to do thereafter, since he would be gone. Although Hanson denied he had any conversations with any employees in the change house on the night he quit, it was a general denial given prior to Dennis' testi- mony, and, although called on rebuttal, he did not deny making the remarks attributed to him by Dennis. In the circumstances, and as I see no reason for Dennis to tes- tify falsely, I credit Dennis and find that Hanson made the remarks described by Dennis. Instigating a walkout in the face of a no-strike clause is unprotected activity. However, I am not persuaded that Hanson's remarks amounted to instigation of a walkout. Rather, it appears that he was merely spelling out the factual situation to the employees who were free, in his words, to do what they wanted to do. They did. They remained at work. Hanson's interference with Respondent's appointment of Raulerson as fitter foreman is another matter. Based on Hanson's own testimony, it is clear that he caused Raulerson to decline the job of fitter foreman. Thus, Hanson went out to Raulerson's home and told him that if he accepted the foreman's job it would create all kinds of problems on the job, that he would cause a walkout if he accepted the job. Moreover, according to the uncon- tradicted testimony of Superintendent Daniel Douthit, when Raulerson reported for work he asked Hanson about taking the foreman's job and Hanson told him it was a management prerogative but warned him that if he took it there would be problems and he would be re- sponsible. In effect, Hanson threatened a work stoppage if Raulerson accepted the job of foreman. Such activity is not protected by Section 7 of the Act. I find that it was this conduct of Hanson and not his presenting the employees' concern about the appointment of Raulerson to Powell that motivated Respondent in refusing to rehire Hanson. Accordingly, I conclude that Respondent did not violate the Act by refusing to rehire Hanson. B. Gerald Glenn Respondent's refusal to rehire Glenn does not, in my judgment, require extensive analysis or discussion. At the time Glenn quit, he was a statutory supervisor. Accord- ingly, contrary to the General Counsel's assertion, when he quit in protest of Respondent's alleged unlawful ap- pointment of a job steward he was not engaged in pro- tected activity and Respondent could lawfully refuse to rehire him for quitting. 2 C. Ernie Benedict In the case of Benedict, the initial question is the reason for Respondent's refusal to rehire him. In its brief, Respondent contends that Benedict was rejected for 2 This case does not present the situation presented in cases like Shera- ton Puerto Rico Corp., d/b/a Puerto Rico Sheraton Hotel, 248 NLRB 867 (1980), and DR W Corporation d/b/a Brothers Three Cabinets, 248 NLRB 828 (1980). rehire because of his participation in an unprotected work stoppage. It is undisputed that Benedict, in concert with the other employees, quit his job on May 20. Whether in quitting his job he was engaging in a strike in breach of the no-strike clause in the collective-bargaining agree- ment need not be decided. That is, if his conduct is viewed as a strike, it was unprotected; if it is viewed as a quit-and that is what it appears to be, because after leaving work Benedict engaged in no conduct to indicate he was engaged in a strike-it was neither protected or unprotected, and Respondent had the right to refuse to rehire him thereafter because he had quit. Accordingly, if Benedict's leaving the job was the reason why Re- spondent did not rehire him it did not violate the Act. The General Counsel does not dispute the foregoing. His contention is that Respondent refused to rehire Bene- dict because, after he quit, he, in concert with the other employees who quit, attempted to obtain his paycheck. The General Counsel contends that this constituted pro- tected concerted activity. I fail to see how such activity can be said to be protected in the situation here present- ed. This is not the case of an employee, in concert with other employees, protesting his employer's failure to render wages due. Employee concerns over payment of their wages is clearly Section 7 activity. In my judgment, however, the situation is different when the employee has quit his job and his demand is for the immediate pay- ment of wages due. He is not in such a circumstance en- gaged in activity affecting wages, hours, or other condi- tions of employment; he is asserting a claim for a debt. In my judgment, in the context of this case, Benedict's activity in seeking to obtain his paycheck at the time of his quitting of work did not constitute protected activity and Respondent's refusal to rehire him was not violative of the Act. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW I. Bechtel Power Corporation is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The General Counsel has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act by its refusal to rehire Don Hanson, Gerald Glenn, and Ernie Benedict. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I issue the following recom- mended: ORDER 3 The complaint is dismissed in its entirety. s In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the find- ings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 316